T. J. Carter

The Apollinarian Christologies:

a study of the writings of Apollinarius of Laodicea

The Christological writings of Apollinarius of Laodicea and what has been written about them present us with something of a contradiction. The style of Apollinarius' exposition and his intellectual reputation indicate that he taught a clear, logical and systematic doctrine of Christ and on this the commentators tend to agree: 'The brilliance and thoroughgoing logic of Apollinarius' system are undeniable'; 'This was a brilliant and logical system destined to exercise an enormous influence'; '...it stands as a complete and elaborate system of doctrine to which all his writings make their contribution'. Yet when it comes to specifying the precise nature of this doctrine his interpreters, both ancient and modern, offer divergent opinions and strongly disagree with one another. It is this apparent contradiction which first attracted me to re-examine the Apollinarian texts as collected by Hans Lietzmann in his 1904 edition and to reconsider what has been said about them, for it suggests that the interpretative discussion may not be closed since the contradiction would appear to have two possible causes: either the existing interpretations have been variously less than successful at delineating the precise nature of Apollinarian doctrine, or Apollinarius' teaching was, in fact, less clear, logical and systematic than his style and reputation suggest and his interpreters assume.

'T.J. Carter's work provides a fresh and thorough look at the whole body of fragments of the works of Apollinarius of Laodicea, not simply another summary account illustrated by selective quotations. He presents what can be learned of the Fragments' historical and theological contexts, offers exegeses of the texts individually, and as a whole, and reviews Apollinarian scholarship in its most thorough analysts, especially Voisin, Grillmeier, de Riedmatten and Mühlenberg. The *tour de force* is his work on the *Apodeixis*, unravelling all its contortions in Gregory of Nyssa's *Antirrheticus*.' Reverend Dr F.J.Laishley S.J. Heythrop College, University of London.

'This is a very thorough and thought-provoking thesis.' Reverend Dr Anthony Meredith, S.J. Heythrop College, University of London.

'This is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Apollinaris.' Professor Andrew Louth, University of Durham.



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THE APOLLINARIAN CHRISTOLOGIES:

a study of the writings of Apollinarius of Laodicea

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Heythrop College
University of London
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Dedication

To my dear wife Jenny, whose unfailing love
and support enabled me to write this book.

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Abbreviations

ACO	*Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, (ed.) Schwartz, E.
Adv.Fraudes	*Adversus Fraudes Apollinaristarum* (by 'Leontius of Byzantium', see *MPG*86.1948-1976)
ANQ	*Alte und neue Quellen zur Geschichte des Taufsymbols und der Glaubensregel* (by Caspari, C.P.)
Cod. Theod.	*Codex Theodosianus*
CSCO	*Corpus scriptorum christianorum orientalium* (series published Paris: Louvain)
D.	'dichotomic'
DCBL	*A Dictionary of Christian Biography and Literature*, (ed.) Wace, H., and Piercy, W.C.
Doctrina	*Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi* (see L.pp.110-116)
DOP	*Dumbarton Oaks Papers*
E.T.	English translation
Ep./Epp.	*Epistula/Epistulae*
Fr.	Fragment(s)
H.E.	*Historia Ecclesiastica*
J.	Jaeger, W. (ed.), *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, vol.3.1 (Müller, F. (ed.), *Opera Dogmatica Minora*
JTS(NS)	*Journal of Theological Studies (New Series)*
KKB	*Κατὰ Κεφάλαιον Βιβλίον* (Fr.121-139, see L.pp.237-241)
KMP	*Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις* (see L.pp.167-184)
L.	Lietzmann, H., *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LV	Leontian variant (of *KMP* 27-31, see L.pp.176-179, subtext)
MPG	Migne, J.-P. (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus completus Series Graeca*
MPL	Migne, J.-P. (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus completus Series Latina*
MSR	*Mélanges de Science Religieuse*
NPNF	*Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (A Select Library of the Christian Church)*, Second Series, (ed.) Schaff, P. and Wace, H.
ΠΔ α΄	*Against Diodore, The First Book* (Fr.140-141, see L.p.241)

ΠΔ β΄	*Against Diodore, The Second Book* (Fr.142-146, see L.pp.241-242)
Ps.-	Pseudo
QUSC	*Quod Unus Sit Christus* (see L.pp.294-302)
ROC	*Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*
RSR	*Recherches de Science Religieuse*
T.	'trichotomic'
TU	*Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, (ed.) Gebhardt O.V., Harnack, A. von, *et al.*

Note on the Text

When quoting from texts written in languages other than English, I have offered my own English translations for the ease of the reader. In the interest of economy, I have not reproduced the original texts in full beneath, but where the exact sense is particularly important I have bracketed significant or problematic words and phrases from the original text within my own translation. When reproducing Lietzmann's German, I have not followed his practice of not capitalising the first letter of German nouns, because this scholarly convention looked unusual in the context of my own work. When translating the Apollinarian texts, I have sometimes, but not consistently, capitalised the first letter of personal pronouns when I wish to emphasise that, in these particular instances, Apollinarius seems to employ them to denote the singular divine subject in Christ, as opposed to Christ as a divine-human whole. This type of capitalisation also occurs when, on occasion, I quote from older English translations of Greek texts (e.g. from the *NPNF* series), as indicated. When explaining what Apollinarius means by 'συνίστημι', I have sometimes used the expression 'to co-constitute' in order to emphasise that, here, the verb means 'to constitute something as one of its co-constituents', rather than simply 'to establish something'. In the analytical sections of my work, I sometimes employ a bracketed question mark '(?)' to indicate that I consider a statement, a term, or a reference to be a reasonable suggestion, rather than fully justifiable, on the basis of the surviving textual evidence. Given the fragmentary state of the Apollinarian material, this tentative approach seemed preferable to one which was over-categorical.

Abstract

The thesis is developed by a comparative analysis of two groups of Christological texts written by Apollinarius of Laodicea, as found in Lietzmann's 1904 edition. The *Introduction* offers a review of modern scholarship. Previous interpretations disagree and are variously less than successful in accounting for the textual material, but they assume the consistency of Apollinarian thought. *Chapter One* looks at the bases for this assumption, noting several indications of inconsistency, not least Rufinus' testimony and Lietzmann's (discounted) hypothesis that Apollinarius' Christology changed, as evidenced by the shift from 'dichotomic' to 'trichotomic' terminology. The language of σύνθεσις, prominent in the 'dichotomic' texts, seems largely absent in the 'trichotomic' writings, which prefer to speak of the Word's 'assumption' of flesh. In *Chapter Two* an analysis of the 'dichotomic' texts shows that a 'compositional' conception of unity is basic to Apollinarius' Christology, but that an 'assumptional' conception is co-present, especially where Apollinarius finds it necessary to qualify his 'compositional' thesis. *Chapter Three* 'reconstructs' the *Apodeixis*, Apollinarius' main 'trichotomic' work, from Gregory of Nyssa's commentary in the *Antirrheticus*. *Chapter Four* delineates the different type of Christology (and anthropology, predication and soteriology) found in the *Apodeixis*, identifying its basic idea as 'the divine πρόσληψις of flesh'. *Chapter Five* looks at the other 'trichotomic' documents, showing that (with one exception) they all advocate the same type of Christology as the *Apodeixis*. Conclusions are drawn in *Chapter Six*: (A) In Apollinarius' dogmatic writings we find more than one unitive conception informing two distinct Christological doctrines. (B) From what is known of these writings' circumstances it is possible to sketch the process of a genuine development in Apollinarian doctrine. *Chapter Seven* considers the significance of these conclusions in respect of (1) the argument between Apollinarius' disciples, (2) Apollinarius' position *vis-à-vis* 'Alexandrine' 'Orthodoxy' and (3) the modern interpretive disagreement.

INTRODUCTION

The Christological writings of Apollinarius of Laodicea and what has been written about them present us with something of a contradiction. The style of Apollinarius' exposition and his intellectual reputation indicate that he taught a clear, logical and systematic doctrine of Christ and on this the commentators tend to agree: 'The brilliance and thoroughgoing logic of Apollinarius' system are undeniable';[1] 'This was a brilliant and logical system destined to exercise an enormous influence';[2] '...it stands as a complete and elaborate system of doctrine to which all his writings make their contribution'.[3] Yet when it comes to specifying the precise nature of this doctrine his interpreters, both ancient and modern, offer divergent opinions and strongly disagree with one another. It is this apparent contradiction which first attracted me to re-examine the Apollinarian texts as collected by Hans Lietzmann in his 1904 edition[4] and to reconsider what has been said about them, for it suggests that the interpretative discussion may not be closed since the contradiction would appear to have two possible causes: *either* the existing interpretations have been variously less than successful at delineating the precise nature of Apollinarian doctrine, *or* Apollinarius' teaching was, in fact, less clear, logical and systematic than his style and reputation suggest and his interpreters assume.

With this problem and these possibilities in mind I re-read and analysed the Christological writings of Apollinarius. I focused my investigation upon the treatises and fragments found in the Lietzmann edition because scholarship has generally accepted the authenticity of this material for over a century and because doctrinal exposition is the intended purpose of these texts, which have consequently provided the main subject matter for the interpretative debate since 1904.[5] Any attempt at sound interpretation must begin

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[1] Kelly,J.N.D.,*Early Christian Doctrines*,1977,p.295.
[2] Frend,W.H.C.,*The Rise of Christianity*,1984,p.635.
[3] Raven,C.,*Apollinarianism*,1923,p.176.
[4] Lietzmann,H.,*Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule*,1904.
[5] There have been learned attempts before and after Lietzmann to expand the Apollinarian corpus at its margins (e.g.) by J.Dräseke,R.Hübner and F.X.Risch(see p.12,pp.32-34,below). There are also a number of exegetical fragments,which can be found in the *Catenae*. These *are* generally held to be authentic and I have re-examined those which feature prominently in the arguments of other commentators. For the purposes of this doctrinal investigation the exegetical fragments were treated with caution. They come to us with no clues as to their original context. Also, it is difficult to judge the wider significance of such statements since the scriptural text has determined the precise agenda for the Apollinarian argument. Concepts introduced to facilitate specific exegetical tasks need not amount to binding precepts transferable to the sphere of Christology.

with the primary material itself and must seek to establish, insofar as possible, its original context and purpose. This is particularly difficult in the case of the Apollinarian material because it consists mainly of whole treatises passed on pseudonymously, or fragments which have been recontextualised in the arguments of other authors.

A completely self-sufficient attempt to interpret primary material would be an enterprise of doubtful merit and in this case impossible because the fragments themselves come embedded in a tradition which is itself selective and interpretational.[6] Thus I chose to re-examine the Apollinarian texts having first made myself fully aware of the interpretations already offered by leading scholars, whose opinions will have, to some extent, preconditioned my own response. Such scholars have already elected key issues for interpretation and supplied useful analyses and an interpretive vocabulary for those wishing to continue the discussion. Consequently, my own attempt at a fresh interpretation is not only based upon close scrutiny of the Apollinarian texts themselves, but also helped and inspired by the relative success and failure of previous attempts to explain these texts. The interesting contradiction which first drew me to look again at the work of Apollinarius is not just to do with what he wrote, but with how it has been interpreted, and the dialectic between the two. It is, therefore, appropriate to preface my own analysis of the texts with a brief review of the various types of interpretation which have been supplied by leading Apollinarian scholars and historians of dogma in the modern era. In so doing I will draw attention to interesting and divergent features of these interpretations, some of which have proved influential upon my own interpretation. My own attempt did not set out to 'overcome'[7] these previous interpretations, but it enjoyed the benefit of coming after them.

Previous Interpretations of Apollinarius' Christology

In his great work *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ* (translated by Simon, D.W., 1889, vol.2, pp.352-399), J.A. Dorner argues that the Apollinarian doctrine of the ἄτρεπτος Christ is primarily anti-Arian (pp.359-360). He also advances the 'hypothesis' that Apollinarius made the Word the νοῦς in Christ (the 'Heavenly Man'), *not* to deny the completeness of his humanity/human personhood, but to *perfect* it, since he believed the Logos to be both God and the archetype of all rational

[6] See,Mühlenberg,E.,*Apollinaris von Laodicea*,1969,p.109.
[7] Cf. Hübner,R.,'Gotteserkenntnis durch die Inkarnation Gottes',*Kleronomia* 4,1972,p.161.

beings, who was eternally destined to become man (pp.371-375). This interpretative idea to some extent influences A. von Harnack's account of Apollinarian Christology in his famous *History of Dogma* (translated by Speiers, E.B. and Millar, J., 1898, vol.4.2, pp.138-163), which possesses other characteristics not unrelated to Harnack's overarching thesis. In Harnack's view Apollinarius 'completed the work of Athanasius inasmuch as he added to it the Christology demanded by the *Homoousia* of the Logos' (p.162). He denied the human soul because he shared with Athanasius 'the central conviction of Greek piety' that only the immutable God can save humanity via a process of natural deification. Harnack recognises the influence of scripture, 'Apollinaris formed his views chiefly on the New Testament; for above all he was an exegete' (p.155), and he notes Apollinarius' fondness for 'fishing in the muddied waters' of those texts which encourage speculative Christology (e.g. 1 *Cor.*15.45-47; *Phil.*2.7-8). Harnack also discerns an 'Aristotelian' influence upon Apollinarius' thought and method, suggesting that he may have held a hierarchical 'Neo-Nicene' view of the Trinity where the Logos was in fact a 'middle being' mediating between God and man (p.154 n.[1]).

In his monograph *Apollinarios von Laodicea. Sein Leben und seine Schriften* (*TU* 7, 3/4, 1892), J. Dräseke brings together for the first time in one volume all the citations and treatises of Apollinarius which he believes to be authentic (pp.205-401). Dräseke's preoccupation, and the most original aspect of his interpretation, is his attempt to extend the Apollinarian corpus by re-attributing 'orthodox' Trinitarian works passed on 'fraudulently' under the names of (Ps.-) Basil, Athanasius/Maximus and Justin (pp.81-202). One interesting aspect of his biographical reconstruction (pp.7-80) is the fact that Dräseke chooses to accept Rufinus' story (*H.E.*2.20) that Apollinarius changed from a 'dichotomic' to a 'trichotomic' account of the incarnation. He regards *Ad Jovianum* as typical of the 'earlier' type of doctrine and dates this and similar works in 363 (p.26). The new Apollinarian texts established by Dräseke contain very little Christological material, but there is one passage in Ps.-Justin's *De Trinitate* which explicitly accepts the doctrine of two natures (p.173). This contributes to the overall effect of Dräseke's work, which is to affirm the 'orthodox' lines of thought present in Apollinarius' theology, thereby distancing him from the more extreme accusations of his enemies.

Guillaime Voisin, in his doctoral thesis *L'Apollinarisme* (1901) (this work is hereafter cited as 'Voisin'), argues persuasively against Dräseke's attempt to attribute orthodox Trinitarian works (pp.236-270). *Contra* Dorner, he argues that the primary motive

of Apollinarian Christology is opposition to 'Antiochene Dualism' (pp.24-25; pp.52-59). Voisin also disagrees with the liberal view of Harnack that 'Catholic doctrine is a more lofty form of Apollinarianism', differentiating the 'monophysite' doctrine of Apollinarius from the 'orthodox' Christology of Athanasius and Cyril (e.g. p.58; p.407). He explains its 'heretical' departure from the mainstream in terms of its rationalistic ('Aristotelian') methods and conceptions. In accounting for the union Apollinarius 'sacrificed the givens of the Faith for the illegitimate exigencies of his reason' (p.59). Thus, a 'dichotomite' anthropological model determines Apollinarius' denial of the soul and a philosophical 'axiom'– viz. 'that nature and person are *correlatives*' (p.278; p.290) – determines his monophysitism, which has a divinely unipersonal basis. In line with this, Voisin understands Apollinarius' consequent soteriology to be less about the physical deification of an inherently sinful nature and more about theophany, the sacrifice and resurrection of a truly human body, and the future salvation of the whole man through faith and ethical imitation of Christ (pp.310-320).

Hans Lietzmann provides the first reliable critical edition of the (dogmatic) Apollinarian texts in *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule* (1904) (this work is hereafter cited as 'L.'). In his introduction (pp.1-163) Lietzmann's primary concern is clarification of sources, manuscripts, mode of transmission, arguments for authenticity, etc., but he makes *two* interesting interpretative suggestions:

(1) Apollinarius advocated *two* different Christological 'theories' (this has been referred to as 'Lietzmann's Hypothesis'):

> 'Rufinus and Epiphanius relate – and an analysis of the Apollinarian fragments proves them correct – that two different theories (Theorien) about the person of Christ were advanced, one after the other. The first allows the Logos, the second person of the Trinity, to take up residence as soul in the body born of Mary as his garment in such a way that in the "one nature of the incarnate Logos" (einen Natur des fleischgewordenen Logos) the Logos is the willing and acting subject (Subject), the human body the suffering instrument. Through an exchange of attributes the Godhead assumes the human (attributes) the body the divine. Thus is the unity of nature brought about together with the salvation of the humanity consisting of deification. So, essentially runs the doctrine of Apollinaris in its oldest form: the second theory, growing out of argument with opponents, allows the Logos to assume only the place of the νοῦς and thus of the higher psychic powers (der höheren Seelenkräfte) whilst the body and the animal soul were human; the Saviour is "Heavenly Man" not as regards the earthly element, but because the principal

element (die Hauptsache) of his humanity, the νοῦς, originates from heaven' (pp.5-6).

(2) Apollinarius subscribed to a particular soteriological doctrine whereby Christ's body sacramentally mediated the salvific benefits of the incarnation to the faithful in the eucharist. Lietzmann discerns this conception in *De Fide et Incarnatione* 2-3, *Apodeixis* (Fr.76-80), *KMP* 2, and Fr.116 (p.136), and provides (slightly!) more elucidation on how he understands it in his *History of the Early Church* (translated by Woolf, B.L., 1953, vol.3, p.270).

Giuseppe Furlani lends indirect support to 'Lietzmann's Hypothesis' in his article 'Studi Apollinaristici II: I presupposti psicologici della cristologia di Apollinare de Laodicea' (*Rivista trimestrale di studi filosofici e religiosi*, 4.2, 1923, pp.129-146). Furlani argues, *contra* Voisin, that Apollinarius never adhered to a strictly 'dichotomite' analysis of the human individual (pp.139-140) and that his 'Aristotelian' anthropology was always (capable of being) 'trichotomist'. After Aristotle, Apollinarius holds a 'creationist' view of the origin of the rational soul from God and a 'traducian' view of the origin of the lower soul. Apollinarius' 'first' error stems from 'his attempt to amalgamate Aristotle's psychology with Holy Scripture' (p.134). When he tried to explain Christ's fatherless birth in creationist-cum-traducian terms, 'there was no running away! The Holy Scripture explicitly states that Mary's conception happened through the Holy Spirit...Consequently not only Jesus' divine spirit, but his ψυχή came from God' (pp.144-145, with reference to *De Unione* 13). Furlani argues that Apollinarius was forced to abandon this aspect of his 'Aristotelian' thesis in the face of texts which undeniably referred to Christ's human ψυχή: 'He had to choose between Aristotle and the gospels... he therefore turned his back on Aristotle and the virginal conception became for him a real μυστήριον' (p.145). In the 'second period' Apollinarius taught that only the mind was divine and did not offer a philosophical explanation of the origin of Christ's ψυχή: 'An evolution can thus be witnessed in the Christological doctrine of the heresiarch and not his psychology' (p.140). Furlani does not develop this suggestion any further.

Charles Raven, in his book *Apollinarianism* (1923) (this work is hereafter cited as 'Raven'), attempts to explain Apollinarian Christology within the context of a historical survey of the development of Christological doctrine. In so doing he opposes Voisin's idea that Apollinarian Christology is 'heretically' distinct from the 'orthodox' 'Catholic'

mainstream, but accepts Voisin's view of its 'anti-Antiochene' motive, integrating this into the 'two-rival-schools' hypothesis which underpins his Christological survey. Thus, Raven presents Apollinarius as 'perhaps the greatest representative' of 'Greek' Christianity (p.160) standing in a line of 'Alexandrine' and 'Platonistic' thought which can be drawn from Justin, via Origin and Athanasius, to Cyril (and Dr. Bright!) (p.232). 'Greek' theology, because of its inherent dualism and related 'only-God-can-save' view of salvation, must take an inherently 'docetic' view of Christ's humanity once the Arian solution is rejected. Apollinarius' denial of Christ's human mind is simply a more logical and 'honest' (p.189) expression of this view than the 'Orthodox' denial of the human personhood because they both amount to the same thing. According to Raven's interpretation, Apollinarius is not a 'monophysite' in the 'Eutychian' sense, who confused the natures (pp.220-228): he uses φύσις in a flexible way, sometimes to denote (Aristotle's) 'first substance' and sometimes 'second substance'. In his μία φύσις formula he uses it in the former sense (like Cyril) to denote the singularity of Christ as a (divine) person and hypostasis, not a mixed generic nature. To preserve the divinity of the Saviour and the reality of the saving unity Apollinarius introduced a '*kenotic* theory', which Raven suggests is his great contribution to 'Greek' theology (pp.200-208). This theory lies behind Apollinarius' use of the *communicatio idiomatum* which holds the middle ground between a nominal transfer and real confusion (pp.209-211). Apollinarius' anthropology was consistently trichotomic (pp.170-175); thus, the sum total of his 'heresy' is the denial of the human mind in Christ for logical and soteriological reasons rooted in his 'Greek' dualism.

In *Two Ancient Christologies* (1940) R.V. Sellers interprets Apollinarius' Christology in the light of a more balanced 'two schools' analysis of the evolution of Christology. According to Sellers' central hypothesis the Christologians of both Alexandria and Antioch strove to uphold the same two basic 'Christological principles'. (1) Christ is one person, God himself (who has become incarnate). (2) United in him are genuinely divine and human '*substantiae*' which remain distinct (and which *both* possess the faculty of self-determination). Sellers shows how Apollinarius was a typical 'Alexandrine', above all committed to the 'first principle' (pp.51-57) according to its sharpened Athanasian definition: viz. 'In Jesus Christ, the Logos, while remaining what He was, has, for our salvation, united manhood to Himself, thereby making it His own; He is not therefore two persons, but one person, the Logos Himself in His incarnate state' (p.39). Sellers also

furnishes evidence that Apollinarius tried to uphold the 'second principle' (pp.57-60), emphasising the distinct properties of Christ's divine and human πράγματα, thereby, in Sellers' opinion, espousing *de facto* a doctrine of two (generic) natures (p.60). Like Raven, Sellers believes that Apollinarius only departs from the Alexandrine mainstream because of his peculiar decision to deny the human νοῦς on logical and soteriological grounds (pp.60-65). Despite its differences, Sellers' interpretation remains influenced by Raven's, particularly when demonstrating Apollinarius' commitment to the 'first principle': Sellers' divinely unipersonal reading borrows Raven's '*kenotic* theory' suggestion (pp.51-52) and shares Raven's 'two substances' analysis of φύσις and πρόσωπον which blurs the distinction between the Apollinarian idea of 'one nature' and 'one person'.

M. Richard's article, 'L'introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la théologie de l'incarnation' (*MSR*, 2, 1945, pp.5-17), lends (indirectly) a more technical type of support to Raven's contention that Apollinarian Christology is 'proto-Cyrilline'. Richard argues that the Trinitarian doctrine of the Word as one divine hypostasis created a Christological problem: was Christ the hypostasis of the Word (incarnate) or did the Word assume another (human) hypostasis? Apollinarius, the first recorded Christologian to use the term ὑπόστασις, went for the first solution since: 'the body without soul which he attributed to the Saviour could with difficulty represent a distinct hypostasis' (p.7). In the writings of Apollinarius it remains unclear how he understands the body's 'agglutinisation to the hypostasis of the Word' and some of his disciples speak 'injudiciously' of one 'composite' divine-human hypostasis. But, in Richard's opinion, the true doctrine of 'the first Apollinarian school' is revealed by reports written by Epiphanius c.374-376 (in *Ancoratus* 77, and *Panarion 77*,22-24). The Apollinarians known to Epiphanius advocated a Christology modelled on a trichotomic anthropology wherein 'man is a hypostasis by virtue of his νοῦς, principle of his life, and his animal soul and body are hypostatised by and in the νοῦς' (p.10). Richard concludes: 'The first Apollinarian school did not put the Word and the assumed flesh on the same plane in the constitution of the hypostasis of Christ. That hypostasis for them, as for the modern theologians, was that of the Word. As for the flesh it entered only *in obliquo* as ἐνυπόστατος' (p.11). Richard believes that his opinion is further confirmed by a passage (§§7-10) from the treatise *Quod Unus Sit Christus* written by an unknown Apollinarian, perhaps Apollinarius, against one who accuses him of making the Word composite with a body: e.g. 'the body did not become something which co-completed

the divine hypostasis. Rather he who was truly complete also perfected the incomplete' (L.p.300, ll.20-21, see Richard, p.16).

In his lecture, 'Apollinaris: or Divine Irruption' (*Fathers and Heretics*, 1940, pp.94-119), G.L. Prestige offers an interpretation of Apollinarius' Christology which is not unsympathetic to its orthodox intention: 'Apart from his one peculiar tenet, his teaching was clear and strong and good' (p.94). 'Ill considered zeal' for the 'evangelical truth' that unless Christ is God, man has not been redeemed/re-created (2.*Cor*.5.17) (pp.103-104) led Apollinarius to deny the human mind because he believed it was impossible for two self-determining principles to co-exist in a single being and because he 'regarded the human mind as fatally corrupted through subservience to the flesh and therefore incapable of acting as the instrument of human redemption' (p.110). But Prestige also chooses to re-emphasise the heretical novelty (and absurdity) of Apollinarius' doctrine, disagreeing with some of Raven's earlier interpretative decisions. Prestige notes (with reference to Fr.2 and Fr.107) that Apollinarius appears to deny not just the mind, but the human soul entire (p.109). It is this recognition which leads Prestige to dispute Raven's opinion that Apollinarius was always a 'trichotomist': 'I think his normal view is definitely dichotomic' (p.111 n.[1]). Prestige finds an absurd notion of automatic flesh-mediated salvation derived from the prescriptive application of this psychological scheme to Christology: 'Apollinarius has left no scope for direct action of the Saviour on the souls of men; the only link between the divine spirit of the Saviour and the spirits of mankind is redeemed flesh. What an extraordinary theory this is! And what an amazing reversal it demands on the proper relation between soul and body' (p.113). Whilst Prestige recognises just how radical Apollinarius' quasi-psychosomatic conception of the unity is – 'the two together compose a single living being' (p.110) – he still endorses a divinely unipersonal view of Apollinarian Christology: 'The "νοῦς" of *fid.sec.part*.30 seems equivalent to the "psyche" of *de unione* 12, and both appear to mean "rational personal consciousness" in contrast with sentient flesh' (p.111 n.[1]). In a later monograph, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea* (1956), Prestige defends Apollinarius against 'Ancient Misrepresentation' (e.g. that he taught heavenly flesh, transformation, and theopaschitism) made against him by the Cappadocian Gregorys in particular (Appendix B, pp.60-65). The main purpose of this posthumously published monograph is to remake Dräseke's case for the authenticity of the

correspondence between Basil (*Epp.*361-364) and Apollinarius (*contra* (e.g.) Voisin and Lietzmann).

In a series of essays upon Apollinarius, the Dominican scholar Henri de Riedmatten offers a different and insightful interpretation of Apollinarian Christology which remains influential. The strength of his method is that he chooses to interpret the terms and ideas of Apollinarius in the light of certain striking passages of Apollinarian exposition rather than a generalising overview of the history of dogma. In his first essay, 'Some Neglected Aspects of Apollinarist Christology' (*Dominican Studies*, 1, 1948, pp.239-260) (this article is hereafter cited as 'Riedmatten[1]'), de Riedmatten highlights the novelty of Apollinarius' doctrine, not by lumping it together with subsequent monophysitism (cf. Voisin), but by drawing attention to some of its peculiar features. De Riedmatten notes the 'theological significance' which Apollinarius attaches to the virginal conception. Quoting the unusual explanation of Christ's procreation in *De Unione* 13 he observes: 'Apollinarius... expounds the substitution of the divinity for the human soul in terms of his traducianism. He crudely puts it on a physical even biological plane' (p.242). On the basis of this thesis Apollinarius must ascribe to the divinity not only the functions of the νοῦς, but also 'those of the animal soul, the principle of life and sensation' (p.245). And so it proves! De Riedmatten shows how Apollinarius typically describes the role of the divinity in *vitalistic* and physical terms (as opposed to 'personal' or metaphysical): 'instead of speaking of will, the majority of texts insist on the flesh of Christ "living" through its information by divinity' (p.245). It is this understanding of the divine-human unity which informs Apollinarius' characteristic use of the *communicatio idiomatum*: 'it is not a mere interchange of titles in virtue of a common subject, but a profound and vital connection of the two elements' (p.248). Because of this vital organic union, Apollinarius holds that Christ's flesh is uniquely efficacious in mediating its divine life. Here, with reference to Fr.7,116,155, de Riedmatten endorses Lietzmann's suggestion that there is a eucharistic dimension to Apollinarius' Christology (pp.248-250). Offering his own interpretation of Apollinarius' conception of μία φύσις (pp.252-260), de Riedmatten rejects the view that this is merely 'equivalent' (*contra* Raven) or 'correlative' (*contra* Voisin) to the metaphysical idea of one (divine) person: basic to the conception is the comparison with a single human nature – an organic, living whole collaboratively co-formed from its psychosomatic 'parts'. De Riedmatten regards *De Unione* 5 as 'formal' (p.257). In de Riedmatten's opinion, this idea of physical unity is prior

to Apollinarius' idea of unity of person (p.258) and, 'in Apollinarius' eyes' it ensures real unity in distinction (p.260).

In another essay, 'La christologie d'Apollinaire de Laodicée' (*Studia Patristica*, vol.2 (*TU* 64), 1957, pp.208-234) (this article is hereafter cited as 'Riedmatten[2']), de Riedmatten offers a more comprehensive analysis of Apollinarius' Christology and the philosophical anthropology which underpins it, investigating whether there is a significant difference between the doctrine in the so-called 'dichotomic' and 'trichotomic' works. He delineates a series of arguments which are typically present in the 'trichotomic' works to justify the exclusion of the human νοῦς (pp.209-213): viz. it is impossible to have a unity between two completes/minds; Christ is impeccable and the human mind is inevitably sinful; God did not wish to destroy human freedom by coercing a mind. (These are the arguments identified by Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 4.2, p.151.) Turning to the 'dichotomic' works, de Riedmatten delineates a 'rather different line of argument' (pp.213-222), describing the same type of vitalistic, biological anthropologically-based monophysite doctrine which he identified in his earlier article. In connection with the 'eucharistic' dimension of Apollinarius' related soteriology he refers also to an exegetical fragment, *In Jn*.6.53-55 (p.221), and he emphasises more strongly than in his first article just how radical and implicitly 'heretical' Apollinarius' view of Christ's flesh is: 'the flesh of Christ by fact of the unique nature in which it is found passes into a different order of realities... Does not his conception of μία φύσις lead directly to the synousiast thesis?' (p.222). In spite of the apparent differences between the arguments most typical of the 'trichotomic' and 'dichotomic' works, de Riedmatten demonstrates, by careful analysis of several exegetical fragments, that Apollinarius' anthropology did not change (p.233), since it can be shown that he held a syncretic conception of man – 'the most advanced combination of traducianism and spiritualism' (p.230) – which is compatible with his 'dichotomic' and 'trichotomic' exposition. With less evident justification, de Riedmatten also concludes that, even though Apollinarius admits a human ψυχή in the trichotomic works, his Christology did not change either, just its 'accent' for controversial reasons (p.233). De Riedmatten believes that Fr.107 (from the 'trichotomic' *Apodeixis* (?)) is 'valuable in that it recapitulates in concise fashion the "biological" aspects of the dichotomite section and the "moral aspects" of the trichotomic section' (p.217).

In another essay, 'Sur les notions doctrinales opposées à Apollinaire' (*Revue Thomiste*, 51, 1951), de Riedmatten examines the arguments brought against the Apollinarian denial of the human νοῦς by Ps.-Athanasius and Epiphanius. In so doing he calls into question M. Richard's exegesis of *Ancoratus* 77 (see p.16, above). In de Riedmatten's view it is more probable that it is Epiphanius, as a 'good dichotomist', and not the Apollinarians, who regards the soul and body as 'unhypostatic' *per se.* Epiphanius uses his own preconception to reduce the Apollinarian argument to the absurd (p.556-557). In his monograph, '*Les Actes du procès de Paul de Samosate*' (1952), de Riedmatten rejects Raven's over-simple equation of the Christology of Malchion and the Fathers who prosecuted Paul of Samosata (268) with that of Apollinarius (see Raven, p.65; p.177), showing how they are 'undeniable links' (pp.49-55) but 'clear differences' (pp.55-58). These observations lend further support to de Riedmatten's view that Apollinarius' monophysite Christology was a peculiar departure from the mainstream tradition.

Soon after de Riedmatten's work three American scholars contributed to the interpretative debate. In *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, vol.1 (1956), H.A. Wolfson looks at the way the Fathers make use of ideas available in contemporary secular philosophy to explain the 'mystery of the Incarnation' (pp.365-493). Wolfson denotes 'five types of physical union as defined by Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy' (p.385). Wolfson argues that the 'orthodox' Fathers, in spite of their terminological differences, all use the most suitable analogy – Aristotelian 'union of predominance'. Wolfson shows how Apollinarius employs the same analogy, but makes 'unorthodox' use of it (pp.433-444) because, in line with his incarnational belief, he holds that the 'weaker member' in a 'union of predominance', 'has no nature; it has only properties; and hence the body, which Jesus does have, implies only bodily properties, but not a bodily nature' (p.444). An interesting aspect of Wolfson's 'philosophical' interpretation is his assumption that Apollinarius began with a 'theological belief' that the Word's flesh lacked a soul and was not a complete man and adapted his Aristotelian model accordingly rather than *vice versa.* But he proves Apollinarius' allegiance to a modified form of 'union of predominance' by a questionable method, selecting nine passages from various Apollinarian works and then reshuffling them to support his own deductive argument (pp.435-441).

In a later essay, 'Philosophical implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism' (*DOP*, 12, 1958, pp.3-28), Wolfson attempts to give a philosophical explanation of why these two

contrasting and opposed heresies came to the same Christological conclusions: viz. that Christ has only one nature; that Christ was without a rational soul; that Christ was also without an irrational soul (a view which they subsequently changed). Wolfson argues that both 'heretics' were attempting to uphold basic (but not identical) religious principles, which indirectly involved certain philosophic views, and both did so by applying a similar method of syllogistic reasoning which led them to the same conclusion. Thus, Arius begins with the religious-cum-philosophic principles that God is absolutely one and that God is Creator not Begetter of the World: by logical deduction it follows that the Logos is not divine by nature and there were not therefore two natures in Christ, nor a 'copy' of the Logos (i.e. rational soul) since the Logos itself was incarnate. Apollinarius begins with the religious principle that only God can save: by logical deduction it follows that Christ has one (divine) nature and therefore no rational soul since: 'All those without a human soul are without a human nature'. Wolfson suggests this second Christian principle was derived by Apollinarius from *Gen.*2.7 (p.24). The shared change of view over the irrational soul Wolfson puts down to the joint vacillation of Arius and Apollinarius over the thorny philosophical problem of whether such a soul is inseparable from the rational soul, *or* the body: 'Philosophers, as we know, have a right to change their minds' (p.25). Wolfson's interpretation of Apollinarian doctrine in this essay lacks any reference to the actual texts. He offers his own version of a representative Apollinarian syllogism which precipitates the conclusion, 'Therefore, Jesus is God' (p.22), yet in the Apollinarian writings we find other syllogistic conclusions: e.g. 'Therefore, he is both God and man' (*Anacephalaeosis* 17-20); 'Therefore, he is neither a whole man nor God, but a mixture' (Fr.113). Similarly, Wolfson's explanation of the logical basis of Arian Christology is not wholly convincing: e.g. 'to Arius the one nature was the human nature' (p.21): cf. 'Jesus is without a human nature. Therefore, Jesus is without a human soul. This is how we may explain on behalf of both Arius and Apollinarius why they denied a rational soul in Jesus' (p.24).

W.P. Haugaard also considers the relationship between Arian and Apollinarian Christology in 'Arius: Twice a Heretic?' (*Church History* 29, 1960, pp.251-263). He argues that there is no evidence that Arius, or his early followers, advocated an 'Apollinarian' Christology which denied Christ's human soul (pp.251-253). Later on (c.374-377) it suited Epiphanius to bring this charge against Arius and his teacher Lucian because, by then, he was engaged in controversy with the Apollinarians (pp.259-261). Haugaard accepts there is evidence that the later Arians (e.g. Eunomius and Eudoxius) denied the human soul, but

there is no reason to believe that they derived this doctrine from Arius. Haugaard makes his case convincingly, but depends on H.M. Gwatkin's late dating of Eustathuis of Antioch's death (c.356-360) so that he can explain the Eustathian fragment which refers to the Arian denial (p.253). If Haugaard is correct, then later Arian Christology may have been influenced by the teachings of Apollinarius, which seems more probable than the reverse.

The most valuable study of Apollinarian doctrine from an American scholar comes from R.A. Norris Jr. In his book *Manhood and Christ. A Study of the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (1963) (this work is hereafter cited as 'Norris'), Norris provides a very comprehensive survey of fourth century philosophical anthropology (pp.3-78) in order to assess (comparatively) the extent to which the Christologies of Apollinarius and Theodore were shaped by anthropological presuppositions. Looking at the Christology of Apollinarius Norris argues (*contra* 'Lietzmann's Hypothesis') that his 'basic *schema*' remains the same. The difference between its 'dichotomous' and 'trichotomous' presentation reflects a shift in the *way* Apollinarius employed anthropological ideas in relation to his Christology:

> 'In his earlier writings he employs anthropological considerations primarily to define the nature of the unity of Christ's person; and what becomes most prominent as a consequence is the bearing of such considerations upon the *form* of his Christology. In the later writings, however, with their interests in the problem of freedom and of sin what emerges most strongly is the relevance of a doctrine of man as supplying not so much a form as the *motive* for such a Christology as Apollinarius proposes' (pp.93-94).

When delineating the type of anthropological conception which he believes supplies the 'form' of Apollinarian Christology, Norris (*contra* Dorner) finds no trace of the 'Platonic' idea that 'the soul is the man' (p.101); neither (*contra* Wolfson) does he find Aristotle's 'union of predominance' nor, indeed, (cf. Voisin) a cruder form of Aristotelian hylomorphism (pp.107-111). He finds rather a 'doctrine of "mixture"' which combines the materialistic Stoic idea of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων with a special type of Neo-Platonic 'mixture' which can occur between something corporeal and an immaterial substance (see pp.70-78). Thus, Norris is able to endorse de Riedmatten's interpretation of Apollinarius' conception of the union, but in a more technical way which explains why, in Apollinarius' eyes, this does not involve transformation:

> 'It is a unity of life – a *biological* unity deriving from the fact that the whole organism lives by the single life of the informing spirit. At the same time it is a unity which can be accounted for in an essentially Neo-Platonic doctrine of "mixture"... on which it is possible both to assert the oneness of Christ's nature and to guard against confusion of its constituent elements' (p.111).

Norris then looks at the 'apologetic' arguments which Apollinarius typically uses to justify the exclusion of Christ's rational faculty (these are the 'trichotomic' arguments identified by de Riedmatten, see p.19, above). Norris then tries to reconstruct the philosophical view of human sin, freedom and salvation which underpins these arguments (pp.116-122). Here he makes some interesting observations which constitute his most original contribution to the interpretational debate. Apollinarius' view of sin and salvation (in the later works) seems to be informed by a much more 'dualistic' understanding of the spirit-flesh relation: 'he sees in flesh, as flesh, the seat of that passion which is the root and source of sin' (p.117). Norris contrasts this with the anthropological view in the earlier works which emphasises 'the co-naturality of the spirit and flesh'. Norris finds further ambivalence. Apollinarius' thinking is influenced by two different ways of conceiving human freedom and virtue: the first, in line with his dualism, is about the natural attraction of human reason to the good; the second is about freedom of moral choice which depends on the constitutional mutability of the rational being, which is the cause of sin in the first scenario! According to Norris, Apollinarian soteriology rather juggles the two views, but it is the first which is ultimately determinative: 'In Apollinaris' thought... it is an emphasis on the 'divine' nature of the soul which triumphs in the end' (p.121). The sanctification of Christ's flesh allows the (future) salvation of the human νόες via self-assimilation. How is this now possible when the mutability of their carnal situation previously prevented it? Like de Riedmatten and Prestige, Norris points to those texts which suggests the eucharistic mediation of the benefits of Christ's flesh (p.120 n.[3]).

The most interesting aspect of Norris' analysis is his discernment of differing and contradictory themes co-present within Apollinarian thought: the least convincing aspect (therefore) is his opinion that Apollinarius maintains 'a relatively self-consistent unified anthropological conception' (p.88) as the basis of a Christology which remains 'fundamentally the same' (p.93).

Ekkehard Mühlenberg offers the most substantial study of Apollinarius' Christology since Voisin and a new and original type of interpretation in his monograph *Apollinaris von*

Laodicea (1969) (this work is hereafter cited as 'Mühlenberg'). He chooses to give primacy to the fragments of the *Apodeixis* (Fr.13-105): 'All attempts to research the meaning of the original doctrine of Apollinaris of Laodicea are dependent on the reconstruction of the *Apodeixis*' (p.64). In Mühlenberg's opinion, the other fragments 'reflect only partial problems which became important as the teacher defended himself' and the 'pseudepigraphic writings' are problematic since they lack a context and probably originate from 'the circle of his pupils' (pp.108-109).

According to Mühlenberg's analysis of the (reconstructed) *Apodeixis*, Apollinarius advocates a doctrine of θεία σάρκωσις – 'Apollinaris' entire Christology is contained in the phrase'(p.112) – against those who deny it since they subscribe to a pre-Christian (Greek/Jewish) way of thinking which says it is impossible for the impassible God to become man or to reveal himself directly because divine and human nature are separate and foreign to one another (pp.138-140). Apollinarius defines his doctrine against a false view of Christ as ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος. In Mühlenberg's opinion, Apollinarius does not use this formula to identify a particular group of dualists, but all those who slide into a non-Christian understanding of Christ and revelation. (Mühlenberg traces the idea of divine knowledge as only mediated by wise men in the anti-Christian philosophic tradition (pp.117-129).) Countering this view with the confessional belief that God himself became incarnate and the scriptural notion of the 'heavenly man', and interpreting this within his own 'Greek-philosophical' anthropological framework, Apollinarius comes up with what Mühlenberg regards as his key idea: Christ is (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος. In this way Christ is both God and (like) man and able to initiate decisively divine salvation through knowledge which can transform and renew human nature. Mühlenberg believes that it is soteriology which provides the primary motive for the Christology of the *Apodeixis*: 'Apollinarius founded his basic Christological idea of νοῦς ἔνσαρκος upon an anthropology aligned with soteriology' (p.151); 'The question as to the unity of Christ's person is *not* his point of departure: he comes to it only as a result of his own soteriology' (p.152). Mühlenberg finds this doctrine of salvation encapsulated in two fragments: 'The soteriological basis for Apollinarius' Christology can be found in Fr.76,80' (p.188; also p.180). In these fragments Apollinarius suggests that human minds have fallen under the power of the flesh 'through weakness of knowledge', but, because the divine mind assimilates flesh to itself, human minds are able to participate in divine virtue by becoming like Christ intellectually (νοερῶς) and not unlike

him carnally (σαρκικῶς). Mühlenberg interprets these ideas in the context of a passage from Plato's *Theaetetus* 176-177 (pp.172-173) and a particular theme in Athanasian soteriology found in *De Incarnatione* and *Contra Gentes*. Salvation lies in the existential reorientation of rational human souls away from the animal/carnal and towards the spiritual and the good. The incarnation facilitates this not because Athanasius and Apollinarius take a physical/mechanical view of salvation (*contra* Harnack's interpretation), but because they see the divine incarnation as a decisive revelatory and (ethically) demonstrative event. Thus, in Mühlenberg's eyes: 'the key to understanding the uniqueness of Apollinarius' Christology is to be seen in his soteriology: this Christology explains the basis of a cognition which redesigns man' (p.190). Mühlenberg does not need to highlight the 'eucharistic' theme to explain Apollinarius' view of future salvation: 'through the only real man Jesus all other people *are* redeemed because through him an effective cognition (Erkenntnis) of God as the Good is provided which has the strength to reform people' (pp.199-200). Mühlenberg goes on to show how the same type of soteriologically-based νοῦς ἔνσαρκος concept is the 'primary component' of the works *Contra Diodorum*, the *Ad Jovianum* and even in Athanasius', Apollinarian-influenced, *Tomus ad Antiochenos* c.362 (pp.215-230).

The originality and brilliance of Mühlenberg's interpretation cannot be denied and it provides an apology for Apollinarian Christology more generous than Dorner's: 'It is to be understood as the most convincing answer to the question posed by Plato and Aristotle as to the possibility of effectively knowing God... reason incarnate, as the manifest God in the person of Jesus Christ, solves the problem' (p.238). Nevertheless, some of Mühlenberg's judgments are open to question, not least his methodological decision to make the *Apodeixis,* so unreliably transmitted by Gregory, the interpretative key to Apollinarian doctrine in the other works. (In his book *Arius: Heresy and Tradition* (2001) Rowan Williams adopts the reverse approach when trying to establish the doctrine of a heretic, favouring 'complete texts' over 'the reports of his enemies' (p.95).) Some of the exegetical decisions which facilitate the 'reconstruction' are questionable, particularly his view that Fr.76 and Fr.80 are foundational to the Christological thesis here (and therefore elsewhere) when, arguably, they are elements of a soteriological argument which is *one of several differing arguments* used to justify a particular view of Christ's unity. Mühlenberg's appraisal of Apollinarian (and Athanasian) soteriology rightly draws attention to its 'demonstrative' epistemological theme – but this is not the only way in which Apollinarius (or Athanasius) conceived salvation.

Learned criticism of Mühlenberg's interpretation soon followed. In his review, 'Une nouvelle interprétation de la christologie d'Apollinaire' (*RSR*, 59, 1971, pp.27-36), the Athanasian scholar C. Kannengeisser largely accepts Mühlenberg's account of Apollinarius' anthropology (pp.31-32), but he has strong reservations about Mühlenberg's interpretation of Apollinarian soteriology disagreeing with his exegesis of Fr.76,80 which is based upon 'the sole authority of the *Theaetetus*', and criticising the inadequacy of Mühlenberg's comparative assessment of Athanasian soteriology which fails to mention its 'double trait' and theme of man being 'in the image of God' (pp.33-35).

In his article 'Gotteserkenntnis durch die Inkarnation Gottes' (*Kleronomia*, 4, 1972), R. Hübner gives Mühlenberg's interpretation a much fuller analysis, subjecting it to detailed criticism at every point. Hübner finds Mühlenberg's attempt to separate the 'literal' fragments of the *Apodeixis* from those paraphrased by Gregory (in order to facilitate his 'reconstruction') unconvincing: 'in most cases when he criticises Lietzmann his reasons are either not very strong (as in the case of Fr.14, 18, 19, 22, 26, 29, 45, 85,102-104) or they are incorrect (Fr.27 and 51)' (p.126). Hübner makes several telling criticisms of Mühlenberg's interpretation of Apollinarius' anthropology. (1) He disagrees with Mühlenberg's translation and interpretation of Fr.28. Apollinarius is not making a subtle anthropological point about the essential man being the soul; he is making a Christological point on the basis of an anthropological comparison which is developed Fr.28-32 (pp.145-146). (2) He argues that Mühlenberg's view, that Apollinarius saw the human soul as open to being formed by reason, is a fascinating hypothesis without textual evidence (p.146). (3) He rejects Mühlenberg's claim that for Apollinarius the human spirit is only a receptacle for the heavenly spirit: this is based on faulty anthropological exegesis of Fr.90 and Fr.76 which, like Fr.28, are primarily Christological (pp.146-147). (4) He argues that the 'incorrectness' of Mühlenberg's interpretation of Apollinarian anthropology is manifestly proved by the way it does not cohere with evident elements of Apollinarius' Christology (viz: the 'arithmetical' and 'free-will' arguments for the incompleteness of Christ's humanity): 'If the [divine] Spirit is the ἐνέργεια (reality) of the potential reason and if reason is not real without it, then [human] reason cannot also be αὐτεξούσιος, and therefore man cannot be τέλειον and an entire line of argument in Fr.81 and Fr.87 becomes pointless' (p.148).

Hübner also criticises Mühlenberg's interpretation of Apollinarian soteriology. (1) He points to the 'physical' theme of salvation that is co-present in the Athanasian

soteriology and questions Mühlenberg's mono-linear understanding of the saving efficacy of Christ's death, both in Athanasian and Apollinarian soteriology: 'According to this the death of Christ seems to have been important only in the pedagogical sense' (p.152). (2) Hübner (pp.152-156) focuses his critique with great precision upon a statement from an exegetical fragment which is crucial to Mühlenberg's epistemological interpretation and final commendation of Apollinarius' soteriological Christology. (The fragment comments upon *Jn.*14.6 and is No.100 in J. Reuss' *Johannes-Kommentare aus der griechischen Kirche* (*TU* 89, 1966), see Mühlenberg, p.211n.[3]) The key statement is: 'οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀσώματον θεότητα πορεία τις αὐτοῦ καὶ πρᾶξις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα συνάπτουσα, ἀλλὰ φύσις αὕτη καὶ οὐσία'. Mühlenberg interprets this as follows:

> 'Christ is not ἀρετή and αἰώνιος ζωή as the Transcendent One... but he is (these things) because transcendence has passed into immanence. Apollinaris concludes from this that excellence manifesting itself in the incarnate is also φύσις and οὐσία. Thus Christ's virtue is οὐσιώδης and accordingly divine *not* because Christ is perceived as the transcendentally permanent basis for virtue in the sphere of mankind, but, rather, because Christ as man embodies virtue... In this regard Apollinaris goes further than Platonic thought that human virtue presupposes the ideas for the idea *has appeared as idea*' (Mühlenberg, pp.212-213).

Hübner finds this thesis 'impressive', but argues that it cannot be substantiated on the basis of Reuss No.100, since Mühlenberg's interpretation depends on connecting the demonstrative pronoun αὕτη with πορεία and πράξις rather than ἀσώματος θεότης. Hübner makes a very convincing grammatical and exegetical case for the greater probability of the later reading (pp.154-156), thereby seriously wounding Mühlenberg's overall assessment of Apollinarian Christology.

In the final pages of his article Hübner offers some more general criticisms of Mühlenberg's interpretation. (1) Mühlenberg chooses to assume that the problem posed by philosophic epistemology provides *the* background for Apollinarian soteriology with insufficient justification (p.157). (2) Mühlenberg finds a doctrine of salvation through knowledge, but does not Apollinarius rather more preach salvation through the justifying death of Christ? (p.159). (3) Mühlenberg fails to recognise that it is Apollinarius, not those against him, who falls prey to an un-Christian philosophical way of thinking when he insists that the divine νοῦς cannot assume a human νοῦς or a whole human being:

> 'This argument is only convincing under the following condition: God can be treated as the object of a metaphysical anthropology. And, in the end, it is here that one should doubt whether the Christology of Apollinarius *is* really superior to the orthodox. It is exactly this temptation inherited from antique philosophy to account for God's essence *more geometrico* (γεωμετρικαὶς ἀποδεῖξεσιν!: Greg. Naz., *Ep.101 ad Cled.*, PG 37,183C) against which Athanasius had fought in his fight with Arius and Basil in his fight with Eunomius' (p.160).

Hübner regards Mühlenberg's work 'as an attempt to disprove the interpretation of Harnack' (p.122) (viz. that Apollinarian Christology is the product of the 'Greek' view of salvation which understands it as a 'physical' or 'pharmacological' process of 'becoming like God'). At the end of his article he concludes: 'The overcoming (Überwindung) of Harnack, if it is still necessary, will have to be done in a different way' (p.161). It cannot be denied that this essay casts serious doubt upon the sufficiency of Mühlenberg's original interpretation of Apollinarian Christology, but it does not develop a counter-interpretation of its own. Hübner simply redirects us to look again at the 'heretical' method of Apollinarius, his 'physical' conception of salvation and, in particular, the many statements which Mühlenberg mentions, but largely ignores, 'about the importance of the death of Christ for our salvation' (p.156).

Since Mühlenberg's monograph and Hübner's persuasive criticism, historians of dogma have returned to a more 'physical' understanding of Apollinarian doctrine and the type of 'physical' interpretation advocated by Henri de Riedmatten exerts the most obvious influence upon their views.

Aloys Grillmeier, in the second revised edition of *Christ in Christian Tradition* (translated by Bowden J., 1975, pp.329-343) (this work is hereafter cited as 'Grillmeier'), suggests that Apollinarianism was a 'heretical' form of 'Logos-sarx Christology' which departed from the mainstream by accepting the radical implications of its 'eclectic framework' and actually denying rather than remaining silent about the human psychology of Christ (p.342). 'Fear of division and the effort to make the unity in the Word made flesh as close and deep as possible' was the basic motive of the Christological doctrine of Apollinarius who was a 'lifelong' opponent of the 'divisive Christology' of Paulinus, Flavian and Diodore (p.330). When Grillmeier comes to offer a more detailed account of the terms and concepts most typical of Apollinarian doctrine, many of his interpretative opinions coincide with those of de Riedmatten. Apollinarius employs a model of man as a psychosomatic synthesis, understood along dynamic 'Stoic-Alexandrine' lines to explain

how God and man are joined. Accordingly, the divine and corporeal elements do not form a unity like 'static' components in an Aristotelian mixture, theirs is a vital 'symbiosis' in which the Logos exclusively supplies energy and movement to the body at an animal as well as spiritual/volitional level (p.325). The virginal birth is 'indispensable' (p.336) to Apollinarius' conception of the union as a πνεῦμα-σάρξ synthesis and it is 'of secondary importance' whether he presents it in 'dichotomist' or 'trichotomist' terms (p.331). Apollinarius' monophysite conception of the unity has this 'monergetic', vitalistic, biological basis, and his idea of μία φύσις should not be simply equated with his idea of one person or hypostasis (although, in Grillmeier's opinion: 'οὐσία should be regarded as the equivalent or approximate to the concept of *physis*' (p.335)). Apollinarius' vital-dynamic idea of μία φύσις lies behind his distinctive use of the *communicatio idiomatum*, insistence upon the unity of worship and teaching on the eucharist (p.336n.[37]) – here Grillmeier commends de Riedmatten for his rightful recognition of '"neglected aspects" of the Apollinarian system'.

In spite of its reliance upon the earlier interpretation of de Riedmatten (and Norris), Grillmeier's account of Apollinarian Christology contains some interesting observations and ambiguities which suggest other interpretational possibilities. (1) Grillmeier comes closer than de Riedmatten and Norris to recognising the 'spiritualist' nature of Apollinarius' anthropological model in some of the texts: e.g. *Anacephalaeosis* 16 (p.331). (2) More than de Riedmatten, Grillmeier recognises how Apollinarius' conception of the union implies the partialisation of both elements, suggesting that the psychosomatic analogy for μία φύσις in *De Unione* 5 (which de Riedmatten regards as 'formal') shows how 'the basic thought of the Apollinarian system... logically leads to Arianism'. Linking this to Fr.113 (the μέσοτης text) Grillmeier observes: 'The idea of "parts" is eventually brought to an absolutely intolerable pitch by Apollinarius and illustrated by quite trivial examples... One might suspect the influence of the Aristotelian teaching about *mixtum*. Apollinarius himself feels the absurdity of his conception and so later seeks to correct it' (pp.332-323). Grillmeier's reference (n.[17]) is to a passage in *KMP* 28 wherein Apollinarius stresses that: 'the Word became man not as one who became equal in an equal body, but as a master who took on the form of a servant' (L.p.178, ll.1-3). Grillmeier's remarks indicate that he discerns some sort of process of 'corrective' development away from the quasi-Aristotelian doctrine of *De Unione*/Fr.113, but he does not justify his use of 'eventually' and 'later', and his illustration

of Apollinarius' (self-)'corrected' doctrine cannot stand. G.L. Prestige has earlier shown how the passage in *KMP* 28 is an interpolation which has been lifted (probably by a later Apollinarian editor) from Athanasius' *Ep. Ad Adelphium* 8 (see Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea*, 1956, pp.60-61). (3) Grillmeier urges us not to conflate the Apollinarian idea of one person with the Apollinarian ideas of one nature and one energy (p.338). The latter concepts are logically prior because they are about the concrete '*way in which* the unity of person comes about' (p.336). In distinguishing Apollinarius' concept of unity of person Grillmeier notes Fr.151: 'Apollinarius comes nearest to the idea of unity of person as he speaks of the "unity of subject in Christ"' (p.338). Nevertheless, Grillmeier comes to the conclusion that Apollinarius 'ultimately reduces the "unity of person" to a vitalistic "unity of nature"' (p.338). (Grillmeier's view that Apollinarius' monophysitism is ultimately 'a monergetic or monothelite creation' (p.339) is not easy to reconcile with certain statements (e.g. Fr.22,63 *Anacephalaesosis* 30, *KMP* 30).) Thus, like de Riedmatten, Grillmeier acknowledges, but fails to delineate clearly, a distinct idea of 'unity of person' which seems to be co-present in the 'monophysite' writings of Apollinarius.

In the fifth revised edition of his long serving textbook *Early Christian Doctrines* (1977), J.N.D. Kelly gives a concise account (pp.289-295) of Apollinarius' Christology which shares Grillmeier's contextualising overview ('he carried tendencies long accepted in the Alexandrine school to their logical limit' (p.289)) and which treats as typical the peculiarly physical aspects first identified by de Riedmatten:

> 'This was his theory (e.g. *De Unione* 11-13) that the Word was the sole life of the God-man, infusing vital energy and movement into Him even at the purely physical and biological levels' (p.292); 'Christ on this theory is an organic vital unity, just as a man compounded of soul and body is a unity; there is a "unity of nature"... between the Word and His body' (p.293).

Kelly notes important features of Apollinarius' Christology which 'flow logically' from this 'core' unitive idea: e.g. his strong use of the *communicatio idiomatum* understood, ultimately, as involving 'a real exchange of attributes' and his eucharistic scheme of salvation (p.295).

In her survey of the literature and background to the Christological controversy, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon* (1983), Frances M. Young offers a more nuanced assessment of Apollinarius' doctrine and its probable context (pp.182-191), admitting that it is extremely

difficult to reconstruct his actual teaching from its fragmentary remains and acknowledging that 'there are a number of unsettled issues of interpretation' (p.183). When considering the most probable origins of Apollinarius' teaching she remakes the case for the older interpretative view (of (e.g.) Dorner): 'it may be that the influence of his opposition to the Antiochenes has been exaggerated. There are reasons for thinking that the two sides did not come into direct conflict until after Apollinarius' condemnation' (p.184)... 'We can hardly doubt that the Arian controversy provided the main context within which Apollinarius' basic ideas arose' (p.185). For soteriological reasons the divine Word incarnate must be ἄτρεπτος, which is not possible if the human soul is admitted into the union. Young takes more seriously than Raven and Prestige the 'ancient' suggestion that Apollinarius actually taught the doctrine of Christ's 'heavenly manhood': 'There are hints that he may have thought of God having always been in some sense "enfleshed"' (pp.187-188, with reference to Fr.50). The 'heavenly man' idea may be rooted in Apollinarius' commitment to the ἄτρεπτος Logos and the indivisibility of the union: 'A passage from the *First Letter to Dionysius* [§7]... suggests that the only thing Apollinarius really cared about was the union and he was not disposed to examine too closely its corollaries' (p.188).

Young finds Mühlenberg's interpretation 'interesting' if 'not entirely convincing' (p.185) and is prepared to give it some credence, resolving the disparity between the 'dichotomic' and 'trichotomic' terminologies with reference to what Mühlenberg regards as the main idea: 'Precise anthropological terms were not Apollinarius' prime concern; his main interest was to contrast his view of θεὸς ἔνσαρκος (God enfleshed) with the more generally acceptable idea of an ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος' (p.187). Nevertheless, when she comes to describe Apollinarius' doctrine of the union, she presents it in the same physical terms as de Riedmatten with reference to his influential essays:

> 'Apollinarius is far from being chary of explaining the union in terms of μῖξις (mixture) or σύγκρασις (combination); for him the union is an organic or biological union exactly analogous to the composition of man out of flesh and spirit. The virgin birth is important precisely because it produces a biological freak; there is no male sperm charged with vivifying power – instead there is the descent of the Spirit. So the "one nature"... for Apollinarius... meant that Christ is a unique kind of being combining God and man' (pp.188-189).

Young presents the novelty of Apollinarius' doctrine of the union in even starker terms than de Riedmatten, because, like Harnack, she links the idea of physical salvation via the

incarnation to Apollinarius' (occasional) references to Christ as mediator (e.g. Fr.113): 'for him, unlike the later Eutychians, the flesh was not transformed into divinity, but was united with the divinity to form a unique *tertium quid*' (p.189). In arriving at this understanding of Apollinarian monophysitism she may have equated too easily Apollinarius' anthropological model for unity in *De Unione* with that in the *Apodeixis*: 'He basically thinks of man as a νοῦς ἔνσαρκος (a mind enfleshed) or a composite of πνεῦμα and σάρξ (spirit and flesh)' (p.187).

In more recent years scholarship has focused once again upon the literary question, reopening Dräseke's investigation as to whether certain 'orthodox' Trinitarian works pseudonymously transmitted were in fact written by Apollinarius.

In his learned monograph, *Die Schrift des Apolinarius von Laodicea gegen Photin (Pseudo-Athanasius, contra Sabellianos) und Basilius von Caesarea* (1989), R. Hübner argues that Apollinarius is the real author of *Contra Sabellianos*, a Pseudo-Athanasian work upon Trinitarian doctrine which displays many similarities to Basil's *Homily 24*: *Contra Sabellianos, Arium et Anomeos.* Scholars have tended to assume that the Pseudo-Athanasian treatise is derived from the Basilian work, but Hübner believes that the reverse is the case. He argues that Apollinarius wrote the *Contra Sabellianos* against Photinus (referred to as 'the Judaiser') c.358-360 (pp.249-252) and he shows that Basil's *Homily 24* displays a 'literary dependency' upon the 'Apollinarian work' (pp.47-125). In Hübner's opinion, this sequence and derivation further demonstrates the theological influence of Apollinarius upon the development of the 'orthodox' Trinitarian doctrine of Basil, as already indicated by the existence of the (genuine) correspondence between the two (Basil, *Epp.*361-364).

Hübner treats evidence of Apollinarius' distinctive Christology as a 'prime indication' of Apollinarian authorship. Whilst admitting that, 'the statements which brought him into disrepute, namely the denial of the spiritual part of the manhood united with the Logos and the formula of the one enfleshed nature of the Logos, are not to be found in the *c. Sabell.*' (p.209), Hübner goes on to show how passages of this Trinitarian work are 'saturated' with the proof texts, terminology and ideas typical of Apollinarius' specifically Christological writings (pp.209-229): e.g. Christ is not a man but 'like a man', with reference to *Jn.*3.13, *Jn.*6.38, *Gal.*4.4, 1 *Cor.*15,45-47, *Phil.*2.7 (*Contra Sabellianos* 13: cf. *Anacephalaeosis* 4,2,16,23; *De Unione* 1,2,4,6; *Apodeixis* Fr.17,18,21,25,27-31,89-90); the Word is 'enfleshed' (σαρκωθῆναι, σάρκωσις) (*Contra Sabellianos* 2,13,14,15: cf.

Apodeixis Fr.19; *KMP* 2 etc.); 'the invisible bodiless divinity' assumes a human form (*Contra Sabellianos* 15: cf. *De Unione* 6) – viz. a 'σῶμα' or 'σάρξ' – which serves as a 'robe'(cf. Fr.6) or 'veil' (*Contra Sabellianos* 13: cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep.*101); the Word, when enfleshed, remains (μένειν) unchanged in his own nature (*Contra Sabellianos* 15: cf. *KMP* 2,11,37; *De Unione* 14; Fr.117,152) 'uncircumscribed' by his body (cf. Fr.138; *Ad Jovianum* 2); the reception of the body occurs through an act of divine will and self-giving (*Contra Sabellianos* 15: cf. *KMP* 1-2); the union is an 'admixture' (ἀνάκρασις) of the Word with a human constituent (*Contra Sabellianos* 3,15: cf. *Contra Diodorum* Fr.128). (Hübner admits that this is not the term denoting mixture ('σύγκρασις') which Apollinarius more typically favours elsewhere (p. 221).)

It is not the purpose of Hübner's monograph to offer an overall analysis of Apollinarian Christology *per se*, but he obviously regards the 'typical' Christological terms and ideas which he identifies in the *Contra Sabellianos* as basic to that (singular) doctrine – which is implicitly monothelite (see Hübner's interpretation of *Contra Sabellianos* 15, pp.223-224) and (elsewhere) νοῦς-denying and monophysite (p.209). Hübner believes that the *Contra Sabellianos* is Christologically significant chiefly because it shows the 'crossing point' from fourth century anti-monarchian theology into anti-Samosatan Christology (pp.285-286).

In the final section of his book Hübner demonstrates how the theological influence of 'Apollinarius'' *Contra Sabellianos* extends to other Basilian works (pp.252-267). In his conclusion he suggests that, if Apollinarius is the author of *Contra Sabellianos*, then Dräseke's discredited view that he is author of Ps.-Basil *Contra Eunomium IV-V* is worthy of reinvestigation as is the possible Apollinarian authorship of (Ps.-)Athanasius' *Contra Arianos IV* (and even the extent of Apollinarius' influence upon Athanasius' *Contra Arianos III*).

F.X. Risch provides a painstaking study of one of the Trinitarian works which Hübner suggests may be Apollinarian: *Pseudo-Basilius: Adversus Eunomium IV-V Einleitung, Ubersetzung und Kommentar* (1992). In his introduction, Risch argues (pp.9-12) that of three probable authors, Basil, Didymus of Alexandria, and Apollinarius – Apollinarius is the most likely, listing five 'pointers' which indicate that fact: (1) the author is a Nicene, who also believes in the divinity of the Spirit; (2) the author has written against Eunomius and Aetius, but also against Marcellus, Photinus and the 'Spirit Fighters'; (3) the

author has read the logical works of Porphyry and knows the philosophy of Plotinus; (4) the author is an adversary of sophistical reasoning, but has been influenced by it; (5) the author is a conscious successor of Athanasius. Although Risch prefers to refer to the author as 'the Theologian', he draws attention in his commentary to the theological parallels between the doctrine in *Adversus Eunomium IV* and *V* and that in the other writings of Apollinarius. Since the two books are almost exclusively concerned with Trinitarian doctrine (*IV* looks at the unity and distinction of the divine Father and Son; *V* makes the case for the divinity of the Spirit, furnishing many proofs of this and the Triadic unity from scripture), the parallels tend to the theological rather than Christological. Thus, even if we accept that Apollinarius was the author of this work, Risch's admirable study and translation of the text makes available little new material for those seeking to interpret Apollinarius' doctrine of the incarnation. In Risch's view the *Adversus Eunomium IV* and *V* were written c.359-360, possibly in reply to the *Apology of Eunomius*: he believes that they probably constitute the first of the anti-Anomean works. Their importance, therefore, lies in the fact that the author supplies 'the decisive interpretational approach' which is taken up by other spokesmen for orthodoxy in the ensuing debate with this later form of Arianism.

1

THE CONSISTENCY OF APOLLINARIAN THOUGHT

A Shared Assumption

Those who have previously interpreted the writings of Apollinarius offer widely differing accounts of his doctrine, yet it is interesting to notice that they also hold something in common: in spite of Rufinus' testimony and Lietzmann's 'hypothesis'[1] they all tend to rather assume the fundamental consistency of Apollinarian thought.

Dorner absolves Apollinarius of inconsistent ideas (attributed to him falsely by members of his 'school' and, consequently, by his opponents) and discerns instead, 'a progressive evolution of his views of which the stages are consistent'.[2]

Harnack contrasts 'the unambiguous, coherent and frank avowals' of Apollinarius with the 'obscure and hazy' reasoning of his orthodox opponents and declares: 'This doctrine, estimated by the presuppositions and aims of the Greek conception of Christianity as religion, is complete'.[3]

Voisin, whilst recognising a modification of anthropological vocabulary, sees no change in Apollinarius' underlying conception of the unity:

> 'Like most of his contemporaries he favours dichotomy and although the demands of polemics made him change his mind later on, his understanding always remained based on dichotomy'; 'At every stage in his life Apollinarius designates the constituent parts of man by the terms πνεῦμα and σάρξ... This division is found in nearly every page of his writings, both in those which he shows himself to be trichotomite and the others. There is no inconsistency in this'.[4]

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[1] See p.13,above.
[2] Dorner,J. A.,*The Person of Christ*,vol.2,1889,p.353.Whilst Dorner goes on to describe a subtle and systematic doctrine, which he believes should rightly be attributed to Apollinarius, he fails to explain the 'consistent' process by which this 'evolved'.
[3] Harnack,A.von,*History of Dogma*,vol.4,p.151;p.155.
[4] Voisin,p.273;p.277.

Raven extols Apollinarius for his consistency above all else: 'No quality in Apollinarius' work is so arresting as its uniformity and consistency... those who study the fragments will find them singularly free from even the appearance of contradiction'.[5] Accordingly, Raven believes that 'his psychology from first to last was based on a triple division of man's nature' and refuses to accept the idea that Apollinarius ever advocated a 'dichotomite' conception of Christ: 'In no passage early or late does Apollinarius say that Christ did not assume a human soul'. Raven's faith in Apollinarius' consistency seems to have caused him simply to overlook Fr.2 and *De Unione* 12.[6]

De Riedmatten identifies and differentiates certain arguments more typical of the 'trichotomic' writings than the 'dichotomic' and *vice versa*, but then turns to certain exegetical fragments in order to prove that in all his writings Apollinarius consistently espoused the same (syncretic) anthropological conception.[7] 'Thus, there is no reason then to imagine an evolution in his anthropology!'[8] De Riedmatten remains similarly convinced that Apollinarius' Christology is fundamentally consistent: 'In my view it is not the Christology itself which has evolved it is the accent which has changed probably for polemical reasons... all through his work Apollinarius remains constant to his fundamental theme of the vivification of the flesh by the Word on the analogy of the human composite'.[9]

Norris maintains a similar view to de Riedmatten when discussing 'Lietzmann's Hypothesis' (viz. that the shift in anthropological terminology marks a change in Apollinarius' Christological 'theory'): 'Apollinarius uses both terminologies to express or interpret a relatively self consistent, unified anthropological conception, which underlies both forms of speech and... provides him with a scheme for his Christological doctrine'; 'His basic *schema*, anthropological and Christological remains fundamentally the same'.[10] Like Voisin, Norris believes that the omnipresence of Apollinarius' πνεῦμα-σάρξ formula, or 'scheme', indicates 'the essential unity of his teaching over a number of years'.[11]

Mühlenberg sees no obvious inconsistencies and so dismisses the idea of a genuine development in Apollinarian doctrine: 'A development in Apollinarius' teaching cannot be assumed in so far as we are not forced to do this by fragments with definite dates or

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[5] Raven,pp.175-6;also,pp.101-103:'the most lucid and unambiguous of all Greek theologians'.
[6] Raven,p.173.G.L. Prestige notes Raven's oversight:*Fathers and Heretics*,1940,p.111 n.[1].
[7] Riedmatten[2],pp.209-232.
[8] Riedmatten[2],p.233.
[9] Riedmatten[2],p.233.
[10] Norris,p.88;p.93.
[11] Norris,p.91.

inexplicable contradictions between individual quotations'.[12] When reconstructing Apollinarius' argument in the *Apodeixis* Mühlenberg prefers to assume the absolute consistency of Apollinarius' thinking: 'I assume that the arrangement was very single-minded (zielstrebig) and that Apollinaris provided detailed and systematic reasoning. So, in addition to what we learn from Gregory, we must take into account the realisation of the internal coherence of the fragments'.[13] The same type of assumption leads Mühlenberg to seek and find the doctrine of the *Apodeixis* in the other Apollinarian documents.[14]

Hübner, when demonstrating that Apollinarius is the author of *Contra Sabellianos,* works with the assumption that he is looking for a singular Christological theory which is omnipresent in the various ('dichotomic' and 'trichotomic') Apollinarian works to which he alludes, and which is consistent with both 'the denial of the spiritual part of the manhood' and the famous monophysite formula from the ('dichotomic') *Ad Jovianum* 1:

> 'Result: in Apollinarius as in c. Sabell. 13, the same Christological thesis is substantiated by the same collection of proof texts. The formulae (used) are very often the same. The concurrences are found not only in one text, but are spread out evenly in such a way that c. Sabell. 13 cannot be explained as plagiarism. Conclusion: the author of the Pseudoathanasian (work) is Apolinarius.'[15]

The shared assumption that Apollinarian thought is fundamentally consistent would appear to have several bases, some more valid than others. The picture of Apollinarius which emerges from the fragments of his work, the scattered biographical details and the epistolary references, is of a man of both intellect and integrity. Apollinarius appears to have been a theologian more in the habit of tenaciously upholding his beliefs than of changing them in the face of criticism: he was a life-long supporter of the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity in the age of Arianism[16]; he preserved the truths of the Christian faith against Greek philosophy in an era which witnessed a pagan revival[17]; he upheld an unfashionable Chiliast doctrine of future salvation because of its basis in scripture[18]; he consistently advocated a belief in the 'divine incarnation' against another type of dualistic Christology,

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[12] Mühlenberg,p.110.
[13] Mühlenberg,p.72.
[14] Mühlenberg,pp.215-230.
[15] Hübner,R.,*Die Schrift des Apolinarius von Laodicea gegen Photin*, 1989,p.214.
[16] Sozomen,*H.E.*6.25;Apollinarius,(*Apodeixis*)Fr.24,39;*KMP* 1 etc.
[17] Socrates,*H.E.*3.16;Sozomen,*H.E.*5.18.
[18] Epiphanius,*Panarion* 77,36-38;Basil *Ep.*265;Apollinarius,Fr.167.

which he believed was sub-Christian[19]; he defended his own Christological doctrine with careful precision against certain disciples who had misrepresented it[20], against Diodore (of Tarsus)[21], and the spokesmen for 'Orthodoxy' who turned against him;[22] he was finally prepared to go into schism rather than renouncing his doctrine of Christ.[23] The style of argument which we find in the Apollinarian material is similarly uncompromising. It employs syllogistic reasoning and theory-constitutive analogies, and, rather than sheltering behind paradoxes, it is often prepared to deduce bold and unambiguous conclusions.[24] The way in which Apollinarius and his followers were put outside orthodoxy fairly quickly, their doctrine associated with a few characteristic 'false' beliefs, further suggests that his was a singular and easily identifiable system.[25]

The assumption of Apollinarian consistency is also, to some extent, a necessary aspect of the modern interpreter's method: given the problems posed by a fragmented and de-contextualised text, surrounded by potentially misleading comments, the interpreter is rather forced to assume that Apollinarius' exposition was consistent in order to arrive at any sort of unified understanding of his original doctrine (as Mühlenberg admits).[26] With less justification, however, the assumption of Apollinarian consistency also seems to be related to the interpretational tendency of historians of dogma to categorise in an 'either, or' fashion. In some of the older textbooks this tendency arises because the evolution of Christological doctrine is perceived as the triumph of 'Orthodox' belief over a number of heterodox alternatives. In more recent textbooks it arises because the development of doctrine is seen in terms of a dialectical argument between conflicting 'schools' or 'types' of Christology. Thus, Apollinarius' Christology has been perceived as either 'heterodox' or (*de facto*) 'orthodox', either based on Greek philosophy or based on a literal exegesis of scripture, either anti-Arian or anti-'Antiochene', either typical of 'Alexandrine' ('Word-Flesh') Christology or a departure from the same, (thus) either proto-'Cyrilline' or non-'Cyrilline', either 'Monophysite' in the later sense or in a different way, either motivated by

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[19] E.g.*Ep Ad Dionysium A 1*;(*Apodeixis*)Fr.14-15.
[20] Fr.161.
[21] Fr.117-146.
[22] Fr.48.
[23] Theodoret,*H.E.*5.4.
[24] E.g. *Anacephalaeosis* 1-23; Fr.113,127,128; *De Unione* 13;(*Apodeixis*)Fr.23-25.
[25] The Apollinarians, officially banned for the first time in 383 (*Cod.Theod.*16.5.12) and in subsequent imperial edicts of 384,388,397 and 435, are mentioned for the last time in the Grand Heresy Law of 428, see Lietzmann,p.40.
[26] Mühlenberg,p.72.

('Athanasian') soteriology or by an anthropological theory of unity, which is, in itself, either 'Aristotelian' or 'Platonic', either 'dichotomic' or 'trichotomic'. The consistency of Apollinarian thought has also been assumed for the simple reason that any interpretation seeks to give itself, as well as its object, clear definition: the latest interpretation has to distinguish itself as one analysis as distinct from the others, and any true analysis, in being more than a description, is necessarily, to some degree, reductionist.

For such reasons (and because of the relative weakness of Lietzmann's underdeveloped 'hypothesis') the consistency of Apollinarius' Christological thinking has been generally assumed when, even at first sight, there are a number of quite obvious factors which suggest that the very reverse might be the case.

Indications of Inconsistency

Firstly, there is the testimony of Rufinus' writing in his *Ecclesiastical History* (c.401) some ten years after Apollinarius' death. In the short chapter on the nature of Apollinarius' heretical teaching, the Italian historian, who had travelled extensively in the East (c.372-397), explicitly records that the Bishop of Laodicea changed his opinion in response to criticism:

> 'He had said... that in the economy only a body was taken up by the Lord and not a soul (animam). On this he afterwards changed his position (vertit se post) when forced by the evident (words) of the gospels' testimony in which the Lord and Saviour Himself professes to have a soul and desires at one time to put it down and at another time to take it up [*Jn.*10.17-18] and which He says is troubled and saddened even unto death [*Mt.*26.38; *Jn.*12.27]; and, so as not to seem completely changed or refuted, he [sc. Apollinarius] said that He did indeed have a soul – not (having) the part of this which is rational, but only that (soul/part) by which the body is vivified. In fact, in order to supply the rational part he said it was the Word of God Himself. This doctrine was first rejected in the city of Rome by Damasus and Peter of Alexandria, by the decision of the assembled council...'.[27]

Most of the modern commentators who believe in the consistency of Apollinarian thought have treated this passage as if it bears witness, primarily to a change in Apollinarius' anthropology. For example, de Riedmatten writes:

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[27] Rufinus,*H.E.*2.20(*MPL*21.526C-527A).

> 'The works published by Lietzmann allow themselves to be divided into roughly two sections according to whether the anthropology which is professed their appears "dichotomite" or "trichotomite". Rufinus expressly records that Apollinarius might have changed from a dichotomite ψυχή/σάρξ anthropology to the trichotomite νοῦς/ψυχή/σάρξ scheme.'[28]

Certainly, those arguing in favour of Apollinarian consistency have most typically tried to solve the problem posed by Rufinus' testimony and the two terminologically differing groups of writings as if it were a problem of (apparent) *anthropological* inconsistency. However, when we consider the passage itself, the testimony of Rufinus is primarily a testimony that Apollinarius changed his *Christology*. Apollinarius was forced to admit the human soul *in Christ* and to do this he had to differentiate between the (divine) rational part of Christ's soul and the (human) soul which animated his body (and suffered, died, was raised, etc.). Rufinus only records this one change in Apollinarius Christology and uncharitably suggests that it was a face-saving measure, but we only need look at the Christological theory made explicit in one of Apollinarius 'dichotomic' works – viz. *De Unione* – to see that such an admission would represent not a consistent evolution of his views but, a major Christological departure. If Apollinarius were to introduce a human animal soul into the very precise account of the incarnational union and virginal conception which we find in *De Unione* 12-13, his expositional thesis would no longer be workable, nor logically would the traducian anthropology which supports it, since Christ lacks the human father to supply a human animal soul.

If Rufinus' comments suggest a real change in the Christological teaching of Apollinarius, other factors indicate a real inconsistency (which possibly relates to the reported change). There is, for example, the evident confusion of Apollinarius' disciples. If the teachings of their master were so 'lucid' and 'free from contradiction' why did some of them apparently misunderstand what he had taught during his lifetime and why did others disagree so fiercely about the true nature of his doctrine soon after his death? Epiphanius of Salamis, who witnessed at first hand the mission of certain 'young' disciples of Apollinarius to Cyprus, recalls:

> 'I thought that his pupils who were coming to see me from him had not understood the profound <utterances> of so well educated and wise a man and teacher, and had

[28] Riedmatten[2],p.209.

not learned from him and made it up on their own. For even among the ones who were visiting me a great deal was in dispute (ἀμφεβάλλετο).'[29]

In the same paragraph of the *Panarion*, Epiphanius associates some of these disciples with the denial of Christ's ψυχή and others with the fallacy that the body was consubstantial with the Godhead. In Epiphanius' opinion Apollinarius himself was certainly innocent of this latter erroneous exaggeration of his doctrine. Yet when we turn to the writings of Apollinarius it is at once apparent that the surviving evidence is more ambiguous. We find several unequivocal denials of the consubstantial divinity of the flesh, notably in response to Athanasius' *Ep. Ad Epictetum* which strongly denounces the same error,[30] but we also find more ambivalent statements,[31] and we find one *de dicto* admission of consubstantiality.[32] There are also fragments where Apollinarius seems to use μία οὐσία as if equivalent to μία φύσις,[33] a formula which features prominently in the 'dichotomic' writings, to denote the result of a physical (and therefore (con)substantial?) union between the divine and corporeal. In one fragment Apollinarius describes this union in 'synousiastic' terms.[34] In the context of these latter statements the 'consubstantialist' doctrine of the Apollinarians who went to Cyprus appears not to be the complete departure from Apollinarius' teaching that Epiphanius, writing several years later and after his interview with Vitalis, imagines. This being the case, the unequivocal denials of consubstantially divine flesh may represent more of a departure on Apollinarius' part – from the 'substantialist' conception of the union which, like the denial of the ψυχή (also advocated at Cyprus), is most typically a feature of his 'dichotomic' writings.

Argument and uncertainty about what Apollinarius actually taught is even more apparent when we look at the later writings of his 'school' which Lietzmann gathers in the second half of his edition. Writing to his fellow disciple Polemon, Julian begins, 'Our first and only father Apollinarius spoke loud and clear...',[35] but the evident controversy which soon sprang up between the 'Polemianists', and 'moderate' Apollinarians like Valentinus and Homonius (and between both these groups and Timothy of Berytus) suggests the very

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[29] Epiphanius,*Panarion* 77 2.3-4,translated Williams,F.,1994,pp.568-569 (this work is hereafter cited as 'Williams'). ἀμφεβάλλετο (see Holl,p.417,l.9) might equally be translated 'was in doubt/uncertain'.
[30] See Fr.159-161,163,164.
[31] See *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3-7.
[32] Fr.126/146,see L.p.242,ll.20-21.
[33] Fr.117,119.
[34] Fr.116,L.p.235,ll.8-9.
[35] Fr.180,L.p.277,ll.12-13.

reverse of clarity. Even though each group likes to present it thus, it seems unlikely that any one faction consistently maintained the true teaching of Apollinarius while the others departed from it, since all the controversialists are able to list proof texts from their master's work. Those opposing the Polemianists accused them of the 'consubstantialist' error which Apollinarius himself had explicitly rejected in some of his statements and these, consequently, feature prominently in their proofs.[36] The Polemianists, or 'Synousiasts', as they became known, accuse the others of lapsing into dualism and prefer to cite the monenergetic and monophysite statements of their master most typically drawn from his 'dichotomic' writings.[37] The disagreement among these disciples of Apollinarius is not obviously related to the change in his Christology reported by Rufinus, even though Augustine suggests that it is,[38] but *is* plainly related to differing ideas about the basic nature of the truly Apollinarian conception of the incarnational unity. These ideas may be different, but it appears that they can equally claim authority from the words of Apollinarius himself.

The ambiguous reaction of Eastern 'Orthodoxy' to the Bishop of Laodicea's Christological teaching further indicates that his doctrine may have been less than clear and consistent. Monks sent by Apollinarius were present at the Nicene Council of Alexandria in 362,[39] where their assent to the stipulations of *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7 may have been taken as proof of Apollinarius' Christological orthodoxy, but his precise interpretation of this formula seems to have remained unclear or unknown in Nicene circles beyond Antioch for many years: (e.g.) we find him explaining his properly 'Athanasian' understanding of the formula to exiled Nicene bishops from Egypt c.376.[40] Although 'Orthodox' leaders strongly condemned the 'consubstantialist' error (c.369-371), which seems to be not unrelated to some of his teaching, they were, at first, very slow to condemn Apollinarius himself: Athanasius does not mention Apollinarius in the *Ep. Ad Epictetum* (but he was sent a copy);[41] Epiphanius knows that the doctrine of 'consubstantially divine flesh' has been spread by 'young Apollinarians', but sincerely believes that they have misunderstood their master's doctrine; c.374 Epiphanius reports the doctrine of 'some people' who deny a human

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[36] E.g.the proofs of Valentinus,see L.p.104.
[37] E.g.the proofs preserved by the 'Polemon Source',see L.p.113.
[38] Voisin (p.116) argues that Augustine's report in *De Dono Perseverantiae* that there were three groups of Apollinarians – viz. those who denied the spirit, those who denied the soul, and those who denied the flesh – has been derived from Epiphanius' account of opinions held by 'young disciples' (see *Panarion 77*,1.4;2.4).
[39] Athanasius,*Tomus Ad Antiochenos*,9.
[40] *Ep.Ad Diocaesareenses* 2,L.p.256.
[41] See L.p.254,ll.2-3.

νοῦς of Christ, but he does not identify these as Apollinarians until later;[42] it requires a fact-finding mission to Antioch and an interview with Vitalis before the Bishop of Salamis, with a nose for heresy, is able to understand the true nature of Apollinarius' own doctrine;[43] as late as 376 Basil refers to the teaching of Apollinarius as if it were wearisome and incomprehensible rather than heterodox.[44] The slow advent of the Church's critical reaction to the teaching of Apollinarius himself was in part due to his enduring reputation for Trinitarian orthodoxy[45] and in part due to the nature of the underdeveloped (and inherently Apollinarian (?)) Christology espoused by the leaders of Eastern Orthodoxy, but it also suggests that Apollinarius was a more skilful apologist for his own doctrine than some of his disciples. He seems to have successfully (re)presented his doctrine as orthodox for many years (352-376) by conforming it with external stipulations and by qualifying it in response to (implied) criticisms.

When the Church finally condemns the 'heresy' of Apollinarius himself there are indications that it does not fully comprehend what it has condemned, and that this is because Apollinarius' doctrine is not, or was not always, bound to one consistent and 'heretical' conception of Christ. Thus, the early 'orthodox' polemicists, like the Cappadocian Gregorys, focus their criticism upon Apollinarius' denial of the human νοῦς in Christ, but they also accuse him of errors which are not obviously related to this ('trichotomic') conception of the union: heavenly flesh and theopaschitism.[46] A careful reading of the fragments from the *Apodeixis* reveals that one of Apollinarius' main reasons for insisting on the (pre-existing) divinity of Christ's νοῦς is that this allows the ensouled flesh to be human and to suffer like ours and to be from Mary and not from heaven. The Gregorys may be misunderstanding or 'misrepresenting'[47] Apollinarius' teaching (c.378-385), but both seem to be genuinely suspicious that a cruder type of Apollinarian doctrine – consubstantialist, 'dichotomic' and quasi-Arian – lurks beneath Apollinarius' novel 'trichotomic' theory.[48] When Conciliar censorship came (377, 378, 391) it was directed against the ('trichotomic') Christology which denies the Word's assumption of a complete humanity for soteriological

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[42] Epiphanius,*Ancoratus* 77 (*MPG*43.161B). Voisin (p.70n.[2]) believes that his identification of this group as 'Απολιναριοι' in *Ancoratus* 13 is a subsequent gloss.
[43] Epiphanius,*Panarion* 77 20.3-24.3.
[44] Basil,*Ep.*129.1;also,*Ep.*244 (see p.411,below).
[45] E.g.Epiphanius(c.376),*Panarion* 77,2.1.
[46] See Gregory of Nyssa,*Antirrheticus* 4-5,13-15;Gregory of Nazianzus,*Ep.*202(*MPG*37.332B-333A).
[47] See Prestige,G.L.,*St Basil and Apollinarius*,1956,pp.60-65.
[48] See Gregory of Nyssa,*Antirrheticus* 44 (J.p.205,l.21-p.206,l.26);Gregory of Nazianzus,*Ep.*101(*MPG*37.184A);*Ep.*102(*MPG*37.196B).

reasons.[49] By identifying Apollinarius' doctrine thus the Church was able to suppress his heresy relatively quickly. Yet other typically Apollinarian ideas and formulae – most notoriously: 'μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην', from the 'dichotomic' work *Ad Jovianum*[50] – were passed on without suspicion in the 'Alexandrine' tradition exerting influence upon (e.g.) Cyril and Eutyches.[51] These Alexandrine Churchmen were both able to reject Apollinarius' doctrine of Christ who lacked the human νοῦς and to accept as orthodox his doctrine of μία φύσις as set out in certain of his works preserved under pseudonymous titles. This again indicates that his was a doctrine not consistently tied to one typical theory or unitive conception – a Christology which was in some ways both 'heterodox' and 'orthodox'.

In one passage of his anti-Apollinarian correspondence Gregory of Nazianzus explicitly brings such a charge of inconsistency against his opponents:

> 'And who will not marvel at their learning, in that on their own authority they divide the things of Christ and assign to his manhood such saying as he was born, he was tempted, he was hungry, [etc]...but reckon to his divinity such as these: he was glorified by angels, he overcame the tempter, he fed the people in the wilderness, [etc]...; and then they accuse us of introducing two natures, separate or conflicting, and of dividing the supernatural and wondrous union. They ought, either not to do that of which they accuse us, or not to accuse us of that which they do; so at least if they are resolved to be consistent and not to propound at once their own and their opponents' principles. Such is their want of reason; it conflicts both with itself and with the truth to such an extent that they are neither conscious nor ashamed of it when they fall out with themselves.'[52]

Although we must take into account Gregory's polemical purposes, his criticism is to some extent borne out by an ambiguity which is evident in writings of Apollinarius himself. In some of his works (e.g. the 'dichotomic' *De Unione* and *Ad Dionysium A*) Apollinarius insists against dyophysites that all the attributes of Christ, both human and divine, should be predicated *inclusively* (κοινῶς) to the 'whole' – i.e. the one nature of Christ which is made up of flesh and divinity. De Riedmatten has identified this as *the* typically Apollinarian conception of the *communicatio idiomatum* and contrasts this with a more conventional

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[49] E.g.Damasus' *Synodical Letter* in Theodoret *H.E.*5.10.
[50] L.p.251,ll.1-2.
[51] See Cyril,*Duodecim Capitum Defensio Adversus Orientales Episcopas* (*MPG*76.349) and Eutyches *Ep.*21 (*Ad Leonem*), see Schwartz,E.,*ACO* 2.2.1,pp.34-42,nos.7-12.
[52] Gregory of Nazianzus,*Ep.*102(*MPG*37.201A-B),E.T.Browne C.G.,and Swallow,J.E.,in *NPNF*, vol.7,pp.444-445.

practice: 'non le procédé d'attributions à une unique personne qui est celle du Fils de Dieu'.[53] Nevertheless, there are passages in some of Apollinarius' works where he does seem to predicate in this more conventional, and divisive way, assigning all the attributes to one divine subject and specifying which pertain to his divinity and which apply to Him 'according to the flesh'.[54] This practice rather implies two (generic) natures,[55] undermining Apollinarius absolute insistence upon μία φύσις (κατὰ σάρκα) found elsewhere.[56] Thus, Gregory's criticism appears to relate to a genuine inconsistency in Apollinarian thought, which is at least terminological and may be to do with his conception of the *communicatio idiomatum* and the nature of the Christological unity which provides its basis. Gregory's criticism has some similarity to the testimony of Rufinus, therefore, in that it bears witness to the fact that certain problematic passages from scripture forced Apollinarian theory to move inconsistently closer to the 'orthodox' position it opposes.

The idea that the Apollinarian conception of Christ sometimes, or at some point, approached an 'opposite' 'orthodox' view when confronted with the expositional difficulties inherent in the divine mystery of the incarnation seems not improbable if we take into account general considerations. Firstly, there is the length of time during which Apollinarius advocated his doctrine of Christ: nearly forty years if Gregory of Nazianzus is to be believed.[57] Then there is the controversial context of this advocacy and the variety of Apollinarius' opponents: (e.g.) 'Samosatan' dualists, dyophysites, Diodore, those (disciples) advocating the consubstantial divinity of flesh, 'orthodox' critics, etc. Then there is the view of modern scholarship about the way Christian doctrines have typically come into being: viz. formulae are devised and concepts formed by means of a dialectic between differing and insufficient interpretational ideas and between these and the givens of the Faith. Apollinarius was writing in a period when the Christological doctrine of the Church was still very much 'in the making' even though there is a tendency now to see this period through post-Chalcedonian spectacles. Whatever Apollinarius' reputation for logic and lucidity, it is most unlikely that a singularly 'Apollinarian' doctrine came into his head in the

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[53] Riedmatten[2],p.218.
[54] E.g.*Ad Jovianum* 2;(*Apodeixis*)Fr.46-47,59-65,93,102-103;*KMP*11-12,29,32.
[55] Writing c.428 Theodoret notes with *exempla* how nearly Apollinarius approaches dyophysitism when predicating divisively:'Lo! even he who first introduced the mixture (κρᾶσιν) of the natures has been manifestly proved to apply the notion of a division between them:he not only called the body "robe"(στολὴν) "creature" and "instrument", but even called it "servant"' (*Eranistes III*,see L.p.206,ll.1-4).
[56] E.g.*Ep.Ad Dionysium A* 1-2,8;*De Fide et Incarnatione* 3-6; *Ad Jovianum* 1;Fr.140:'ἡ ἄκρα ἕνωσις κατὰ σάρκα'.
[57] Gregory comments (c.382) in *Ep.*102 that Apollinarius' 'faith began thirty years ago' (*MPG*37.200C).

350s and was consistently maintained against all-comers until 390. If we bear in mind the time, the situation, the *prima facie* evidence of conceptual inconsistency in his writings, and even his celebrated piety, then it seems more probable that his doctrine emerged by some sort of process as it tested itself in a variety of controversial discussions and in the logical, yet faithful, mind of Apollinarius himself.

The disagreement among modern interpreters of Apollinarius' doctrine constitutes a secondary reason for doubting that his teaching was consistent. Although they all assume consistency, and most dismiss Lietzmann's hypothesis that there was a genuine change, they provide a variety of accounts of *the* Apollinarian doctrine, none of which are wholly convincing when weighed against all the surviving material. The various interpretations outlined above tend to focus upon certain aspects of Apollinarius' teaching, thereby showing the shortcomings of previous interpretations which may have 'neglected' such aspects by focusing upon others and making those the key to the Apollinarian 'system'. All the interpretations tend to be at their least convincing when trying to prove consistency: (e.g.) Norris argues for consistency with reference to an omnipresent *formula* – πνεῦμα-σάρξ[58] – but this does not necessarily indicate the consistency of the derived Christology once an animal ψυχή is admitted in the σάρξ rather than the πνεῦμα. Norris' subtle attempt to explain the evident differences between the 'dichotomic' and more 'ethical' 'trichotomic' works in terms of whether a (consistent) anthropology supplies the 'form' or 'motive' for Apollinarius' (consistent) Christology[59] is also unconvincing in that if an anthropology supplies the particular form of a Christology then it also supplies a basic 'motive'.

Evidence of a Particular Form of Inconsistency

We notice what appears to be an interesting and more specific type of inconsistency in the teaching of Apollinarius when we weigh the surviving evidence from his dogmatic writings against the most persuasive and influential of the modern interpretations. This inconsistency is particularly interesting given the nature of the interpretive discussion since Lietzmann, because it apparently coincides with the 'dichotomic'-'trichotomic' division of the texts.

In his influential essays upon the Christology of Apollinarius Henri de Riedmatten has emphasised the importance of the μία φύσις formula and drawn attention to its

[58] Norris,pp.88-91.
[59] Norris,pp.93-94.

peculiarly Apollinarian sense which is, in his view, primarily vitalistic and 'biological'. In a key passage of his interpretation, de Riedmatten defines the Apollinarian conception of unity which lies behind the μία φύσις formula and does so in *compositional* terms:

> 'In the writings of Apollinarius this formula neither points directly at the unity of the person of the Word Incarnate nor to a particular state of the nature of the Word in the incarnation... In a word, μία φύσις describes Christ as man, as composed of Word and flesh on the model of the human μία φύσις, which is neither soul nor body but the compound (le composé) of the two. It is the indivisible unity of this compound which requires the '*communicatio idiomatum*' and not the convention of attribution to a unique person who is the Son of God.'[60]

Other eminent scholars have since shared de Riedmatten's view, identifying the conception of *union by composition* as foundational to the Christology of Apollinarius. For example, Aloys Grillmeier writes:

> 'The metaphysical framework from which Apollinarius seeks to interpret the being of Christ is a picture of the substantial unity of a man as a synthesis of body and soul. For him the God-man is a "σύνθεσις ἀνθρωποειδής", a compound unity in human form... Now if a true compound unity in human form consisting of one heavenly element and one earthly element is to be achieved then both these two elements must be related as "parts" of a "whole"... The idea of "parts" rather introduces us to the inner structure of the Apollinarian picture of Christ. Apollinarius can speak quite simply of "parts" because something new, a "totality", is produced when the Logos takes flesh. The basic thought of the Apollinarian system, which logically leads to Arianism, becomes clear in this passage...' [sc. *De Unione* 5, L.p.187, ll.7-10].[61]

Likewise, R.A. Norris writes:

> 'Essential then, to an understanding of the form of Apollinarius' Christology is not only a grasp of his sense of the similarity in kind between human and divine πνεῦμα, but also a comprehension of his view of the unity of man's two-fold nature. This unity Apollinarius writes is not that which belongs to what is 'simple' (τὸ ἁπλοῦν), but a synthetic unity (see Fr.123) which is composed of parts whose mutual relationship is constitutive...'.[62]

The opinion of these scholars is plainly borne out by a number of statements wherein Apollinarius explains the mode of the physical union (ἕνωσις) between the divinity and

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[60] Riedmatten[2],p.218.
[61] Grillmeier,A,pp.330-332.
[62] Norris,pp.103-104.

flesh/a body using the terminology of composition (σύνθεσις, σύνθετος, συντίθημι, συνίστημι). These statements are particularly prevalent in the 'dichotomic' works where the μία φύσις formula is also most in evidence. The term σύνθεσις was employed in contemporary secular philosophy to denote a particular type of physical union, so it could be that Apollinarius has a precise and technical idea of union by composition when he uses this term and its cognates. It is in the *KMP*, one of his 'trichotomic' works, that Apollinarius comes closest to giving a definition of what he means by σύνθεσις:

> 'We also assert that the Triad (is) one God, but we do not perceive the one as (being) out of a synthesis of three (ἐκ συνθέσεως τριῶν) for that, which has been made to exist out of a synthesis is (in) every part incomplete (μέρος γὰρ ἅπαν ἀτελὲς τὸ ἐκ συνθέσεως ὑφιστάμενον)'.[63]

This statement occurs in a section of Trinitarian exposition where Apollinarius' primary concern is to reject the 'Sabellian' doctrine of God, by exposing the unsuitability of σύνθεσις as a concept for explaining divine unity in plurality. However, what is particularly interesting about the statement, given what scholars have said about the foundationality of union by a synthesis to Apollinarian Christology, is that it seems to expose equally, by the same definition, the unsuitability of σύνθεσις as a concept for explaining *Christ's* divine unity in plurality. In the Trinitarian sections of *KMP* Apollinarius makes it clear that he believes that the divine Word is not a part of, nor a faculty within, something or someone else, but a perfect person and a hypostasis in his own right.[64] In the first Christological statement he makes clear that it is this very same divine Word himself who takes flesh, 'standing firm in his identity (ταυτότητι) and without change to his (perfect) divine nature'.[65] Albeit that the Trinitarian problem of unity in plurality is not identical to the incarnational, it seems extraordinary that Apollinarius should have chosen to define σύνθεσις thus in a Trinitarian section of a work and then gone on to use it as a key concept in the Christological sections. But he does not! If we look at the Christological sections of *KMP* we find virtually no evidence of the language or conceptuality of union by composition as defined in *KMP* 18, or as characterised by modern commentators upon Apollinarian Christology. We find very little evidence either of the other terms denoting

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[63] *KMP* 18,L.p.173,ll.13-15.
[64] E.g.*KMP*1,L.p.167,l.18-p.168,l.4; *KMP*37 L.p.181,ll.14-17; *KMP*13-15.
[65] *KMP* 2,L.p.168,ll.7-8.

physical union which may be used by Apollinarius elsewhere as near equivalents of σύνθεσις (e.g. σύγκρασις, κρᾶσις, μῖξις). The principal Apollinarian idea of the Christological unity in *KMP* does not appear to be μία φύσις understood vitalistically or 'biologically'. The unity of Christ in this work is identified more obviously with the unchanging (person and hypostasis of the) Word himself (which rather supports the type of interpretation preferred by Voisin and Richard). In this work the unitive action is more typically presented as the divine Word's assumption (προσλαμβάνειν) of human flesh.[66] At first sight, the same also appears to be true of the other trichotomic writings. The language of σύνθεσις and similar (?) physical modes of union is not obviously predominant, and much more to the fore are statements to do with the divine Word's bearing, wearing, possession and taking of the flesh. Theodoret is one ancient witness who notices this incarnational theme in Apollinarius' writings. Having thrice cited from the *KMP*, he impresses upon his monophysite opponent that, 'even Apollinarius the writer of heretical babbling, confesses the divine Word to be immutable, and states that He was not turned into flesh but assumed flesh (σάρκα ἀνειληφένα) and this over and over again as you have heard'.[67] Theodoret wants to show the fifth century monophysites that there is evidence that even Apollinarius (the 'father' of their heresy) subscribed to Theodoret's own 'orthodox' interpretation of *Jn.* 1.14 whereby the incarnational 'becoming' is understood as 'taking'.[68]

We are led to wonder whether this apparent difference in typical terminology and unitive conception, coinciding as it does with the 'dichotomic'-'trichotomic' division of the writings, marks some sort of significant shift in Apollinarius' thinking. Has the 'basic' idea of union by composition been replaced by an idea of unity by 'divine assumption' or are these two ideas not mutually exclusive? Identification of the Word with the human νοῦς as opposed to the animal ψυχή would appear to encourage a less 'compositional', more 'spiritualist', understanding of his unity with flesh – i.e. the carnal form which he 'assumed'. Nevertheless, the 'trichotomy' is still in some respects a model of unity by tripartite composition, whilst Theodoret is equally able to find statements referring to 'unity' by divine 'assumption' in one of Apollinarius' 'dichotomic' works.[69] This prompts us to ask a more specific question, which appears to be worth investigating. Was Apollinarian

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[66] *KMP* 2,L.p.168,l.7,*KMP* 28,L.p.177,l.6;Fr.1,L.p.185,ll.4-5.
[67] Theodoret,*Eranistes I* (*MPG* 83.104D)E.T. Jackson,B.,*NPNF*,vol.3,p.182.
[68] See Theodoret,*Eranistes I* (*MPG* 83.37Aff).
[69] Fr.121-124 from the *Contra Diodorum* (*KKB*),see Theodoret,*Eranistes 1*(*MPG*83.104A-C).

Christology consistently informed by a conception of compositional unity or not, and if so what was the precise nature of this conception? Referring to the Apollinarian usage of the term σύνθετος Lampe's *Patristic Lexicon* acknowledges that the answer to such a question has remained unclear: 'In Apollinarian writings Apollinarius appears to reject notion in relation to Christ... [see, Fr.123; cf. *Ad.Dion.A*9]: ...but describes nature resulting from union as φύσεως σ. μεταξὺ οὔσης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων'...[see, Fr.111]; so also his followers... [see, Eunomius and Julian]...; but Polemon writes of Tim Beryt... [see, Fr.174]...'.[70]

The Purpose and Method of this Investigation

It was these initial observations about the dogmatic writings of Apollinarius and what has been previously said about them, which determined the specific purpose of my own reinvestigation of the texts. I was particularly interested to find out whether the apparent absence of the language and conceptuality of union by composition in the *KMP* and Apollinarius' apparent preference for the idea of union by divine 'assumption' applauded by Theodoret marks some sort of significant discontinuity in Apollinarian thought. For, although the most influential among modern commentators have argued that an idea of compositional unity is foundational to the Christological doctrine which Apollinarius consistently maintained, and, although this type of idea is certainly present in some of his writings, most notably the 'dichotomic', here, in this carefully considered 'trichotomic' confession, the idea of σύνθεσις appears to be absent, almost by definition, neither is it very obviously present in his other 'trichotomic' works. There are many reasons for believing that Apollinarian thought was not as consistent as has been previously assumed and some indication that the evident inconsistency may be related to some sort of genuine change in Apollinarius' basic conception of the union and/or Christological 'theory', as reported by Rufinus, as postulated by Lietzmann and as perhaps reflected by the evident 'dichotomic'/'trichotomic' division of his works according to their distinctive terminology and argumentation. If Apollinarius chose to abandon the conception of union by composition when writing the *KMP* and possibly the other 'trichotomic' works in favour of other (possibly more 'orthodox') conceptions of the unity, this would constitute a genuine

[70] Lampe,G.W.H.,*A Patristic Greek Lexicon*,1961,pp.1329-1330.

change in his Christological doctrine, or at least its underlying conception of unity, if, indeed, an idea of union by composition is foundational to the other works as has been argued. With these possibilities in mind I decided to re-examine the 'dichotomic' and 'trichotomic' writings of Apollinarius to see if the evidence suggests that this, or a similarly significant change, did occur in Apollinarius' underlying conception of the incarnational union/unity and (consequently) in the Christological theory based upon it. I was also keen to establish in so far as possible the context and reliability of each document in order to gain some insight into the historical background, motive and sequence of any such discernible change in Apollinarian thought.

To this end I elected to work systematically through the two groups of Apollinarian documents according to the division customarily made by scholarship.[71] I chose to examine the 'dichotomic' documents first since these are generally regarded as 'earlier' than the 'trichotomic' even by scholars who do not accept the Lietzmann 'hypothesis' and since, even without Rufinus' testimony, such a sequence seems more logically probable than the reverse (i.e. it is easier to understand how the trichotomic Christology/anthropology, and in particular the 'trichotomic' sense of ψυχή, could be a subsequent refinement of the 'dichotomic' position rather than *vice versa*). I chose to approach each document as a separate exegetical task and to proceed methodically because a common weakness of previous interpretations has been their tendency to put together a picture of Apollinarian Christology by selecting excerpts from various works and then weaving them together without giving proper consideration to the differing contexts of such statements within the original arguments to which they belong and (often) within the subsequent argument of those who have preserved them.[72] Thus, I considered the source, 'authenticity', and (probable) context of each document, before translating the text and noting the structure of the Apollinarian argument. I then analysed the dogmatic content of each document. My chief concern was to identify the typical way (or ways) in which Apollinarius appears to conceive or chooses to explain the mode of the unitive action and the nature of the (resulting?) Christological unity (i.e. who and what Christ is). In particular, I considered whether a 'compositional' conception of unity was present, and if so, what the precise nature of this conception was and to what extent it was basic to the Christological thesis. I also looked for any other conceptions of the union/unity which were in evidence, considering to

[71] See (e.g.) Riedmatten[2],p.209 n.[1];Norris,p.83.
[72] See (e.g.) Wolfson,H.A.,*Philosophy of the Fathers*,vol.1,1956,pp.435-444.

what extent these (also) informed Apollinarius' Christology and whether they were compatible with the 'compositional' conception or a departure from it. In particular, I considered whether or not an 'assumptional' idea similar to the one identified by Theodoret in *KMP* was present and to what extent this was (also) basic to the Apollinarian argument. I noted the terminology most typically employed by Apollinarius to denote the mode of the union and the unity, taking particular note of how he employed what were to become key Christological terms and whether such usage was generally consistent, or inconsistently determined according to (more than one) unitive conception. The chapters that follow retrace the steps of this investigative process.

[Note: hereafter I will use the abbreviation 'D.' for 'dichotomic' and the abbreviation 'T.' for 'trichotomic'. Before I proceed with my own analysis I will recapitulate some helpful terminological distinctions which have been already drawn by others.]

The Terminology of Composition and Mixture

(A Recapitulation of Technical Distinctions drawn by R.A. Norris and H.A. Wolfson)

Henri de Riedmatten cites Fr.111 and Fr.149 as joint examples of the Apollinarian concept of physical unity, but the former speaks of a composite (σύνθετος) nature and the latter a co-mixed (σύγκρατος) nature.[73] If we are to embark upon an investigation of Apollinarius' idea of union by composition we should not be too quick to assume that he used such terms as semantic equivalents. Norris and Wolfson have carefully delineated the differing senses of the various terms employed in fourth century physics and philosophical anthropology to denote distinct types of physical union.[74] These technical distinctions may have, to some extent, determined Apollinarius' choice of terminology, and they provide a useful means of describing more idiosyncratic usage, so they are worthy of recapitulation, before we proceed.

According to Norris, a Stoic doctrine of mixture remained influential in the fourth century as a means of describing the mode of the body-soul union. Norris delineates three types of Stoic mixture as distinguished by Alexander of Aphrodisias in *De Mixtione* and

[73] Riedmatten[1],p.252.
[74] Norris,pp.67-78;Wolfson,H.A.,*Philosophy of the Fathers*,vol.1,1956,pp.372-385.

compares these with three types of mixture distinguished by Aristotle in *De Generatione et Corruptione*. The six types can be categorised as follows:

(1) *Aristotelian Synthesis* (σύνθεσις) = an 'inert mixture', a juxtapositioning of small parts of the constituent elements. These elements do not interact or change each other and retain their distinctive properties.

(2) *Aristotelian Mixture* (κρᾶσις or μῖξις) = a mixture/blending in which the two elements involved reciprocally change each other to an equal extent so that a *tertium quid* is formed: 'a compound in which the distinctive properties of the ingredients remain potentially (with the consequences that the compound can be analysed into its original elements), but in which they are actually superseded by the properties of an intermediate substance'.[75]

(3) *Aristotelian Mixture/Union – of Predominance* (κρᾶσις or μῖξις) = a special type of mixture/blending where one of the elements dominates the weaker transforming it into itself (e.g. as in a mixture of form and matter, or in a mixture of 10,000 gallons of water and one drop of wine).

(4) *Stoic Juxtaposition* (παράθεσις) = Aristotelian Synthesis (see, (1), above).

(5) *Stoic Mixture/Confusion* (σύγχυσις) = a stronger version of Aristotelian Mixture (see, (2), above): 'a mixture in which both ingredients are altered, and which (unlike the Aristotelian κρᾶσις) cannot be resolved again into its elements'.[76]

(6) *Stoic Mixture of Wholes* (κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων) = 'a mutual and total interpenetration of two material substances in which each maintains all its characteristic properties unaltered so that even in their intimate union the two substances remain distinct'.[77] By the *Mixture of Wholes* the Stoics attempted to delineate a type of mixture holding a mid-position between *Juxtaposition* and *Confusion*, neither of which was an appropriate model for the

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[75] Norris,p.69.
[76] Norris,p.69.
[77] Norris,pp.69-70.

psychosomatic union. (Given the materialism of the Stoic view it is hard to see how there can be an interpenetration of material substances which is not ultimately reducible to either (4)/(1) or (5)/(2).) Norris argues that the fourth century Neo-Platonists may have criticised (6), but they saw its potential value as a means of explaining the unity of soul and body. With reference to Plotinus, Porphyry and Nemesius, Norris delineates a seventh type of (quasi-)mixture which found employment in fourth century philosophical anthropology.

(7) *Neo-Platonic Incorporeal-Corporeal Mixture* = a union/mixture which can exist between something immaterial and something corporeal. The former is able to interpenetrate the latter at every point, making itself present whilst remaining unchanged by a volitional action variously described as 'intention/inclination' (νεῦσις), or 'illumination' (ἐλλάμψις), or 'relationship/attachment' (σχέσις), or 'attention' (ἐπιστροφή).

In his earlier study Wolfson delineates the 'five kinds of union of physical things' supplied by secular philosophy to the Fathers formulating the doctrine of Christ:[78] 'Union of Composition' (= (1)/(4), above); 'Union of Mixture in the Aristotelian sense' (= (2), above); 'Union of Mixture in the Stoic Sense' (= (6), above); 'Union of Confusion' (= (5) above); 'Union of Predominance ' (= (3), above). The main difference between Wolfson's analysis and that of Norris, therefore, is that he fails to recognise (7), overestimating instead the influence of (3) upon the incarnational doctrine of all Christologians from Tertullian to Cyril and beyond.

According to the definitions supplied by Norris and Wolfson, union by σύνθεσις should theoretically be equated with παράθεσις and contrasted with the 'closer' types of union denoted by κρᾶσις and μῖξις, etc. But it is interesting that neither scholar makes the Peripatetic/Stoic sense prescriptive when considering the Apollinarian idea of composition. Norris focuses mainly upon Apollinarius' characteristic use of the language of (συγ)κρᾶσις and μῖξις, but seems to admit that he uses the language of σύνθεσις as its near equivalent and therefore in a 'stronger' (non-technical) sense to denote a *Stoic Mixture of Wholes*.[79] Wolfson argues that Apollinarius used the language of composition (and mixture) to denote

[78] Wolfson,H.A.,*Philosophy of the Fathers*,vol.1,1956,p.385.

[79] Discussing *Ep.Ad Dionysium A* 8-9,a passage in which Apollinarius employs the term σύνθεσις and σύνθετος,Norris (p.109) writes:'Neither constituent is a composite nature in itself within the nature because the single nature of Christ is the σύνθεσις, the σύγκρασις, of the two'.

the 'stronger' Aristotelian concept of *Union by Predominance*.[80] Thus, despite these useful definitions which we must bear in mind, the terminology of σύνθεσις found in the writings of Apollinarius potentially has a semantic range from παράθεσις to σύγχυσις.

[80] Wolfson,H.A.,*Philosophy of the Fathers*,vol.1,1956,pp.443-444.

2

THE IDEA OF COMPOSITIONAL UNITY IN THE 'DICHOTOMIC' (D.) WRITINGS OF APOLLINARIUS

The First Epistle to Dionysius (Ad Dionysium A)[1]

Source, Authenticity, Context and Content

This epistle was passed down among the writings attributed to Julius of Rome the anti-Arian Pope (337-352) who supported Athanasius during his second exile. Justinian, in his *Contra Monophysitas* (composed c.542-543), and the author of the *Doctrina De Verbi Incarnatione* (the seventh century summary of Chalcedonian doctrine) both quote from *Ad Dionysium A* 6 specifying that Apollinarius wrote the letter.[2] Lietzmann shares their opinion because it is confirmed by one of Apollinarius' disciples, Valentinus.[3] We have no external clues as to the original context of this letter other than the name and possible status of the addressee. There are four Greek manuscripts of the letter: two specify that Dionysius was a bishop of Corinth, and two that he was a bishop of Alexandria. When Justinian quotes from *Ad Dionysium A* 6 he refers to Dionysius as a 'presbyter' and this information is also passed on by Eutyches when he quotes §§1-7 of ('Julian's') *Ep. Ad Dionysium* to Pope Leo. Lietzmann believes this to be the more probable status of Apollinarius' addressee, given that we know of no such Alexandrian or Corinthian bishop in the second half of the fourth century.[4]

Lietzmann's suggestion that Dionysius may have been an 'Apollinarian' cleric makes sense if we consider the contents of the letter. In the epistle Apollinarius appears to be writing to an associate offering him advice on how he should respond to the views of a group within his church who confess the same Christology (viz. 'that God from heaven has

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[1] L.p.156,l.18-p.262,l.4(E.T.pp.298-301,below).
[2] See L.p.109;p.111.
[3] Valentinus prefaces his *Capita Apologiae* (see,L.p.287-291) with twelve citations attributing nine to Apollinarius himself including two from *Ad Dionysium A* (excerpted from §1 and §10).
[4] L.pp.147-149.

been enfleshed of the virgin and is one with the flesh' (§1)), but who employ a novel terminology of two natures. Apollinarius' letter seeks to demonstrate that those who speak thus depart from the substance as well as the language of the true confession. Apollinarius subjects this two-natures Christology to several lines of criticism (§§1,2(a),3-6(a),8) introducing his own doctrine of one nature (§§2,6) as a counter-thesis. Apollinarius advocates the idea of one nature in Christ linked to a very specific view of physical unity (§9) by demonstrating the anthropological (§§2(b),8), scriptural (§§9-11), and soteriological (§12) coherence of such a conception.

The Conception of the Union

A conception of union by composition (κατὰ σύνθεσιν) in a composite singularity (τῷ συνθέτῳ) is central to the exposition of Apollinarius' anti-dyophysite argument and to the explanation of his predicative practice.

> 'But if both things are one thing (ἕν ἑκάτερόν ἐστι) according to the union and the combination and the composition in human form (κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν καὶ τὴν σύνοδον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὴν ἀνθρωποειδῆ) then one name is suitable for what is composite (τῷ συνθέτῳ) – "(that which) is uncreated" (τὸ ἄκτιστον) in virtue of (ἀπὸ) the divinity, "(that which is) created" in virtue of the body, "(that which is) impassible" in virtue of the divinity and "(that which is) passible" in virtue of the body. And just as we hear from Paul that Christ suffers [*Acts* 26.23] we do not hear (that this is) "in part" (μερικῶς) nor do we hold that the divinity suffers, so too "(that which is) creature and servant" is not said of part (μερικῶς) nor does it make the divinity a creature or servant. And further "(that which is) uncreated" does not make the flesh uncreated nor is it said in part (μερικῶς) only of the divinity.'[5]

Since σύνθεσις is the most technical of the three terms chosen to describe the mode of the union, and because Apollinarius has placed it last in the series, it serves to determine the sense of the other two: that this was Apollinarius' intention seems to be confirmed by his choice of adjective (σύνθετος) for denoting the resulting unity. This vocabulary is introduced at what appears to be a defining moment in the exposition of Apollinarius' counter-thesis. It does not employ the 'one nature' formula which Apollinarius earlier uses in connection with his own thesis (§§2,6), but it displays obvious connections, recapitulating the anthropological analogy (§2) and aspects of the soteriological justification: 'we confess

[5] *Ad Dionysium A* 9,L.p.259,l.23-p.260,l.10.

one nature of the impassible divinity and the passible flesh so that our baptism into God and the death of the Lord might be accomplished' (§6).[6] In *Ad Dionysium A* 9 Apollinarius' own idea of natural unity, previously alluded to unexpansively (τὸ καθ' ἕνωσιν ἕν (§3)), or by undeveloped analogy (§2), or in association with confessional practice and soteriological reality (§6), receives, for the first time in the treatise, more explicit definition in compositional terms. *Ad Dionysium A* 9 is also a key moment in Apollinarius' explanation of his predicative practice. He has been accused of cross-predicating the divine and bodily attributes, but he explains that his practice is to predicate inclusively to the whole (§7). In §9 he shows how this convention has its basis in the reality of a particular type of (synthetic) union: 'if both are one κατὰ σύνθεσιν [*protasis*]... then one name is suitable for what is composite [*apodasis*]'.

The idea of 'synthetic' unity which Apollinarius defines in *Ad Dionysium A* 9 and has in mind elsewhere in the epistle does not appear to be 'juxtaposition', 'predominance', κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων or 'Neo-Platonic mixture';[7] it displays a *prima facie* resemblance to the type of physical union which Aristotle calls 'mixture': divinity and a body are indivisibly united because they are the constituent elements of a *tertium quid* (the one thing (§§3,9)/ nature (§§2,6)/whole (§§4,7,10)/compound (§9)/life (§10)) to which divine and human attributes jointly apply (§6); the elements can still be formally distinguished (§§7,9) and one does not become another (§10); ...(?) the *tertium quid* has an intermediate generic nature thereby involving the constituent elements in some sort of qualitative change.

An Aristotelian mixture involves reciprocal change and results not only in a *tertium quid,* but a *tertium quiddity.* The constituents: 'change out of their own nature...yet neither becomes the other, but both become what is intermediate and common'.[8] There are at least two statements in *Ad Dionysium A* which suggest Apollinarius' understanding of the compositional unity between the divine and the corporeal may be this radical:

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[6] L.p.258,l.19-p.259,l.2.

[7] In a 'juxtaposition' the constituent elements do not inter-react or change which would render unnecessary the qualifying parenthesis in §10:'the body enduring as a body (even) in the synthesis (τῇ συνθέσει) and the divinity as divinity' (L.p.260,ll.17-18). The statement which ends §10 seems to rule out 'predominance':'one thing shares with the other in being named...without the body being changed into the disembodied' (L.p.261,ll.1-3). It seems unlikely that Apollinarius has the Stoic 'mixture of wholes' in mind either, since he uses τὸ ὅλον several times to denote the (composite) unity rather than the duality. He certainly does not see a mutual interpretation of two whole natures (§§2,8). Neither is it very apparent that his concept of the union owes much to the Neo-Platonic conception of incorporeal-corporeal mixture:the divine element is depicted as source of life rather than volition (§8) and, in §3, Apollinarius does not give the human spirit special status – he regards it as one of the many kinds of things (πολυειδὲς) which make up the bodily nature.

[8] Aristotle,*De Gen.et Corr.*1,10 328^{a},29-31.

'there is one nature... since the body is not a proper nature (ἰδιά φύσις) and the divinity is not a proper nature in respect of the enfleshment'(§2)[9]; 'the body is not of itself (καθ' ἑαυτὸ) a nature in the one Christ since it is not life-giving according to itself and it cannot be saved away from the life-giving Word. Nor is the Word by itself divided into its own nature (καθ' ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἰδίαν μερίζεται φύσιν) which it possesses (ἔχει) in respect of being that which is fleshless (τὸ ἄσαρκον) since the Lord came into the world in flesh and not fleshlessly'(§8).[10]

Although the statements in §§2, 8 are suggestive, Apollinarius may *not* be saying that the divine and human natures are qualitatively changed by the incarnational union superseded by the composite (generic) nature belonging to Christ. He may rather be stressing that the divine and human elements are existentially interdependent correlatives within the one nature that is Christ. In the passage from §2 (above) Apollinarius may be using ἴδιος in its secondary sense of 'distinct or separate' to denote the fact that the divinity and the body are *existentially,* rather than qualitatively, inseparable.[11] Apollinarius' conception of composite unity/μία φύσις is informed by an anthropological analogue (§§2,9) which within *Ad Dionysium A* receives little explicit definition. In the passage from §8 (above) Apollinarius hints that being a nature from the body's perspective involves *dependency* upon a life principle rather than ownership of a set of properties. Thus Apollinarius' conception of compositional union in one nature may be guided by an anthropological model which is more vital/dynamic than Aristotelian mixture and which may better preserve the elements from implication in change and partialisation. To develop further our understanding of Apollinarius' notion of compositional unity/μία φύσις 'as man is one nature', it is necessary to turn to passages of anthropological exposition in other treatises.

It is interesting that the idea of composite unity in *Ad Dionysium A* also bears a resemblance to the concept of σύνθεσις which Apollinarius rejects as a suitable (Trinitarian) model of divine unity-in-plurality in the T. *KMP* 1 & 18: it is the antithesis of a union of persons (§7); it is the union of impersonal element*s* (most typically divinity and a body) – the singular person of the union seems to be identified with the composite unity produced (§§2,7); the element*s* are partial/imperfect, either in themselves, or in relation to

[9] L.p.257,ll.15-17.
[10] L.p.259,ll.15-20.
[11] Ambiguity is caused, and to some extent persists, because Apollinarius *does* use ἴδιος in connection with φύσις qualitatively in §8 to refer to the Word's 'own' non-incarnate nature.

the composite which they co-form (see, §§2,8, where *vis-à-vis* the one nature of Christ the divinity and the body are both in some sense(s) not fully natures themselves).

There is another idea of Christological unity in *Ad Dionysium A*: the Lord is one enduring masculine individual (ὁ αὐτός)/divine subject/person(?), both agent of creation and born of a woman, both Son of God and Son of Man.[12] Christ is 'God enfleshed'.[13] This idea draws on the language of scripture and tradition; it is less technical and less prominent and features most obviously in Apollinarius' refutation of the Samosatan error to which he believes dyophysitism is logically related (§§1,2,3,5). This other idea of Christological unity may not, however, be fully systematic with Apollinarius' central expository idea of unity by composition, which draws more upon anthropology and the language of physics. In *Ad Dionysium A* 2 we find the two conceptions juxtaposed rather than fully integrated and *both* informing Apollinarius' declaration of μία φύσις:

> 'if he who was brought forth from the holy virgin was designated "one individual (εἷς)" and is the same (αὐτός) as he "through all things were made", [1 Cor.8.6] *there is one nature* (μία φύσις ἐστίν) *since* (ἐπειδή) [=*first reason*] one person does not possess a division into two (πρόσωπον ἕν οὐκ ἔχον εἰς δύο διαίρεσιν), *and since* (ἐπεὶ μηδὲ) [=*second reason*] the body is not a proper nature and the divinity is not a proper nature in respect of the enfleshment but, just as a man is one nature, so also he who was made in the likeness of men – Christ.'[14]

The interpretative disagreements between Voisin and de Riedmatten over what constitutes the basis of Apollinarius' monophysitism provides secondary indication that Apollinarius may have juxtaposed rather than synthesised two differing conceptions of the Christological unity in this passage. The 'first reason' for μία φύσις lends support to Voisin's view that Apollinarius began with the idea of one (divine) person/subject and saw the singularity of the (possessed) nature as 'correlative': the 'second reason' lends support to de Riedmatten's view that the comparison with a composite human nature is foundational to Apollinarius' conception of μία φύσις. Accordingly, de Riedmatten's refutation of Voisin's reading of the

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[12] E.g.L.p.257,ll.11-15(this passage arguably supplies the primary basis for Apollinarius' subsequent assertion of one person and one nature);L.p.257,l.20;L.p.258,l.11.

[13] L.p.256,l.20;p.261,l.24.

[14] L.p.257,ll.13-19. This is not the only possible reading of this passage. It could be that Apollinarius is using 'nature' and 'person' as near equivalent terms with the second ἐπεὶ clause explaining the first:'he is one nature since (his) one person (= nature) does not possess a division into two, since the body is not a proper nature and the divinity is not a proper nature, etc.'.

passage from *Ad Dionysium A* 2 is not wholly convincing,[15] yet neither does Voisin's interpretation do justice to the passage in its entirety, nor to the dominant idea of unity in the epistle as a whole. Each scholar has perhaps fastened on to one of the two ideas and tried to make it *the* idea. Apollinarius may not have consciously offered two different arguments for the unity of nature in *Ad Dionysium A* 2: we may find him, unselfconsciously, coming at the problem of Christ's unity from two different angles. His first line of thought is to do with unity of (divine) subject and is more instinctive, based on confessional and scriptural parlance; his second line of thought, to do with 'compositional' unity, is more consciously contrived and draws on an anthropological analogy and the technical language of physical union. The second line of thought is, without doubt, the dominant conception of unity in *Ad Dionysium A*, but the co-presence of the first conception, not altogether systematic with the second, may prove to be significant.

Concerning the Union (De Unione)[16]

Sources, Authenticity, Context and Content

This short D. treatise has also been passed on in the tradition among the writings attributed to Julius of Rome – in this case his 'Fifth Epistle'. Lietzmann establishes that Apollinarius is the real author of the work on the basis of Timothy of Berytus' letter to fellow Apollinarian Homonius, preserved by Leontius of Byzantium in *Adv. Fraudes* 138.[17] At the end of this letter Timothy quotes a number of passages taken from the writings of their esteemed master. The first two are from *De Unione* (from §2 and §8) and the first is

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[15] De Riedmatten is critical of the fact that Voisin's reading of *Ad Dionysium A* 2 is based upon the *Muratori* variant – 'the defective text published by Dräseke', which gives 'μία φύσις ἐστίν ἐπειδὴ πρόσωπον ἕν ἔχων εἰς δυό οὐ διαιρεῖται' rather than Lietzmann's '...πρόσωπον ἕν ἔχον εἰς δύο διαίρεσιν'(L.p.257,l.16). 'This reading is valueless'(see Riedmatten[1],pp.254-255). Perhaps the nom. participle of ἔχω and the passive mood of διαιρέω in the *Muratori* variant *are* more suggestive of the causal link which Voisin sees, but it is hard to see how the Lietzmann version rules Voisin's reading out. De Riedmatten would seem to be splitting hairs when he argues ''Επειδὴ' means "since", not "because", and ἐπεί μηδέ is parallel to it'. The conjunction *can* be used casually. De Riedmatten regards the second ἐπεί clause as determinative:'the remainder of the passage shows well enough that the argument is not derived primarily from metaphysics'. It seems inconsistent that he regards this second clause as the causal explanation of the first ἐπειδὴ phrase which he will not admit as casual. Nevertheless, there is insufficient justification for Voisin's view that the first clause represents an incontrovertible 'philosophical principle'(Voisin,p.280).

[16] L.p.185,l.7-p.193,l.2(E.T.pp.302-306,below).

[17] See L.p.277,l.18-p.258,l.29.

introduced with a near exact reference to the opening line of the treatise.[18] Whilst we have a good idea of the subsequent contexts of *De Unione* 2, and 8, we have no external clues as to the context in which Apollinarius wrote the whole treatise. It is therefore only from the content that we gain some insight into the original purpose of *De Unione.*

De Unione is a carefully constructed treatise which interprets the incarnational union by means of a highly original and specific thesis: it employs the analogy of one human nature constituted from two parts (soul and body) to explain the mode of union between the divinity and the body (§5), and it goes on further to explain their union as a unique act of vivification (§§10-12), originating in a unique act of conception (§13). The treatise also advocates the practice of inclusive (κοινῶς)[19] predication of Christ's divine and human attributes to 'the whole'. This practice is justified in terms of the theory of the union, and the theory and practice are in turn substantiated by scriptural citations (particularly from the sayings of Jesus himself).[20] *De Unione* gives fewer clues than *Ad Dionysium A* as to its occasion. The treatise may recommend a unity of one nature, but there is no explicit polemic against a dyophysite alternative.[21] In *De Unione* Apollinarius' primary concern is the advocacy of his own position . However, the structure of Apollinarius' argument, which alternates between a theory of predication and a corresponding theory of union, may well indicate that the treatise had an apologetic, as well as expository, motive: it begins with a boldly 'inclusive' statement about the 'holy offspring' and what follows seems to be an attempt to demonstrate that this is indeed 'rightly confessed' (καλῶς ὁμολογεῖται), given the union which underpins it. It could be, therefore, that Apollinarius wrote the treatise as an apology for his use of the *communicatio idiomatum* in other Christological statements which may have been misunderstood or misrepresented by his enemies. Alternatively, Apollinarius could have been clarifying his predicative practice and his related theory of union for the benefit of his own disciples, who may have questioned or misinterpreted the meaning of earlier pronouncements.

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[18] See L.pp.133-135;p.104,nos.15,16.
[19] L.p.188,l.9;p.191,l.17.
[20] E.g.*Jn.*17.5(§7);*Jn.*17.19;*Jn.*10.36;*Jn.*18.37(§§10-13).
[21] L.p.185,ll.9-11.

The Conception of the Union

At two key moments in the passages wherein he defines his theory of the union, Apollinarius uses the verb συνίστημι to refer both to the unity (ἑνότης/σύγκρασις) in Christ – 'one constituted nature' (φύσις μία συνισταμένη) (§5) – and the unitive action by which 'the holy foetus is constituted' (συνίσταται) (§13):

> 'It is confessed that in Him, the creature is in a unity (ἑνότητι) with the uncreated, the uncreated in a co-mixture (συγκράσει) with the creature, one nature being constituted (συνισταμένης) out of each of two parts, the Word having contributed the energy part to the whole with the divine perfection';[22] 'The holy foetus from the virgin is constituted from the approaching Spirit and the overshadowing power (ἐκ δὲ πνεύματος ἐφόδου καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπισκιασμοῦ [see *Lk.*1.35] τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τῆς παρθένου συνίσταται βρέφος), and spermatic matter does not make the divine life (ζωήν), but the spiritual and divine power endow the virgin with the divine conception (κύησιν) and bestow the divine childbearing (τοκετόν)'.[23]

Analysis of *De Unione* §5, §13, and the treatise as a whole, indicates that this idea of a constituted divine-corporeal unity/co-mixture is the same or similar to the compositional conception which is central to *Ad Dionysium A*, here even more obviously resembling the type of union by σύνθεσις rejected by Apollinarius in *KMP* 1 and 18.

De Unione 5: Apollinarius explicitly recommends the idea of unity by formation from constituents which are *all* incomplete parts (i.e. union by σύνθεσις, cf. *KMP* 18)[24] as the way in which to understand the incarnational union: 'one nature constituted out of each of two parts (ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους)... just as in the common human being brought into existence out of two incomplete parts (ἐκ δύο μερῶν ἀτελῶν)'. In keeping with this conception of unity and its anthropological model, Apollinarius explicitly prescribes for the Word the role of a part in relation to the whole (nature of) Christ – 'the Word having contributed (συντελέσαντος) the energy part (μερικὴν ἐνέργειαν) to the whole...' adding the paradoxical qualification, '...with the divine perfection' (μετὰ τῆς θεϊκῆς τελειότητος).

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[22] L.p.187,ll.5-9.
[23] L.p.191,ll.7-12.
[24] L.p.173,ll.14-15.

De Unione 13: When Apollinarius says that the 'holy foetus is constituted ἐκ the approach of (divine) spirit', the action he has in mind is not just inceptional – it is compositional. Staying with the Christological model of a human nature 'brought into existence out of two incomplete parts' (§5), Apollinarius considers exactly how such a nature is brought into existence (from the two parts) in the act of procreation: 'the human being is endowed with the soul and lives out of the will of the flesh and the will of a male since the spermatic matter is sent forth conveying the life-giving power into the womb which receives it'.[25] He then applies the logic of this explanation to the virginal conception. In the Virgin's womb the divine 'spirit/power' serving as ψυχή/animating impulse ('the energy part' §5) comes together with an incomplete human part (a body unfurnished with a human soul §12)[26] and out of them is formed 'the holy foetus' which is (thus, also) 'from the Virgin'[27] – the composite unity that is Christ.

De Unione as a whole: The conception of unity which predominates does not obviously display the characteristics of 'juxtaposition', κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, Neo-Platonic 'mixture', or 'predominance'.[28] The concept at the heart of Apollinarius' argument (§§1,5,11-13,17(?)) seems to bear most resemblance to Aristotelian mixture: the unity is referred to most often as if it were a neuter, impersonal entity – the one nature/living thing/whole (τὸ ὅλον) – a *tertium quid* with inclusively predicated attributes; although Apollinarius shows it is possible formally to analyse the attributes into those of the original elements (§§7,14,17), he makes a number of daring statements which suggest that the union of flesh and divinity

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[25] L.p.191,ll.4-7.

[26] 'Thus, the body lived by the sanctification of the divinity and not the equipment (κατασκευῇ) of a human soul (ψυχῆς)'(L.p.190,ll.17-19).

[27] L.p.191,ll.8-9.

[28] Intimations of 'juxtapositional' union are more than offset by other statements which imply a much 'stronger' form of physical union (see p.65,below). Apollinarius' conception of the union bears no obvious allegiance to the Stoic conception of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων: the term ὅλος is used *passim* to denote the resulting unity rather than the two elements in the union, which are treated as parts (§5). Apollinarius' traducian account of the act of conception (§13) seems to be a long way from the Neo-Platonic notion of a spirit 'inclining' to make itself present to matter. Apollinarius gives spermatic *matter* a quasi-instrumental role as vehicle for the soul (L.p.191,ll.6-10). When Apollinarius speaks of the 'travelling spirit and the over shadowing power', his reference is not to the Neo-Platonic idea of spiritual inclination, but Luke's pre-nativity account. In the Neo-Platonic concept the spiritual element takes the volitional initiative: Apollinarius refers explicitly to a volitional impetus from the carnal element: 'the human being is animated and lives by the will of the flesh and the male' (L.p.188,l.14). There is also little evidence that Apollinarius has Aristotelian 'Union of Predominance' in mind. Apollinarius is more careful to specify that the divine element remains unchanged by the union, but he gives at least one firm parallel assurance that the body is not changed either (L.p.188,l.14). In *De Unione* 3-4 he treats the body as the form of the divinity rather than *vice versa*. In §5, the ultimate unity is 'the whole' – this is why he has to specify that the divine 'part' remains perfect.

involves real and reciprocal change via the production of the unity with intermediate titles and properties:

> 'The Lord is rightly confessed a holy offspring from the beginning even according to the body and in respect of this he/it(?) differs from all bodies' (§1);[29] 'This is not to say that the body is by itself/properly(?) (ἰδίως) a created being since it is altogether inseparable from that one whose body it is' (§2);[30] 'He is not disunited *neither in fact* (πράγματι) nor in name when the Lord is called 'Slave' and the Uncreated is designated 'moulded' by (way of) the conjunction' (§4);[31] 'Speaking of the whole, invisible God is transformed (μεταμορφούμενος) by a visible body, uncreated God is made manifest by a created envelope' (§6);[32] 'here there is an act of being sanctified and an act of the embodied' (§11);[33] 'the holy foetus from the virgin is (co-)constituted from the approaching Spirit...' (§13);[34] 'the flesh receives what it did not have: (viz.) impassibility in place of passions, a heavenly way of life in place of an earthly one, royal status in place of servitude under men, to be worshipped above every creature in place of worshipping' (§15).[35]

It is unsurprising, in the light of such statements, that Apollinarius' technical term for this type of union by co-constitution is σύγκρασις (§5). Apollinarius' unitive conception again resembles the type of union by composition rejected in *KMP* 1 and 18: it is unipersonal (§10); it is a union of an impersonal (corporeal) object and (most typically) an impersonal (divine) energy/power, the singular nature being identified with the co-formed whole (§§5, 17(?)), as is the singular person: '*maintaining* the one person (πρόσωπον) and the undivided manifestation of one living thing (ἑνὸς ζώου) he [sc. Jesus in *Jn.*17.19] posits the sanctifying and being sanctified of the whole so that it might be precise and clear to us that one individual (ἄλλος) does not sanctify another'.[36] Some ambiguity is caused by parallel

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[29] L.p.185,ll.9-11.
[30] L.p.186,ll.2-4. De Riedmatten interprets thus:'In *De Unione*...Apollinarius says:"One does not consider that the body is properly speaking (dire proprement) a creature". He confirms from the beginning of the treatise that the holiness makes it different from any other body. The rest leads on to establish the truth of this sacredness and at the same time the difference; it is the profound "biological" unity of the body of Christ with the Word as a result of the virginal conception'(Riedmatten[2],p.219).
[31] L.p.187,ll.2-4.
[32] L.p.187,ll.20-21.
[33] L.p.190,ll.8-9.
[34] L.p.191,ll.7-9.
[35] L.p.192,ll.3-7.
[36] L.p.189,ll.15-19.

references to the divine element using personal titles and the seemingly equivocal usage of φύσις/οὐσία with reference to the enduring character of *both* elements (4,6,8).[37]

In *Ad Dionysium A* Apollinarius' conception of compositional unity/μία φύσις is informed by an anthropological analogue – in *De Unione* this (?) model receives fuller elucidation. Apollinarius has in mind the singularity of man as a psychosomatic whole constituted from two parts in a collaborative union (§5) initiated by the act of human procreation wherein a father supplies the ψυχή/vital impulse and a mother supplies the body/flesh. This model is not a type of unity as defined by theoretical physics, but an actual unity which itself rather resists analysis: the concrete unity of the human being *qua* living organism – τὸ ζῷον (§10). In this context the soul and body are both imperfect in themselves because they are vitally interdependent and require each other to be perfected/complete in the sense of *actually to live as such* within the complex whole (living body) which they co-form.[38] The dependency of the soul/energy part upon that which it ensouls/energises to become fully actual as such is not made quite so explicit by Apollinarius as the vital dependency of the body upon the soul,[39] but perhaps such thinking is implicit in this incarnational statement:

> 'Here there is an act of being sanctified, and here (also) an act of being embodied (τὸ σεσωματῶσθαι) and these acts (τὰ πράγματα) might be divided, but they are united according to the union of the flesh with the divinity, so that one who (τὸν) sanctifies is not divided from another who is sanctified and the enfleshment itself is wholly a sanctification (αὕτη δὲ ὅλως ἡ σάρκωσίς ἐστιν ἁγιασμός)'.[40]

Henri de Riedmatten has drawn attention to the way in which Apollinarius conceives the Christological unity/μία φύσις in a distinctively vitalistic/biological way. He sees the psychosomatic model of *De Unione* 5 and related quasi-traducian account of the virginal conception in *De Unione*13 as 'formal' to this conception, and, in his first essay, he rather suggests that the vitalistic character of Apollinarius' anthropological model for composite unity/μία φύσις (a) better preserves the elements from intrinsic qualitative change and (b)

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[37] L.p.186,ll.18-19;p.188,ll.2-4,ll.14-18. The implication of these statements is an admission of two (generic?) natures which is surprising given the fact that in *Ad Dionysium A* Apollinarius seems unprepared to admit a duality of natures in any sense.

[38] It is in this context that we should probably interpret ἰδίως in *De Unione* 2(L.p.186,l.3), ἰδίως, as in *Ad Dionysium A* 2, conveying the idea of existential rather than qualitative distinctness, *contra* de Riedmatten's interpretation(Riedmatten[2],p.219).

[39] Cf.L.p.190,ll.17-19.

[40] L.p.190,ll.8-12.

better preserves the divine element from becoming a part than a less dynamic model of composite unity might have done (e.g. the Aristotelian mixture to which his conception otherwise shows some resemblance/tendency?):

> 'The comparison with a human nature takes on a pre-eminent and exact significance in his eyes because it preserves the intrinsic character and human origins of the flesh; and at the same time it gives an explanation of its communion in the properties and the attributes of divinity. There is no change of divinity into the body nor of the body into the divinity, but there is so complete a union of the body and the divinity, that they are no longer two but one...'[41]; 'The unique nature is not that of the Word in a new phase (for the Word would then have the role of a part) "not a nature according to the Incarnation" says the *First Letter to Dionysius*. The choice of words is significant. That which two imperfect parts constitute in man, the Word and the body constitute in Christ. If the Word preserves the divine perfection none the less "that also" fulfils the function of a part. His energy therein is μερική'.[42]

But if we consider some of the things which Apollinarius says in *De Unione* it seems that the vitalistic character of Apollinarius' model of union by composition does not ultimately preserve the elements from intrinsic change. The existence of the (vital) whole is the basis for an exchange of attributes which is more than nominal (§4)[43] and for talk of one element (the divine!) being 'transformed' by the other (§6).[44] This 'whole' is not an abstract singularity, but a concrete living organism which actually exists as something distinct from either of its constituent parts – a (living) *tertium quid.* If such is the basis for talk of transformation then Apollinarius must mean *real* transformation. If we consider Apollinarius' model of biological synthesis (§§5,12-13), it would seem that by composing a living body corporeal matter and an animating principle *do* undergo a level of change: a living body has different characteristics from the flesh supplied by a womb (a body bereft of life); an animating principle exists in a different form before it has a body to animate (e.g. when conveyed in spermatic matter and after the dissolution of the body). If common flesh in a mother's womb undergoes qualitative change once animated/ensouled, by how much more is the flesh from Mary when divinely informed at a biological level (§15).[45] In de

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[41] Riedmatten[1],p.260.
[42] Riedmatten[1],p.258. De Riedmatten's distinction between 'having the role of a part' and 'fulfilling the function of a part' is unclear, as is his reason for believing that the latter possibility is better afforded to the divine perfection by the anthropological analogy.
[43] L.p.187,ll.2-4.
[44] L.p.187,ll.20-21.
[45] L.p.192,ll.3-7.

Riedmatten's second essay he seems to have come to recognise this: 'the flesh of Christ by fact of the unique nature in which it is found passes into another order of realities... Does not his conception of μία φύσις lead directly to the synousiast thesis?';[46] 'Voilà pour les conséquences de l'union vitale'.[47]

In *De Unione* it is not the vitalistic character of Apollinarius' model of union by composition which allows the Word to function as a part whilst being a perfection. Apollinarius refers to the unity in Christ as both 'one living thing' (§10) and 'one (divine) life' (§13, cf. *Ad Dionysium A* 10), so there is a possibility that his vitalistic model of composition allows him to identify the ultimate unity with both the living composite and one part – the life-giving principle. Apollinarius may understand the psychosomatic union as a special type of asymmetrical composition – a composite unity of nature between a perfect nature (the vital principle, which is life-giving according to itself) and an element which is not a perfect nature, the body. However, analysis of *Ad Dionysium A* 10, *De Unione* 13, *Ad Dionysium A* 8 indicates that Apollinarius does *not* see and exploit a subtle identification-cum-distinction between unity of living thing and unity of life, nor does he formally define nature in terms of self-animating capability.[48] Apollinarius' assertions that the Word survives as a nature/perfection whilst also a quasi-part of a composite nature/whole probably have more to do with Apollinarius' deference to the doctrine of divine immutability than an anthropological model which allows the singular nature of a vital principle to both participate and predominate in the one composite nature of a living thing. In *De Unione* 5 Apollinarius does not deduce the continuing perfection of the divine energy 'part' out of his (vitalistic) model for compositional unity: he preserves it by *qualifying* the model which in itself seems to prescribe partial status, and therefore change, to the (simple and immutable)

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[46] Riedmatten[2],p.221-222;p.219(see p.66,n.[38],above).

[47] Riedmatten[2],p.220 with reference to Fr.153 where Apollinarius also makes explicit that 'the flesh receives the properties(ἴδια)of God by a union with God'.

[48] The logic of Apollinarius' argument in *Ad Dionysium A* 10-11 suggests that he uses 'μία ζωή' to denote the divine-human unity as opposed to the 'disembodied' divine life-giving principle (the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν in §11) *per se*:'For one thing shares with the other in being named in virtue of the one life, without that which is disembodied changing into a body or the body into the disembodied' (L.p.261,ll.1-3). In *De Unione* 13 it also seems unlikely that 'τὴν θείαν ζώην' (L.p.191,l.10) designates the singularity of the vital principle, but rather the composite singularity engendered in the Virgin's womb: 'Spermatic matter does not make the divine life' (i.e. by conveying the life-giving power to something else). So, by implication, the divine 'Spirit and overshadowing power'(L.p.191,ll.7-8) make the divine life. The 'power' and the 'life' are not therefore, strictly speaking, identical. In *Ad Dionysium A* 8 Apollinarius' comment, 'For the body is not of itself the nature in the one Christ since it is not life-giving according to itself' (L.p.259,ll.15-18), does not seem intended as a formal definition of φύσις as Grillmeier's analysis rather suggests (Grillmeier,pp.334-335). It is part of a more symmetrical statement in which the life-giving Word also depends upon flesh to become an incarnate nature, whilst somehow 'possessing' simultaneously his own fleshless nature.

divine element as it does more obviously to the corporeal element: 'one nature being co-constituted out of each of two parts, the Word having contributed the energy part to the whole [but] *with the divine perfection*'.[49]

Although the psychosomatic model encourages identification of the individual/subject/person with the composite rather than one of its parts (§§1,7,9, 10-13),[50] *Ad Dionysium A*'s 'other' idea of unity (viz. Christ as one enduring divine individual/subject/person(?)) is also present in *De Unione*, particularly in those paragraphs which preface (§§2-4), or interrupt (§§6-8), or follow (§§14-17) the key passages in which the compositional thesis is expounded .[51] Thus, within *De Unione,* there is some ambiguity over who the subject is in Christ. For example, the passage where the compositional model is introduced (*De Unione* 5) describes a symmetrical mode of union resulting in a *tertium quid* and therefore, perhaps, by implication a third 'who', but is prefaced by 'ἐν αὐτῷ': 'In Him... etc.'. The unity of subject (= person?) in Christ does not *result* from the vitalistic natural union; it provides a *locus* for it. The 'what' in Christ is composite: the 'who' is divine.[52] The latter is not suggested by the dynamic of the psychosomatic model; it is another (theological) idea which Apollinarius seems to rather presuppose. Perhaps Apollinarius' concept of unity of (divine) subject is, after all, logically prior to his compositional conception of unity of nature as Voisin and Raven tend to assume (in contrast to de Riedmatten and Grillmeier who gave priority to μία φύσις).[53]

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[49] L.p.187,ll.7-9.

[50](E.g.)In *De Unione* 1 the gender of ἡνωμένος (L.p.185,l.12) suggests that 'the Lord' and not 'the body' is the subject of διαλλάττει (l.10). Thus, the Lord 'differs from all bodies for he was not conceived wholly apart from divinity, but was united with it' i.e. the Lord is an embodied subject who is united to the divinity rather than identical with it. In *De Unione* 9 Apollinarius comes very close to contrasting the individual who is Christ Jesus with the Word of God:'the divinity was not called Jesus before the genesis from the virgin, nor did it have the unction of the Holy Spirit, because the Word of God is the giver of the Spirit, not he who is made holy (ἁγιαζόμενος) by the Spirit'(L.p.189,ll.6-9).

[51] E.g.in *De Unione* 4 the subject is 'the Lord', but here the personal title denotes, not an embodied being, but 'he who came down from heaven'(καταβεβηκὼς), for whom the title 'ὁ ἄκτιστος' is used interchangeably (L.p.187,ll.2-4), who enters into conjunction with a body, but keeps his 'Lordly (i.e.divine) nature' (L.p.186,ll.18-19). We find the same continuity of divine subject in *De Unione* 6:'Therefore, the God and He who became man, the Lord, and He who surpasses (creaturely) generation is Lord, even if He has been formed after the slaves'(L.p.187,ll.15-17). In *De Unione* 14-15 Apollinarius expresses this continuity of subject in hypostatic terms:'the Word possesses glory eternally. For the very same(ὅπερ) subsists (ὑπῆρχεν) and endures; he subsisted in the form of God and was equal to God. And (when) in the flesh, he says that he is equal to God'(L.p.191,ll.19-22).

[52] The ἐν ᾧ which introduces *De Unione* 5 must refer back to the 'uncreated Lord' in the final statement in §4(L.p.187,ll.3-4).

[53] See p.63,above.

In the passages which affirm Christ's unity as the divine subject there are also statements which suggest: (1) a different type of unitive action from composition, viz. possession/conjoining/assumption;[54] (2) a more 'spiritualist' view of the soul/Word-body union, viz. a descent (καταβαίνειν), an interweaving (συμπλοκή), the body as (outward) form (μορφή)/mould (πλασσόμενον)/envelope (περιβολή); [55] (3) a different type of explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum*: viz. one which is more divisive and nominal, the basis of the transfer being *the fact of the union* rather than the existence of a *tertium quid* with inclusive properties.[56] Together with Apollinarius' traditional commitment to the unity of divine subject/person, such features suggest that his exposition is guided by another understanding of the union which is not always fully systematic with his main compositional theory. Somewhat parenthetical, and possibly not by conscious design, this 'other' idea exerts something of a restraining influence.

The co-presence of two not entirely compatible notions of Christological unity in *De Unione* may explain certain disagreements which have arisen over the transmission and interpretation of the text: (e.g.) does Apollinarius employ the term 'ὅλος' or the term 'λόγος' to denote the Christological subject in §10 and §16?;[57] (e.g.) how should we interpret the sense of τὴν φύσιν in *De Unione* 17? Raven, Sellers and de Riedmatten offer three different interpretations of Apollinarius' final statement which all have some textual justification, but none of which are completely satisfactory.[58]

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[54] 'The body...is altogether inseparable from that one whose body it is, and it has partaken in this title and the name of God, because it was conjoined (συνῆπται) into a unity with God'(p.186,ll.3-6);see also L.p.187,ll.2-5;L.p.186,ll.8-9.

[55] L.p.186,l.20-p.187,l.5;L.p.187,l.21;L.p.191,l.21.

[56] E.g.'He is also consubstantial with God according to the invisible spirit, even the flesh being understood by the name (τῷ ὀνόματι), since it was united with he who is consubstantial with God'(L.p.188,ll.9-11).

[57] In two places Lietzmann's sources become confused as to whether Apollinarius employs ὅλος or λόγος (L.p.189,l.14;L.p.192,l.11). In the first case Lietzmann suggests that the presence of λόγος in the majority of manuscripts is a copying error (L.p.134), but the co-presence of what may be two distinct notions of unity in *De Unione* 10 – 'defending the one person *and* the individual manifestation of one living thing' - may explain the confusion of the ancient copyists.

[58] L.p.193,l.2. De Riedmatten believes that 'τὴν φύσιν' here recapitulates the idea of one composite nature set out in *De Unione* 5 (Riedmatten^2,p.214). Raven, who rather equates the μία φύσις of *De Unione* 5 with unity of person, takes a more divisive reading of *De Unione* 17 :'he who recognises the peculiarities and preserves the union will neither mistake the nature *of the elements* nor ignore *their* union' (Raven,p.228). Sellers believes that 'the "nature" is that of the Logos incarnate'(Sellers,p.60).

Against Diodore (Contra Diodorum) (Fr.117-146)

The Various Sources and Works

These are fragments of treatises written by Apollinarius against Diodore (the Antiochene presbyter who became Bishop of Tarsus c.378) which have been preserved and recontextualised in controversial works composed in the fifth and seventh centuries by opponents of monophysitism and monothelitism: e.g. Theodoret (*Eranistes*); 'Leontius' (*Adversus Fraudes Apollinaristarum*); Justinian (*Contra Monophysitas*); 'Anastasius' (*Doctrina Patrum De Incarnatione Verbi*). Some of the fragments selected by the later controversialists come from *florilegia* compiled by disciples of Apollinarius for use in their own controversial writings upon the 'correct' interpretation of Apollinarian doctrine: e.g. Timothy of Berytus (*Ad Homonium*) and Polemon (*Contra Timotheum (?)*).[59] The fragments afford insight into the nature of Apollinarius' original theses against Diodore, but their subsequent contexts and the motives of those who selected them should be taken into account when considering how representative this is likely to be.

On the basis of editorial comments the fragments can be divided into three groups according to the original works from which they have been taken.

(1) Fr.117-120 come from a work which the *Doctrina* calls 'κατὰ Διοδώρου πρὸς Ἡράκλειον' and Leontius describes as the 'Syllogistic discourse'.[60] I will refer to this work as *Contra Diodorum (Ad Heraclium)*.

(2) Fr.140-146 are quoted by Timothy of Berytus in his work against fellow Apollinarian Homonius, which is preserved by Leontius in *Adversus Fraudes* 143-145. Timothy's comments indicate that the fragments are excerpted from Apollinarius' 'first' (Fr.140-142) and 'second' (Fr.143-144) discourses πρὸς Διόδωρον and that Fr.145-146

[59] *Ad Homonium*, see L.p.277-278;Lietzmann lists Timothy's citations pp.104-105. Lietzmann also argues convincingly that Justinian and the *Doctrina* share a 'Polemon source': this would explain why they share nine citations, why they both know that Apollinarius was the author of *Ad Dionysium A* and *De Unione* and why they both cite a fragment from Polemon's letter against Timothy (Fr.174)(L.pp.112-116).See, also, Mühlenberg, p.96.

[60] See L.p.236,l.3,ll.20-21.

'come from a summary (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) of this same (i.e. the second?) discourse'.[61] I will refer to these discourses as *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔ α΄ and β΄).

(3) Fr.121-139 are taken by Theodoret from a work which he calls 'The Book Set Out in Paragraphs' (τό κατὰ κεφάλαιον βιβλίον).[62] Lietzmann believes this to be *Contra Diodorum* since Theodoret's Fr.126 is identical to Fr.146 which Timothy of Berytus tells us is from the (summary of) ΠΔ β΄.[63] Theodoret quotes from this work at the end of each book of the *Eranistes* when proof texts are furnished in support of the 'orthodox' anti-monophysite argument: Fr.121-124 (*Eranistes I*); Fr.124-136 (*Eranistes II*); Fr.136-139 (*Eranistes III*).[64] I will refer to the work quoted by Theodoret as *Contra Diodorum* (*KKB*). Because Fr.121-139 are not obviously similar to Fr.140-144, and because Fr.126 and 146 are the same, it is possible that the *KKB* is the 'Summary' of *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔ β΄) mentioned by Timothy.

These divisions correspond with differences in the style and apparent purpose of the fragments and also their dogmatic content, notably the level of emphasis which they put upon a compositional conception of Christological unity.

Contra Diodorum (Ad Heraclium) Fr. 117-120[65]

This is a group of expositary fragments unafraid to assert the substantial unity of Christ in opposition to Diodore's fallacious alternative, viz. a union of appearance or unanimity (Fr.118) between two *ousiai* (Fr.120).

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[61] See L.p.241,ll.3-4;l.27;p.242,l.13.
[62] See L.p.237,l.10,l.25;p.241,l.4.
[63] L.p.142.
[64] Theodoret,*Eranistes*, *MPG*83.104A-C;213C-217A;309B-C. De Riedmatten argues that Lietzmann is over reliant on the J.L. Schulze edition of *Eranistes* reproduced in Migne, which depends on one defective Greek manuscript (*Vatican gr.624*). With access to new manuscripts (especially *Bodl.Clark* 2) de Riedmatten provided a new edition of the Apollinarian fragments cited by Theodoret:'Les Fragments d'Apollinaire à l'"Eranistes"',*Chalkedon* 1,1951,pp.203-212. More recently G. Ettlinger has published a new edition of Theodoret's entire work: *Theodoret of Cyrus Eranistes: Critical Text and Prolegomena*,1975. In this edition the Apollinarian fragments are found on pp.109-110;pp.184-187;pp.247-249. In Ettlinger's view de Riedmatten was 'too optimistic' about the authenticity of the new manuscripts which 'should be approached with great caution'(Ettlinger,p.48).
[65] L.p.235,l.18-p.236,l.35(E.T.pp.307-308,below).

The Conception of the Union

The same compositional conception of the union which predominates in *Ad Dionysium A* and *De Unione* appears to lie behind Apollinarius' declaration of 'one energy' (Fr.117[b]) and 'one *ousia*' (Fr.117[b],119). Two impersonal elements, one active and one passive, form a third – τὴν ἐνέργειαν – a dynamic whole which they co-complete as parts (ἀποτελέω) via a natural process (φύω): 'The instrument and the moving element (τὸ κινοῦν) make complete one energy (μίαν πέφυκεν ἀποτελεῖν τὴν ἐνεργείαν). But if the energy is one so also is the substance one. Therefore, one substance has come into being (μία ἄρα οὐσία γέγονε) of the Word and the instrument'.[66] The most likely sense of ἐνέργεια here seems to be 'an active principle actually functioning in that which it activates' – the τό ζῷον of *De Unione* 10 expressed in dynamic terms. Unity of worship and name demonstrate that Christ is *one composite substance*: 'μία (οὐσία) κατὰ σύνθεσιν θεοῦ πρὸς σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον'.[67] Apollinarius' sense of one composite substance here seems very close to his sense of μία φύσις in *Ad Dionysium A/De Unione* – viz. one living/functioning divine-corporeal being.[68] Perhaps addressing a disciple, and goaded by Diodore's declaration of two natures and *ousiai* in Christ, Apollinarius is prepared to denote Christ as a composite unity with a term which is potentially more problematic due to its (ambiguous) Trinitarian employment. In Fr. 117[b] there is some indication that Apollinarius may regard unity of substance as consequent upon rather than identical with unity of energy, but this is perhaps in keeping with his compositional conception in *Ad Dionysium A* and *De Unione*: unity of person or substance are not metaphysical *apriorities* to unity of nature or energy – they are the result of the physical/energetic union.

In the longer version of Fr.117 Apollinarius' presentation of the union and use of ἐνέργεια is less compositional: the picture is of God's assumption (ἀνάληψις); the divine subject *is* the energy of Christ; he does not co-compose it: 'God takes up (ἀναλαβὼν) an instrument and is God in so far as he is active/operates (ἐνεργεῖ) and is man in respect of the instrument. Since he remains God he has not changed.'[69] This may indicate that the

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[66] Fr.117[b],L.p.235,l.26-p.236,l.2.
[67] Fr.119,L.p.236,ll.26-27.
[68] See Grillmeier,pp.335-336.
[69] Fr.117[a],L.p.235,ll.24-25.This expansion to Fr.117 is preserved in a résumé of doctrine attached to the decrees of the Council of Constantinople,680.

'other' concept of Christological unity found in *Ad Dionysium A* and *De Unione* also featured in *Ad Heraclium.* The strongly compositional flavour of the surviving fragments may be due more to the motives of those who selected and preserved them than to the balance of Apollinarius' original argument.

Contra Diodorum (ΠΔ α΄ & β΄) (Fr.140-144)[70]

This is a group of polemical fragments which have survived from two works, or a two-part work, in which Apollinarius directly addresses Diodore, criticising his Christology and responding to Diodore's criticism of his own doctrine of ἡ ἄκρα ἕνωσις.

The Conception of the Union

The fragments afford us direct insight into the nature of the Christological argument between Diodore and Apollinarius, which, since Voisin, has often been regarded by scholarship as a formative influence upon the development of Apollinarius' own distinctive doctrine of the union. Apollinarius accuses Diodore of mounting an unmerited attack on his own theory of the 'highest unity' (Fr.140,142-144). Apollinarius criticises Diodore's doctrine of union by grace (Fr.141) because it is not properly incarnational (Fr.140-141); it does not account for the uniqueness of the union and its miraculous origin (Fr.140,142); it holds that Christ is/has a human nature; it is illogical because it claims to believe in the truth of the virginal birth and the incarnation of the Word and yet contradicts these beliefs with its two natures doctrine and divisive predication. Diodore has criticised Apollinarius' Christological doctrine because it strongly advocates the *communicatio idiomatum,* using acute and controversial expressions suggestive of a real and inappropriate transfer of attributes (Fr.143) particularly from the divine to the human (Fr.144); it recommends a bogus theory of 'the highest union', viz. a virginal-conception-related, vitalistic view of co-mixture (Fr.140,142-144) as the basis for the *communicatio idiomatum*; it thereby involves the humanity and the divinity in change and confusion (Fr.140,142).

On this evidence it appears that Diodore was critical of Apollinarius' compositional theory of the union such as we find advocated in *Ad Dionysium A*, *De Unione*, *Contra*

[70] L.p.241,l.3-p.242,l.12(E.T.see p.308-310,below).

Diodorum (Ad Heraclium). Certain fragments of Diodore's own work seem to confirm this.[71] In reaction to such criticism Apollinarius remains firmly committed to the compositional conception which originates in *Ad Dionysium A* 1-2 as an anti-dyophysite thesis: he holds to his doctrine of 'the highest unity' 'according to the flesh' rather than by grace (Fr.140-142), in which divine and human elements are united by co-mixture (Fr.144) because they share a common origin in the miraculous event of the virginal conception (Fr.140,142) by which one living being (Fr.144), one nature (Fr.142) and one person (Fr.144) is co-constituted:

> 'The union (ἕνωσις) of God with flesh was something unique and miraculous that occurred (only) once and not a second time'[72]... 'the birth from the Virgin comes to something vain and superfluous if what (τὸ) is born is not worthy of the (virginal) birth and is the same as the things begotten of a man/husband (ἐξ ἀνδρὸς) and a woman'[73]... 'How is that which is conjoined (συναφθὲν) to God according to a unity of person (καθ' ἑνότητα προσώπου) not God with him? How is that which was united to the uncreated according to a vital unity (καθ' ἑνότητα ζωτικὴν) not uncreated with him? For if there (is) not a common (κοινὴ) title, then, neither is what has been co-mixed (τὸ συγκεκραμενόν) thus [i.e. something in common]'.[74]

Contra Diodorum (KKB) (Fr.121-139) (+ 145?)[75]

This is a group of expository fragments possibly from a *Summary* attached to the second work *Contra Diodorum* in which Apollinarius presents his doctrine of the union in more circumspect and apologetic fashion. The marked difference in tone and emphasis may be determined as much by the expository purpose of Theodoret as that of Apollinarius: Theodoret was trying to illustrate that even 'the heresiarch' taught a more 'orthodox' doctrine of the incarnation than the subsequent monophysite 'Eranistes' with whom 'Orthodoxus' is arguing in a series of 'dialogues'.[76]

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[71] E.g.Fr.2,19,26,27,see Brière,M.,'Fragments Syriaques de Diodore de Tarse',*Revue de l'Oriente Chretien* 10,1946,p.260;pp.266-267;pp.269-270.
[72] L.p.241,ll.6-7.
[73] L.p.241,ll.20-23,cf. L.p.191,l.5(*De Unione* 13).
[74] L.p.242,ll.2-5.
[75] L.p.237,l.3-p.241,l.2(E.T.pp.310-315,below).
[76] 'Orthodoxus' is the mouthpiece for Theodoret's own views *contra* 'Eranistes'. Theodoret probably wrote the *Eranistes* c.447-448(see Ettlinger,p.3 n.[3]) as a defence of his own 'Antiochene' Christology against the monophysite Christology of Eutyches. Each of the three *Dialogues* focuses on a specific Christological point: viz.'ἄτρεπτον'(*Eranistes I*);'ἀσύγχύτον'(*Eranistes II*);'ἀπαθής'(*Eranistes III*). After each discussion there is

The Conception of the Union

Apollinarius employs various arguments to clarify and justify his doctrine of the incarnation in response to Diodore's criticism, the nature of which is indicated by the issues which concern Apollinarius' elucidatory exposition. Apollinarius has been accused of denigrating the Word's divinity (Fr.126,130(?), Fr.131-135) and divinizing Christ's flesh (Fr.125,133,136) by teaching a doctrine of mixture (Fr.127) and composition (Fr.133) in one nature (Fr.134) and one substance (Fr.126), which amounts to a confusion (Fr.129) of the divine and human (natures (Fr.128)) in which their properties are changed or destroyed (Fr.121-124, Fr.127-128,134). Such criticisms appear to be levelled at a theory of union which shares the same terminology and problematic implications as the compositional thesis which Apollinarius advocates in *Ad Dionysium A, De Unione Contra Diodorum (Ad Heraclium & ΠΔ α΄ & β΄).*

One line of apologetic response is Apollinarius' reaffirmation of the compositional conception of union: he remains faithful to its psychosomatic model (Fr.123,129,134-135,139) and its terminology of mixture and synthesis (Fr.123,127-128,133-134,138), stressing that this type of union ensures distinction as well as unity:

> 'A simple thing (τὸ ἁπλοῦν) is one, yet a composite thing (τὸ σύνθετον) is unable to be one. Therefore, he who claims that the Word has been made flesh says that there is change in the one Word. But if the composite thing is one just as a man is one, he who says that the Word became flesh due to its union (ἕνωσιν) with flesh says (there) is one thing according to a composition (τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἕν)'.[77] 'If the body of a man persists in its characteristic nature (ἰδίας φύσεως) and does this even when ensouled (ἐψυχωμένον) then in Christ the co-mixture (σύγκρασις) does not change the body so as not to be a body'.[78]

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a *florilegium* of orthodox proof texts and Theodoret uses the unusual polemical tactic of placing the 'orthodox' testimony of Apollinarius at the end to show that Eranistes is more heretical than the 'founder of his heresy'(*MPG*83.104D). Theodoret's selection may not be fully representative, but his inverted motives have perhaps led him to highlight authentic aspects of Apollinarius' exposition which Justinian, 'Anastasius', Timothy and Polemon choose to pass over for other reasons. Mühlenberg (p. 88) and Voisin (p.152) believe that Theodoret's quotations come from a later summary of Apollinarius' teaching. Raven (p.209) and Lietzmann (p.90) believe that Theodoret had access to Apollinarius' original work. The fact that Timothy of Berytus testifies to the authenticity of Fr.146, which differs in only one word from Fr.126(θέος for κύριος), suggests that there is a strong case for regarding Fr.121-139 as the *ipsissima verba* of Timothy's master.

[77] Fr.123,L.p.237,ll.19-23. De Riedmatten comments:'To Diodore who held that "the close union" in Christology entailed a metamorphosis of the divinity or at least confusion, Apollinarius replied that the unity of the composite allowed the avoidance of the consequence'(Riedmatten^2,pp.250-251).

[78] Fr.134,L.p.239,l.31-p.240,l.3.

Qualification and Modification of the Compositional Idea of Unity

There are other features of the apology, however, which suggest that Apollinarius has made concessions to Diodore's criticism of his compositional thesis and its terminology, particularly in the interests of preserving the simplicity and immutability of the Word's divinity. These may represent something of a departure from, or modification of, the compositional conception of unity which predominates in other D. treatises.

For example:

(1) Sometimes Apollinarius describes the unitive action which occurs in the incarnation (and its psychosomatic model) in a non-compositional way which recapitulates more the 'other' conception of unity which is present in *Ad DionysiumA/De Unione.* In Fr.121 a masculine subject (τις/ὅ), in Christ's case divine, *takes-on-in-addition* flesh – the thing assumed (τοῦτο) – in an asymmetrical unitive action (πρόσληψις) which, by definition, preserves the subject from the change: 'If someone (τις) is not changed into what (τοῦτο) he (ὅ) takes-on-in-addition (προσλαμβάνει), and Christ takes-on-in-addition flesh, then he was not turned into flesh.'[79] In some of the fragments Apollinarius refers to the anthropological example of unity without confusion, but in terms of possession and juxtaposition rather than composition and mixture:

> 'If a man possesses (ἔχει) both soul (ψυχὴν) and body and these things endure whilst being in a unity – by many more times Christ, whilst possessing divinity together with (μετὰ) a body, possesses each enduring and not confounded (συγχεόμενα)';[80] 'He who confesses that the body and the soul are juxtaposed (παρίστασθαι) as one by the scriptures disagrees with himself in alleging that such a union of the Word with a body is an (essential) change (μεταβολὴν) although this change is not observed in a soul'.[81]

We also find a form of exegesis and explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum* which is *more divisive* than the 'inclusive' style associated with the compositional conception in *Ad*

[79] Fr.121,L.p.237,ll.11-12.
[80] Fr.129,L.p.239,ll.2-4.
[81] Fr.135,L.p.240,ll.5-8.

Dionysium A/De Unione (Fr.125,131,137[a],139,145). (e.g.) The exegesis of *Jn.*2.19-22 in Fr.137 differs from that given of *Jn.*17.19 in *De Unione* 10-11. In Fr.137 Apollinarius does not explain the text in terms of an inclusive whole from parts, but the oneness of the divine subject and the passible body which he owns: 'John says that the destroyed temple, namely the body of the one who raises it up, is Him (αὐτόν)... if the body of the Lord has become one with the Lord the characteristic properties (τὰ ἴδια) of the body have been made His, in virtue of the body.'[82] It may be appropriate to describe this type of explanation of the union and consequent predicative practice as *'assumptional'* rather than *'compositional'*. Theodoret certainly believes that the Apollinarian concept of unity recommended in Fr.121 (and elsewhere) conforms to a traditional line of Christological thought wherein the Johanine 'becoming' is understood in terms of *taking*, *possessing*, *wearing* flesh, thus sparing the divinity from involvement in change, confusion and suffering.[83] The *florilegia* of the *Eranistes* offer a retrospective overview of the conceptuality and terminology of what we might call the *incarnational Christology of divine assumption.* The scriptural proof texts for this conception (*Heb.*2.16; *Phil.*2.7; *Jn.*10.17-18) seem to be technically incompatible with Apollinarius' compositional theory of the incarnation and the type of anthropological theory which underpins it in (e.g.) *De Unione* 13.[84] The *Eranistes* indicates that Apollinarius preferred the term προσλαμβάνω to the term ἀναλαμβάνω which appears the more commonly used compound of λαμβάνω in the Orthodox tradition describing the incarnational union as a form of assumption.[85] This serves to warn us that Apollinarius'

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[82] L.p.240,ll.17-21.

[83] Theodoret,*Eranistes I*(*MPG*83.104D);*Eranistes II*(*MPG*83.217D=L.p.206,ll.1-6).

[84] *Heb.*2.16:'he took on him(ἐπιλαμβάνω) the seed of Abraham'(see(e.g.)*Eranistes I MPG*83.40D). This type of reference to (the acquisition of) Christ's humanity (see,also,*Romans* 1.3 and the genealogies of Jesus in *Matthew* and *Luke*) is hard to reconcile with *De Unione* 13, where the divine spirit replaces Joseph's spermatic matter. *Phil.*2.7:'he took (λαμβάνω) the form of the servant' (see(e.g.)*Eranistes I MPG*83.72D). This Pauline statement points away from the idea of Christ as a quasi-psychosomatic composite towards the idea of Christ (like man) as a spiritual subject in carnal vestiture.*Jn.*10.17-18:'I lay down my life/soul(ψυχή) that I may take it up again (πάλιν λαμβάνω)'(see(e.g.)*Eranistes II MPG*83.149D). The idea of the divine subject assuming the human soul/life principle goes against the compositional thesis of *De Unione* where the Word is the life principle (§12).

[85] It is interesting that the terminology of ἀνάληψις is consistently preferred when Theodoret and his witnesses are writing about the fact that a soul as well as a body was assumed or when stressing the completeness of the assumed humanity. In *Eranistes II* and *III* and in the *Appendix* the compound is used on forty nine occasions and in twenty nine of these to refer to the assumption of a soul/complete humanity. If we compare the use of λαμβάνω it is used on only eight occasions out of eighty in this way. Unlike λαμβάνω and ἐπιλαμβάνω, ἀναλαμβάνω has no scriptural authority, but a passage in *Eranistes II* may reveal its scriptural derivation from *Jn.*10.17-18 where Jesus speaks of laying his soul down (τίθημι) that he may take it back 'again' and, therefore, 'up'. After the proof text Eranistes moves easily from John's term λαμβάνω to the compound:

notion of taking-on-in-addition (πρόσληψις) may not be the same as the orthodox idea of assumption (ἀνάληψις).

(2) Apollinarius also introduces various supporting arguments to show how his doctrine of the union does not involve the elements (particularly the divine) in change and destruction; these are not entirely systematic with his compositional conception of the unity in Christ; they point more to the assumptional conception and exert a modifying influence upon Apollinarius' compositional thesis, e.g.: *A Semantic Argument*: Apollinarius rules out change by introducing the idea of incarnation as πρόσληψις (Fr.121). *Soteriological Arguments*: Apollinarius rules out confusion by arguing that had *he* who saves must be more beauteous than what is saved (Fr.122), and by depicting the divine element within the mixture as a purposeful subject who can choose to be 'mixed' or 'unmixed' with the body in order to achieve his economic purpose: 'the energy of the divinity is either independent or mingled with a view to what is needful on each occasion'.[86] *Christological Arguments*: Apollinarius rules out the essential transformation of the Word by introducing the Pauline idea of the incarnation as *kenosis*, the dynamic and vocabulary (λαμβάνω , μορφή, σχῆμα) of which suggest a more 'assumptional' understanding of the union and 'spiritualist' view of the body as περιβολή: 'Enfleshment is an "emptying" [*Phil.*2.7]. But emptying makes known not a man, but the Son of Man who emptied himself according to the outer form (περιβολήν) and not according to (essential) transformation (μεταβολήν)'.[87] He rules out the suffering (hunger) of the divine element by introducing the notion of the occasional and deliberate quiescence of the Logos which does not fully cohere with his compositional conception of the incarnation as vital/essential divine-corporeal interdependency: 'in so far as the divinity was mingled according to its imperviousness to need, the hunger was prevented, but, when (the divinity) did not match its imperviousness to need against need, the hunger came into being for the destruction of the devil'.[88] He rules out the Word's involvement in the 'defectiveness' which accrues to the soul upon the dissolution of a psychosomatic unity by introducing the traditional Christological argument that the Word was not 'circumscribed/encompassed' by his composition with flesh (Fr.138). *Physical*

'These and other passages clearly point out that God the Word assumed (ἀνέλαβεν) not only a body but a soul' (*MPG*83.152A). Similarly, Athanasius as cited in the third *florilegium* (*MPG*83.293B).

[86] Fr.127,L.p.238,ll.18-19.

[87] Fr.124,L.p.237,ll.30-32.

[88] Fr.127,L.p.238,ll.19-23.

Arguments: Apollinarius rules out qualitative change to the elements involved in the incarnational σύγκρασις/μῖξις not simply by asserting the non-transformational nature of mixture as a mode of union, but with reference to the idea of an *unmixed residue* (τὸ/τι ἀμιγές) of the original elements which manages to avoid mixture (and consequential transformation?):

> 'The qualities of things which are co-mixed (συγκιρναμένων) are mixed (κεράννυται), but not also destroyed, with the results that certain things even stand apart (τινὰ καὶ διΐσταται) from things which have been co-mixed such as wine and water. And there is not a co-mixture (σύγκρασις) with a body, nor (a co-mixture) such as of bodies with bodies, but that (the co-mixture) has also what is unmixed (τὸ ἀμιγές). And so (likewise) the energy of the divinity is either independent or mingled...'[89]

Apollinarius rules out change in Christ's body (corporeal nature?) due to mixture by introducing a more helpful, non-anthropological, model of admixture (ἀνάκρασις) – viz. iron and fire – wherein a passive element is not strictly speaking transformed out of its own nature, but mediates the qualities of an active element which permeates it (Fr.128).

(3) When applying the language of synthesis and mixture to the incarnational union Apollinarius sometimes attaches qualifying provisos which create terminological paradoxes indicative of the need for, or the beginning of, modification or withdrawal from the compositional conception of unity and its vocabulary: eg. the (divine) unmixed and mixed ingredient (ἢ ἰδιάζειν ἢ ἐπιμίγνυσθαι) (Fr.127); the (divine) non-composite component (συντεθὲν πρὸς σῶμα...μένει δὲ καὶ ἀσύνθετον) (Fr.133);[90] the natural union/mixture with a body of he (God) who is not naturally one with a body [by nature] (ὁ μὴ [φύσει] σώματι συμφυὴς θεὸς ἀμεταβλήτως ἑνοῦται πρὸς σῶμα...κατὰ συμφυΐαν) (Fr.134);[91]

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[89] Fr.127,L.p.238,ll.14-19.

[90] Interpretation of Fr.133 depends on whether Apollinarius employs τὸ ἄορατον (L.p.239,l.21) to designate (a) the rational element in a man (see,Fr.132) or (b) the divine element in Christ. The case for reading (b) is stronger. The argument in Fr.133 does not have the same analogical structure as Fr.132, rather it seems to expand upon the final declaration of Fr.132 that the saviour/Uncreated God is not a creature even though the created body lies close beside him. The second statement in Fr.133 confirms that the body in question throughout the fragment is the body which is united to God, and therefore τὸ ἀόρατον and ἀσύνθετον must refer to the divine element in the incarnational composition. Raven(p.207),Norris(p.107),Lampe (p.252) read Fr.133 in this way.

[91] L.p.239, ll.27-31. Given that 'κρᾶσις...κατὰ συμφῦΐαν'(L.p.239,ll.27-28) signifies a vital/biological interdependence which is typical of the 'compositional' picture of the union in *Ad Dionysium A* and *De*

the divine component who is above the composition and unaffected by its dissolution (ὑπὲρ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἐστι ταύτην, και ὑπὲρ τὴν διάλυσιν ... οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνθέσει περιελήφθη)' (Fr.138). In Fr.123 Apollinarius claims that the (psychosomatic?) anthropological *exemplum* provides a model which shows how a similarly paradoxical notion of unity can actually occur in reality: viz. the simple composite: 'A simple thing is one yet a composite thing is unable to be one, but if a composite thing is one just as man is one...there is one thing by composition.' But the anthropological model does not appear entirely to have solved his theological problem: it demonstrates how the singularity of the immutable Word endures, but not his simplicity (unless Apollinarius regarded the human ψυχή as something simple, which is able to function within a composite thing (the psychosomatic σύνθετον) without its simplicity being infringed, remaining unchanged and supplying the identity of what is singular before, during and after the union). However, in Fr. 138, when seeking to protect the Word *qua* ψυχή from the change (defectiveness) implicit in Christ's death (dissolution of the composite), Apollinarius rather admits that the psychosomatic model of union is not in itself sufficient as a model for the incarnational union: 'in the dissolution (διαλύσει) he [sc. the Word] did not possess the defectiveness (ἐνδεὲς) which comes from dissolution as the soul does.'[92] It is the unique reality of the Word-Incarnate rather than the mundane reality of a psychosomatic whole which appears to inform Apollinarius' thinking when he attaches these provisos to his compositional conception of Christological unity (in the face of Diodore's critique?). If such paradoxical qualifications were theologically necessary Apollinarius may have come to consider whether the compositional conception of the union, its terminology of synthesis and mixture and its psychosomatic analogue were indeed the most effective way of expounding his understanding of the unity of Christ *contra* the Dyophysites. This could be why...

Unione, the extent of Apollinarius' departure from this unitive idea depends on how 'ὁ μὴ σώματι συμφυὴς θεὸς' (L.p.239,ll.30-31) is interpreted. Norris (pp.106-107) believes that there is no departure from the psychosomatic model:'the analogy holds without modification'. Norris is assisted by the fact that he sees a Neo-Platonic idea of mixture in play where the spiritual element transcends the mixture. Conceivably, the statement represents a complete departure from the psychosomatic model, but it seems more likely that the proviso is intended to revise rather than cancel out the anthropological model. This interpretation is encouraged by the variant offered by de Riedmatten ('Les fragments d'Apollinaire',p.209,l.18) and Ettlinger (p.186,l. 2):'ὁ μὴ φύσει σώματι συμφυὴς θεὸς'. Apollinarius is saying that God *is* naturally mixed with a body like a ψυχή (i.e. 'according to the flesh'/in the economy of the incarnation) but he is *not* naturally one (i.e. *per se*) because he still possesses his own independent nature and because he has an independent pre-history originating in eternal generation rather than the virginal conception (cf.*Ad Dionysium A* 8,L.p.259,ll.18-120;Fr.127,L.p.238,ll.18-19).

[92] L.p.240,ll.28-29.

(4) In some of the fragments Apollinarius re-presents his anthropological model of unity-in-distinction in a different way which seems to anticipate the anthropology (and derived Christology) of the 'trichotomic' writings.

(a) Apollinarius emphasises the rationality of man's psychic element/Christ's divinity (Fr.126, 132) in an argument employed to illustrate how the divine substance and subject can be substantially bound to flesh without change. In doing so Apollinarius seems to identify the subject – the man/the Saviour – more directly with his rational element (substance) than the whole or the carnal/irrational element:

> 'Human beings are consubstantial with irrational living beings (ἀλόγοις ζώοις) in respect of the body which (in both) is irrational, but they are of a different substance in respect of their being rational (λογικοί). So also God is consubstantial with men in respect of the flesh but of a different substance according to (his being) Word and God.'[93]

Such thinking appears to lead him away from the idea of Christ as one composite substance (cf. Fr.119) towards an anthropological/Christological notion which understands the substance of man/Christ in two different ways: man *is* essentially a rational being who *has* a body with an irrational essence. Similarly, God the Word *is* one divine/rational substance and is also one substance with men 'according to the flesh', i.e. in the sense that he *has* flesh which is essentially carnal/irrational. Presenting the psychic/divine element in man/Christ as the rational substance/subject allows Apollinarius to admit some level of a irrational impulse to action in the carnal/corporeal element of man/Christ, and in two of Theodoret's fragments there is some evidence that he begins to explore this line of thought.

(b) In Fr.130 Apollinarius seems to admit an 'energy' for the carnal element in Christ: 'the human (ανθρωπίνη) [energy] partakes of the divine energy' (θείας ἐνεργείας) in so far as it can attain it, but is also distinct (ἑτέρα) as the smallest from the greatest.'[94] In

[93] L.p.238,ll.9-12.

[94] L.p.239,ll.6-10. An interpretational problem is caused by the feminine gender of ἀνθρωπίνη and ἑτέρα: to which human element do they refer? R.V. Sellers takes this as a reference to Christ's human φύσις (*Two Ancient Christologies*,p.59). Φύσις does feature in Fr.128, with reference to the union, but Theodoret attests a gap between Fr.128-129 and Fr.130(see L.p.239,l.5). On the basis of Fr.130 taken in isolation the feminine adjectives can only agree with ἐνέργεια. If this is the case then Apollinarius appears to admit that the human

Fr.131 he attributes *Jn*.5.19 ('the things he sees the Father do he himself does') divisively to the flesh, since there are not 'two divine energies' (thereby implying that there is, rather, one divine energy and one carnal).[95] If these fragments do refer to a human/carnal ἐνέργεια (in the sense of 'active principle') in Christ, then Apollinarius departs from his monenergetic understanding of Christ in other 'dichotomic' treatises and moves towards the 'trichotomic' ψυχή-σῶμα distinction within σάρξ. As with (a), this departure is primarily in the interests of preserving Christ's divine element from change, here initiation of sub-divine activity.

To Jovian (Ep. Ad Jovianum)[96]

Sources, Authenticity and Context

This short confessional statement upon the incarnation has been preserved among the writings of Ps.-Athanasius and was regarded as authentically Athanasian in the fifth century, most (in)famously by Cyril of Alexandria. Lietzmann is persuaded that Apollinarius is the real author by the testimonies of the later polemicists against monophysitism.[97] The strongest evidence of Apollinarius' authorship comes from Polemon. The disciple quotes from *Ad Jovianum* 1 when offering an example of his 'divine master's' teaching in a fragment of a polemical work preserved by Maximus the Confessor.[98] Polemon gives no title to the work and Lietzmann chooses to accept the title offered by Justinian and the *Doctrina*: 'together the sources indicate that the confession was a letter written to the Emperor Jovian: we cannot verify the correctness of this testimony, but we have no grounds to doubt them. Apollinarius may, just like Athanasius and others, have expounded his faith to the new emperor.'[99] If we accept Lietzmann's suggestion then the *Ad Jovianum* is the first of the 'dichotomic' documents for which we are able to reconstruct a specific historical and church-political context.

We can date the document with relative precision due to the brevity of Jovian's reign. On 27 June 363 Jovian was elected Emperor by the troops on the Persian front. He died at

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element in Christ is not entirely passive – *unless* Fr.130 is an anthropological rather than Christological statement, which is another possibility.

[95] L.p.239,ll.12-15.

[96] L.p.250,l.1-p.253,l.14(E.T.pp.316-317,below).

[97] L.pp.116-121.

[98] See Fr.174,L.p.274,l.29-p.275,l.3.

[99] L.p.146.

Dadastana on the night of 16-17 February 364, asphyxiated by the fumes of his charcoal burner. The events of his brief reign are recorded in the chronicle of a pagan historian from Antioch, Ammianus Marcellinus, as well as the ecclesiastical histories.[100] From such sources we can form a picture of his brief reign. After making an ignominious peace with the Persians Jovian travelled westwards. He issued an 'edict of toleration' which led to the re-institution of Christianity after Julian's apostasy. He was met by both Arian delegates and Athanasius whilst still beyond the Euphrates. In October, he entered Antioch with Athanasius and it was probably here that Athanasius furnished him with an orthodox dogmatic statement – *Ep.*56 – at the Emperor's request. Jovian may have asked the Antiochene faction led by Meletius for a similar statement. Basil of Ancyra's party 'displeased' the Emperor, by requesting the recognition of Seleucia's ὅμοιος formula. Jovian was also petitioned whilst at Antioch by the Alexandrian Arians under Lucius, a rival for Athanasius' see, but Jovian preferred to give Athanasius his written blessing. Athanasius' attempt to re-establish communion with the Meletians failed and he was driven back into the arms of Paulinus and the 'Old Nicene' party who were uninterested in reunion. The Emperor left Antioch in December to adorn Julian's tomb at Tarsus. From this sequence of events it would seem most likely that Apollinarius wrote to Jovian when he was at Antioch where Apollinarius may have already enjoyed influence (within the Meletian congregation).[101] Thus, the political context of the letter would appear to be the divided Church at Antioch in the autumn of 363, after Julian's pagan revival and after the attempt at reconciliation proposed by the Alexandrian Synod of 362. It seems that the Christianity of the new Emperor proved less conducive to healing divisions than had Julian's scornful toleration. What we know of Jovian's time at Antioch indicates a situation where all the factions were trying to impress the Emperor with the case for their own views and claims on office rather than by demonstrating their readiness to compromise with one another. Given this context, there are two possibilities as to Apollinarius' precise aim and motive in writing *Ad Jovianum.* Either he was responding to the request of the Emperor who was seeking

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[100] See *Ammianus Marcellinus* 25,4-10,translated by Rolfe,J.C.,1935-1940;Socrates,*H.E.*3.22,24-26;Sozomen,*H.E.*6.3-6;Theodoret *H.E.*1-4;Themistius,*Oration* 5;Athanasius *Ep.*(56) *Ad Jovianum* (*MPG*26.813-819).

[101] The Apollinarians under Vitalis emerge from the Meletian congregation a decade later (Sozomen *H.E.*6.25). Analysis of Athanasius' *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* indicates that c.362 there was theological disagreement between the Paulinists and the Meletians at Antioch and Christological disagreement between *the same two groups*. The Apollinarian monks who were also present (§9) may be associated with the Meletian delegation.

Antiochene reunification and therefore wanted a moderate statement of Apollinarian doctrine showing its compatibility with Nicaea and *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7, or Apollinarius was, of his own volition, offering the new Emperor a persuasive exposition of the relative merits of Apollinarian doctrine *vis-à-vis* other competing Christologies present at Antioch.

The Conception of the Union

At first sight, the famous 'μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην' formula of *Ad Jovianum* 1[102] appears to offer a radical expression of Apollinarius' compositional idea of the unity: the gender of the participle indicates that Apollinarius attributes 'being enfleshed' to the Word's (changed/post-incarnational(?)) *nature* rather than the Word *per se* as unchanging divine subject. This suggests a commitment to a compositional view of natural unity *which may even extend to a generic sense of* φύσις: i.e. there is a divine-carnal nature with 'intermediate' properties at once 'enfleshed' and 'worshipped' (προσκυνουμένην).

However, details in the next phrase of the *Ad Jovianum* 1 formula 'καὶ προσκυνουμένην μετὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ μιᾷ προσκυνήσει'[103] – viz. the use of μὲτα and the gender of the participle (*feminine*) and the pronoun (*masculine*) – indicate that Apollinarius is also thinking (like Cyril subsequently?) along more *assumptional* lines beginning with a notion of one divine subject and his 'correlative' nature rather than the theory of compositional union. There is one divine subject, the eternally generated Son of God, who possesses 'the one nature of God the Word' which is worshipped, and, after the enfleshment, he also possesses flesh (τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ), not so much as part of his nature, but as something together with it (μετὰ), and therefore worshipped, which he has taken on/assumed.

There are other features of the confession which also indicate that Apollinarius has chosen to present his doctrine in a less compositional way. He emphasises the unity of the divine subject and the divinity of his nature: 'He is the one from God as I said one (ἕνα) and the same (τὸν αὐτὸν) and not another being Son of God and (also) brought forth from Mary

[102] L.p.251,ll.1-2.
[103] L.p.251,ll.2-3.

according to the flesh in the last days';[104] 'He who was brought forth from the virgin Mary is Son of God by nature (φύσει)'.[105] He predicates Christ's attributes divisively to this one divine subject: 'He ascended into heaven...being elevated from earth to heaven in respect of (κατὰ) the Word's flesh...but in respect of the divinity He is uncircumscribable encompassing every space.'[106] He quotes scriptural passages (1 *Peter* 4.1; *Rom.*8.32; 1 *Cor.*15.3,55) which suggest that salvation from sin and death comes from the vicarious suffering of the divine Son rather than the physical union itself. He rejects an over-close view of the union: 'if someone says...that the divinity was changed into flesh or that it was confounded (συγχυσθεῖσαν) or became different...this the Catholic Church anathematises'.[107]

In spite of these features, there seems to be also a polemical dimension to the confessional statement and an analysis of its structure reveals that the compositional conception of unity is still central to Apollinarius' thinking. Apollinarius defines his own position not only in antithesis to the two Sons error, but also dyophysitism (cf. *Ad Dionysium A* 1-2) and opposes a doctrine of divine-human unity and predication which pertains 'by grace', like Diodore's, rather than 'according to the flesh' (cf. Fr.140). Structurally, the key to the whole confession is the citation of *Lk.*1.35 at the end of §1 in reply to the question of Mary at the annunciation (*Lk.*1.34) and the more technical Christological question raised by Apollinarius' confession of the faith: 'How can the eternally generated Son be also born of a woman?' The angel's reply – 'The Holy Spirit will descend *(ἐπελεύσεται)* upon you and the power (δύναμις) of the Most High will overshadow (ἐπισκίασει) you and for this reason (διὸ) the holy offspring (τὸ γεννώμενον ἅγιον) will be called Son of God'[108] – is the same text which supplies the scriptural justification and terminology for Apollinarius' controversial opening remarks in *De Unione* 1 about an embodied Lord who is 'holy offspring from the beginning' and the quasi-traducian account of the virginal conception in *De Unione* 13 wherein the biological genesis of Christ's one composite nature (*De Unione* 5) is explained. Everything which Apollinarius says in the rest of *Ad Jovianum* (§§2-3) is then presented as a consequence (τοίνυν) of the Lukan explanation of the unity.

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[104] L.p.251,ll.6-8.
[105] L.p.251,ll.12-13.
[106] L.p.252,ll.11-17.
[107] L.p.253,ll.7-12.
[108] L.p.251,ll.10-12.

Nevertheless, the confession remains ultimately ambiguous when it comes to the meaning of key phrases and Apollinarius' over-all conception of Christological unity. The rather opaque phrase 'κὰτα σάρκα' is used on several occasions for both unitive and divisive purposes. There seemed to be at least four possible senses of the phrase, some of which point to the compositional view of the union, some to the more assumptional.[109] Similar ambiguity persists regarding the sense of 'κατὰ πνεῦμα/κατὰ θεότητα' and the key monophysite formula in §1. These ambiguities may be related to an overarching ambiguity to do with how Apollinarius understands the unity in Christ: advocating his doctrine of one nature as a counter-thesis to the Samosatan and dyophysite fallacies he may (as in *Ad Dionysium A*) be offering *two* not fully integrated explanations side by side: (a) There is one nature since there is one (divine) subject/person (according to scripture) and there is a numerical equivalence between unity of subject and unity of nature [*an 'assumptional' explanation*]. (b) There is one nature since Christ is like a man, not two, but one (composite) nature co-constituted out of animating ψυχή/divine power and a body in the act of procreation/virginal conception [*a 'compositional' explanation*].

A reconstruction of the Church-political context of *Ad Jovianum* (above) indicates that Apollinarius may have had one of two different aims when he wrote the confession: (1) to offer a circumspect testimony of his Christological orthodoxy in line with *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7 in response to Jovian's attempts to reunify the Antiochene factions around the Nicene position; (2) to give his own theories evangelical expression *contra* those of his Antiochene rivals. He may, of course, have written to Jovian with both aims! This double motive would help explain why Apollinarius works (consciously or unconsciously) with two different conceptions of unity side by side. His assumptional conception receives emphasis because it is more suitable for purpose (1). The (muted) compositional conception is still central because the confession seeks to recommend the same μία φύσις thesis we find in *Ad Dionysium A* and *De Unione,* as held by Apollinarius (and his Antiochene supporters?), over and against the alternative doctrines preached by others (e.g. Paulinus and Diodore) at Antioch c.363.

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[109](1)'only in respect of the carnal element possessed by the divine subject/nature'(e.g.(?)L.p.251,l.14);(2)'in respect of the carnal part of the one son *qua* πνεῦμα-σάρξ (= psychosomatic) virginal-conception-constituted composite'(e.g.(?)L.p.250,l.7);(3)'in respect of the divine Son in his (new) carnal nature'(e.g.(?)L.p.250,l.3); (4)'in respect of the divine Son acting in carnal mode'(e.g.(?)L.p.251,l.16).

On the Faith and the Incarnation (De Fide et Incarnatione)[110]

Authenticity, Text Variants, Unity and Context

Like two of the other D. documents, this treatise has been preserved in the tradition pseudonymously attributed to Julius of Rome. Lietzmann prefers to accept the testimony of the *Doctrina* which quotes *De Fide et Incarnatione* 6 and attributes it to 'Apollinarius the heretic from a work he wrote concerning the divine enfleshment of the Word against those who contested against him on the pretext of the *homoousios*'.[111]

The whole treatise (§§1-9) can be found in two Syriac manuscripts (***B***^{1}and ***B***^{2}). It is only in this ***B*** version that the two introductory paragraphs survive. The middle section (§§3-7) is also preserved in the Greek manuscript *Vaticanus Florilegium 5 (**V**).* The middle section and the concluding paragraphs (§§3-9) survive in two other Syriac versions (***S*** and ***A***), the second of these existing in two manuscripts. In Lietzmann's opinion ***B*** and ***A*** are not independent translations of an original Greek text: it is more probable that they draw on a shared Syriac source which contains the whole treatise. When it comes to reconstructing the text Lietzmann regards ***B*** as the least reliable variant[112], but, since it is the only version of *De Fide et Incarnatione* in its entirety, he reproduces it in German translation at the top of the page in his edition italicising the more suspect phrases. Beneath this he offers a reconstruction of the text from the other sources. In the middle section (§§3-7) he gives priority to ***V*** since it is a Greek copy rather than a Syriac translation and since it appears to be independent although not without its own obvious interpolations[113]. When it comes to §§8–9 Lietzmann prefers ***A*** to ***B,*** regarding the former as a more accurate copy of the shared Syriac sources, and he prefers ***S***, which seems to be independent, to both. Thus, he gives a reconstruction from ***S*** and ***A*** for §§8-9 in German translation beneath the ***B*** variant. When

[110] L.p.193,l.3-p.203,l.24(E.T.pp.318-321,below).
[111] See L.p.112.
[112] See L.pp.135-137.
[113] E.g.L.p.195,l.20;L.p.197,l.23-p.198 l.16.

we come to consider the text we have no choice but to look at the ***B*** version for §§1-2; thereafter it is the Greek version of §§3-7, and the ***S/A*** version of §§8-9 which should command our closest attention.

De Fide et Incarnatione only survives as a whole and under this title in its least reliable version. It is only a paragraph (§6) from the middle section which has been accredited to Apollinarius and the *Doctrina* and *Vaticanus Florilegium* refer to this work by a different title: viz. *Contra Adversarios.* Nevertheless, Lietzmann believes there is a coherence of argument and terminology which indicates that the three sections *did* originally belong together as in ***B***[114]. The first two paragraphs identify salvation with the incarnation, concluding with an allusion to the saving body; this then leads into the opening proposition of §3: '[Therefore (Deshalb)]^{B} let no-one disparage the Lordly and saving flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ...'. §§8-9 are linked to §§3-7 not only by the editorial comments in ***S*** and ***A*** testifying that they belong to the same treatise, but also by a statement at the climax of §9 which seems to recapitulate the theme and vocabulary of an assertion in §6 affirming Mary as 'God-bearer' and God as subject of crucifixion *by the Jews*[115].

We have only one explicit clue as to the occasion of this treatise. In *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3 Apollinarius writes: 'Neither we *nor our Synod,* nor anyone who possesses human reasoning says or understands that the body is consubstantial in its own right'. This comment causes Lietzmann to conclude that the work is 'a pamphlet...ordained to refute those who raised objection to an Apollinarian Synod'.[116] If Lietzmann is correct in supposing the Synod to be *Apollinarian,* then this may indicate quite a late date for this D. treatise because the Apollinarians did not go into official schism until 377. Raven inclines towards this view suggesting that the treatise is 'a synodal confession' which 'may emanate from the Synod which Gregory Naz., *Carmen de Vita sua,* mentions as held in 378 or

[114] L.p.136-137.
[115] Cf. L.p.198,ll.23-25 and L.p.203,ll.20-24.
[116] L.p.137,re L.p.194,ll.17-19.

379'.[117] However, the fact that Apollinarius alludes to a Synod to which he was party need not indicate that this was a schismatic 'Apollinarian' Synod. We know that Apollinarius had representatives at the 'orthodox' Synod of Alexandria in 362. In his Christological confession to Jovian in 363, he advocates his own doctrine, but speaks on behalf of the Catholic Church.[118] The reference, therefore, may be to an 'orthodox' Synod, or perhaps a more partisan Synod composed of Apollinarius and like-minded churchmen, held *before* the Apollinarians went into schism. Athanasius refers to a proliferation of diverse synods of dubious authority and orthodox councils condemning them in *Ep. Ad Epictetum* 1 (c.370-371). According to Epiphanius the *Ad Epictetum* was Athanasius' response to a recent 'Synod' attended by Apollinarians and dualists reported to him by Epictetus.[119] Anything more specific about the context of *De Fide et Incarnatione* and the nature of the Synod to which it refers must be gleaned from the tone and content of the treatise itself. The treatise begins with a soteriological prolegomenon which invites us to consider the mystery and the incarnational means of our salvation (§§1-2). This is followed by a statement of doctrine, apologetic in tone, clarifying the status of Christ's saving flesh/body *vis-à-vis* the *'homoousion'*, the divine Trinity, and the unity that is Christ (§§3-7). The conclusion of the treatise (§§8-9) is more polemical and recapitulates a key soteriological theme: God himself was born, crucified and saves (not a man).

The Conception of the Union

In this apologetic (?) treatise Apollinarius seems reluctant to admit that his doctrine of the indivisible unity of the Word and flesh extends to their being consubstantial: 'Neither we, nor our Synod, nor any who possess human reasoning say or understand that the body is *'homoousios'* in itself (καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὁμοούσιον)' (§3).[120] Nevertheless, there are a number of features which indicate that Apollinarius' exposition is informed by the 'compositional'

[117] Raven,p.218n.[4] Raven is unable to decide whether *De Fide et Incarnatione* or the *Tomus Synodalis* (L.pp.262-264) is the confession of this particular Apollinarian Synod:'Either of these, but clearly not both emanate from the Synod'.
[118] L.p.253,l.12.
[119] See Epiphanius,*Panarion 77*,2.5-7.
[120] L.p.194,ll.17-19.

theory of union which leads him to assert one composite substance of God and a body elsewhere (cf. Fr. 117,119): e.g. there is some evidence of an anti-dyophysite motive (§§3,7); natural/vital-dynamic terms are used to signify the Christological unity (§§3,6) and here the phrase 'ὅλος θεός, ὅλος ἄνθρωπος' may recapitulate the idea of the composite 'τὸ ὅλον' (cf. *De Unione*); when Apollinarius explains the basis of Christ's human 'likeness' he has in mind the Lord's analogous generation in the virginal conception (§4) understood along the same quasi-traducian lines as *De Unione* 13: 'the animating spirit (belebende Geist) of our Lord Jesus Christ was fatherless (vaterlos) in his birth on earth because it was God who descended from earth and not a man springing from human seed' (§9);[121] a real and inclusive understanding of the *communicatio idiomatum* is sometimes implied (§§4,6,7);[122] thus, Apollinarius may be asserting one composite person (§§3,6 cf. *De Unione* 10) and, for the first time in an extant D. work, one composite hypostasis (§§3,6).

Yet there are other phrases which suggest Apollinarius was also guided by an 'assumptional' understanding of the union when he wrote *De Fide et Incarnatione*. In particular, there are many statements which present the union as a divine subject's *possession* of flesh (§§3-7): e.g.

> 'He is inseparable and indivisible from his own flesh and, according to its union with God the Word, the flesh of Him of whom the flesh indeed is (οὗ καὶ σάρξ ἐστιν), shares in the name (ὀνόματι) of the natural consubstantiality of the Word with the Father' (§4);[123] 'One and the same individual (ταὐτὸν) is the body and God whose body (it is) (οὗ τὸ σῶμα)' (§7).[124]

The two key formulae for unity (§§3,6) are both introduced by such statements and, arguably, they identify the incarnational unity ultimately with the divine (masculine) individual rather than another natural, personal, or hypostatic unity which divinity has co-formed with flesh:

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[121] L.p.201,ll.20-24.
[122] In spite of Apollinarius' careful emphasis that the transfer of divine consubstantiality to the flesh is nominal in §4(L.p.195,ll.19-20), he must be speaking about *real* 'participation' because he goes on to say that our salvation depends on this (L.p.195,ll.22-24). In §6 he explains the worship of the flesh and the Word's becoming flesh on the basis of their being 'one life (μίαν ζωὴν) of the Word and the flesh' (L.p.198,l.16). The opening statement in §7 is suggestive of an intermediate substance:'His substance (οὐσία) (is) the divinity with regard to what is invisible, but flesh with regards to what is visible'(L.p.199,ll.18-19).
[123] L.p.195,ll.17-22.
[124] L.p.199,ll.23-24.

'We confess that God the Word has been enfleshed from the Virgin Mary and we do not divide him (αὐτὸν) from his own (αὐτοῦ) flesh rather he is one person (ἕν πρόσωπον), one hypostasis (μία ὑπόστασις) wholly (ὅλος) man wholly (ὅλος) God'(§3).[125]

'Not one division of the Word and of his (αὐτοῦ) flesh is put forward in the divine scriptures - but he is one nature, one hypostasis, one energy, one person (μία... μία... μία... ἕν...), the same (ὁ αὐτός) wholly man (ὅλος) wholly (ὅλος) God' (§6).[126]

In *De Fide et Incarnatione* therefore, a tension exists between Apollinarius' compositional theory of the union and assumptional idea of the divine Word's possession of flesh and this makes it difficult to interpret precisely what Apollinarius means when he says that Christ is one hypostasis/person in the §§3,6 formulae. Does he mean (a) Christ is a composite individual objectivisation of the Word's consubstantial divinity and flesh, or (b) Christ is a divine subject, the second person/hypostasis of the Trinity? Taken in isolation the syntax of the formulae is more suggestive of (b)[127] but it is necessary to consider Apollinarius' argument as a whole to decide whether he was thinking primarily on compositional lines or whether (for apologetic reasons) he had moved towards a more assumptional conception when he wrote this treatise and devised these formulae. In *De Fide et Incarnatione* Apollinarius presents his doctrine of Christological unity as if it is the consequence of a soteriology, so we need to consider whether the type of soteriology advocated implies or justifies a compositional conception of unity in Christ or points away from this towards another idea.

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[125] L.p.194,ll.20-23.

[126] L.p.198,l.25-p.199,l.17.

[127] In the first formula (§3), the gender of ὅλος seems to reveal that it is God the Word who is (somehow) fully God and man and not a composite person (ὅλον) or hypostasis (ὅλη). The person or hypostasis is God the Word – unless Apollinarius is referring to God-the-Word-who-has-become-enfleshed by ὅλος. The phrase 'and we do not divide him from his own flesh' rather suggests that Apollinarius does not include flesh in the masculine subject at least from a grammatical point of view. So how is the divine subject/person/hypostasis fully man according to this statement? – because he indivisibly *possesses* human flesh (?). In the second formula (§6) even more clearly, the pronoun ὁ αὐτός, as well as the gender of ὅλος, indicates that Apollinarius locates the divine-human unity, not ultimately in a composite nature, hypostasis, energy or person, but in a masculine subject – the Word (?) – who is the single nature, hypostasis, energy and person in Christ indivisible from the flesh which he possesses. Here there is slightly more reason to believe that Apollinarius has in mind a composite masculine individual when he speaks of ὁ αὐτός because, although the immediate subject of the pronoun appears to be the Word *per se,* the passage which the formula concludes begins:'if therefore the Word has become enfleshed'(L.p.198,l.18), so Apollinarius could be talking about the incarnate divine subject Christ Jesus. Also terms which denote Christ as a composite unity elsewhere, φύσις and ἐνέργεια, appear in the formula and μία ζωή features earlier in the paragraph.

The incarnational-centred (§4) soteriology of *De Fide et Incarnatione* has a double emphasis.

(1) *God himself saves* is the most basic theme; throughout the treatise there are simple statements emphasising that the incarnation/salvation is the action of a divine subject (and not a man): 'Because he is good and Son (*read*: Creator) of the good he not only set us free from punishment, but also gave us eternal life' (§1); 'God came to us'; 'He has led us up to heaven' (§2); 'We confess that God the Word has become enfleshed' (§§3,4); 'there is no salvation outside the divine Trinity (§5); 'one must confess him Son of God and true one before eternity, *homoousios* with the father... whom the Virgin begat, Saviour and deliverer' (§6); 'the holy apostles...proclaimed to the world that God was incarnate' (§8); 'the redemption is (a deed) of God and (likewise) the renewal of the world, thus it is not (the deed) of another' (§9). The reason God himself must be saviour is because only God can give life: 'it is not possible to find the life which stems from God from a human being... But life-giving is he who was born and crucified' (§9). God is thus also subject of the second saving action (2) which involves his body: 'He gave his body and blood for us' (§2). On the face of it the theme that God the Word is the sole source of eternal life seems to fit together with the idea that divinity is the sole source of animal life in the one nature of Christ and at the virginal conception (cf. *De Unione*), – but it does not fit exactly. Once the emphasis is placed on the subjectivity of the divine element in the incarnation (and virginal conception)[128] it is not just the fact of the physical union of a body and divinity which saves, it is what the Word consciously does in the flesh on our behalf which saves: he makes flesh his own whilst maintaining self-control so that his flesh is sinless and immortal and can be given vicariously for us upon the cross to set us free from punishment and give us back eternal life (§§1-2,8-9).

(2) *The saving role of Christ's body (and blood)* is also affirmed (§§2-3) in connection with a physical scheme where 'the incarnation is salvation' because the Word is indivisibly united (§§3,4,6,7) to a body/humanity like ours (§7). Such flesh is no longer alienated from God and has eternal life not because it is divine *per se,* but because it is indivisibly united

[128] In *De Unione* 13 Apollinarius gives the divine spirit the function of an animal soul in the co-constitution of the composite foetus. In *De Fide et Incarnatione* 8 the 'beblebende Geist' is immediately identified with the descent of a divine (not human) subject (L.p.201,ll.20-24).

with divinity in a composite reality (ἡ σάρκωσις) which subsists within the Trinity and in which we are included:

> 'Salvation would not follow from the enfleshment (σαρκώσεως) for those who believe, if it [the enfleshment [or the flesh (?)] *feminine*] subsisted (ὑπαρχούσης) outside the Trinity' (§4);[129] 'His substance is the divinity with regard to what is invisible, but flesh with regard to what is visible. Therefore, the enfleshment of our Lord Jesus Christ is neither alienated nor has it been divided from the divine Trinity. For in the numbering of the Trinity he declares that baptism is given for the forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the body' (§7).[130]

'Salvation follows on from the σάρκωσις for those who believe' not just because Christ's body serves as a concrete universal,[131] but because Apollinarius links the physical to a eucharistic scheme of salvation whereby the physical advantages of Christ's flesh are passed onto the believer in the sacraments. Lietzmann's opinion[132] that the final words of the Soteriological Introduction (§§1-2) – 'and not only this, he gave (gab) his body and blood for us' – allude to the eucharistic sacraments seems, on balance, justified. The key eucharistic verb μετέχω does not apparently feature, but the mention of 'blood' adds to the eucharistic feel here, if not in §8. The repeated reference to 'mysteries' in the Introduction in connection with God's second providential initiative seems to confirm that Apollinarius has the idea of (future) salvation through the sacraments in mind – hence the special status of Christ's body (§§3-7). (The idea of salvation through cleansing (λουτρόν), made possible by baptism into the death and new life of Christ, is another sacramental theme which Apollinarius makes explicit (§§5,7) to justify his inclusion of the Word-flesh unity within the Trinity.)

Two Apollinarian fragments from elsewhere indicate that Apollinarius' conception of salvation through the eucharistic sacraments is closely connected with his compositional

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[129] L.p.195,ll.23-24. Grammatically, it is more likely that Apollinarius means that the Word-flesh σάρκωσις rather than the σάρξ subsists within the Trinity due to the unitive action, although his enemies take him and his Synod to mean the flesh *per se* (§3) and also some of the Syrian translators of §5(see,L.p.197,l.2). Apollinarius seems to use σάρκωσις here to denote the unity rather than the act of union,cf. *De Unione* 11(L.p.190,l.12).

[130] L.p.199,ll.18-22.

[131] Apollinarius begins explaining the means of our salvation by quoting 2 *Cor*.5.17:'He who is in Christ is a new creation' (§2), but his understanding of how such inclusion has 'led us up to heaven' seems to be physical/incarnational rather than strictly Pauline. A subsequent statement is reminiscent of the Athanasian idea (cf. *De Incarnatione* 9) of the King taking up residence in one body/house to end the corruption and death in others:'He came to us, God to humankind, the Lord to his vassals, the rich man to the poor, the living and the life-giving to the house of the dead' (L.p.193,ll.28-31).

[132] L.p.136,see p.14,above.

conception of the incarnation. In his exegesis of *Jn.*6.53-55 he explains the (eternal) life-giving properties of Christ's (sacramental) flesh with reference to the incarnational 'mixture' in which the divinity plays a vital-dynamic role.[133] In Fr.116 a 'synousiast' view of the Word-flesh union, which draws close to admitting the consubstantial divinity of the flesh, is justified with reference to the saving efficacy of Christ's sacramental flesh due to the special status it acquires through the union.[134]

Prestige's criticism[135] of this (second) line of Apollinarius' soteriological thinking is valid: if the idea of flesh-mediated salvation (via the sacraments) is linked to the compositional Christology found in the D. documents, it produces an unsatisfactory doctrine of *automatic* salvation. In the one who is saved the soul is either replaced or over-ridden by the divine power in the (sacramental) flesh of Christ, or it is transformed by its own divinized flesh. If Apollinarius is to distance himself from these inherent problems he may have had to reconceive his idea of the incarnational union.

Thus the soteriological argument which informs/justifies Apollinarius' doctrine of the union and its key formulae (§§3,6) in *De Fide et Incarnatione* exhibits the same tension as the Christology. The 'God himself saves' theme points towards the 'assumptional' view of the union and interpretation of one (divine) hypostasis/person and the 'saving body' scheme, which is linked with the compositional theory of union, is suggestive of a composite hypostasis/person. There also seems to be a corresponding ambivalence to Apollinarius' apologetic stance *vis-à-vis* the consubstantiality of Christ's flesh: he wants to show that his doctrine holds the flesh out of *de facto* consubstantiality (§§3,4), but he is unrepentant about including the flesh in the physical/substantial union with divinity (§§6,7).

This double emphasis within Apollinarius' Christology, soteriology and apologetic stance and the ultimate inscrutability of his formulations (§§3,6), may explain why commentators are divided as to whether Apollinarius ultimately means (a) or (b) (see p.92,

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[133] 'It is not possible to have the benefit of the Word of God with a view to eternal life unless through his flesh. For so long as he was not mixed together (ἀνεμίγνυτο) with flesh, all flesh was held down under death. But now flesh has been given which makes everything of the same generic type (πᾶν τὸ ὁμογενὲς) grow into life through the power (δυνάμεως) which is blended (ἀνακραθείσης) with it, and its similar mingling (ἀνεκιρναμένης) with those who participate (μετεχούσιας) in flesh'. For Greek text, see Riedmatten[2],p.221 n.[2].

[134] L.p.235,ll.8-17(E.T.,p.323,below). The fragment contains an interpretative problem. It remains ambiguous whether Apollinarius means (1) the eucharistic flesh is consubstantially divine, or (2) the eucharistic flesh is consubstantial with the human recipient (but is *also not* consubstantial because it is life-giving), or (3) the vital principle of the eucharistic flesh is consubstantially divine. (2) or (3) are more likely and these point to a compositional view of the unity.

[135] Prestige,G.,*Fathers and Heretics*,pp.112-113.

above) when he asserts: 'He is one person, one hypostasis, wholly God, wholly man.' For example, de Riedmatten and Grillmeier tend to favour (a), whilst Raven and Richard favour (b).[136] On the basis of the mixed evidence, both types of interpretation have some validity.

Richard argues that the authentic doctrine of Apollinarius and the 'first Apollinarian school' is that the Word *per se* supplied the hypostasis yet is 'wholly man via a unitive action of agglutinising the flesh to himself' (viz. enhypostatisation) which is not equivalent to compositional union.[137] This conception of unity/union is based on a T. anthropological model in which the νοῦς is the hypostasis of a man, in which and by which the animal soul and body are enhypostatised. Such thinking possibly informs the formulae in §§3,6, but Apollinarius does not make a theory of union by enhypostatisation explicit in *De Fide et Incarnatione* even though it would have been apologetically useful. His formulae, Christology and soteriology send out mixed signals as to his sense of one hypostasis/person and this may be why some of his disciples develop a theory of enhypostatisation[138] and yet others, believing themselves to be no less faithful to their master, assert 'one composite hypostasis'.[139] In *De Fide et Incarnatione* Apollinarius *may* be inclining towards a (revised?) concept of union by enhypostatisation which is why he asserts the unity in terms of hypostasis and person as well as nature. If Apollinarius is inclining towards this revised conception of Christological unity he may also be inclining towards the revised T. anthropology which underpins it.

More Thoughts about the Context

The original context of *De Fide et Incarnatione* might explain the tension within it between Apollinarius' compositional and assumptional conceptions of the Word-flesh unity and the two corresponding soteriological themes; it might also explain any departure from, or modification of, the compositional thesis which occurs because of the assumptional emphasis. The treatise appears to have been written in apologetic response to *Nicene* critics, who have accused Apollinarius 'and his Synod' of propounding a doctrine of the incarnation which makes the flesh consubstantially divine, endangering the *homoousion* and the doctrine of the Trinity and implicating the Word's divinity in change and suffering. We cannot be

[136] Cf. Riedmatten[2] p.218;Grillmeier,pp.338-339;Raven,pp.224-225;Richard,pp.6-8;.
[137] Richard,p.11.
[138] E.g.Vitalis(?),(see Epiphanius,*Panarion 77*,23.5) and the author of *QUSC*,(see L.p.300,ll.9-p.301,l.2).
[139] E.g.Bishop Jobius,(see L.p.286,ll.20-23).

certain, but one possibility suggested by these circumstances is that the Apollinarian treatise belongs to the same period as Athanasius' *Ep. Ad Epictetum* (c.370-371).[140] Epiphanius offers a credible explanation of the background to the Athanasian epistle.[141] Some of Apollinarius' disciples began to teach that the flesh was consubstantial with divinity. This caused 'turmoil' in the East and a Synod was held where Christology was discussed. Minutes were taken by Epictetus and sent to Athanasius. In his reply Athanasius focuses his criticism upon the fallacy of the 'consubstantialist' Christology. Interestingly, he emphasises that the Word's 'becoming flesh' should be understood in assumptional and possessional terms. We know from Apollinarius' *Ep. Ad Serapionem*[142] that he received a copy of the Athanasian *Ep. Ad Epictetum* and writing to their mutual friend he chooses to endorse Athanasius' opinion and condemn the 'consubstantialist' position more unequivocally than in *De Fide et Incarnatione*. Given that the 'consubstantialist' doctrine seems genuinely derivable from terms and ideas present in Apollinarius' 'dichotomic' writings, the *De Fide et Incarnatione* may constitute an earlier, or less guarded, reaction to this (new) type of Nicene/Athanasian criticism. Such a context would explain the ambivalence of the Apollinarian statement. Apollinarius' response is in part unrepentant holding to the compositional thesis and the related soteriological justification (the saving body); but he has also registered the seriousness of the criticism and emphasises a different terminology for the unity (person/hypostasis), a different soteriological argument (God himself saves) and a more assumptional idea of union (the Word's possession of flesh). These apologetic features create the ambiguity pertaining to the two key formulae for unity (§§3,6) and point away from the compositional conception towards a new or modified conception (enhypostatisation?) requiring a revised anthropological framework.

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[140] Raven argues for c.360-361, but the majority of scholars prefer this later date (see Voisin,p.62;Lietzmann,p.11;Kelly,J.N.D.,*Creeds*,p.324) since it is most likely that the recent Roman Synod mentioned in *Ep. Ad Epictetum* 1 is that of Damasus which condemned Auxentius of Milan (see Williams,F., *Panarion* (1994),p.569).

[141] Epiphanius,*Panarion 77*,2.5-7.

[142] L.pp.253-254.

Unclassifiable Fragments Featuring a Compositional Conception of Unity e.g. Fr. 111, 113, 149[143]

There are a number of fragments wherein the nature of Apollinarius' anthropological framework is not made explicit, which indicate how far Apollinarius was, on occasion, prepared to take his conception of Christ as one composite nature.

In Fr.111 Apollinarius employs the idea of Christ's composite and intermediate generic nature to defend the unity of Christ against those who speak divisively of the Word and 'the man assumed':

> 'Christ (is) one man as the Father (is) one God – this (the latter) one-ness being by nature (φυσέως) so too the former – by means of the composite nature being between God and men (φύσεως συνθέτου μεταξὺ οὔσης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων).'[144]

The term μεταξὺ means 'between' in an intermediate rather than connecting sense. This is confirmed by the plurality of 'ἀνθρώπων'. Apollinarius is speaking about the human nature possessed by all ordinary men and not the human component in Christ's nature. Apollinarius' anti-dyophysite analogy for the unity in Christ is here not psychosomatic or 'biological', it is theological/metaphysical. *KMP* 14-15 affords insight into how Apollinarius understands the Father to be one God 'by nature'. The Father, Son and Spirit are one God 'by nature' because each is a person who 'possesses' and individually objectivises the one divine nature understood along quasi-generic lines, viz. the same 'characteristic property' (τὸ ἴδιον/ἡ ἰδιότης) of God (the Father).[145] If we set aside the peculiarities which belong to his uniquely tri-personal example, Apollinarius is using a model for unity of nature in Fr.111 which sees a numerical correlation between an individual subject and the single generic nature which he possesses or individualises. On this analysis Christ as a single person cannot possess/individualise two natures and be God and a man at the same time. Therefore, Christ is one 'man' (and 'God') through the possession/individualisation of one composite generic nature which is intermediate between those of God and men.

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[143] Also,Fr.116,107(E.T.p.323,below);also(?) Fr.9,10,11.
[144] L.p.233,ll.27-29.
[145] L.p.172,ll.4-13.

In Fr. 113 (from another work) this line of thought is elaborated using the model of the 'intermediate state' (μεσότης) which exists in a hybrid animal or compound colour to explain how Christ is 'a mixture of God and man':

> 'Intermediate states come into being by different properties (ἰδιοτήτων διαφόρων) coming together into one thing – as the property (ἰδιότης) of an ass and of a horse in a mule, and the property of white and black in a grey colour, and as spring is made from the atmosphere of summer and the property of winter. But no intermediate state possesses both extremes in (their) entirety (ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου), rather they have been mixed in part (μερικῶς ἐπιμεμιγμένας). And there is an intermediate state (μεσότης) between God and men (ἀνθρώπων) in Christ. Therefore, he is neither a whole man nor God, but a mixture (μίξις) of God and man.'[146]

Here the μεσοτής is not identical with the *tertium quid* – it exists 'in' it. Apollinarius' explanation of the unity in Christ refers primarily not to the 'middle being', but the manner of its existence. The modal sense of μεσοτής is relational: it is to do with the intermediate entity's standing between two extremes and when Apollinarius explains the origin of such a state he does so by talking about the combination of different (sets of) essential properties in a third.

Thus, whilst the Aristotelian notion of the medium between two extremes is not identical to Aristotle's conception of a mixture between two elements, it suggests a very similar kind of unity. The 'intermediate state' which exists in/belongs to a hybrid animal or compound colour is very similar to the intermediate generic nature which belongs to the *tertium quid* produced by a mixture. In Aristotelian κρᾶσις the set of properties belonging to the *tertium quid* is not identical to the properties belonging to either of the ingredients nor an aggregate of both. The two ingredients, by combining, have thus reciprocally changed each other in a qualitative way. Something similar happens to the two sets of properties belonging to the 'extremes' when they come together in a μεσοτής: 'no intermediate state possesses both extremes ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου'. The properties of (e.g.) an ass and a horse have only been mixed 'in part' in a mule. 'Μερικῶς' does not refer to the fact that there are unmixed elements within the mixture,[147] but the fact that *only some* of the qualities of the ass and the horse belong to the mule: the mule is partly ass and partly horse in generic terms.

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[146] L.p.234,ll.13-20.
[147] Cf.*Contra Diodorum*,Fr.125.

The unitive process by which this occurs involves reciprocal change: some of the properties of the original ingredients cancel themselves out and different intermediate properties emerge. That Apollinarius is thinking of something not unlike an intermediate generic nature when he applies the μεσοτής model to the unity in Christ seems to be confirmed by the plurality of 'ἀνθρώπων': 'In Christ there is an intermediate state of God and men', i.e. a set of properties composed (partly)[148] of God's properties and partly of those belonging generically to human beings.

Such thinking may also lie behind Fr.149's assertion of 'one mixed nature carnal and divine' and (slightly less symmetrical) references to God-Incarnate's mixed divine-carnal nature in Fr.9,10.

If Apollinarius is prepared to admit and explore this type of conception of compositional unity openly in Fr.111,113, then there is no reason why he should not have accepted it as to some degree implicit in his psychosomatically modelled thesis of μία φύσις by composition/co-mixture which predominates in the D. works: this also understands the incarnation as a symmetrical union of two incomplete parts in a third nature (*De Unione* 5). Thus, Apollinarius' understanding of Christ's μία φύσις in the D. documents may (sometimes) be generic as well as vital/existential in the interests not only of Christological unity, but his physical/eucharistic theory of salvation.

[148] It is interesting that Apollinarius draws short of actually saying this:'Therefore he is not a complete man nor [complete?] God, but a mixture of God and man'L.p.234,ll.18-20).

3

RECONSTRUCTING THE *APODEIXIS*

The Significance, Sources, Authenticity and Context of the Apodeixis

Of the surviving 'trichotomic' work, what remains of the *Apodeixis* provides the most extensive and, potentially, the most revealing insight into the type of Christology which Apollinarius had in mind when he chose to employ an anthropological trichotomy as a model for the incarnational unity. In the Lietzmann edition the *KMP* may be the longest T. text, but it offers a more general theological confession; the *Apodeixis* appears to have been a treatise devoted exclusively to the exposition of Apollinarius' Christological doctrine. Due to the mode of its transmission the *Apodeixis* has been preserved in fragmentary form. Lietzmann includes ninety-four quotations from/paraphrases of the *Apodeixis* (Fr.13-107) among the collection of 171 fragments he attributes to Apollinarius himself.

Lietzmann recovers the fragments of the *Apodeixis* from three sources: Gregory of Nyssa's *Antirrheticus Adversus Apolinarium*[1] preserves all but two of the fragments (Fr.13-105); the *Doctrina* supplies Fr.106; Justinian offers Fr.107 together with a variant of Fr.81[b].[2] Unless Gregory is labouring under a misapprehension it seems certain that Apollinarius himself was the author of the *Apodeixis*: the whole purpose of Gregory's *Antirrheticus* is to 'examine the teachings of Apollinarius of Syria' by means of presenting (and critically considering) one of his discourses entitled: 'Απόδειξις περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως τῆς καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου'[3]. Gregory's statement of purpose may establish the Apollinarian authenticity of the *Apodeixis*, but it creates a much more complex problem when it comes to ascertaining the authenticity of the individual fragments. When Gregory refers to Apollinarius' text is he quoting directly, is he reporting accurately, or is he offering a less-than-faithful paraphrase? The two fragments preserved independently by the *Doctrina* and Justinian (Fr.106,107) claim to be quoting the words of Apollinarius himself from a treatise 'Περὶ τῆς θείας

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[1] This is Müller's title (see n.[3],below). Mühlenberg and Lampe prefer *Adversus Apollinarem*.
[2] L.p.208,l.9–p.232,l.21. The Lateran Council also preserves a shorter version of Fr.107(L.p.232,ll.22-4).For Fr.81[b],as reported by Gregory and Justinian,see L.p.224,ll.16-24.
[3] Gregory of Nyssa,*Antirrheticus* 2,see Jaeger W.,ed.*Gregorii Nysseni Opera*,vol. III.1(Müller,F.,ed.),*Opera Dogmatica Minora*,1958(this work is hereafter cited as 'J.'),p.132,ll.15-28.

σαρκώσεως'. Lietzmann's editorial decision that this work is the same as the *Apodeixis* remains open to question as does his opinion as to the probable position of these fragments in relation to those preserved by Gregory: 'Fr.106 may belong to Fr.70-73, Fr.107 must have closely followed it and must have stood in the environs of Fr.74'.[4]

The sources for Fr.13-107 furnish no information as to the historical context in which Apollinarius wrote the *Apodeixis* – any clues need to be sought in the fragments themselves. Whilst some of the earlier commentators argue that the *Apodeixis* was written before Apollinarius' break with Orthodoxy, and may even have been the cause of this,[5] it seems more likely that it was written *after* the secession of Apollinarius from the church (c.377) which Müllenberg, more convincingly, argues was for political reasons.[6] In the early part of the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius refers to his opponents obliquely as those who espouse a false type of Christological conception which can be traced back to Paul of Samosata (Fr.14-15). But later on he identifies his opponents as those who do not accept the precise Christological theory he is advocating in the *Apodeixis* (Fr.51-55). It becomes plain from Gregory's comments that he himself feels included among those whom Apollinarius opposes[7] – a group which Gregory (at least) identifies as Orthodoxy: 'But again he [sc. Apollinarius] returns to his own point and claims that the statement of the Church says that we regard the suffering in respect of the man.'[8]

We have slightly more evidence to go on when it comes to dating the *Antirrheticus*. Lietzmann and Mühlenberg argue that the *Antirrheticus* must have been written after Gregory's other anti-Apollinarian work, *Ad Theophilum: Adversus Apol(l)inaristas*, since in his epistle to the Patriarch of Alexandria Gregory shows no great knowledge of the substance of the Apollinarian heresy, calling upon Theophilus to provide a more detailed refutation. This would seem to indicate that Gregory could not have read the *Apodeixis* nor written his reply before 385, which is the year when Theophilus became Patriarch.[9] Gregory's comments after Fr.42[a] seem to suggest that Apollinarius was still alive when Gregory wrote the *Antirrheticus*: 'if he [sc. Apollinarius] would only turn away from his stupid doctrine in his heart we would make an end to our reproaches.'[10] This puts the composition of the *Antirrheticus* before c.391. On the basis of this evidence it would appear that Gregory wrote the *Antirrheticus* after

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[4] L.p.141.
[5] E.g.Dräseke,pp.42-45;Voisin,p.85.
[6] Mühlenberg,pp.26-63.
[7] E.g.'...he says that *we* say that he who was crucified had nothing divine in his nature not even that very principal element which is spirit'(L.p.216,ll.30-31).
[8] L.p.229,ll.1-3.
[9] L.p.84;Mühlenberg,pp.90-91.
[10] *Antirrheticus* 22,J.p.162,ll.12-15.

385 and before c.391. We should note, however, that Hübner has disputed Mühlenberg's interpretation of the *Ad Theophilum*, arguing that it may have been written *after* the *Antirrheticus* since it asks for political rather than theological help and offers 'a clear and distinct refutation of some of the teachings of Apollinarius'. Consequently Hübner prefers 382-383 as a suggested dating of the *Antirrheticus*.[11]

These deductions about the dating of the *Antirrheticus* do not allow us to be much more precise about the historical context of the writing of the *Apodeixis* other than to say that the *Apodeixis* was probably written between 377 and the time when it fell into Gregory's hands in the mid (?) 380s. The real importance of the *Antirrheticus* for those wishing to understand the *Apodeixis* is that it supplies the *literary context* for the surviving Apollinarian fragments, 'the *oldest* surviving text to come down to us directly from which we can extract fragments of Apollinarius'.[12] The many fragments from the *Apodeixis* as given in the Lietzmann edition afford an insight into the Apollinarian treatise and the type of T. Christology it advocated which is only potentially revealing, as the clarity of this insight is dependent upon, amongst other things, a full understanding of Gregory's argument in the *Antirrheticus,* which shows how and why he has chosen to refer to the Apollinarian work on each occasion. Some interpreters of Apollinarius have perhaps misjudged the significance of individual fragments from the series Fr.13-105, and assumed their conformity with Apollinarian statements excerpted from other treatises, because they have not fully considered their context in Gregory's refutation. Any attempt at a fair investigation of the T. Christology which lies behind Fr.13-105 must first investigate Gregory's argument in the *Antirrheticus*: herein lie the primary clues as to the authenticity of the individual fragments, their interrelation and the shape and purpose of the work to which they originally belong.

Gregory of Nyssa's Antirrheticus Adversus Apolinarium

The *Antirrheticus* is a long and verbose work in which Gregory sets out to see if the doctrines of Apollinarius should be categorised as orthodox teaching or false prophecy.[13] He does this by describing, examining and refuting one of Apollinarius' works, the *Apodeixis*. At the beginning of the *Antirrheticus*, Gregory seems unfamiliar with

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[11] Hübner,R.,'Gotteserkenntnis',*Kleronomia* 4,1972,pp.136-138.
[12] L.p.83.
[13] *Antirrheticus* 1-2,J.p.131,l.1-p.132,l.28.

Apollinarius' doctrine.[14] Gregory's reply is thus developed in an *ad hoc* fashion in the form of a multitude of diverse and ingenious arguments which refute individual points made by Apollinarius; Gregory does not offer an analytical overview of the Apollinarian heresy nor set out a systematic counter-thesis of his own. There may well be truth in Mühlenberg's suggestion: 'It seems that Gregory had a clerk read him the book and only bothered to refute something when he felt directly attacked or when he could most clearly expose the absurdity of the Apollinarist Christology.'[15] In spite of the difficulties, E. Mühlenberg and A. Meredith attempt to analyse thematically the structure of Gregory's argument in *Antirrheticus.*[16] Although these analyses offer a helpful way of dividing up a long and daunting work, they are, perhaps, over generous to Gregory given the lack of any evident design. The themes highlighted by Mühlenberg as defining the structure of the *Antirrheticus* are mostly *reactionary*: e.g. *Contra* Apollinarius' theopaschitism (*Section I* = §§2-12); *Contra* Apollinarius' doctrine of the heavenly man/eternal body (*Section II* = §§13-21); *Contra* Apollinarius' doctrine of Christ as νοῦς ἔνσαρκος (*Section IV* = §§35-39); *Contra* Apollinarius' doctrine that Christ's humanity of Christ is mindless (*Section V* = §§40-41); *Contra* Apollinarius' trichotomic analysis of Christ (*Section VIII* = §§46-57). These themes are a response to aspects of Apollinarius' thesis which lend themselves readily to Gregorian refutation and Gregory is interested in these aspects *whenever* they arise and therefore his attack on them is not confined within thematic sections.[17] The apparent predominance of particular themes in certain chapters is due not to the structure of the *Antirrheticus,* but to the enduring structure of the *Apodeixis* to which it reacts. Due to Gregory's rather pedestrian approach to his polemical task it is the thematic development of Apollinarius' argument which seems to set the agenda in all but a few chapters of the *Antirrheticus.*[18] Gregory's relative

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[14] We can tell this from (e.g.) the way in which Gregory first responds to Apollinarius' admission that Christ has human flesh *and* a ψυχή in *Antirrheticus* 7:'In attaching human flesh and that ensouled (ἔμψυχον) to the Word he attaches nothing other than a complete man' (L.p.210,ll.4-6). Such an argument indicates that Gregory has not yet read ahead to the parts in the *Apodeixis* in which Apollinarius sets out his anthropological trichotomy distinguishing the ψυχή from the mind/spirit (cf. Fr.23 in *Antirrheticus* 8 and Fr.88 in *Antirrheticus* 46-47). Also (e.g.) when Gregory first encounters Apollinarius' exegesis of 1 *Cor* 15.45 he mistakenly believes that Apollinarius is trying to argue that *all men* since Adam and before Christ are mindless (*Antirrheticus*,10-12 J.p.144,l.11-p.146,l.27). This is clearly not the point Apollinarius is making as becomes apparent even (eventually) to Gregory (cf.e.g.*Antirrheticus* 48,J.p.213,l.7-p.214,l.3).

[15] Mühlenberg,p.71.

[16] Mühlenberg,pp.71-72;Meredith,A.,*Gregory of Nyssa*,1999,pp.49-50.

[17] E.g.in 'Section V'(§§40-41) Gregory counters Apollinarius' doctrine of the mindless Christ using *several* arguments. The argument to do with the free and intellectual nature of virtue noted in the analyses of Mühlenberg and Meredith, is *one* of these. Another refutes the doctrine on the grounds that it implies *heavenly flesh* or binds God to the mutable.(J.p.196,l.3-p.197,l.2).

[18] E.g.*Antirrheticus* §§4-5:On the evidence of Fr.13 and 14 it is Gregory's polemical preconception or analytical overview which prompts the discussion on the theopaschite theme of the *Apodeixis* and not anything which Apollinarius wrote at the beginning of the *Apodeixis.* E.g.§§40-41:Having moved beyond

ineptitude as a polemicist thus assists a reconstruction of the *Apodeixis*. Unlike Theodoret who has completely dislocated fragments from the work(s) *Contra Diodorum* to serve his thematic refutation of monophysitism in the *Eranistes*, Gregory has preserved the skeleton of the *Apodeixis* largely intact as a framework buried beneath his own *ad hoc* refutation. Given the nature of the *Antirrheticus* it is perhaps wisest to make a synopsis of Gregory's argument which is content to be more *descriptive* than analytical, locating the Lietzmann fragments in their Gregorian context.

Sources for the Antirrheticus

When Lietzmann excerpts Fr.13-105 from the *Antirrheticus* he is working with L.A. Zacagni's 1698 edition of the Gregorian text[19] which is based upon codex *Vaticanus graecus 405* which Lietzmann refers to as *G*. Lietzmann re-edits the excerpted passages using two other main sources. Like Zacagni, Lietzmann takes into account *C* which has been written in the margin of *G* collating another lost manuscript. Lietzmann also considers *Marcus Venetus graecus 496* which he calls *H*.[20] The modern student of the *Apodeixis* can approach the Apollinarian fragments via the Jaeger edition of the *Antirrheticus* which was produced by F. Müller in 1958. Müller uses the same three main sources as Lietzmann (*G, H, C*), but takes a fourth (which Lietzmann calls *F*) more seriously.[21] In his apparatus Müller notes where he departs from the Migne (= Zacagni) edition of the *Antirrheticus* and the Lietzmann edition of the Apollinarian excerpts. A survey of Müller's apparatus reveals that his editorial disagreements with Lietzmann are relatively few and rarely significant, but such disagreements need to be taken into account when interpreting Fr.13-105.

In what follows when I refer to the fragments of the *Apodeixis* and Gregory's immediate contextualising remarks my primary reference will be to Lietzmann's edition of the writings of Apollinarius. When I refer to the wider context of these in Gregory's *Antirrheticus* (not given by Lietzmann) my reference will be to F. Müller's text in the third volume of the W. Jaeger edition of Gregory's works.[22] (This work is cited as "J.".)

Apollinarius' soteriological proof (Fr.74,76[a]) in §39, Gregory seems to revisit it (Fr.76*,79,80) in the interests of his own argument about the necessary connection between salvation, virtue, freedom and intelligence. E.g.§§51-55:Prompted by specific charges to which he briefly alludes (Fr.94-96), Gregory sets out his own Christology offering something of a grand apology. E.g.§§55-59:By selecting certain statements it is probably Gregory who chooses to reprise the themes of theopaschitism and heavenly flesh.

[19] Zacagni's edition is reprinted by Migne:*MPG*45.1123-1278.

[20] L.pp.83-87.

[21] See J.p.130.

[22] See p.101(n.[3]),above.

When referring to the *Antirrheticus* I will also make use of the fifty-nine chapter divisions to which Lietzmann refers. These are given in the Zacagni/Migne edition, but not in Jaeger.

A Synopsis of the Antirrheticus Locating the Apollinarian Fragments

§1 Gregory's Introduction (J.p.131,l.1–p.132,l.14).

§2 Gregory's Statement of Purpose (J.p.132, ll.15-28).

§§2-3 Discussion of the Title of Apollinarius' Treatise (J.p.132,l.29-p.135,l.7) [contains **Title**].

§§4-5 The Beginning of the *Apodeixis*. Apollinarius' Theopaschitism (J.p.135, l.8-p.138,l.9) [contains **Fr.13-14**].

§§6-8 The First Stage of Apollinarius' Exposition. Gregory's Counter-Position (J.p.138,l.10-p.142,l.5) [contains **Fr.15-22**].

§§8-12 Gregory Criticises Apollinarius' T. Anthropology and Exegesis of 1 *Cor.*15,45 (J.p.142,l.5-p.147,l.11) [contains **Fr.23-31**].

§§13-15 *Contra* the Pre-existing Flesh: God was 'Admixed' with a Human Nature 'in the last days' (J.p.147,l.12-p.151,l.20) [contains **Fr.32-34**].

§§16-17 Gregory Develops his own Christology/Soteriology re *Eph.*1.7 etc. (J.p.151,l.21-p.154,l.27) [contains **Fr.35-36**].

§§18-19 Gregory Refutes Apollinarius' Exegesis of *Zach.*13.7 & *Heb.*1.1-3 (J.p.154,l.28-p.158,l.30) [contains **Fr.37-41**].

§§20-21 Gregory Expounds his own Doctrine of the Incarnation based on *Phil.*2. 6-10 (J.p.158,l.31-p.162,l.5)

§§22-24 Gregory Refutes Apollinarius' 'Docetic' & Soulless Interpretation of *Phil.*2.6-10 (J.p.162, l.6-p.166,l.17) [contains **Fr.42-47[a]**].

§24 Apollinarius' *Polemical* Resumption of Heretical Exposition: Gregory's Review/Preview. (J.p.166,l.17-p.168,l.25) [contains **Fr.48, 47[b]**].

§§25-26 Gregory Counters Apollinarius' Polemic with his own Orthodox Doctrine (J.p.168,l.26-p.172,l.15) [contains **Fr.49-53**].

§§27-28 Gregory Disputes that Christ's 'Principle Element' must be σύμφυλον with God (J.p.172,l.16-p.175,l.30) [contains **Fr.54-58**].

§§29-30 Soteriological Criticisms of Apollinarius' Exegesis of Texts suggesting Christ's Human Will/Soul (J.p.176,l.1-p.178,l.9) [contains **Fr.59-62**].

§§31-34 *Contra* Apollinarius' Attribution of Christ's Human Will (*Mt.*26.39) and Appetites (*Mt.*11.19) to God (J.p.178,l.10-p.183,l.21) [contains **Fr.63-65**].

§§34-35 The Incoherence of Apollinarius' Distinctions re the True and False Mode of the Incarnational Union (J.p.183,l.22-p.187,l.14) [contains **Fr.66-69**].

§§36-39 The Fallacy of Apollinarius' Formal Proofs that Christ was Divine Νοῦς Ἔνσαρκος Who Did Not Assume a Human Mind/Whole Man (J.p.187, l.14-p.194,l.27) [contains **Fr.70-76[a], 81[b]**].

§§40-41 Further Details of Apollinarius' Soteriological Proof: Its Basis is a Fallacious Theory of Incarnation/Salvation/Human Virtue (J.p.194,l.28-p.199,l.17) [contains **Fr.76* - 80**].

§§42-45 Gregory's Doctrine of a Human Nature Transformed by the Divine is *not* Adoptionism: Apollinarius' Doctrine Degrades the Divinity more than Eunomius and Destroys Human Free Will (J.p.199,l.17-p.208,l.27) [contains **Fr.81-87**].

§§46-48 Gregory Shows that Apollinarius' T. Anthropology has No Scriptural Basis and Opposes its Christological Application (J.p.208,l.28-p.214, l.18) [contains **Fr.88-90**].

§§49-51 Gregory Considers Three Apollinarian Proofs that Christ is not a Complete Man (J.p.214,l.19-p.218,l.9) [contains **Fr.91-93**].

§§51-55 Gregory Expounds his own Christology in Reply to Apollinarius' Questions: Is Christ God or Man? Who Suffers, Dies and Rises? (J.p.218,l.10-p.227,l.9) [contains **Fr.94-96**].

§§56-57 Gregory Shows that Apollinarius' Incarnational Theory involves the Divinity in Change and Binds it to Flesh in Pre- and Post-existence (J.p.227,l.10-p.230,l.30) [contains **Fr.97-98**].

§§58-59 Gregory Describes the Conclusion of the *Apodeixis* Selecting Extracts (J.p.230,l.31-p.233,l.18) [contains **Fr.99-105**].

In his introduction Lietzmann offers only a brief outline of what he considers to have been the probable structure of the *Apodeixis*.[23] More recently E. Mühlenberg has gone back to the text of the *Antirrheticus* (in the Jaeger edition) and attempted a thorough and painstaking reconstruction of the Apollinarian work even to the extent of reviewing Lietzmann's editorial decisions since he believes that: 'All attempts to research the meaning of Apollinarius' original doctrine are dependent on the reconstruction of the *Apodeixis*... the only one of Apollinarius' writings whose train of thought can be completely followed in Gregory of Nyssa's refutation.'[24] The assumption behind Mühlenberg's reconstruction may be open to question along with some of his individual exegetical decisions and his consequent interpretation of Apollinarius' 'original doctrine'[25], but he undoubtedly develops a very effective method for reconstructing the *Apodeixis*. First, Mühlenberg reconsiders the text of the *Antirrheticus* in order to establish which of the Lietzmann fragments are genuinely verbatim (wörtlich) statements from the *Apodeixis* and which are Gregory's report (Referat).[26] Then, assuming the consistency of the Apollinarian argument and paying careful attention to Gregorian comments which reveal its form and sequence, Mühlenberg sketches out a 'rough survey' of the overall shape of the *Apodeixis*.[27] He then provides a detailed commentary upon the groups of fragments which fall together within this preliminary outline, attempting to show the connective thread of the Apollinarian argument.[28] Mühlenberg concludes by giving a more fully considered and detailed reconstruction of the *Apodeixis*: 'The Schematic Organisation of the *Apodeixis* by Apollinarius'.[29]

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[23] L.pp.140-141.
[24] Mühlenberg,p.64.
[25] Mühlenberg makes a double assumption:(1) Apollinarius' argument in *Apodeixis* is self-consistent (this is not apparent to Gregory!);(2) it expresses *an* 'original doctrine' consistent with that expounded in other Apollinarian works. Exegetical decisions open to question are (e.g.):Fr.13's reference to Jews and Greeks indicates that Apollinarius opposes an 'extra Christian thesis' (Mühlenberg,p.87);Fr.22^{b} belongs to Gregory's argument (pp.66-67);Fr.45 is not genuine (p.68);Fr.48 marks the beginning of the 'Second Main Part' of the *Apodeixis* (pp.77-78);Fr.66 indicates the introduction of a new theme (p.81);the proof to do with 'training' in Fr.75 should be incorporated in Apollinarius' *soteriological* reasons for νοῦς ἔνσαρκος (Fr.74-80)(pp.82-84);a Gregorian remark in Fr.105 indicates the *Apodeixis*' final 'Conclusion':'Christian teaching is the truth of Greek philosophy'(pp.86,90). Such exegetical decisions all contribute to Mühlenberg's overall interpretation of Apollinarius' 'original doctrine' in the *Apodeixis* and thus elsewhere.
[26] Mühlenberg,pp.64-70.
[27] Mühlenberg,p.73.
[28] Mühlenberg,pp.74-86.
[29] Mühlenberg,pp.86-90.

Mühlenberg has devised a method which is worthy of imitation. It is perhaps unnecessary to begin with a lengthy *wörtlich/Referat* reclassification of the fragments since it rather suggests that this factor has some absolute bearing on how useful individual fragments are when it comes to reconstructing Apollinarius' original argument. The 'reported' fragments would appear to have gradations of usefulness and each needs to be weighed according to its individual merits in the context of the two unfolding arguments. Most useful are reports wherein Gregory simply mentions what came next, or what he has chosen to leave out, or the proof texts employed by Apollinarius in support of his argument.[30] Also useful are paraphrases which contain Apollinarian formulae from earlier fragments thereby indicating the probable authenticity of the recapitulated phrases.[31] Less helpful are Gregorian *summaries* of Apollinarius' teaching, because these reports may offer a misunderstood/misrepresentative précis of Apollinarius' original exposition in the interest of Gregory's counter-argument. Such summaries are not totally unhelpful because they may still indicate the theme of what originally followed, and, if we take into account the probable hyperbole of Gregory's reaction, the way in which he polemically caricatures Apollinarius' doctrine can be revealing of the *type* of view Apollinarius may have been developing.[32] Those reports wherein Gregory expresses surprise at the 'orthodoxy' of what Apollinarius says are perhaps particularly revealing.[33] The Gregorian summaries which are the least helpful are those which offer a longer review (or preview) of the substance of Apollinarian doctrine[34], because it is difficult to judge how far these are determined by Gregory's unsympathetic response to Apollinarius' treatise in general rather than by what came next in the *Apodeixis*.

Mühlenberg's 'rough survey' of the *Apodeixis* comes prior to his 'schematic plan', but this is not because the former is a preliminary step in the production of the latter. Mühlenberg offers the 'survey' as a simplified preview of his final analysis so that his reader has a framework for the detailed discussion of the fragments in the intervening commentary which provides an 'elucidation of and argument for this co-ordination'.[35] It is perhaps better to begin by attempting a more provisional, yet

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[30] E.g.Fr.23,24,33,35,37,39,44,54,62,65,67,68,82,88,94,96,99.
[31] E.g.Fr.40(cf.36,55),43,46,50,53,55,105.
[32] E.g.Fr.31,40,43,46,50,53,55,105.
[33] E.g.Fr.40,42^{b},47.
[34] E.g.Fr.34,48,66,78,86.
[35] Mühlenberg,p.73.

justified, division of the fragments *before* the closer investigation of Apollinarius' argument and production of the final reconstruction. The danger at this stage is that divisions may be prompted by our preconceptions about the type of argument Apollinarius is likely to be developing. Such divisions should therefore be justified on the basis of Gregorian comments upon the structure of *Apodeixis*, or by obvious connections displayed by groups of fragments with similarity of content, style, authority or motive.

Whilst Mühlenberg's assumption that 'the arrangement (of the *Apodeixis*) was very single-minded and Apollinarius provided detailed and systematic reasoning for his main thesis' can claim no *a priori* justification, Mühlenberg is correct to point out that without such an assumption it is not possible to proceed at all, given the imperfections of Gregory's report. [36] The 'Suggested Reconstruction' of the *Apodeixis* offered below has been produced by implementing a slightly revised version of Mühlenberg's method. First, Fr.13-105 were divided into groups according to subject matter or Gregorian comment. Then the thread of Apollinarius' original argument within and between each group was re-established by analysing the verbatim fragments, the Apollinarian proof texts, and the more helpful Gregorian 'reports' and making the most likely connections between these. On the basis of this more detailed analysis[37] a summarised synopsis of 'The Structure of Apollinarius' Argument' in the *Apodeixis* was produced.

The Structure of Apollinarius' Argument in the Apodeixis (A Suggested Reconstruction)

Title (Antirrheticus2-3)

'An Exposition/Demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) of the Divine Enfleshment (θείας σαρκώσεως) which (was) According to the Likeness of a Man (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου).'

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[36] Mühlenberg,pp.72-73.

[37] For a commentary upon the Apollinarian fragments (as transmitted by Gregory of Nyssa) in the *Antirrheticus*, which provides detailed insight into the exegetical decisions which facilitated this reconstruction of Apollinarius' original argument in the *Apodeixis,* see pp.339-384,below.

(1) ***Introduction (Fr.13)***

It is important that the orthodox faith should be well-examined (ἐξετάζω) so that it does not fall victim to the opinions of Greeks and Jews.

(2) ***A False Christological Conception (Fr.14-15)***

(a) The faithless and the heretics have said that it is not possible for God to become man and suffer and this false view has been 'added to the Rule of Faith by the heresies which say Christ was a divinized man (ἄνθρωπον ἔνθεον)' (***Fr.14***).

(b) Paul of Samosata, Photinus and Marcellus of Ancrya were the originators of this unscriptural, heretical conception (***Fr.15***).

(3) ***Initial Exposition of Christological (Counter-)Thesis (Fr.16-22)***

(a) Christ is not merely 'a man from earth'/'Son of Man' (witness *Jn.*3.13) (***Fr.16***).

(b) Christ is a unique man (*Jn.*3.13), but also a (real) man according to the gospels (***Fr.17***).

(c) ***Main Point*** (τὸ κεφάλαιον): if Christ is both Son of Man from heaven (*Jn.*3.13) and Son of God from a woman (*Gal.* 4.4 (?)), then the same masculine individual/Son (ὁ αὐτὸς) is both God and man (***Fr.18***).

(d) (How?) ***Christological Thesis Introduced***: 'God by the spirit which was enfleshed and man by the flesh taken-on-in-addition (προσληφθείση) by God' (***Fr.19***).

(e) ***Scriptural proof that the subject of the incarnation is divine united to/in flesh***: 1 *Tim.*3.16 (***Fr.20***); *Jn.*1.14 (***Fr. 21***).

(f) ***More information about the flesh***: 'the flesh is not without a soul (οὐκ ἄψυχος)' since (i) human flesh has an (irrational) ψυχή – witness *Rom.* 7.23 – (**Fr.22**[a]) and since (ii) 'the bodies of irrational beings are also ensouled (ἔμψυχα)' (**Fr.22**[b]) (i.e. flesh = body + irrational/animal ψυχή).

(4) ***A More Precise Exposition of Christological Thesis Employing (a) Anthropological Framework and (b) Pauline Proof Texts (Fr.23-31)***

(a) ***Trichotomic Anthropology Introduced and Applied to Christ as an Orthodox Expositary Solution*** (***Fr.23-25***)

(i) Lengthy 'demonstration by means of several (philosophic?) proofs that man is constituted from three elements (ἐκ τριῶν συνεστάναι)' (***Fr.23-24***).

(ii) Citation of Synodical Formulae condemning the (ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος) Christology of Paul of Samosata (***Fr.24***).

(iii) Citation of words from the Nicene Formula: 'He [sc. the consubstantially divine Son/Creator] descended from heaven and was enfleshed and made man' (***Fr.24***).

(iv) Application of the T. analysis to Christ precipitating a *second* (cf. Fr.19,22) more technical statement of the Christological Thesis which explains *how* Christ is both God and (heavenly) man (cf. Fr.18) in a way which conforms with Nicaea and the Synods *contra* Paul of Samosata: 'Indeed Christ possessing God (as) the Spirit (πνεῦμα) that is the mind (τὸν νοῦν), together with a soul (μετὰ ψυχῆς) and body, is rightly called "a man from heaven"' (***Fr.25***).

(b) ***Scriptural Authority for the T. Definition of Christ as Heavenly Man (1 Cor.15.44-47)*** (***Fr.26-31***)

(i) Thus Christ conforms to a Pauline definition of man/First Adam, viz. 'a soul (ψυχὴν) together with a body' – witness 1 *Cor.*15.44-45 (***Fr. 26***).

(ii) Thus Christ conforms, *also*, to Paul's definition of the unique 'Second Man' who is 'from heaven' and 'spiritual' – witness 1 *Cor.*15.45 – which 'implies that the man who is mixed (συγκραθέντα) with God is irrational' (***Fr. 27***).

(iii) N.B. 1 *Cor.*15.45 is fully compatible with the T. analysis of man: when Paul calls the First Adam 'a living soul' (ψυχή) he is not denying that man has a spirit, but refers to the human trichotomy by one of its elements (***Fr. 28***).

(iv) This is why Paul calls Christ a 'life-giving' (rather than 'living') spirit (1 *Cor.*15.45) and 'a man from heaven' (1 *Cor.*15.47) – 'for reason that the heavenly Spirit was enfleshed' (cf. Fr. 25) (***Fr. 29,31***).

[*Note*: ***Fr.30*** seems to be Gregory's (misrepresentative?) assessment of Apollinarius' exegesis of 1 *Cor.*15.45-47 and is, therefore, omitted from the reconstruction.]

(5) ***Exposition upon the Scriptural Basis for the First Tenet of the Christological Thesis – viz. 'a divine enfleshment' – which confirms and clarifies the nature of Christ's Divinity (in accordance with the T. Model) (Fr. 32-41)***

(a) Consideration of the *way* in which Christ pre-exists (as evidenced by scripture, see (5b), below) confirms that the spirit/subject in Christ is divine for 'the human being Christ (ὁ ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς) does *not* pre-exist as (if) the spirit is another alongside him that is God, but in the sense that in the nature of the God-man the Lord is the divine spirit' (***Fr. 32***).

(b) ***Scriptural Evidence of Christ's Divinity (Fr. 33-38)***.

(i) Texts attesting the divinity of the eternal subject/ego of (the human) Christ: *Jn.*1,15; *Col.*1,17; *Jn.*8.58; 1 *Cor.*8.6; *Zach.*13.7 (e.g. in *Zach.*13.7: 'the sword is raised against *the Lord* because of the designation "Shepherd"') (***Fr.33,37***).

(ii) Texts attesting the divinity of the Saviour (*qua* subject/spirit), who redeemed us from sin by 'his' flesh and blood: *Zach.*13.7 (***Fr.33,37***); texts 'passed over' by Gregory (***Fr.35***) – e.g. *Heb.*2.10 (?); *Lk.*15.4/*Mt.*18.12 (?); *Eph.*1.7 (***Fr.35***); *Heb.*2.14-15 (?).

(iii) A clinching (foundational ?) proof text, which confirms the divinity of Christ as attested by texts (i) and (ii) (above), and suggests a new metaphysical term for it – '*hypostasis*', *Heb.*1.1-3: 'But by these (words) it is made manifest that the man himself who speaks to us the things of the Father is God the Creator of the Ages "the effulgence of (his) glory" the "exact impression (χαρακτὴρ) of his hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως)" in as much as he is God (in very truth) by his own Spirit and not (because) he possesses God in himself as someone else beside himself; the very same (individual) through himself (αὐτὸς ὁ δι' ἑαυτοῦ), that is through the flesh, has purified the sins of the world' (***Fr.38***).

[*Note*: It is likely that ***Fr.34,36*** offer Gregorian (mis)interpretations of what Apollinarius means to say on the basis of his proof texts and they are therefore discounted from the reconstruction.]

(c) This scripture-based view of Christ's divinity is consistent with the Nicene *homoousion* (***Fr.39***) – witness *Zach.*13.7: 'Awake O sword against my shepherd and against the man of my own stock (ἄνδρα σύμφυλόν μοῦ)' (see *Antirrheticus* 18, J.p.155, ll.3-4): σύμφυλος means that the Son/Shepherd/man 'is naturally united (συμφυῆ) and consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον) with God the Father' (***Fr.40***).

(d) The scriptural testimony to Christ's consubstantial divinity in *Zach.*13.7 is also consistent with/confirms the T. analysis of Christ as *divine* Spirit together with human flesh: 'The prophetic Word uses these things to show that he is *homoousios* with God *not* according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit which has been united with flesh' (***Fr.41***).

(6) ***Exposition upon the Scriptural Basis for the Second Tenet of the Christological Thesis – viz. 'in the likeness of a man' – which confirms and clarifies the nature of Christ's Humanity (in accordance with the T. model) (Fr. 42-47)***

(a) *Phil.*2.6-7 provides scriptural testimony for the first and the second tenet of the Christological Thesis: 'Lo the equality [*Phil.*2.6] with the Father of the same Jesus Christ pre-exists (cf. Fr.38,41, etc.) – the likeness [*Phil.*2.7] comes into being afterwards. And what is more plain than these things (so as to make evident) that he is not one individual with another a perfect God with a complete man' (***Fr.42***).

(b) ***The terminology of Phil.2.7 indicates the mode of the incarnational action by the divine subject and the type of (incomplete) humanity which is the object of the action (Fr.43-45).***

(i) He wore/bore (φόρεω/ὑπέρχομαι ?) the 'inglorious form (μορφή)' of human beings being a man 'in body (σώματι)' (***Fr.43***).

(ii) 'The Lord appeared in servile frame (σχήματι)' (***Fr.44***).

(iii) 'Not a man, but like a man (ὡς ἄνθρωπος)'. The T. analysis of Christ offers technical clarification of the Pauline phrase – 'since he is not consubstantial with man according to the most dominant element (τὸ κυριώτατον)' (***Fr.45***).

(c) ***Exegesis of Phil.2.8-9 (Fr.46-47):*** to whom or what do Christ's abasement (ταπεινόω) and exaltation (ὑπερυψόω) apply? *Answer*: Abasement and exaltation should both be predicated to the same (divine) masculine subject – but distinction should be made between what applies 'in flesh/as man' and what applies 'in divinity/as God'.

(7) *Polemical Exposition of Christological (Counter -)Thesis (Fr.48-69) (+Fr.76[a], 81[b])*

[*Note*: ***Fr.48*** offers a Gregorian review/preview of the Apollinarian doctrine as it has emerged so far and will emerge in the next section of the *Apodeixis*. Gregory's dogmatic observations should therefore be regarded as a summarising (mis)interpretation of Apollinarius' wider argument rather than an accurate description of what was said immediately after Fr.47. Gregory notes a polemical turn taken by Apollinarius which is reflected in the style and tone of the fragments Fr.49ff.]

(a) ***Christ's Divinity:*** the subject, principle element, spirit, active authority, will in Christ is divine (cf. 'a divine enfleshment') (***Fr.49-62***).

(i) Those who do not accept the Christological Thesis (expounded above) 'do not believe in the Form of Faith' holding to a false conception. They are like disbelieving Jews and Greeks (***Fr.49***) because they will not admit 'that *God* was born of a woman and crucified by the Jews' (***Fr.52***) and they prefer the false 'divinized man' (ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος) conception of Christ (***Fr.51***).

(ii) *Contra* this – the true belief is that God who was enfleshed pre-existed (as a divine Spirit/νοῦς?) and was subsequently brought forth experiencing suffering and death 'according to natural necessity (κατὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκην)' (***Fr.50,53***).

[*Note*: There is reason to believe that ***Fr.50,53,*** which are suggestive of pre-existing flesh and necessary divine suffering, are less than representative Gregorian reports of what Apollinarius actually said.]

(iii) Failure to accept the Christological Thesis expounded in the *Apodeixis* is equivalent to failure to recognise Christ's true divinity and *vice versa*: 'he says that we say that he who was crucified had nothing divine in his own nature not even that very principle element (τὸ κυριώτατον) which is spirit' (***Fr.54***); 'he says that unless we say that thing (ἐκεῖνο = τὸ κυριώτατον/πνεῦμα?) pre-

existed its birth on earth and was before all things we are denying it is akin (σύμφυλον) to God' (***Fr.55***) (cf. Fr.32-41 & *Zach.*13.7).

(iv) Consider 'who (τις) is the subject?' in the earthly Christ, He who exhibited divine wisdom and holiness from the moment of his birth and 'does divine works by his own authority (ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ)' (***Fr.56-58***).

(v) The Gospel *equates* (κατὰ πνεῦμα), and *draws distinctions* (κατὰ σάρκα) between, the way in which God and Christ (God enfleshed) *act* (***Fr.59*** re *Jn.*5.17) and exercise *will* (***Fr.60*** re *Jn.*5.21) with divine authority. *Jn.*10.18 further confirms the equality of God and Christ who can undertake divine work on his own (volitional) authority (ἐξουσίαν) – viz. the saving work of death and self-resurrection (***Fr.61***). *Jn.*12.24 confirms and elaborates the soteriological implications of *Jn.*10.18 (***Fr.62***).

[*Note*: Gregory chooses to omit Apollinarius' exegesis of *Jn.*12.24. Apollinarius may have offered a trichotomic analysis of Christ's death/resurrection *vis-à-vis* ordinary human death to explain how it is a divine action (κατὰ πνεῦμα) which saves the human soul and body (κατὰ σάρκα): cf. Gregory's discussion on whether or not the (human) ψυχή dies in *Antirrheticus* 30, J.p.178,l.7-p.179,l.7.]

(b) ***Christ's Humanity:*** texts which appear to give Christ human attributes (the proof texts of the psilanthropists?) are explained on the basis of the Christological Thesis, viz. 'that Christ is God enfleshed *in the likeness of a man'* (i.e. has taken on/bears a human carnal form of soul and body) (***Fr.63-65***).

(i) *Mt.*26.39: 'Not thy will but mine.' This (distinct = other?) *will* in Christ does '*not* belong to the man of earth as they suppose, but to God who descended from heaven' (***Fr.63^{a}***). It is God's will – in the sense that some sort of human will (the will of the flesh?) has conformed itself/been conformed to the descending divine will: 'this will (τὸ θέλημα) was said to belong (ἴδιον εἴρηται)... to God as that [sc. will] which has been taken-on-in-addition into a union with him (τὸ εἰς ἕνωσιν αὐτοῦ προσειλημμένον)' (***Fr.63^{b}***).

(ii) *2 Cor.5.16* (***Fr.64***).

[*Note*: Gregory omits Apollinarius' exegesis of this text which attributes *temporality* to Christ's humanity. 2.*Cor.*5.16 may have been Gregory's proof text cf.*Antirrheticus,*53(J.p.222,l.25-p.223,l.1).]

(iii) *Mt.11.19:* 'these things (eating and drinking) are necessary (ἀναγκαῖα) on account of the man' (i.e. these are carnal necessities which belong strictly to the human form that the divine subject has taken-on-in-addition?) (***Fr.65***).

(c) ***Typological and Technical Definition of the (true) Doctrine of the Incarnation (as advocated in Apodeixis) vis-à-vis the False Doctrine opposed (Fr.66-69)(+76[a], 81[b]?).***

'The flesh in which God was manifest lacked intelligence' (***Fr.66***) – because the incarnation is ...

(i) A union of flesh (σαρκὸς ἕνωσις) and *not* the taking-on-in-addition of a man (ανθρώπου πρόσληψις) (***Fr.66***).

(ii) A unitive action involving one divine subject/person(?) (ὁ ἄσωματος) and 'a likeness to our life in flesh' (cf. formula/of the *Apodeixis*) and *not* 'two persons – God and the man taken on (προσληφθέντα) by God' (***Fr.67***).

(iii) A unity of 'one (person?) (τὸ ἕν) as each of us is one ([human] person?) out of (ἐκ) spirit and soul and body' (***Fr.68***).

[*Note*: Gregory may be responsible for recapitulating Apollinarius' T. analysis in the *reported* Fr.68 because it serves his counter-argument (cf. *Antirrheticus* 35,J.p.185,l.13-p.186,l.20). The reported statement in Fr.67 links more smoothly with the new dichotomic analysis of Christ/man in Fr.69 if the allusion to trichotomy in Fr.68 is omitted.]

(iv) A unitive action/unity in which God becomes *like* man because God 'comes to be a mind enfleshed (νοῦς ἔνσαρκος) exactly as a man (καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος)' (i.e. in terms of structure and carnal form?) (***Fr.69***).

[*Note*: Fr.69 may offer *the* technical formula (νοῦς ἔνσαρκος) by which Apollinarius clinches his typological definition of the incarnation as a divine unity/union with flesh as opposed to the taking-on of a man (Fr.67ff). The formula is trailed in Gregory's earlier preview (cf. Fr.48) and seems to be implied and anticipated by (the first two tenets of) Apollinarius' earlier exposition: a divinely initiated action ('a divine enfleshment') in which the divine subject, spirit, will, intelligence, person (?) = mind (i.e. God the Word) takes-on-in-addition (προσλαμβάνω) (not a man/human person) but a human likeness ('according to the likeness of a man') so that he is 'exactly as a man' structurally and in accordance with the carnal form which he possesses/wears. What follows next appears to be formal proofs of the verity of this definition

(Fr.70-75). These, according to Gregory, precipitate a 'conclusion' which takes the form of another typological definition of the (saving) incarnation (Fr.76[a]). Gregory's comments after this (see *Antirrheticus* 39) indicate that Apollinarius may have gone on to give even more precise definition of his doctrine of the incarnation *vis-à-vis* that of his opponents (e.g.Fr.81[b]). Gregory's own counter-argument (*Antirrheticus* 39-41) disrupts the sequence of Apollinarius' exposition in the *Apodeixis*; after Fr.81[b] (*Antirrheticus* 39) Gregory goes back to discussing statements (Fr.76-80) which seem to belong to Apollinarius' argument in Fr.74,76 (*Antirrheticus* 40-41) before returning to Fr.81 (*Antirrheticus* 42). Thematically, there seems to be a case for placing Fr.76[a] and Fr.81[b] alongside Fr.66-69, although there is no way of verifying that this corresponds to their original situation in the structure of the *Apodeixis*.]

(v) A taking-on-in-addition of flesh (πρόσληψις σάρκος) and not the assumption of a mind or a whole human being (ἀνάληψις νοῦ καὶ ὅλου ἀνθρώπου) – for if not the human race is not saved (***Fr.76[a]***).

[*Note*: Apollinarius may have discussed the semantic difference between πρόσληψις and ἀνάληψις and the types of unitive action they designate (see *Antirrheticus* 39,J.p.193,l.11-p.194,l.1). This terminological distinction may have been linked to another paradoxical 'arithmetical' conception of the incarnational union which is mentioned next (*Antirrheticus* 39,J.p.194,ll.2-27).]

(vi) 'A composition (συντιθέμενον) of that which is incomplete (τὸ ἀτελὲς) (e.g. flesh – an incomplete humanity) together with he/that which is complete (τῳ τελείῳ) (e.g. God/mind)' making a singular unity, and *not* the conjoining (συνάπτω) of a complete (e.g. God) to a complete (e.g. a whole man) (since 1 + 1 = 2, but ½ + 1 does not = 2) (***Fr.81[b]***).

(8) ***Proofs Demonstrating the Verity (Faithfulness) of the Doctrine Advocated (Fr.70-80)***

(a) ***First Argument:*** Christ must be (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος to preserve *the uniqueness of the incarnation as a divine action*: the coming of Christ was the visitation (ἐπιδημία) of God, *not* the birth of a man/the illumination of a human mind by wisdom (***Fr.70***).

(b) ***Second Argument:*** Christ must be (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος *to preserve the uniqueness of the incarnation as a divine action*: the Lord/Word 'descended (κατέβη)' (cf. *Jn*.3.13) and 'emptied himself' (ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν) (cf. *Phil*.2.7): he was not wisdom in the mind of a man (***Fr.71***).

(c) ***Third Argument (Anthropological)):*** Christ must be (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος because it explains his (special) manhood: it allows him to be (as) a man 'for a

man is a mind enfleshed according to Paul' (***Fr.72***) and a special man since 'he was a man of clay and this man of clay was also a heavenly man' (***Fr.73***).

(d) ***Fourth Argument (Soteriological):*** Christ must be (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, without the assumption of a human mind or a whole human being, so that 'the *work* of the enfleshment is...accomplished in him'/'the human race is...saved' (***Fr.74,76,79,80***).

[*Note*: Resequenced, the fragments of this proof suggest this singular *Soteriological Thesis*:]

(i) The work of salvation ('loosing from sin') *cannot* be accomplished in a self-moved (αὐτοκινήτος) undetermined (μὴ ἀναγκαστός) human mind, so it must be accomplished by a divine mind operating passive (ἑτεροκινήτος) flesh. [Our self-moved minds participate in this 'loosing' by self-assimilation to Christ] (***Fr.74***).

(ii) This is because (unlike a self-moved undetermined human mind) the unchanging divine mind does not fall under the power of the flesh through weakness of knowledge, and because the divine mind is able to join the flesh to itself 'without constraint (ἀβίαστως)' since (flesh is passive (cf. Fr.74) and) 'for it being ruled is a natural property (φυσικὸν... τὸ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι)' (***Fr.76^{b}***).

(iii) Thus, 'Flesh is joined to God without constraint (ἀβιάστως) and partakes of pure virtue' (***Fr.79***).

(iv) This is extended to human beings since: 'He (God/divine mind) gives a share in pure virtue to every mind under his control and to all who become like Christ intellectually [i.e. 'assimilate themselves', cf.Fr.74] and are not unlike Christ in terms of the flesh [cf. Fr.72]' (***Fr.80***).

Conclusion: 'Therefore, the human race is not saved by the ἀνάληψις of a (human) mind nor a whole man, but the πρόσληψις of flesh' (***Fr.76^{a}***).

(e) ***Fifth Argument (re 'training'):*** Christ must be a (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος without a human mind since: 'if one (mind) attains more than another this comes about through training (δι' ἄσκησιν). But there is *no* training in Christ [cf. Fr.57]. There is not, therefore, a human mind (in Christ)' (***Fr.75***).

(9) ***The Case for the two Alternatives: a Unique Union with Flesh or the Adoption of a Complete Man? (Fr.81-87)***

(a) God cannot be joined together with a complete man (to form one individual) because this does not work logically/arithmetically since 1 + 1 = 2 and because this amounts to two-sons-adoptionism, 'one Son of God by nature (φύσει) and one adopted (θετός) (Son)' (***Fr.81***).

(b) Those who subscribe to an adopted Son by holding to the completeness of Christ's humanity espouse attendant errors: promotion of a God-bearing (θεοφόρος) man above angels and expansion of the Trinity into a Tetrad (***Fr.82***) and a polytheistic tendency (***Fr.83***).

(c) By contrast, the true doctrine of the *mode* of union (the divine πρόσληψις of flesh) preserves the *uniqueness* of the incarnation which is indicated by the unique *unity of worship.*

(i) 'Nothing (else) was united to God (ἥνωται πρὸς θεὸν) in such a way (οὕτως) as the flesh which was taken-on-in-addition (προσληφθεῖσα); things not united in this way (οὕτως) are not thus worshipped. And nothing else is worshipped in such a way as the flesh of Christ.' (***Fr.84***) Thus, 'No *created* thing is worshipped together with (μετὰ) the Lord as his flesh' (***Fr.86***).

(ii) This unity of worship (and the mode of union which supports it) can be explained in metaphysical and physical terms: 'The flesh of the Lord is worshipped because it is one person (πρόσωπον) and one living being (ζῶον) together with him (μετ' αὐτοῦ)' (***Fr.85***).

[*Note*: Gregory appears to draw out the combined implications of Fr.86[a] and 85 to prove that Apollinarius surpasses Eunomius in depravity. The *non-verbatim* part of Fr.86(***86***[b-c]) probably has more to do with Gregorian (mis)interpretation than what Apollinarius actually said in Fr.86[a]ff. and is, therefore, passed over in the reconstruction.]

(d) The alternative (viz. the union of God and a complete man) also fails because of a free will argument: if God unites himself to a (complete) man like other men, God will constrain the man's free will and, therefore, destroy the autonomous nature which he made. God cannot do this because of his immutability as providential creator: 'the nature is not destroyed by he who made it. Therefore, a man is not united to God' (***Fr.87***).

[*Note*: The *Free Will Argument*, which, by implication, recommends the union of God with (incomplete) flesh 'since the flesh does not have free will' picks up a theme found in the *Soteriological Argument* (cf.Fr.74, 76[b],79,80) and it may be a constitutive element within a systematic soteriological theory which informs the Christology of *Apodeixis*.]

(10) *The Anthropological Framework Recapitulated (Fr.88-92)*

(a) *Scriptural Proof of Trichotomic Anthropology (Fr.88)*

(i) The basic spirit, soul, body division of man is proved by *Thess*.5.23.

(ii) The spirit/soul (ψυχή) distinction is confirmed by *Dan*.3.86.

(iii) The separation of man's spiritual element and its equation with νοῦς is proved by *Rom*.1.9; *Jn*.4.24.

(iv) The sub-division of the flesh into ψυχή and body, as opposed to the third element – the Spirit – is proved by *Rom*.7.23.

(b) *Christological Re-application of T. Anthropology to further Demonstrate the Truth of the* Νοῦς Ἔνσαρκος *Doctrine contra the God-joined-to-a-man Alternative (Fr.89-92)*

(i) On the T. analysis (given that the divine Spirit has replaced the human spiritual element) it is possible to see how Christ is both (as) a man (i.e. 'from three

elements – spirit, soul and body') and also a heavenly man (i.e. since he is a divine/life-giving spirit) (***Fr.89***).

(ii) On the T. analysis the alternative doctrine (which insists on a complete man) is shown to fail: 'If… the heavenly man is from *all* the elements equal to us men of clay, so that he has a spirit equal to us men of clay, he is not a heavenly man but a receptacle (τὸ δοχεῖον) of the heavenly God' (***Fr.90***); 'if we are from three elements, but he is from four, (then) he is not a man, but a Man-God (ἀνθρωπόθεος)' (i.e. a hybrid) (***Fr.91***).

(iii) (Leaving aside the T. analysis) the alternative doctrine is bound to fail because it is not possible to integrate two 'completes' (cf. Fr.81): 'if he is from two complete (beings) he is not God in the one in which he is man nor is he a man in the one in which he is God' (***Fr.92***).

(11) ***What is Christologically/Soteriologically Requisite: the Incarnational Doctrine of the Apodeixis is the Only Expositional Solution (Fr.93-97)***

(a) ***It is requisite for incarnational/soteriological reasons that:***

(i) Christ is *not* 'a man subordinated to the common corruption of man,' but God who is mingled (ἐπιμιχθέντος) with us (in the gospel sense of 'becoming flesh/man' and 'tabernacling among us') (***Fr.93***).

(ii) Christ (=God) becomes a man free from sin and dies and rises (ὡς) a man (***Fr.93***).

(iii) Christ is not a suffering man (as those who subscribe to the false view say) (***Fr.94***).

(iv) Christ is not a man who dies, because 'the death of a man does not annul death' (***Fr.95^{a}***).

(v) Christ is God – the pre-existing divine Word (which is denied by those who subscribe to the false view (***Fr.96***)) who (in some sense) *dies* so that Christ (as man) can rise and *not* die (***Fr.95, 93***).

(vi) Christ is God who has become man without changing (***Fr.97***).

(b) ***The only (faithful, well-examined) expositional solution***

'*How does God become man* [e.g.] without having changed away from being God [and fulfil all the other Christological/Soteriological requirements, above] *unless mind has set itself down (κατέστη) in man?*' (***Fr.97***).

(12) ***Conclusion (Fr.98-105)***

[*Note*: On his own admission Gregory reports upon the end of the *Apodeixis* very selectively (primarily to assist his own polemic at the end of the *Antirrheticus*). We therefore lose touch with the original structure of Apollinarius' argument, but the content and terminology of the surviving fragments indicate that Apollinarius offered a *summary* of his main points and, possibly, a final series of proofs.]

(a) ***Summary/Recapitulation of the Main Tenets of the Incarnational Doctrine in Apodeixis (Fr.98(?)–104) e.g.:***

(i) *There is a continuity of divine subject in Christ* – witness *Mt.*24.30 and *Jn.*10.30. *Mt.*24.30 disproves the false view (cf., *inter al*, Gregory, *Antirrheticus* 53, J.p.222, ll.25-27) that Christ is a man 'who became God after the resurrection and is no longer a man' (***Fr.98***). The divinity of the subject in the *earthly* Christ is attested by *Jn.*10.27-30 which reveals Christ as the (consubstantially) divine Shepherd who is 'united to God *in himself*' (***Fr.100***) and 'draws the sheep to himself *by the divinity of the Father*' (***Fr.99***).

Such texts recall and confirm the 'first tenet' of the Christological Thesis in *Apodeixis* (viz. 'a divine enfleshment' cf. Fr.32-41 where the idea of Christ as consubstantially divine subject/Shepherd/man is developed in connection with *Zach.*13.7).

(ii) *It is the divine subject who (is incarnate and e.g.) suffers 'according to the likeness of a man.'* 'The Saviour (God [enfleshed]?) has suffered' (***Fr.101***).

(Like the other human attributes) the sufferings do not pertain to a human subject, nor *directly* to the divine subject, but 'were set in motion *according to the likeness (κατὰ ὁμοιότητα) of man'* (***Fr.103***) (i.e. they belong primarily to the 'likeness' = carnal form He has taken-on-in-addition (?)). Thus God suffers according to the likeness of men, but *not* exactly as a man: 'What does not admit suffering suffers not due to the necessity of an unwilling nature, but in conformity with nature (ἀκολουθία φύσεως)' (***Fr.102***).

This explanation of the passion recalls and confirms the 'second tenet' of the Christological doctrine expounded in *Apodeixis* on the nature of Christ's humanity: God took on, not a man, but a carnal human likeness, together with its inglorious attributes, appetites and urges (cf. Title,Fr.19-22,42-47,50,53,63-65).

[*Note*: Apollinarius' original argument in the environs of Fr.102 may have also recapitulated aspects of the *Soteriological Thesis* cf. Fr.74,76,79,80,(87).]

(iii) *This doctrine of the incarnation is the only expositional solution,* e.g. for interpreting *Mt.*24.30/explaining future salvation (?)(***Fr.104***).

(b) ***Final Proofs (?) (Fr.105)***

A series of (philosophical?) arguments to win the support of 'the Greeks' for the Thesis.

4

AN ANALYSIS OF APOLLINARIUS' (T.) CHRISTOLOGY AS ADVOCATED IN THE *APODEIXIS*

Is the Compositional Conception of Unity Present in the Apodeixis?

Central to the D. treatises of Apollinarius is a 'compositional' conception of the incarnational unity. The act of union is understood in terms of divine and corporeal elements/parts co-constituting one vital/organic/natural whole. Apollinarius uses the language of synthesis and (co-)mixture to describe this type of union and he takes as his model the psychosomatic union by which one human individual/nature is co-constituted. According to Apollinarius this particular union originates in a traducian act of procreation. Apollinarius believes that this conception of the unitive action allows for a real union of the elements without change and confusion, but Apollinarius' conception and terminology have some similarity to/tendency towards the Aristotelian idea of union by *mixture* mainly because of the way in which the (resulting) unity is understood. A (vital) *tertium quid* is co-formed and it is this entity which provides the existential locus and ultimate identity of what has been united. Apollinarius typically describes the composite 'whole' to which divine and human attributes belong in several ways: one living thing/life, one energy, one nature, one substance, one person, one hypostasis(?). Apollinarius may even (sometimes) admit that such a unity possesses one (intermediate) generic nature. It is this composite unity which provides the basis for the real *communicatio idiomatum* and the saving atonement made possible by the incarnation and subsequently mediated by the eucharistic sacraments.

Fr.13-105

When we come to consider the fragments of the (T.) *Apodeixis* preserved by Gregory of Nyssa (Fr.13-105), there are certain Apollinarian statements quoted and reported and certain Gregorian reactions which *at first sight* seem to provide obvious evidence that the same idea of union by composition still informs the argument and terminology of the *Apodeixis* in spite of Apollinarius' shift in anthropological framework. However, if we consider each apparent instance of the compositional conception and/or terminology

more closely, taking into account what actually belongs to Apollinarius' original argument and what belongs more probably to Gregory's misrepresentative response, then the obvious 'evidence' that Apollinarius is still recommending the same compositional idea of unity in the same compositional terms proves to be less than conclusive.[1]

Fr.106-107

Whilst the Gregorian fragments (Fr.13-105) of the *Apodeixis* do not provide conclusive evidence of the persistence of the compositional conception of unity typical of Apollinarius' D. treatise in a T. work, the same cannot be said of the fragments of the *Apodeixis* preserved by the other two sources (Fr.106-107).

The editor of the *Doctrina* is of the opinion that Apollinarius' monophysitism is related to a monenergetic view of Christ.[2] This is certainly the case in the D. documents,

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[1] E.g.(1):In *Antirrheticus* 2 Gregory criticises Apollinarius' title formula, 'a divine enfleshment', because it makes the 'ἀσυνθέτος' divine substance/nature something 'μεθόριον' between God and man (J.p.133,ll.14-24). Like the early charge of the theopaschitism, this is probably a stock polemical reaction to Apollinarius' novel terminology rather than an acute Gregorian perception of the fallacious foundationality of union by composition to Apollinarian Christology. Conversely (§3), Gregory criticises 'in the likeness of men' because he assumes that it implies pre-existing, heavenly flesh, and *not* because he perceives that it involves God in a compound human structure. E.g.(2):Gregory first reports Apollinarius' T. model of a human 'σύγκριμα' in compositional terms (Fr.23-24) and describes Apollinarius' consequent Christological deduction in similar language:'...this is made to imply that the man who was co-mixed (συγκραθέντα) with God is irrational'(Fr.27). But Gregory's allusion to Apollinarius' T. analysis is deliberately cursory and imprecise –'...the "τριφυὲς" or "τριμερὲς" or whatever someone might choose to call the human compound'(L.p.210,ll.13-14) – and these terms may well be his own. Similarly the choice of 'σύγκρασις'in Fr.27 may be Gregory's; elsewhere he uses such terminology when presenting his 'orthodox' alternative (E.g.J.p.143,l.24ff.). In Fr.27 the 'irrational' human constituent in the 'co-mixture' is referred to as 'the man' which sounds more Gregorian than Apollinarian. E.g.(3):The presence of 'ἔν ζωῦν' in the verbatim Fr.85 provides the strongest 'evidence' that Apollinarius has not abandoned his compositional conception of the union, certainly when read in the light of Gregory's subsequent commentary which appears to offer a scathing critique of Apollinarius' compositional D. thesis:'...imagining that he [sc. Christ] is a σύνθετον from the beginning formed from things of different natures being fused together (συγκεκροτημένον) from flesh and divinity, [Apollinarius] puts forward that he is ἔν ζωῦν after the likeness of human nature. Worship of the creature is equal on both sides [sc. Eunomius and Apollinarius]...but this man [sc. Apollinarius] adds that the fleshly nature is surrounding the creature and that it is worshipped too'(*Antirrheticus* 44,see Fr.86^{c},L.p.225,ll.28-34). *Nevertheless*, we should not be too quick to equate the Apollinarian concepts of one person and one living thing in Fr.85. The phrasing suggests that Apollinarius identifies the one person with the divine Lord, thereby offering an asymmetrical idea of personal unity alongside the vital idea. The idea of a singular divine subject 'together with' 'his' flesh continues in Fr.86^{a}, indicating a unitive concept which is possessional/ acquisitional rather than compositional. We should *certainly not* accept Gregory's analysis in *Antirrheticus* 44 as reliable or apposite. The 'compositional' vocabulary is Gregory's, and probably there is little relation to what Apollinarius actually said. Gregory is determined to show that Apollinarius exceeds Eunomius in depravity and so here combines the ζωῦν statement (Fr.85), together with another statement implying worship of the creature (Fr.86^{a}), together with the 'human likeness' formula from the title (!) of the *Apodeixis*, in order to draw his own misrpresentative deductions (Fr.86^{c}). When he accuses Apollinarius of 'imagining that Christ is a composite thing from the beginning' he is not referring to the traducian account of the virginal conception (cf.*De Unione* 12-13); he means the beginning of all things. For polemical reasons, Gregory chooses to imagine that Apollinarius' doctrine places a divine-carnal composite sub-divinity into the pre-existence.

[2] L.p.231,ll.33-34.

but here the orthodox editor quotes (Fr.106) from the second chapter/paragraph 'of the work about the divine enfleshment' (i.e. the *Apodeixis*). The charge of revivalist psilanthropism which Apollinarius brings against his opponents in Fr.106 is reminiscent of similar accusations in the Gregorian fragments of the *Apodeixis*: here the focus of Apollinarius' complaint is that they give Christ a human rather than divine 'energy'.[3] In the D. scenario the Word supplies the entire motive force in Christ – the ψυχή – the 'energy part' (*De Unione* 5). Does Fr.106 confirm that, in spite of casting Christ's divine element as νοῦς, Apollinarius still conceives the union along these lines?

In Fr.107, transmitted by Justinian as belonging to the next chapter/paragraph (γ) of the same work, we find a passage explaining the nature of the Christological unity which *without doubt* contains all the hallmarks of the compositional conception which we find in the D. works. Apollinarius employs the language of synthesis to describe the unitive action: the singularity that is Christ is put together (συντίθημι), set together (συνίστημι) and comes together (συνέρχομαι) from a divine energising element (τὸ ἐνεργετικόν) which supplies *all* the motive power to the passive carnal part which cannot be a complete or living being in its own right: 'The flesh is *altogether* (πάντως) moved by something else (ἑτεροκίνητος), that is, by its mover and driver (ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ ἄγοντος), whatever (ὁποῖόν) this thing (τοῦτο) might be, and it cannot be a complete (ἐντελὲς) living being (ζῶον) according to itself.'[4] So in Christ's case the flesh becomes a complete living thing by 'receiving something divine (τὸ θεῖον) ... as its energising element'.[5] The resulting unity is designated in the vitalistic and physical terms typical of the D. works and here the implication seems to be that the divinity also contributes a part to the (third) complete thing composed of what animates and what is animated:

> 'Thus one living thing (ἕν ζῶον) was constituted (συνίστατο) out of (ἐκ) what is moved and what moves and *not* out of *two complete* (οὐ...ἐκ δύο τελείων) and self-moving (αὐντοκινήτων) entities';[6] 'Flesh becoming God's flesh is a living thing (ζῶόν) after this put together (συντεθεῖσα) *into* one nature (εἰς μίαν φύσιν)'.[7]

[3] L.p.232,ll.5-6.
[4] L.p.232,ll.10-12.
[5] L.p.232 ll.15-16.
[6] L.p.232,ll.16-18.
[7] L.p.232,ll.20-21.

Fr.107 is particularly significant for our enquiry because it seems to recapitulate the terms and conceptuality of Apollinarius' compositional D. thesis and because it seems able to combine these with other notions arising from Apollinarius' T. thesis in the *Apodeixis,* thus indicating how Apollinarius may have been able to reconcile these 'two theories' of unity in his own thinking. In Fr.107 Apollinarius refers to the divine element in the union not only in vital/dynamic terms, but twice as the (heavenly) 'guiding principle' (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν).[8] As a neuter substantive the adjective ἡγεμόνικος was used in Stoic natural philosophy and by Christian thinkers such as Clement of Alexandria to designate the principal part of the soul, i.e. the intellect or νοῦς – the seat of free choice. Although Apollinarius does not use the term 'τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν' to denote the divine spirit/mind in Christ in any of Gregory's citations from the *Apodeixis*, there may be some allusion to this in Gregory's report that according to Apollinarius' theory the divinity supplied τὸ κυριώτατον (Fr.45,54). Where we do find a direct terminological connection between Fr.107 and the Gregorian fragments is in Fr.74 where Apollinarius offers the soteriological argument to justify his thesis that Christ is νοῦς ἔνσαρκος. In Fr.74 Apollinarius describes the (human) *mind* as αὐτοκίνητος and flesh as ἑτεροκίνητος. In Fr.74 the divine mind (in place of the human) *operates* (ἐνεργουμένη) Christ's flesh, but in the context of this argument Apollinarius seems to be talking about operation which is primarily moral, volitional, noetic (see Fr.76), rather than animal. In Fr.76, which contributes to the same soteriological thesis, he describes the 'natural property' of flesh as 'being ruled' – τὸ ἡγεμονεύεσθαι – implying that here he understands the role of the mind as τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν as in Fr.107 (?). Taken together, Fr.107 and Fr.74 (+76) seem to supply evidence that Apollinarius ultimately understood the intellectual soul to be the overriding source of power, moral/volitional/noetic or animal/physical.[9] If this is the case then the shift from a D. to T. anthropological framework as a means of explaining this compositional unity between an active psychic/intellectual component and passive carnal component(s) represents no significant shift in Apollinarius' basic monenergetic conception.

For this reason Fr.107 is a key piece of evidence for Henri de Riedmatten when he seeks to demonstrate that the basic Apollinarian conception of Christ remains the same despite the adjustment in anthropological vocabulary. Having identified apparently

[8] L.p.232,ll.13-14.

[9] This would accord with Norris' assessment of Apollinarius' understanding of the soul and its 'parts'. In Norris' opinion Apollinarius, like Clement, 'emphasizes the unity of the rational and irrational parts of the soul – a unity based on the fact that the νοῦς is the single ultimate source of life in the organism' (Norris,p.103).

different arguments typical of the T. and D. works, de Riedmatten then quotes Fr.107 in full suggesting that it offers a synthesis of both: 'A passage from Justinian will serve as a conclusion to this part of the enquiry. It sums up with no uncertainty the results and it is even more valuable in that it recapitulates in concise fashion the "biological" aspects of the dichotomite section and the "moral" aspect of the trichotomite section.'[10] Thus, in de Riedmatten's view the same conception of unity informs the declaration of μία φύσις in Fr.107 (from the T. *Apodeixis*) as can be found in the D. treatises – a conception which he concludes is fundamentally compositional.[11]

However, before we draw the conclusion that Fr.106-107 prove beyond doubt that a compositional view of the unity informs the Christology of the T. thesis, and before we accept de Riedmatten's opinion that Apollinarius' underlying Christology remains the same despite adjustment in presentation we need to ask: do Fr.106-107 belong to the *Apodeixis*? Reconsideration of the evidence indicates that there are much stronger reasons for *not* accepting Lietzmann's editorial decision that Fr.106-107 belong to the same work described by Gregory in the *Antirrheticus*.

Reasons for not accepting that Fr.106-107 belong to the Apodeixis

(1) Content. There is not sufficient evidence to substantiate Lietzmann's suggestion that Fr.106 may belong to Fr.70-73. The argument and proof text in Fr.106 and those in Fr.70-73 do not appear to have a precise and technical coherence. Whilst there are stronger grounds for connecting Fr.107 with Fr.74 (and 76) due to the shared terminology (αὐτοκίνητος ἑτεροκίνητος, ἡγεμονέυω), this evidence is *not* conclusive. The soteriological argument in Fr.74,76 is designed to justify the technical conclusion that Christ is the (divine) νοῦς who takes on (προσλαμβάνω) human flesh and does not assume (ἀναλαμβάνω) a human νοῦς or a whole (ὅλος) man. The vitalistic, compositional account of unity in Fr.107 *may* be an explanation of this, but it does not recapitulate all the technical vocabulary of Fr.74,76 and in particular the term νοῦς and thus need not be regarded *per se* as a T. fragment. There also seems to be some disparity between the anthropological models employed to explain the divinely monenergetic Christ in Fr.107 and the divinely minded Christ in Fr.74,76. In Fr.107 the flesh is completely passive (ἡ σὰρξ ἑτεροκίνητος ... πάντως); in Fr.74 the flesh may be ἑτεροκίνητος, but it is still able to exert its own power over something else for in Fr.76

[10] Riedmatten[2],pp.209-213.
[11] Riedmatten[2],p.218.

Apollinarius tells us that the human mind 'falls under the power of flesh' (ὑποπίπτοντος αὐτῇ).

(2) ***Structure***. The information which the *Doctrina* and Justinian give us as to the original context of Fr.106 and 107 in the work upon 'the divine enfleshment' does not seem to fit together with the structure of the work described by Gregory nor with Lietzmann's opinion that we should place Fr.106 and 107 in the environs of Fr.70-74. According to the *Doctrina* and Justinian, Fr.106-107 are from paragraphs/chapters 'β' and 'γ' and thus come *early on* in the treatise from which they are quoted. My own reconstruction of the treatise described by Gregory indicates that Fr.70-74 belong *not* to the introductory paragraphs, but to a much later section where Apollinarius is offering justifying arguments for a thesis already introduced, expounded, scripturally proven and technically defined. There is the possibility that Lietzmann is wrong in locating Fr.106-107 in the environs of Fr.74-76, but correct in attaching them to the *Apodeixis*: i.e. they may belong to the earlier stages of the work described by Gregory. Against this we may ask why Gregory makes no mention of numbered chapters or a sectional format when describing the *Apodeixis* and neither reports nor describes any passage of exposition which is similar to Fr.106-107.

(3) ***Title.*** The fact that the *Doctrina* and Justinian refer to the work on the incarnation from which they quote using the same 'Περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως' formula which features in the full title of the *Apodeixis* as reported by Gregory need not be taken as proof that these two treatises are exactly the same work. There is no mention by the editor of the *Doctrina* nor by Justinian of the equally distinctive formula 'καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου' which makes up the other half of the title of the work described by Gregory – nor do they refer to the work as the ''Απόδειξις'. There is a strong possibility that Apollinarius wrote more than one work entitled 'upon the divine enfleshment', or works that were passed on or quoted under that title. Whilst the statement of doctrine issued by an Apollinarian synod has been subsequently entitled *Tomus Synodalis* by historians of dogma, the formula 'Περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως' features in the superscription which Apollinarius and his confederates have applied to their own confession.[12] In his *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* Apollinarius prefaces his confession with the comment: 'I say these things *concerning the divine enfleshment...*'[13]

[12] L.p.262,ll.24-25.
[13] L.p.255,l.28.

It is interesting that when Justinian earlier quotes Fr.81[b] he also refers to it as coming 'from the work on the divine enfleshment', but he does not give a precise paragraph number[14] as he does with Fr.107 and as the editor of *Doctrina* does with Fr.106. The *Doctrina* does not give a version of Fr.81 and perhaps the implication is that Fr.81[b] comes to Justinian from Gregory's *Antirrheticus* whilst he and the *Doctrina* have taken Fr.107 and Fr.106 respectively from their 'Polemon source'. If this is the case then the paragraph headings may be down to Polemon and the work 'Περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως' may not be the *Apodeixis* at all but a disciple anthology compiled from various Apollinarian works on the subject. Particularly revealing are some comments made by Timothy of Berytus to Homonius by way of introducing Fr.161 as recorded by Leontius: 'The brother Agapios came to us and listened to the Tome put together *by us concerning the divine enfleshment* from *three* different discourses of our blessed teacher Bishop Apollinarius.'[15] Here is strong evidence that at least one disciple complied an anthology of his master's sayings using the 'Περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως' formula in the title and that Apollinarius wrote more than one work on the same subject (possibly under the same title). In view of this statement it would be very unwise to identify with any certainty the work quoted by the *Doctrina* and Justinian in Fr.106 and 107 with the work described by Gregory (Fr.13-105) on the grounds of the (partially) shared title formula.

Conclusion. Whilst Fr.107 displays a compositional view of the incarnation reminiscent of Apollinarius' thesis in the D. works, this fragment in all probability does *not* belong to the *Apodeixis* and therefore does not demonstrate the full compatibility of the T. Christology expounded therein with the compositional conception found elsewhere.

A Different Type of Christology

In spite of Gregory's far from perfect transmission of the *Apodeixis*, by reconstruction it becomes apparent that in this treatise Apollinarius sets out in a systematic way to recommend, clarify and demonstrate the cogency and faithfulness of a particular Christological thesis against the false alternative(s) offered by his opponents. This thesis does not over-obviously display the typical features of the compositional conception of

[14] L.p.224,ll.20-21.
[15] L.p.277,ll.22-25.

the incarnational union which is central to the D. treatises, so what type of Christology *is* Apollinarius advocating in the T. *Apodeixis*? If the two elements involved in the union are not both parts of a whole, how does he understand them? If the unitive action is not presented as a σύνθεσις or a σύγκρασις how, and in what terms, does he describe it? If the result of the union is not a *tertium quid* – a composite nature, living thing or person – how does Apollinarius conceive the fundamental unity in Christ?

'A Divine Enfleshment'

In the unusual title formula of the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius appears to be setting out succinctly two key tenets of his incarnational belief. The 'suggested reconstruction' indicates that these tenets inform the Christological thesis which is subsequently introduced (Fr.16-22); the tenets are then confirmed and clarified with allusions to scripture (Fr.32-47); they are then recommended in a more polemical way (Fr.49-65) before giving way to, or helping to precipitate, a more technical Christological definition (Fr.66-69) and its formal proofs (Fr.70-80). There is some evidence from Gregory's very selective references (Fr.98-104) that Apollinarius returned to the basic tenets of this doctrine at the end of the *Apodeixis*. Let us consider the first of these tenets: what does Apollinarius mean when he insists there is a 'divine enfleshment' and what are the implications for the derived Christology?

Gregory's initial assessment of the true significance of this Apollinarian phrase is over-hasty and ill-informed: in the D. treatise *De Fide et Incarnatione* Apollinarius may well speak of Christ as a σάρκωσις which is indivisible from the Trinity[16] but here in the *Apodeixis*, if we consider the way his argument unfolds, θεῖα σάρκωσις is *not* intended to signify a divine-carnal entity, but an *action* involving flesh – incarnation – which is a *divine* action and therefore has a *divine subject.* Apollinarius' doctrine of the incarnation in the *Apodeixis* arises out of opposition to those who reject this basic truth of the Christian faith – viz. 'those who say it is not possible for God to become man and suffer...[and] say Christ was a divinized man' (Fr.14). In the polemical section Apollinarius turns his attack on those who disagree with him and are therefore 'ashamed of God born of a woman and crucified by the Jews' (Fr.52). When Apollinarius offers five formal proofs of the verity of his own doctrine (Fr.70-80), the first and second of these justify the thesis upon the grounds that it preserves the uniqueness of the incarnation as a divine action (Fr.70-71). Towards the end of the treatise, when

Apollinarius appears to be summarising what is Christologically and soteriologically requisite, the enduring divinity of the subject of the incarnation is repeatedly emphasized as a crucial factor (Fr.93,94,95[a],97). There is evidence that Apollinarius continued to emphasise the continuity of the divine subject in Christ before, during and after his incarnation in the concluding paragraphs of the *Apodeixis* (Fr.98-100). Apollinarius shows that his belief on this matter is consistent with scripture (Fr.32-41), the Nicene Definition (Fr.24) and the Rule of Faith (Fr.52).

This tenet of belief seems to be logically prior to Apollinarius' Christological doctrine in the *Apodeixis,* a motive for his expositional thesis rather than a consequence of it. The conviction that the incarnation is a θεῖα σάρκωσις appears to have implications for the consequent Christology. To show how God is the subject of the incarnation Apollinarius introduces the T. model of unity (Fr.23-31) which on one level is similar to the D. model – the divinity of Christ is presented as a divine *element* (spirit/νοῦς) which is combined with human element(s). Nevertheless, in the sections where Apollinarius explains and scripturally proves the nature of Christ's divinity he does not so much demonstrate the divinity of an *element* in Christ, or even the divinity of Christ's spirit, as *the divinity of the eternal subject/ego* who is Christ and saviour: God the Creator of the Ages, the Lord, the Shepherd, 'the man himself who speaks to us the things of the Father' (Fr.32,33,38). It is the biblical evidence that the subject in Christ is divine (e.g. *Jn.*1.15; *Col.*1.7; *Jn.*8.58; *Zach.*13.7; *Heb.*1.1-3) which confirms 'he is God by his own Spirit' (Fr.38). In the polemical section Apollinarius repeatedly asks those who deny the divinity of Christ by denying that his 'principle element'/spirit is divine *not* 'what type of spirit does Christ have?', but 'who (τις;) is the subject in Christ?' (Fr.56-58), given the way he acts with divine wisdom, authority and volition. This is why the idea of Christ's pre-existence features so strongly in the *Apodeixis*, not because Apollinarius has some novel scheme of a pre-existing divine man or flesh, but because he wants to emphasise the continuity of the eternal divine subject in Christ since this is the proof and basis of his theory. Two of Apollinarius' proof texts (*Zach.*13.7; *Heb.*1.1-3) encourage Apollinarius to be more technically precise as to how he understands the true divinity of the eternal subject (=spirit) in Christ. *Zach.*13.7 describes the pre-existing subject/spirit of the human Christ as 'of the same stock (σύμφυλος)' as God (Fr.33). Apollinarius appears to have used this text to prove that (the spirit of) he who is both Son of God and Son of Man is consubstantial with God (Fr.40, 41,42[a]), i.e. the subject/spirit in Christ is or has a fully divine substance. The words of Hebrews 1.1-3

[16] L.p.199,ll.19-21.

also lead Apollinarius to identify the subject/spirit of the human Christ with God the Word ('the Creator of the Ages') in the sense that he/it shares the divine attributes/generic nature since he radiates (God's) glory and is an 'exact impression of God's hypostasis.'[17] The conviction that the incarnation is a θεῖα σάρκωσις appears to have another implication for Apollinarius' consequent Christology as can be detected in the statement which introduces his thesis (Fr.19): 'God by the spirit which was enfleshed, and man by the flesh taken-on-in-addition *by God.*' Apollinarius' premise that the incarnation is a divine action implies a notion of the union which is more unilateral/asymmetrical than the compositional idea.

'According to the Likeness of a Human Being.'

The first tenet of Apollinarius' Christological belief is intent on preserving the divine subject of the incarnation so that Christ is not just a man. In accordance with this tenet the divine subject *also* has to be *in some real sense incarnate:* not a mere man, but both God and (heavenly) man (Fr.18). The latter half of the title formula 'καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου' encapsulates the second tenet of Apollinarius' incarnational belief and refers to the (only) *way* in which he believes it is possible for God to be really incarnate and (as) man whilst still continuing to be God. The second tenet of Apollinarius' belief is perhaps not in the *Apodeixis* as foundational as the first. The second tenet has a basis in scripture and Apollinarius' true faith in the reality of the incarnation, but Apollinarius' selection and interpretation of the formula 'καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου' has to some extent been predetermined by his commitment to the first tenet (as well as other *logical* presuppositions (?)). Unless the incarnation/Christ's humanity is understood in this way then Christ is reduced to a divinized man (Fr.14), or there are two ununified Sons (Fr.81,92), or God becomes man by changing away from being God (Fr.97). The second tenet of Apollinarius' Christological belief is to do with the humanity of Christ: given that God is the subject of the incarnation ('a divine enfleshment') his humanity must necessarily take a real yet particular form – 'according to the likeness of a human being' – as evidenced by scripture.

[17] From the way Apollinarius has employed Hebrews 1.1-3(Fr.38) it remains ambiguous whether he is saying that the man, being none other than the Creator of the Ages (the Word), bears the exact impression of *the Father's* hypostasis, or whether he is saying Christ the man, being none other than the Creator of the Ages, bears the exact impression of *the Word's* hypostasis. The latter idea perhaps suggests itself more strongly given the Apollinarian form of words.

In the case of this part of Apollinarius' title formula it is easy enough to see the scriptural reference to *Phil.*2.7 and, therefore, to identify the complex of Pauline Christological ideas which must have (to some extent) informed Apollinarius' understanding of Christ's humanity in the *Apodeixis*. Significantly, it is to *Phil.*2.6-9 that Apollinarius turns in the section of the treatise where he offers clarification and scriptural proof of his views on the nature of Christ's humanity (Fr.42-47). In Fr.42 Apollinarius alludes to *Phil.*2.6-7: v.6 offers further proof of the first tenet of his Christology; v.7 provides him with a means and a terminology for explaining the subsequent humanity of the pre-existing divine subject: 'The equality with the Father of the same Jesus Christ pre-exists [*Phil.*2.6], the likeness with men comes into being afterwards [*Phil.*2.7].' The Apollinarian phrase 'ἡ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὁμοίοτης'[18] is based upon Paul's 'ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων' and Apollinarius' idea of ἐπίγνομαι is probably derived from the Pauline verb γενόμενος. If we consider Paul's account of the incarnation (?!) in *Phil.*2.7, he offers four interrelated ways of understanding it: the divine subject (a) humbled himself, (b) took (λαβών) the form (μορφὴν) of a servant, (c) became (γενόμενος) in the likeness (ὁμοιώματι) of man and (d) was observed as (ὡς) man in frame (σχήματι). In Fr.42 Apollinarius borrows the Pauline phrase expressing the idea (c) and then subsequently explains it (Fr.43-45) in terms of ideas (b) and (d).[19] Thus, in Fr.43,44 Apollinarius understands Christ's human likeness in terms of the human form or frame (he uses the Pauline terms μορφή and σχῆμα interchangeably)[20] which the divine subject/spirit, 'God/the Lord', takes on. Apollinarius does not use Paul's verb (λάμβανω) according to Gregory's report, but verbs to do with bearing and wearing (Fr.43 – φορέω, ὑπέρχομαι). If we understand the second half of Apollinarius' title formula and Apollinarius' opening statement of doctrine (Fr.19,22) in the light of this subsequent clarification then he seems to conceive the divine incarnation as καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου in the following sense (1): God takes on flesh (Fr.19) and a soul (Fr.23) (i.e. a manhood (Fr.26), which includes a will (Fr.63^{b}) and is subject to carnal necessities (Fr.65), passions (Fr.103) and death (Fr.93)), which is *like* ours – i.e. *God Incarnate is like a man because he has taken a body and soul/bears a carnal form and*

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[18] L.p.214,l.2.

[19] Interestingly, Apollinarius does not make *significant* use of the *kenotic* idea here or elsewhere in the *Apodeixis* fragments when developing his Christological thesis (*contra* Raven,pp.200-208). There is a reference to *kenosis* in Fr.71 alongside the Johanine idea of descent – but the emphasis is not here on the precise action of the incarnation, but the fact that scripture attests it is a divine action. In Fr.46 Apollinarius discusses *kenosis*, but this is a discussion to do with the *communicatio idiomatum* given Apollinarius' incarnational thesis based on the other ideas.

[20] See Fr.44 wherein Paul's μορφὴ δούλη becomes δουλικόν σχῆμα (L.p.214,l.27).

this is like (=the same) as the body and soul/carnal form possessed/borne by human beings.

The text to which Apollinarius turns to explain the reality of God's incarnation has certain implications for his Christology. Paul's terms 'μορφή' and 'σχῆμα' have a range of meaning which points Apollinarius away from understanding the flesh as a co-constitutive part of the unity that is man or God as man. Both terms refer to the outer form, shape or figure of an inner reality. (They can also signify appearance as opposed to reality, which is why Gregory tries to play up their 'Docetic' significance in his refutation of Apollinarius (*Antirrheticus* 23).) When applied Christologically the terms indicate that God's carnal acquisition is not a part of a new divine-human reality, but a new outer shape/vestiture for the enduring divine reality. Both μορφή and σχῆμα can also have a generic sense referring to the characteristic kind/sort/species of something. So, whilst Apollinarius was fiercely opposed to dyophysitism in his D. works, in the *Apodeixis*, these terms may even be pointing him towards the notion of the divine subject/spirit/hypostasis in Christ taking/bearing a carnal *nature.* (Implicit to the 'Soteriological' and 'Free Will' Arguments which Apollinarius employs to justify his Christology is the idea that God/divine mind can join flesh to itself without destroying its carnal nature (Fr.87), but in accordance with it (Fr.76^{b}).) The verb which Paul uses to explain the incarnational 'becoming', λαμβάνω, appears also to have influenced Apollinarius' conception of the incarnation as a unitive action. This term points towards a more 'assumptional' understanding of the act (Fr.19), and this may be why Apollinarius adopts terms to do with bearing and wearing to describe the act of union (Fr.43,44).[21]

When Apollinarius refers to God Incarnate's humanity in terms of a 'human likeness' in the *Apodeixis* it appears that he is not only referring to the fact that the carnal 'object'/form/nature(?) taken by God in the incarnation is like that borne by ourselves. There seem to be two other senses of Christ's 'human likeness' at play which may not be entirely systematic with the first. We find one of these in Fr.45, also derived from a phrase in *Phil.*2.7: 'not a man, but like a man... since he is not consubstantial with man according to the most dominant element.'[22] In this second sense (2*), God Incarnate is like a man because he is not the same as an ordinary man in respect of his divine νοῦς/spirit which is not human.* This idea of Christ's non-identical human 'likeness' coheres with Apollinarius' T. analysis of man and Christ (Fr.25-31,88) which is based on

[21] Athanasius and Theodoret *inter al* seem to associate such ideas with an 'assumptional' understanding of the incarnation: see Athanasius,*Ad Epictetum* 2(*MPG*26.1053A-B);Theodoret,*Eranistes 1*(*MPG*83.73A).

other texts. (1 *Cor.*15.45,47; *Thess.*5.23; *Dan.*3.86; *Rom.*1.9; *Jn.*4.24; *Rom.*7.23). The T. analysis is at its most effective in explaining how Christ is *not* an ordinary man (Fr.16), but a unique heavenly man (Fr.17,25,27,29,31). However, the T. analysis is also employed to show how Christ *is* (as) a man because of his similar trichotomic *structure*. This is where we find the other (third) Apollinarian sense of 'καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρώπου'(3): *God incarnate is like a man because he enters into a form of existence which is structurally similar to that of a human being given a certain anthropological analysis (or analyses)*: 'if man is from three and the Lord is also a man (then) the Lord is also altogether from three elements – spirit, and soul, and body'(Fr.89). In the context of the T. analysis of Christ, the second and third idea of 'according to a human likeness' are often found side by side (Fr.25,26,27,28,31,90,91) since they both receive elucidation from the same model. In the middle section of the *Apodeixis* the T. analysis of man and Christ seems to give way to a different (but related) type of (νοῦς–σάρξ) dichotomic analysis (Fr.31-87). Apollinarius seems able to understand God Incarnate's 'human likeness' in terms of this structure as well: 'Consequently he was indeed a man for a man is a mind in flesh according to Paul' (Fr.72). Like the T. version, this D. model allows Christ to be (as) man structurally but non-identically (when it comes to the divine νοῦς) as becomes apparent from the next fragment: 'Since he was a man... and the man of clay was also heavenly' (Fr.73).

In what may be the fragment which clinches his explanation of the mode of 'the divine incarnation according to a human likeness' Apollinarius declares: 'He would not be made in the likeness of man unless he happened exactly as a man (καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος) to be a mind enfleshed' (Fr.69). Arguably, the guiding idea here is that the incarnation is not the assumption of a whole man/human person (Fr.66,67,76[a]) but the taking on of human flesh by God the divine subject and person (?) (Fr.67) and mind (Fr.74). In the context of this line of thought God is exactly as a man in the first sense (1) (above). But given the proximity of Fr.68, wherein Gregory reminds us of the T. analysis, and Fr.72-73, perhaps Apollinarius has the structural idea of similarity (3) more in mind. It could be that he means both: God is 'exactly as' as man because (1) he has assumed something human – flesh (not without a soul)/ a carnal form which is exactly like a man's, and because (3) he has entered into (= become part of (?)) a dichotomous (νοῦς–σάρξ) or trichotomous (πνεῦμα–ψυχή–σῶμα) form of existence which is exactly like a man's. It is tempting to connect the two concepts because they both explain God's

[22] L.p.214,ll.28-29.

humanity in terms of a human *form* in which God is. But the two ideas of form are not strictly the same. In the first idea the form is something which the divine or human subject possesses, in the other idea (3) the form is something which includes the divine (or human) mind/spirit together with other elements. Here we seem to find the two possible implications of the second tenet of Apollinarius' Christological belief. If he is guided by the first idea of 'exact likeness', he is moving towards an assumptional understanding of the incarnational union; if he is guided by the other idea (3) he may still be wedded to a compositional idea of a unity out of two *or three* parts.

The Conception of the Union

Two tenets guide Apollinarius' incarnational Christology as it emerges in the *Apodeixis*: (1) God is the subject of a true incarnation which is a divine action; (2) God does this by taking something carnal like ours/entering into a carnal form of existence like ours whilst remaining God. On the basis of these tenets and with the help of scripture and anthropological model(s), what is the dominant conception of the incarnational union and Christological unity which ultimately emerges from Apollinarius' scientific exposition in the *Apodeixis*?

The Unitive Action

Repeatedly, Apollinarius describes the incarnation as the arrival of God himself in the human sphere from above: God *descended* (καταβαίνω) from heaven (Fr.24,63[a],71); 'the *coming* (παρουσία) of Christ was...the *visitation* (ἐπιδημία) of God' (Fr.70); 'God [as mind]...*set himself down* in man' (Fr.97); 'when he (God) became flesh he *dwelt* (ἐσκηνωκέναι) among us' (Fr.93). Apollinarius also emphasises the related notion that the incarnation was thus the *appearance* (φανερόω) of God himself in flesh and in servile frame (Fr.20,45). Because Apollinarius presents the incarnational action in this way and demonstrates the pre-existence of its (divine) subject, it might seem (to Gregory, at least) that Apollinarius is thinking along docetic or even quasi-Arian lines:[23] '(Apollinarius) says that the son, being mind enfleshed, has been brought forth from a woman not becoming flesh in a woman but having passed through her (διεξέρχομαι) transiently (παροδικῶς) – one such as he existed before the ages and the same

[23] *Antirrheticus* 22-24.

subsequently appeared, being fleshly God or, as he calls it, "enfleshed mind"'(Fr.48).[24] Some of the verbatim statements certainly give the impression that the virginal conception is no longer central to Apollinarius' thinking (e.g. Fr.70).

Apollinarius' view of the divine incarnation in this treatise is not, however, limited to the idea of God's coming into the world and to God's self-revelation. Near the beginning of the treatise he emphasises: 'The Word became flesh... *according to a union*' (Fr.21). What follows is an attempt to define the true mode of the union. Apollinarius goes on to describe the act of union in several different (?) ways:

(1) *God (=mind) takes-on-in-addition (προσλαμβάνω) flesh* (i.e. a body and ψυχή (Fr.22))(Fr.19,63b,76[a],84): this is a unique type of union (ἕνωσις ἑνόω) (Fr.67,84), which is not the same as God taking-on-in-addition a man (Fr.67), or God's assumption (ἀναλαμβάνω) of a mind or a whole human being (Fr.76[a]).

(2) In this way *God possesses flesh* (Fr.35,63[b]).[25]

(3) The way in which St. Paul understands the incarnation as a divine taking (λαμβάνω) has clearly exerted a strong influence upon Apollinarius as can be seen by the title formula. Drawing upon *Phil.*2.6-7, Apollinarius describes the unitive act in terms which we find elsewhere associated with the idea of the incarnation as a divine assumption: *God wears/bears (φορέω) or puts on (ὑπέρχομαι) the inglorious (carnal) form (μορφή = σχῆμα* (Fr.44)*) of men* (Fr.43), i.e. a body (Fr.43), flesh (Fr.46) including a ψυχή (Fr.22), but not a νοῦς (Fr.45). The verb φορέω is almost certainly Apollinarius', despite the non-verbatim nature of Fr.43, because it is thrice repeated and connected to the obviously Apollinarian formula 'τὴν ἄδοξον τῶν ἀνθρώπων μορφήν' which Gregory finds so unusual.[26] The near equivalent ὑπέρχομαι may be Gregory's term, but if it was used by Apollinarius then it may be significant. The literal sense of the verb is 'to go under' and thus 'take upon oneself'. Apollinarius, therefore, *may* have derived another sense of the union from *Phil.*2.7.

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[24] L.p.215,ll.22-26.

[25] In what survives of the *Apodeixis* the idea of the union as an act of *possession* is not over-prominent nor unambiguous. Fr.25 presents the union as a possession, but here it is 'Christ' who possesses God as spirit/mind together with the soul and body (which he also possesses).

[26] L.p.214,ll.21-25.

(4) *God provides the underlying subject/reality (ὑπέρχομαι) for a human form (?)* (Fr.43). Given the proximity of Fr.38, Apollinarius may be approaching an idea not unlike the Word's hypostatisation of a carnal form/nature.

(5) From his T. analysis of man/Christ, Apollinarius derives a new dichotomy which provides another way of understanding the union: *'God is mind'* (Fr.74); *God 'the Word... becomes (a) mind enfleshed'* (Fr.71). Apollinarius gives several clues as to how he understands the institution and maintenance of this type of union. *God/divine mind, without changing, sets himself down (καθίστημι) in a man* (i.e. a human/carnal form?) (Fr.97). *God/divine mind operates (ἐνεργέω) passive flesh* (Fr.74).[27] *God/divine mind 'adapts (συναρμόζω) flesh to himself without constraint' and does not fall under the power of flesh* (Fr.76,79).

(6) Although Gregory sometimes (mis?)reports Apollinarius' view of the union using technical terms which are found in physics (e.g. Fr.27,86), there is *only one* verbatim statement in the *Antirrheticus* where Apollinarius uses such terminology himself: *'God is mingled (ἐπιμίγνυμι) with us'* (Fr.93). Nevertheless, Fr.93 seems to indicate that *some sort* of physical/ compositional(?) notion of the union persists in the *Apodeixis* as implicit, also, in the idea of trichotomic *structural* 'likeness' (Fr.89). It is in this context that we should, perhaps, note one other fragment which is in the Justinian variant, at least, a verbatim Apollinarian statement: Perfect God is not conjoined to a complete man, rather *'an incomplete (humanity) is compounded (συντιθέμενον) to the perfect (God)'* (Fr.81[b]).[28]

The Unity of Christ

The principal idea of unity which governs Apollinarius' thinking in the *Apodeixis* is that Christ is one masculine individual, one Son. Gregory notes this 'main point' which is established in Apollinarius' preliminary Christological discussion: 'ὁ αὐτὸς θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος' (Fr.18). Due to Apollinarius' ardent belief that this one subject is not merely a man, and due to the fact that most of the proof texts he chooses to support his T. analysis of Christ's divinity confirm not so much that the spirit/νοῦς in Christ is divine,

[27] In this fragment Apollinarius is not strictly speaking about the incarnational action, but the subsequent saving work that this allows.
[28] L.p.224,ll.23-24.

but the pre-existing subject (e.g. Fr.33,35,37,56,58), the following idea of unity emerges in the treatise: (1) *The ultimate unity in Christ is (the person and hypostasis of) God the Word himself the eternal Son who is fully divine in substance (and nature).*

> 'By these words it is made manifest that the man *himself* who speaks to us the things of the Father is God the Creator of the Ages, the effulgence of his glory the exact impression of his hypostasis in as much as he is truly God by his own Spirit and *not* because he possesses God *in himself* as something else beside *himself* '(Fr.38) [29]; 'he [sc. Apollinarius] declares that we speak of two persons, God and the man taken on by God. But he says that he does not hold this but deems that the one enfleshed is none other than the Incorporeal One [i.e. one *divine* person (?)] the same one (τὸν ἀυτὸν) according to a likeness of our life in flesh' (Fr.67)[30]; 'Christ... is united with God *in himself* (ἐν αὐτῷ)' (Fr.100)[31]; 'he [sc. Apollinarius] says, interpreting the saying of Zachariah speciously, that it is said by the person of the Father concerning the Son [= the Shepherd/man in *Zach.*13.7] that he is something/*a person* (?) of the same stock (τὸ σύμφυλον) that is naturally united and consubstantial' (Fr.40).[32]

Despite Apollinarius' commitment to the fact that the subject of the incarnation is divine, which seems to determine his understanding of who/what ultimately provides the locus of the Christological unity he also sets out to explain how Christ is both God and man (Fr.17,18) and a heavenly man (Fr.16,17). In the D. treatises this task is often done in a symmetrical way. The ways in which Apollinarius presents the unitive action in the *Apodeixis* (summarised above) are by and large more divinely unilateral and less compositional in dynamic and this leads to a more nuanced and asymmetrical conception of the divine-yet-human unity of Christ: (2) *The unity that is Christ is God himself 'together with' something carnal (a body and soul/form/likeness) which he has 'put on' or 'taken on in addition' to whom and what he is and remains, but which is nevertheless 'his' and fully identified with 'him'.* This type of conception seems to inform Apollinarius' exposition in Fr.84-86 (in spite of the co-presence of the idea of Christ as ἕν ζῶον (Fr.85) which is reminiscent of the D. works.): 'the flesh was taken-on-in-addition' (Fr.84); 'the flesh *of the Lord* is worshipped because it is *one person* and one living being *together with him* (μετ' αὐτοῦ)' (Fr.84); 'no (other) created thing is worshipped with (μετὰ) the Lord as *his* (αὐτοῦ) flesh' (Fr.86). This is a unity which is not simply 'possessional' or conjunctive since it allows the flesh to be identified with the divine subject/spirit/person(?): 'the very same [sc. God the Creator of the Ages, etc.]

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[29] L.p.213,ll.1-5.
[30] L.p.220,ll.12-16.
[31] L.p.230,ll.27-28.

through himself (αὐτὸς ὁ δἰ ἑαυτοῦ) that is *through the flesh* has purified the sins of the world'(Fr.38).[33]

Derived from the trichotomic analysis of God-as-man we find an understanding of the Christological unity which is sometimes less successful at preserving its divine identity: (3) *The unity that is Christ is God himself existing as the principle element/basic reality in a complex human/carnal form/state of existence.* At its crudest level the T. model of man/Christ as a unity is tripartite and, therefore, has the same compositional implications as Apollinarius' D. thesis: the nature (Fr.32), the subject (Fr.25), the person (Fr.68) in Christ is neither human nor divine but 'out of' bits of both. However, when Apollinarius re-expresses the T. model in D. terms (Fr.69,72) he reveals that this conception of unity is not necessarily about a singular composite construction, but a singular underlying reality (a mind) existing in a certain (carnal) form/state. When expressed this way the third idea of unity (derived from anthropology) is perhaps more germane to the second idea ((2) above): it certainly allows for the persistence of the divine identity of the unity and it offers a way of understanding the inclusion of flesh in this (divine) unity.

A Technical Term for the Union

In the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius describes the act of union in various ways, guided not only by an anthropological model but by his basic beliefs about what is true (e.g. it is 'a divine enfleshment', 'the same one is God and man') and what *cannot* be true Christologically (e.g. Christ cannot be an inspired man (Fr.14); complete God cannot be joined to a complete man because this would not be a unity but two individuals (Fr.81,92)[34]). In so doing he arrives at a conception of unity which is centred on the eternal divine subject/Son/spirit/person/hypostasis, but which is also inclusive of his subsequently acquired flesh. The inclusion of flesh is explained (in the main) with reference to the divinely-initiated act of union rather than with reference to some divine-carnal entity which results from it. The technical language to do with a physical type of union and consequent unity which features in Apollinarius' exposition in the D. works has in the verbatim fragments all but disappeared. Is there any evidence of a different technical terminology brought in by Apollinarius to designate the unique type of union he has in

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[32] L.p.213,ll.27-29.
[33] L.p.213,ll.5-6.
[34] This second negative premise seems to be logical more than theological.

mind which he variously describes and which accounts for the inclusion of flesh in the enduring divine unity?

If we look at the 'Suggested Reconstruction' of Apollinarius' argument in the *Apodeixis* (above) there is perhaps one term which catches the eye more than any other – προσλαμβάνω. This verb and the derived noun πρόσληψις seem to be especially significant for a number of reasons.

(1) The term προσλαμβάνω appears at key moments in the 'scientific' development of Apollinarius' argument in the *Apodeixis* (Fr.19,66-67,76[a]).

(a) In Fr.19 Apollinarius chooses to use προσλαμβάνω *in the statement which introduces his Christological thesis as to how there was divine enfleshment of one who is both God and (as) a man.* Part of the solution is to equate the divine subject with the divine spirit which is enfleshed – but this does not explain fully the action of enfleshment until it is turned round the other way and shown to be a unitive action in which God is the active rather than passive subject. God himself is enfleshed/man because 'flesh is taken-on-in-addition *by God*' (Fr.19)[35] – flesh which is 'not without a soul' (Fr.22[a]).

(b) In Fr.66-67, according to Gregory's report, Apollinarius again employs the verb προσλαμβάνω (Fr.67) and the noun πρόσληψις (Fr.66) *in a section of the* Apodeixis *where he is giving typological and technical definition to his conception of the true mode of the union.* In Gregory's report, Apollinarius contrasts his own conception of God's union with flesh (σαρκός ἕνωσις) with the false view of those who would misinterpret this as the πρόσληψις *of a man* (Fr.66)[36] or the taking-on-in-addition (προσλαμβάνω) of a human (person) by God (the divine person) (Fr.67).[37] Gregory can make no sense of Apollinarius' implied criticism arguing that the gospels and scripture leaves us agnostic as to 'the exact mode of the taking-on-in-addition' (τίνα τρόπον πρόσειλημμένου).[38] At this stage in his argument the main contrast Apollinarius appears to be drawing is *not* between two unitive actions (viz. ἕνωσις and πρόσληψις) but between a true and false way of conceiving the object of this action. From what Apollinarius concludes in the

[35] L.p.209,l.24.
[36] L.p.220,ll.6-11.
[37] L.p.220,ll.12-13.
[38] *Antirrheticus* 34,J.p.184,ll.13-14.

verbatim Fr.76[a] he could equally have referred to the true doctrine as the πρόσληψις of flesh (and possibly did so consistently).

(c) Fr.76[a] follows a number of formal proofs (Fr.70-75) in which Apollinarius attempts to demonstrate the verity of the Christological thesis he has technically defined (Fr.66-69). Gregory quotes the opening statement of Fr.76 (76[a]), identifying it twice as *a conclusion* (τὸ συμπέρασμα).[39] Mühlenberg guesses that Fr.76 is probably the conclusion of another proof which Apollinarius has left out since 'the hypothesis and middle term contained nothing Gregory considered worthy of contradiction'.[40] From Gregory's remarks at the beginning of *Antirrheticus* 39 and subsequent discussion[41] it seems more likely that Fr.76[a] represents a more *general conclusion* – either to the Soteriological Argument (Fr.74,76-80), or to the Formal Proofs (Fr.70-76), or even to the section of the *Apodeixis* in which Apollinarius gives technical and typological definition to his Christological doctrine (Fr.66ff.). The fact that Gregory then moves on from Fr.76[a] to consider a different type of argument (Fr.81[b])[42] in *Antirrheticus* 39, which is 'arithmetical' rather than strictly soteriological and has more in common with Fr.81-86, before coming back to consider aspects of the soteriological argument (Fr.74) in Fr.76[c]-80,[43] further indicates that Fr.76[a] was a significant moment in the development of Apollinarius' argument in the *Apodeixis*. It provides a point of reference towards which Gregory's argument is able to work both forward and back. Thus, *in a verbatim statement wherein Apollinarius seems to arrive via technical definitions and formal proofs at an important Christological-soteriological conclusion we find the term πρόσληψις recommended as signifying the true mode of the saving union.* 'Therefore the human race is not saved by the assumption (ἀνάληψις) of a human mind or a whole human being but by the πρόσληψις of flesh' (Fr.76a)[44]...(viz)...'πρόσληψις by the Only Begotten' (Fr.76b)[45]. Unlike Fr.66-67, Apollinarius here seems to be contrasting not just true and false views of the object of the union but true and false views of the unitive action itself, distinguishing between two compounds of λαμβάνω. Mühlenberg is

[39] L.p.222,ll.25-28.
[40] Mühlenberg,p.83.
[41] J.p.193,l.11-p.194,l.27.
[42] J.p.194,ll.2-6(=L.p.224,ll.16-19)cf.Fr.81ff,L.p.224,ll.12-15ff(=*Antirrheticus* 42,J.p.199,ll.17-20ff).
[43] *Antirrheticus* 40-42,J.p.194,l.28-J.p.199,l.17.
[44] L.p.222,l.27.
[45] L.p.222,ll.28-30.

alone among Apollinarius' modern commentators in noticing this: 'This differentiation is unusual; it is found nowhere in the tradition.'[46]

(2) The term προσλαμβάνω is employed by Apollinarius in two revealing statements wherein he (a) specifies the precise mode of the union (Fr.84) and (b) explains exactly why and in what sense something carnal comes to be identified with the singular unity of God himself (Fr.63[b]).

(a) Fr.84 belongs to a section of the *Apodeixis* (Fr.81-87) in which Apollinarius seems to be rehearsing the case for his own true doctrine of the union *contra* the case for the false view of his opponents, which logically precludes true union (Fr.81) and is implicitly adoptionist and polytheistic (Fr.82,83). He recommends his own conception by pointing to the uniqueness of the mode of God's union with flesh illustrated by the unity of worship (Fr.84). This unity of worship (and therefore the unique mode of union which supports it) is then explained in terms of the personal/living unity of the Lord 'together with' 'his' flesh (Fr.85). When Apollinarius chooses a word to denote exactly *how* the flesh was thus (οὕτως) uniquely united to God/the Lord/Christ he again selects the term προσλαμβάνω: 'Nothing else was united to God in such a way (οὕτως) as the flesh which was taken-on-in-addition (προσληφθεῖσα)'.[47]

(b) Fr.63[b] is perhaps one of the most surprising verbatim statements which survives from the *Apodeixis*,[48] given the monenergetic scenario in the D. works and Apollinarius' statement in the *Apodeixis* specifying the passive nature (ἑτεροκίνητος) of flesh. Interpreting *Mt.*26.39, Apollinarius seems to admit that Christ's human element even includes some sort of (carnal?) will which is conformed to God's will. This gospel text presents Apollinarius with his key interpretational question in its acutest form: if Christ is God, the eternal, incorporeal unchanging ego who acts and wills with fully divine authority (Fr.56-60), how is it that human flesh (with a soul (Fr.22) and even a will of its own (Fr.63[b])) can be fully identified with Him (Fr.38)?[49] In relation to Christ's human/carnal will, Apollinarius offers his explanation in Fr.63*, referring not to the existence of a monenergetic/monothelite co-formed divine-carnal unity,[50] but to a

[46] Mühlenberg,pp.200-201.
[47] L.p.225,ll.1-2.
[48] L.p.218,ll.22-24(L.p.219,ll.6-7).
[49] L.p.213,ll.5-6.
[50] Cf. Apollinarius' much more monothelite/monophysite exegesis of the same text in Fr.108-109 from another work where he introduces the idea of the divine will itself providentially begging to be let off.

particular type of unitive action initiated by the divine subject; once again his key term is προσλαμβάνω: 'This will is said [i.e. by scripture] to be that which belongs to/pertains to the self of (τὸ ἴδιον)...God who descended from heaven, being something which has been taken-on-in-addition (προσειλημμένον) into a union with him'.[51]

(3) We know from a semantic argument which Apollinarius employs elsewhere against Diodore (Fr.121) that he understands the verb προσλαμβάνω to have a particular technical significance, which makes it a suitable, helpful and acceptable term for denoting the incarnational action. The term as defined in *Contra Diodorum* sits well with one of the incarnational 'requirements' spelt out by Apollinarius at the end of the *Apodeixis* (Fr.97). According to Apollinarius in Fr.121, the verb denotes an action involving one masculine subject (τις) and an impersonal object (τοῦτο) and an action which precludes change in the former.[52]

(4) Remarks made by Gregory in *Antirrheticus* 39 suggest that Apollinarius took pains to draw a semantic distinction between the actions of πρόσληψις and ἀνάληψις by means of a grammatical analysis which originally featured in the *Apodeixis* in the environs of the 'conclusion' reached at Fr.76[a]:

> 'But let this attempted proof also be silenced most of all because of the conclusion (συμπεράσματος) attached by him which is as follows according to the text: "Therefore the human race is not saved by the assumption (ἀναλήψεως) of a mind or a whole human being, but by the taking-on-in-addition (προσλήψεως) of human flesh"[Fr.76[a]]. This is the conclusion. But *they* who interpret the difference between ἀνάληψις and πρόσληψις are *they* who carefully study cold grammatical phrases so as to systematise the minute dissonance of those little bits of speech called prefixes (προθέσεις) for schoolboys! For *we* [i.e. Gregory] think that what is taken-on-in-addition (πρός-) has been assumed (ἀνά-) and do not doubt that what is assumed (ἀνά-) is taken-on-in-addition (πρός-), having learned such linguistic usage from scripture...[witness: *Ps*.72.24; *Ps*.77.70]...and so the one taken on with glory (προσληφθεὶς) had been taken up (ἀνελήφθη) and the one taken up (ἀνά-) had been taken on (πρός-). For *he* [sc. Apollinarius] *says (λέγει) two things* about what is the same (action – τοῦ αὐτοῦ) and so *what he means (βούλεται) by saying that* "not by assuming (ἀνά-) but by taking-on-in-addition (πρός-) by the Only Begotten is the mystery dispensed as regards the man" [Fr.76[b]] *not even he could say quickly.* But fleeing from contention in foul language with the

[51] L.p.218,ll.21-24.Fr.63* is a verbatim statement reconstructed by Lietzmann from several Gregorian reports/citations which indicate that Apollinarius' original declaration was made up of two components which I have referred to as 63[a] and 63[b]. Gregory discusses Fr.63[a] in *Antirrheticus* 31-32, introducing the second half of Fr.63*(63[b]) in *Antirrheticus* 33.

[52] L.p.237,ll.11-12,see p.77,above.

rubbish of his ill-fitting words *I let pass most of his nonsensical verbiage* (τὰ πολλὰ τῆς φλυαρίας ἀφίημι). I think the reading of what he has written is sufficient refutation of the unnaturalness of what he is saying in his text.'[53]

It seems unlikely that this Gregorian passage was inspired by Apollinarius' perhaps unconscious shift in terminology in Fr.76[a] which Gregory has then dragged out *ad absurdum* in the interests of his polemic. It seems more likely that Gregory is here responding to an actual passage of grammatical exposition at this point in the *Apodeixis* (*prior* to the 'conclusion' in Fr.76[a] (?)) wherein Apollinarius carefully explained the differing senses of the two compounds of λαμβάνω considering the semantic implications of their contrasting prefixes. Apollinarius is included in the '*they* who interpret the difference...', and in Gregory's opinion his conclusions are only fit for schoolboys. Gregory includes himself in the '*we*' who are above quibbling over such grammatical minutiae. Nevertheless, the fact that Gregory turns to scripture to show that such a distinction is artificial again seems to indicate that a formal differentiation of the two terms *was* part of Apollinarius' argument supporting his Christological-soteriological 'conclusion'. There is evidence in this passage that Gregory has passed over much of Apollinarius' argument and that what he has left out is to do with the terminological distinction. At the beginning of *Antirrheticus* 39 he admits to moving on in silence from the previous proof (Fr.75?) to an appended 'conclusion'. The unattached fragment[54] which Lietzmann gives as Fr.76[b] indicates that Apollinarius distinguished between πρόσληψις and ἀνάληψις in more than one statement and Gregory's accompanying comments suggest that Apollinarius was unable to make the distinction 'briefly'. It seems likely that the 'nonsensical verbiage' left out by Gregory was to do with this semantic distinction which he simply fails to see and with which he could not be bothered to argue.[55]

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[53] J.p.193,ll.6-29.
[54] L.p.222,ll.28-30.
[55] The evidence provided by *Antirrheticus* 39 that Apollinarius drew an important semantic distinction between compounds of λαμβάνω when formulating his doctrine of Christ is in part supported by comments made earlier by Epiphanius in the *Panarion* 77,19. In a passage which immediately precedes the report on his visits to Antioch (c.376-377) and his interview with the Apollinarian Bishop Vitalis, Epiphanius also records that Apollinarius and his disciples explicitly rejected ἀναλαμβάνω as a suitable incarnational term on scriptural grounds. Epiphanius' comments imply that the Apollinarians drew a semantic distinction between ἀνάληψις and λῆψις rather than πρόσληψις, but Epiphanius' lack of precision may be caused by his incomprehension. He certainly bears witness to the importance the Apollinarians attached to using the correct expression: 'He [sc. Apollinarius] will not say that Christ's human nature is complete. Furthermore, he hinders some people's salvation by frightening them and telling them we must not say that Christ has "taken up"(ἀνειληφέναι) perfect manhood because if you please of the scripture, "The Lord taketh up (ἀναλαμβάνων) the meek". But no one can say that there is anything different from our frequent use of synonymous expressions in saying that the Lord "took up" flesh (ἀναλαβεῖν) or "took" (λαβεῖν) perfect manhood... whether he or his disciples use the expression in passing in a different sense [but] in

For such reasons it appears justifiable to conclude that Apollinarius when writing the *Apodeixis* employed προσλαμβάνω as a key technical term to denote the type of unitive action and to explain the unique type of unity which he had in mind when he proclaimed 'a divine enfleshment according to a human likeness'. There is no evidence that this is a technical term which Apollinarius has borrowed from fourth century philosophers or physicists (or even grammatical logicians!). It seems to be more a term which Apollinarius himself has chosen (and explains) as a means of describing the complex and paradoxical way in which he understands God to have truly taken flesh whilst remaining God. By analysis of the way(s) in which Apollinarius presents the act of union and the divine unity in Christ, a nuanced picture emerges of a Christological conception which is not obviously the same as the compositional idea which is central to the D. works. This type of Christology does not seem to share the symmetrical structure nor (in the main) the same physical terminology of the compositional type. In view of the apparent significance of the term προσλαμβάνω in Apollinarius' developing argument and in view of the lack of any other evidently technical term it would seem not inappropriate to refer to the different type of Christological conception advocated by Apollinarius in the T. *Apodeixis* as '*the divine πρόσληψις of flesh*'.

A Different Type of Anthropological Model

The idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh which we find in the T. *Apodeixis* appears to be a different Christological conception from the idea of unity by composition which we find in the D. works and it is certainly underpinned by a different type of anthropological model.

The Nature of Apollinarius' 'Dichotomic' Model of Man

In the D. works Apollinarius uses the model of man as a physical unity of two elements, ψυχή and σῶμα, to explain how the divine and human/corporeal are indivisibly united in

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this form and appearance I cannot say. But I have often considered, and been perturbed, that they justify contention and a battle to the death for the sake of this expression. And this tells me that they probably use the expression in some rather strange sense.' Epiphanius,*Panarion* 77,19.1-2,8-10(E.T.Williams,pp.583-584).

Christ who is thus *one* 'as man is one'[56] (i.e. one nature, living being, whole, person). In this same group of writings Apollinarius also uses the terms πνεῦμα and σάρξ to refer to the constituent elements of a human being/Christ.[57] He does not, however, make a technical differentiation between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, and he seems to use σῶμα and σάρξ interchangeably to refer to the non-psychic element.[58] It is the consistency of these dichotomic formulae coupled with the testimony of Rufinus[59] that has led certain scholars to conclude that in these ('earlier') works Apollinarius' Christology was informed by a 'Dichotomic' anthropology.[60]

In Norris' opinion, Apollinarius' Christology in the D. works is not based upon a precisely conceived anthropological 'dichotomy'– there was no such thing; it simply appeals to a non-technical understanding of man as a psychosomatic whole to explain the unity in Christ:

> 'In neither of these passages [viz. Fr.129, *De Unione* 5] is there question of defining with precision the exact psychic function which the Logos performs with relation to the human flesh which he assumes and on which he confers life. The notion of a replacement of the human soul by the Logos is clearly present in Apollinarius' mind. Nevertheless the question of exactly *how* this occurs is neither raised nor considered.'[61]

What Apollinarius says later on in *De Unione* goes against Norris' opinion, however, for Apollinarius not only uses a ψυχή-σῶμα dichotomy to explain the unity of the Word and a body in Christ but goes on to explain exactly *how* this occurs (*De Unione*12-13), giving an account of the virginal conception based on a traducian understanding of the procreation of a human being. Apollinarius prefaces his explanation by asserting, on the basis of Christ's own words, that he was animated by divinity and not the furnishing of a human ψυχή (*De Unione* 12). If we carefully consider the account of Christ's conception which follows and the way in which it is contrasted with the traducian conception of an ordinary man, not only does the 'psychic function' of the Logos in Christ become clear, but also Apollinarius' precise meaning when he refers to ψυχή in this D. work (§§5,12,13). The divine power/spirit in Christ's case replaces the vivifying *carnal* spirit of the father which is normally transmitted in spermatic matter thus animating/ensouling the body/flesh supplied by a womb. If the divinity has replaced

[56] E.g.*Ad Dionysium A* 2,L.p.257,ll.17-18;*De Unione* 5,L.p.187,ll.9-11.
[57] E.g.*Ad Jovianum* 2,L.p.251,ll.14-15.
[58] *De Unione* 5,L.p.187,ll.11-14.
[59] Rufinus,*H.E.*2.20.
[60] E.g.Voisin,p.273.
[61] Norris,pp.91-92.

Christ's human soul even at the level of vivification (this is frequently emphasised in the D. works[62]) and carnal will,[63] then Apollinarius according to this theory must believe that it has supplied Christ's 'energy part' (*De Unione* 5) entire. De Riedmatten and Norris both argue convincingly that Apollinarius would have combined this traducian view of the transmission of πνεῦμα σαρκικόν in matter with a 'spiritualist' view of the πνεῦμα νοητικόν conveyed 'in and with' the carnal/lower soul.[64] If, therefore, Apollinarius' analysis of Christ is tied to this particular explanation of the virginal conception – and there is evidence that in the other D. treatises it is[65] – then whether or not there was technically a 'dichotomic' anthropology and whether or not Apollinarius could have given a further articulation to the terms ψυχή or σάρξ is not the point, for Apollinarius is bound to an anthropological analysis of Christ in which the divinity has replaced the human soul at every level. In so far as Apollinarius' exposition is consistent in the D. works, his explanation of the virginal conception commits him to a particular understanding of his (quasi-)dichotomic anthropological model. By σῶμα/σάρξ he must mean soulless flesh; by ψυχή/πνεῦμα he must mean animal soul together with intellectual soul/faculty.[66]

Thus, Apollinarius' understanding of Christ becomes bound to a quasi-dichotomic analysis which appears to be almost hylomorphic in character, tending towards an identification of the individual being/person with the psychosomatic whole rather than the soul. (We know from Apollinarius' exegetical work that he was capable of making theological use of such a view of man.)[67] Yet the anthropological terms used by Apollinarius in the D. works in themselves remain flexible since ψυχή, πνεῦμα and σάρξ all allow for a further articulation. This enables Apollinarius to present the role of the Logos *qua* ψυχή/πνεῦμα in both intellectual and animal ways. Technically, it is inconsistent for him simultaneously to articulate the term σάρξ so as to include a carnal energy of its own, but the flexibility of the term itself allows him occasionally to imply this when it is exegetically expedient or apologetically necessary (e.g. Fr.131).

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[62] See Riedmatten[1],pp.245-50.
[63] L.p.191,l.4.
[64] Riedmatten[2],pp.227-233;Norris,pp.102-103.
[65] *Contra Diodorum* Fr.142;*Ad Jovianum* 1-2(L.p.251,ll.8-16);*De Fide et Incarnatione* 4,9.
[66] We have one example of what this 'dichotomic' Christology would have looked like if re-expressed in trichotomic terms:'the divine energy filled the place of the soul (ψυχῆς) and the human mind (νοός)... for the soul-less, irrational and will-less temple of Solomon typified in advance the temple of Jesus' body' (Fr.2,L.p.204,ll.7-17).
[67] Commenting on *Mt.* 22.23-33 he writes:'For man is a singular something, which is a combination and a common life and there is a need for both [sc. soul and body] in order that life be set together again after death.' Commenting on *Ps.*118.50 he writes:'We know that the soul living by itself is not a true life since indeed the soul is not the man.' See Riedmatten[2],p.225 n.[4] & n.[1].

The type of anthropological model which Apollinarius chooses to employ in the *Apodeixis* is very different form the quasi-dichotomy which is central to the D. works. It is, *per se*, much more technically exact: Gregory reports that Apollinarius introduced it with a lengthy (philosophical (?)) demonstration (Fr.23-24); Apollinarius also takes pains to justify his model with reference to scripture (Fr.26-31,88), introducing alongside 1 *Cor.*15.45 (which we find in the D. works) new Pauline proof texts, notably *Thess.*5.23; *Rom.*1.9; *Rom.*7.23, together with *Dan.*3.86 and *Jn.*4.24. Such texts not only confirm Apollinarius' trichotomic analysis of man as πνεῦμα-ψυχή-σῶμα, but allow him to be much more precise about the meaning of his anthropological terms. Thus, in the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius draws a technical distinction between πνεῦμα and ψυχή (which he does not do in the D. works), equating the πνεῦμα with νοῦς (Fr.25,Fr.88 re *Rom.*1.9; *Jn.*4.24). This gives ψυχή the technical meaning of non-intellectual soul, which differs from its more inclusive sense in the D. works. The trichotomy allows for a more exact definition of the term σάρξ which is not, as in D., a near-equivalent of σῶμα, but includes the non-intellectual ψυχή (Fr.22,88, re *Rom.*7.23). What is most different about the 'new' anthropological model in the *Apodeixis* is the implications it has for the related Christology. In specifying that the Word serves as Christ's spirit in the sense of νοῦς, the divine role in Christ becomes less physical/animal and more volitional/ethical/intellectual (e.g. Fr.56-62,74,76). In admitting that Christ's human flesh includes a ψυχή together with a body, Apollinarius departs from the monenergetic Christology of the D. writings. If we look at how he justifies his contention that God's flesh is 'not without a soul' in Fr.22, Apollinarius' two fold argument implies that such a ψυχή *is a (second) source of energy* in a human being, both *irrational,* 'for it was said to fight against the ruling of the mind', and *animating,* 'for we say that the bodies of irrational beings are also ensouled/alive'.[68] For differing reasons Voisin and Norris have played down the importance of Apollinarius' admission of a human ψυχή in Christ in the T. works, but this recognition seems to represent a more significant departure from the Christology in the D. works than these scholars will admit.[69] It seems that, as a

[68] L.p.209,ll.31-33.Mühlenberg(pp.66-67) argues that Fr.22^{b} belongs to Gregory's counter-argument and Lietzmann is incorrect in attaching it to the Apollinarian statement in Fr.22. The case for Lietzmann's original editorial decision is stronger. See p.343,n.[17],below.

[69] 'It is possible that even then he was thinking only of the body... for him the (lower) soul had no importance other than it permitted him to reconcile his ideas with Christian beliefs'(Voisin,p.277). 'An emphasis on the passivity of the flesh and governing role of the Logos...is quite as pronounced if not more so in the later trichotomous works'(Norris,p.84). *Contra*:(Discounting Fr.107) Apollinarius admittedly

consequence of/or justified by the new anthropological model, the will of the flesh and the vivifying power – the πνεῦμα σαρκικόν – which the Word replaced when taking on the role of Christ's ψυχή entire in the *De Unione* 13 scenario has, in the T. *Apodeixis*, been given back by Apollinarius to Christ's humanity, namely to the flesh taken-on-in-addition by the divine νοῦς.

At its most basic level the trichotomic analysis of a human being can have the same implication as the psychosomatic model in the D. works when it comes to the identification of the human individual/person thereby constituted for, like the D. model, it suggests a unity from parts (Fr.67 (?), Fr.89). However, in the *Apodeixis*, despite the T. analysis, Apollinarius much more frequently identifies Christ himself with the νοῦς/spiritual element than with the sum of his 'parts'. Such an identification seems to be better facilitated by the new anthropological *dichotomy* which Apollinarius is able to employ *as a result of his T. analysis*: 'a man is an enfleshed mind' (Fr.69,48); 'a man is a mind in flesh (ἐν σαρκὶ) according to Paul' (Fr.72). Despite Apollinarius' identification of νοῦς with spirit (Fr.25), this is *a different type of dichotomy* from the πνεῦμα-σάρξ (= ψυχή-σῶμα) dichotomy in the D. works. Norris, after Voisin, is correct in identifying the πνεῦμα-σάρξ as a dichotomic *formula* which is present in both D. and T. works.[70] However, πνεῦμα–σάρξ has a different *sense* in the *Apodeixis* in that the second articulation (to give the trichotomy) comes within flesh (Fr. 22,88[g]) and *not* within the πνεῦμα/ψυχή : this is made clear by the νοῦς-σάρξ dichotomy.

The new dichotomy is not only different in where it places the animal ψυχή – it is different in where it places the ultimate identity of the human individual. The way in which it is formulated suggests a more *'spiritualist'* less hylomorphic view of man: a man is a spirit/mind which is 'enfleshed'; his flesh is not so much a co-constituent as the condition in which he/the spirit/mind finds himself (Fr.69,48). A man ultimately *is* his rational spirit – which is 'in' flesh (Fr.72.). Although there is no evidence that Apollinarius subscribed to a doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, such a view of man would appear to sit happily with his T. based explanation of Christ as pre-existing (divine) spirit/subject/hypostasis/person(?) who subsequently took on the inglorious

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stresses the natural passivity of flesh in Fr.74,76 – but this is in the context of a soteriological/free will argument brought in to justify the need for a divine νοῦς: this argument does not admit that human flesh is *de facto* passive at an animal/physical level, rather it seems to depend on the fact that *de facto* it is not. Elsewhere in the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius indicates that he does not regard the flesh-including-a-ψυχή taken by the divine νοῦς to be something entirely corporeal and inert: it comes with (psychic(?)) 'necessities' of its own – not only the propensity to suffer but appetites (Fr.64) and rebellious power (Fr.22[a],74,88) and a will (Fr.63[b]) and self-animating capacity (Fr.22[b]).

[70] Norris,pp.88-91;Voisin,p.277.

outer form/clothing of flesh (Fr.32-45). Some of the commentators have noted this line of anthropological thought in the *Apodeixis* and other T. documents (e.g. Dorner, Prestige, Grillmeier)[71] and have suggested that Apollinarius' account of the Word's humanity draws upon a Platonistic view of man in which there is a natural affinity between the rational soul and the divine mind from which it is derived, and in which 'it is the soul which is the man'.[72] Norris fiercely resists such an interpretation of Apollinarius' anthropology: 'Of the Platonic view that "the soul is the man" there seems almost no trace in Apollinaris' system.'[73] Given Apollinarius' flat denial of this view in one exegetical fragment,[74] and given the quasi-hylomorphic model which informs this Christology in the D. works, it would indeed be quite an anthropological conversion if when writing the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius turned to Platonic spiritualism in the interests of his Christological doctrine. Nevertheless, the new dichotomic formulae (Fr.48,69,72), the ready identification of a human subject with his mind (Fr.75) and the divine subject with Mind *per se* (Fr.74), and the consequent close identification of divine mind incarnate with man (Fr.69,72) do indicate that Apollinarius was prepared to explore this line of 'Platonic' thought guided by the tenets of his belief: 'a divine enfleshment according to a human likeness'. We know from the exegetical fragments that Apollinarius is also able to make use of a more spiritualist view of man when his interpretational needs demand it.[75] The idea of man as a rational spirit and man as a psychosomatic composite need not be mutually exclusive. At the beginning of his anthropological survey Norris identifies these, not so much as two alternatives, but as the two parallel convictions held by Greek philosophical anthropologists from Plato onwards.[76]

Conclusion

In the *Apodeixis* we find a different type of anthropological model from the one in the D. works: it is trichotomic and more precisely defined. This trichotomic analysis can also be expressed in dichotomic terms. This dichotomy (νοῦς ἔνσαρκος) and the type of unity towards which it points is *not* the same as ψυχή-σῶμα (or πνεῦμᾶ-σάρξ) dichotomy in the D. treatises. The further articulation is understood in the carnal rather

[71] Dorner,p.372;Prestige,*Fathers and Heretics*,p.110;Grillmeier,p.331.
[72] See,e.g.Plotinus,*Enn.IV*.7.1. Nemesius of Emesa records (*De Natura Hominis* 9) that Apollinarius' trichotomic anthropology 'followed' the type of doctrine laid down by Plotinus and others (see L.(Fr.169) p.279,ll.17-22).
[73] Norris,p.101.
[74] *In Ps*.118.50,see Riedmatten^{2},p.225,n.^{1} and Mühlenberg,p.168,n.^{3}.
[75] *In Exech*.37.6,see Riedmatten^{2},p.230.n.^{1}.
[76] Norris,p.21.

than psychic element: the human individual/person thus constituted is primarily identified with the spiritual element rather than the compound.

How might we explain this? Voisin, de Riedmatten and Norris argue that this is only a terminological shift and that in both D. and T. works Apollinarius remains wedded to a consistent *anthropological* theory; Voisin regards this to be hylomorphist/'Aristotelian'; de Riedmatten and Norris find a syncretic theory which combines the (materialistic) 'Stoic' understanding of the mixture of spirit and body with a more '(Neo-)Platonic' view of the spirit.[77] It is, indeed, most probable that Apollinarius *did* subscribe consistently to one (syncretic?) theory *of man*. Nevertheless, as a Christologian and exegete it seems more likely that he would have been prepared to make use of the full range of ideas – some interlinking, some not altogether systematic – which scripture and contemporary philosophy had put at his disposal as a means of interpreting the incarnational paradox. Thus, in the D. treatises he makes use of a particular anthropological view of man as a personal/living unity composed of body and soul *to show how Christ is one as a man is one*. When the origins of this type of unity are given a precise and technical *traducian* explanation and the same analysis is applied to the virginal conception, then the D. analysis becomes more than an interpretative model and begins to *prescribe* what can be true about the human and divine elements and the resulting unity. The former must be partial and without any human impulse; the latter is by implication also partial and to some degree dependent on the body; the resulting unity is something/someone else. In the T. treatise *Apodeixis* he makes use of another anthropological analysis since he has a slightly different expositional agenda: *to show how Christ is God himself and to show how Christ is enfleshed 'as a man' is.* Because at its crudest level this new analysis is also about a unity of parts, similar Christological consequences appear to be derived from it: the human element must be incomplete (two parts only); and since the divine spirit is also a 'part' the divine subject (Fr.25), nature (Fr.32) and person (Fr.67) sometimes seems to be other than God himself. (There are the same positive expositional advantages: at this level the T. analysis accounts for the specialness of Christ's 'heavenly' humanity (Fr.25) and also for the uniqueness and reality of the integral unity with divinity enjoyed by God's flesh (Fr.84-89).) However, the T. analysis allows a different type of dichotomic view of what constitutes a human individual from the one which we find in the D. works. The new dichotomy draws on ideas which are more 'Platonic': a human being is a rational spirit enfleshed/in flesh/with flesh/bearing/wearing/underlying a fleshly form. This new

dichotomy does not fully determine Apollinarius' understanding of the nature of God incarnate; it is not as if Apollinarius converted to a spiritualist theory of man and belief in the pre-existence of souls and then applied it to Christ. However, the new dichotomy points to a type of anthropological conception which Apollinarius obviously considers more helpful than his other D. conception when it comes to explaining what type of unitive action he has in mind when he speaks of the divine προσληψις of flesh and how he considers God himself thus being like a man. Whilst in the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius' Christological idea seems to precede his anthropological simile, the type of thinking implicit in the latter must, inevitably, have influenced in some degree the way in which he understood the action of προσληψις.

A Different Type of Explanation of the Communicatio Idiomatum

The 'Inclusive' Explanation in the D. Treatises

Typical of the D. works and closely linked with the compositional conception of the unity in Christ is a scheme of 'inclusive' predication. Attributes which apply properly to the divinity or the body can be *jointly* predicated to the one Christ or even cross-predicated to the other element in the union (e.g. *Ad Dionysium A* 11). This is a more-than-nominal convention, according to Apollinarius: it has a real basis in the existence of the divine-human vital/physical whole to which both divine and corporeal attributes actually and inclusively apply (*Ad Dionysium A* 7-10; *De Unione* 5,7,9-10). Apollinarius recommends this scheme of predication because: it corresponds with the language of scripture; it is a correlate of his own physical doctrine of the union and therefore justifies and is justified by it; it preserves the unity of Christ unlike the divisive attribution practiced by the Dyophysites (*Ad Dionysium A* 4); it also prevents the confusion of the divine and human properties (*De Unione* 17); it is soteriologically necessary that there is a real basis for the exchange of attributes (*Ad Dionysium A* 6,12). In the D. treatises, there is obviously a tension between Apollinarius' Christological/soteriological desire for a more-than-nominal *communicatio idiomatum* and his theological desire not to confuse the properties, and it may be that, given the nature of his explanation of the reality of the *communicatio idiomatum*, nameley the existence of a (third) divine-human nature, the latter desire ultimately gave way to the former. We know from other fragments that Apollinarius was prepared to consider the idea that Christ's nature was composite in an

[77] Voisin,pp.273-279;Riedmatten[2],pp.225-230;Norris,p.106.

intermediate generic sense (Fr.111,113) and that his sacramental flesh was (thereby?) a unique medium for salvation (Fr.116). De Riedmatten notes Apollinarius' 'inclusive' scheme and identifies it as the typically Apollinarian form of predication. He links it with Apollinarius' concept of μία φύσις, as developed in the D. documents, and he *contrasts it with a more conventional practice* of joint attribution: 'It is the indivisible unity of this compound which requires the "communication of properties" and *not a process of attribution to a unique person who is Son of God.*'[78] Whilst de Riedmatten rightly delineates the type of *communicatio idiomatum* most typical of the D. documents, we also find in them divisive and ambiguous statements wherein Apollinarius' predication of divine *and* human attributes to the one (divine) Son, either κατὰ σάρκα or κατὰ τὴν θεότα, may in fact indicate that he *also* has the more conventional idea of joint attribution in mind (e.g. *Ad Jovian* 2).[79]

Apollinarius' Explanation in the Apodeixis

In the *Apodeixis*, Fr.46-47 afford us an interesting insight into how Apollinarius chooses to explain the *communicatio idiomatum* in the context of his T. Christology. Having explained the incarnation with reference to *Phil.*2.6-7 – the pre-existing co-equally divine subject takes/puts on an inglorious human form – he goes on to explain to whom or what Christ's 'abasement' (*Phil.*2.8) and 'exaltation' (*Phil.*2.9) should (consequently) be predicated. In Fr. 46[b] Gregory reports that Apollinarius cross-predicates the attributes in the most radical and illogical fashion: 'The flesh (he says) has been humbled... while he says that the divinity has been exalted.'[80] There is no evidence that Apollinarius actually made such a statement at this point in the *Apodeixis* nor that he based it on the idea of Christ's nature as a divine-carnal composite to which humiliation and exaltation can both properly belong. Fr.46[b] is probably Gregory's own misinterpretation of the statement which he reports in Fr.46[a]: 'he says that *he* abased himself *in flesh*, but that *he* was exalted by God (i.e. the Father) the exaltation (being) divine.'[81] The verbatim Fr.47 gives the most reliable insight into Apollinarius' interpretation of *Phil.*2.8-9: '*He* is glorified *as man* who ascends from ignominy. But *he* possesses the glory before the world *as God* who pre-exists the ages.'[82] Apollinarius jointly predicates the abasement

[78] Riedmatten[2],p.218.
[79] See p.87,above.
[80] L.p.214,l.33-p.215,l.2.
[81] L.p.214,ll.32-33.
[82] L.p.215,ll.3-5.

and the exaltation to the same (divine) *subject*. The way in which the attribution pertains to this singular subject is then explained with reference either to his eternal divinity – 'the exaltation (= exalted state) is divine'; 'he possesses (eternal) glory *as God*' – or with reference to the inglorious carnal form he has taken: 'he abased himself *in flesh*'; 'he was (i.e. became) exalted/glorified *as man*'. The ignominy and the ascension out of it into glory are attributed primarily to the divine subject's carnal form which he has taken on. The glory is attributed to the divine subject's own eternal nature. Here Apollinarius appears to approach the more conventional idea of one divine subject/person commanding two sets of attributes (=generic natures?), one divine, one carnal, since he possesses (or hypostatises?) both. Even Gregory occasionally admits surprise at the apparent 'orthodoxy' of Apollinarius' divisive exegesis: 'he distinguishes between what is glorified and he who possesses the glory'; 'the ignominy is altogether the pathetic nature of flesh'.[83] It is interesting to compare this explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum* and *Phil.*2.8-9, arising as it does from Apollinarius' account of the divine προσληψις of flesh in *Apodeixis* Fr.32-45, with the explanation he offers immediately after his 'biological' account of the unity by composition in *De Unione* 12-13. In *De Unione* 14-16 he explains Paul's inclusive predication in *Phil.*2.8-9 with reference to the mode of union and the divine-carnal whole thereby constituted.[84] In what follows it is not altogether clear whether Apollinarius identifies the subject in Christ with the divine element (the Word) or the composite whole (he who is divine by nature *and* by grace).

The most radical expression of the type of attribution which Apollinarius practises in the *Apodeixis* comes in the section dealing with the nature of Christ's divinity (Fr.32-41). For here, with reference to *Zach.*13.7 and *Heb.*1.13, Apollinarius seems prepared to say that the *human being* Christ pre-exists (Fr.32) and is consubstantially divine (Fr.40-41). Gregory sees a polemical opportunity and (mis)interprets Apollinarius as advocating pre-existing 'divine' manhood/flesh (Fr.34,35,36,37^{b}). Apollinarius' refusal to make a human being the subject of the saving passion of Christ (Fr.94,95) gives Gregory his other main polemical opportunity: he (mis)interprets Apollinarius' position as crude theopaschitism (Fr.101). From what survives of Apollinarius' exposition dealing with the issues of Christ's full and eternal divinity and his real humanity, we find a much more subtle presentation which is fully consistent with the more 'conventional' type of *communicatio idiomatum.* The point of the argument in Fr.32-33 is *not* to establish that Christ's human element because of the

[83] L.p.215,ll.6-7;l.15.
[84] L.p.191,l.13-17.

union is in some real sense eternal/divine. Apollinarius, rather, invites us to consider *the way* in which Christ pre-exists as evidenced by scripture to confirm his thesis that the spirit=subject in Christ is divine: 'In the nature of the God-man the Lord is the divine spirit.' Apollinarius is much less ambiguous than in *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3-4 in specifying that the attribute of divine consubstantiality applies to the divine subject in himself 'according to the spirit' and '*not* according to the flesh' (Fr.41). When dealing with difficult texts which suggest that the human Christ acts and wills independently of God (Fr.59-63) and is subject to human necessities (Fr.64,65), Apollinarius also offers carefully divisive exegesis. From what survives of Apollinarius' exegesis of *Mt.*26.39 and *Mt.*11.19 it seems that he attributed Christ's human will (Fr.63[b]) and appetites (Fr.65) divisively – primarily to the carnal form/human likeness which the divine subject has taken on: 'these things are necessary on account of the man.'[85] The suffering, death and resurrection are predicated to the divine subject in respect of his human likeness/carnal form (=nature?): 'he died and rose *as man*' (Fr.93); 'passions were set in motion according to the likeness of man' (Fr.103); 'What does not admit suffering suffers not due to the necessity of an unwilling nature exactly as a man, but in conformity with nature' (Fr.102). In this last fragment, Apollinarius seems to be distinguishing between what applies to the Word/Mind *per se* as an autonomous rational nature, and what pertains primarily to the (carnal) nature which the Word has taken on and is *per se* passive (Fr.74, 76).

Conclusion

The way in which Apollinarius understands the divine and human attributes of Christ thus unified and distinct in the *Apodeixis* does *not* appear to be grounded primarily in the idea of Christ as a single pneumatic-carnal composite as in the D. works; rather it seems to be grounded in the idea of Christ as a singular divine spirit (= rational subject, hypostasis, person) who, whilst remaining himself, takes on a carnal form (= nature(?)) in such a way (πρόσληψις) that this carnality, whilst distinct in origin and characteristics, is also 'his', 'together with' him, and indeed 'him' (Fr.38).

[85] L.p.219,l.36.

A Different Type of Soteriology

A new type of soteriological argument is encountered in the T. *Apodeixis* (Fr.74,76-80,87). If such thinking lies behind the Christology in the D. documents Apollinarius never makes it explicit. Indeed, in order to formulate such an argument it seems first necessary to make the νοῦς-ψυχή distinction afforded by the T. anthropology. Once the Logos has been allocated the specific role of νοῦς and some sort of carnal soul, will or energy has been admitted at the level of flesh (Fr.22,63[b],76,88), then it becomes possible to take a more '*ethical*' view of the relationship between the divine and the human in Christ and our (future) salvation through him.

Soteriology in the D. Treatises

Soteriological arguments do not feature very prominently in the D. treatises with the exception of *De Fide et Incarnatione*. In *Ad Dionysium A* there are only two references to salvation in Christ (§§6,12). In both cases the idea of soteriological necessity is brought in as further justification for Apollinarius' doctrine of one nature and the real and inclusive *communicatio idiomatum* which is grounded in it. The implication is that our salvation depends on the fact of the incarnational union according to the mode advocated by Apollinarius: in the one nature of Christ an indivisible divine-human unity has been achieved at once passible and impassible in which we are included through the earthly body which is the same as ours (*De Unione* 8) but intertwined with divinity (*De Unione* 2). This close and largely unexplained connection between the fact of the union and the fact of salvation leads Lietzmann simply to equate Apollinarius' soteriology in the D. works with his doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum.*[86]

In *De Unione*, however, Apollinarius gives a much more precise explanation of how Christ's corporeal element is 'sanctified' by its inclusion in one divine-human nature, using the model of a psychosomatic nature composed by means of a traducian act of procreation. Although Apollinarius first speaks of the (saving) work of Christ and the Spirit as 'sanctification and illumination',[87] and although two of his Johanine proof texts for his incarnational theory allude to Christ's ' bearing witness to the truth',[88] Apollinarius chooses to present the sanctifying work of Christ's divinity in a physical rather than revelatory way. The divinity sanctifies Christ's body vivifying it with eternal

[86] L.p.5.
[87] L.p.190,ll.4-6.

life in place of the animal (and higher) ψυχή. This is why the body ascends and is exalted together with his divinity (*De Unione* 14-15). The basis for this salvation-as-vivification is here again the fact of the incarnation: 'There is an act of being sanctified and an act of being embodied and the realities might be divided, but they are united according to the unity of the flesh with the divinity... and the enfleshment itself is wholly what has sanctified.'[89] The evidence suggests that the same understanding of the origins and nature of the unity in Christ informs Apollinarius' exposition in *Ad Jovianum* and *De Fide et Incarnatione*,[90] underlying his acknowledgement of the 'Lordly and saving body' in both works, the allusions to soteriology in the former (*Ad Jovianum* 2) and the more developed scheme in the latter (e.g. *De Fide et Incarnatione* 1-2). It is probably fair to say, therefore, that in all the D. treatises what soteriology there is proceeds primarily from the fact of the incarnational union understood on a model of the nature and genesis of man as a psychosomatic unity. *The model for the union and salvation through it is not, therefore, one of ethical conflict between spirit and flesh but physical at-one-ment.* The co-natural accord between soul and body by which a human being comes into being and lives is applied to Christ to show how divinity and humanity come together and live (eternally), co-constituting rather than negating one another.

If this idea of Christological unity is to provide the basis for a doctrine of salvation Apollinarius needs to explain how the benefit of the saving union enjoyed by Christ's body is in turn conferred to other human bodies. *De Fide et Incarnatione* affords our main insight into how Apollinarius would have explained this and he seems to offer two explanations. *Firstly*, we are 'in Christ' and 'led up to heaven' freed from punishment and death because we (who are baptized into the Faith (?)) are physically included in the indivisible unity/co-mixture, between a body like ours (according to birth and corporeal characteristics) and divinity, which is achieved by the saving incarnation. Through the shared corporeal element we are represented in the composite reality of Christ (ἡ σάρκωσις) which has triumphed over death and now subsists within the Trinity (§§5,7). *Secondly*, the advantages of Christ's body (and blood) are passed on to the believer in the eucharistic sacraments.[91] The exegetical text *In Jn.*6.53-55 and Fr.116 indicate that this eucharistic explanation of salvation is also based on the fact that the incarnation achieves a physical mixture within which the divinity's saving role towards

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[88] *Jn.*17.19,*Jn.*17.17(*De Unione* 10).
[89] L.p.190,ll.8-12.
[90] L.p.251,ll.8-12;L.p.195,ll.13-17;L.p.201,ll.20-24.
[91] L.p.193,l.33.

flesh like ours is vital-dynamic.[92] In Fr.116 Apollinarius may even approach the idea that Christ's eucharistic flesh is soteriologically efficacious since it serves as an intermediate substance.

In some of the D. works Apollinarius chooses to give emphasis to soteriological themes which may point *away* from the physical incarnation-based concept of salvation which is otherwise central. In *De Fide et Incarnatione*, Apollinarius frequently emphasizes that it is *God himself* who saves: by implication it is not just the fact of the union between divinity and a body which saves, but what the divine subject consciously does on our behalf in flesh (i.e. what we who are mortal, guilty of sin and lacking in self control could not do (§§1-2)). In *Contra Diodorum*, Fr.127, Apollinarius explains to Diodore how the divinity transcends its physical mixture with a body with reference to the way in which Christ overcomes the devil in the wilderness. A thinking, willing subject is deliberately quiescent or overcomes the bodily passions (hunger) according to his salvific purpose. In *Ad Dionysium A* (§§6,12) and in *De Fide et Incarnatione* (§§1-2,8-9), Apollinarius chooses to emphasise that it is not only the mode of the incarnation, but consequently the *death* of Christ which saves. Here he may be following a soteriological line of thought (found in the proof texts of *Ad Jovianum* 2) which is not simply physical, but to do with vicarious suffering, sacrifice, or ransom.

Apollinarius' 'Soteriological Thesis' in the Apodeixis (Fr.74,76-80,87)

In the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius appears to present his doctrine primarily as a *Christological* theory in answer to *Christological* questions.[93] In so doing he supplies soteriological arguments (among others) as further justification. The most impressive of these (Fr.74,76-80,87) seems to offer a different scheme of salvation from the physical incarnation-based idea which is most typical of the D. works. If this argument is a justification (or indeed the motive) of the Christology in the *Apodeixis* then it may well reflect the dynamics of its key unitive idea – 'the divine προσληψις of flesh'.

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[92] See p.95,n.[133],above.

[93] Apollinarius' doctrine arises in opposition to a false Christology not obviously a false soteriology or theory of revelation. (*Contra* Mühlenberg,pp.131-135) Apollinarius introduces his own counter-thesis *not* primarily to answer the Athanasian question '*Cur Deus homo?*' as Mühlenberg suggests (pp.188-196,p.215). His question is: *who* does scripture (and the confession) say that Christ is and *how* can we explain this (Fr.16-18)? He turns first to anthropology (Fr.23-25) and then to Paul (Fr.26-31) using 1 *Cor.*15.45 to support his quasi-anthropological analysis of who Christ is rather than how he saves.

How does Apollinarius present man's fallen situation?

Rational human beings are in a state of sin from which they need to be 'loosed' (Fr.74). The sinful state is to do with the fact that human minds have fallen under the power (ὑποπίπτω) of flesh (Fr.76). Unlike the divine mind, human minds cannot on their own possess pure virtue (Fr.80), nor confer virtue upon the flesh (Fr.79), nor (thus?) loose themselves from their sinful situation (Fr.74). They cannot save themselves (by overcoming the power of flesh and attaining virtue) for two (implied) reasons: (a) human minds are mutable (Fr.76); (b) human minds suffer from 'weakness of knowledge' (Fr.76). Yet neither can human minds be saved objectively by God 'under the compulsion of necessity' (Fr.74) because human beings are created with autonomy (αὐτεξούσιος) (Fr.74, 87) according to their rational nature (Fr.87), and the providential Creator does not wish to destroy what he has made in 'saving' it (Fr.87).

How does Apollinarius present the means of salvation?

Within this scheme there seems to be *two phases*: the first is objective, the second is more subjective:

(1) God/divine mind 'takes-on-in-addition'/'joins flesh to himself' (Fr.76) and 'operates it' (Fr.74), i.e. 'rules it' (Fr.76), in accordance with its passive (ἑτεροκίνητος) nature (Fr.74,76,87): in so doing he overcomes the power of flesh because he is immutable and omniscient (Fr.76) and through his rule/union the flesh shares in his (rational) virtue (Fr.79).

(2) Because of the saving action of God/divine mind in flesh – human beings are now themselves able to participate subjectively in setting themselves free from sin by 'self-assimilation' (οἰκείω) to Christ (Fr.74). This (conditional) process involves human minds submitting to the command (ὑποχείριος) of Christ and becoming like him intellectually (ὁμοιόω νοερῶς), thereby sharing in his pure virtue (Fr.80).

How does the Incarnation Make the Future Salvation of the Νόες Possible?

In the D. treatises Apollinarius never makes it very plain how the merits of Christ's sanctified human body are subsequently conferred to other human bodies and it may well

be that he has a scheme of eucharistic mediation in mind. In the second phase of the 'Soteriological Thesis' in the *Apodeixis* he gives a more explicit and subjective account of what future salvation involves from the point of view of other human beings *qua* enfleshed minds. But does he reveal (any more explicitly than in the D. works) how the first incarnational phase makes the second phase possible? It is here that it pays to consider the relative merits of two contrasting interpretations offered by two influential commentators.

Two Different Explanations of Apollinarius' Soteriological Schema

(1) R. Norris: Salvation by the Natural Affinity of the Rational to the Divine

In the opinion of Norris, Apollinarius locates the cause of man's fallen situation not in the sinfulness of a human mind but in its 'constitutional weakness'.[94] This weakness exists because the form of a created mind's freedom of choice is its mutability. Such mutability means that the human mind will inevitably fail to co-operate with or unite itself naturally to the immutable divine mind and it will inevitably fail to govern flesh properly and will become subject to carnal passions. In the 'dualistic' scenario of the *Apodeixis* it is the *flesh* which needs sanctifying: the immutable Logos does this by bringing flesh back into its natural obedience to rational spirit. Once this has been done the human mind is free to follow its natural/rational attraction towards the Good/divine mind. This is how Norris ultimately interprets Apollinarius' notion of 'self assimilation' in Fr.74.[95] Norris admits that Apollinarius' scheme of salvation (as he interprets it) fails to explain why the mutability which inevitably prevents the self-assimilation of the νόες prior to Christ does not prevent it after. In acknowledging this problem Norris rather admits that his own interpretation of Apollinarius' (T.) soteriology is unable to explain how in Apollinarius' mind the first Christological phase of salvation makes the second future phase possible. In the end Norris has no choice but to point towards the 'eucharistic' texts (Fr.116 and Fr.128(?)) and de Riedmatten's interpretation as providing the answer.[96]

Assessment Norris rightly recognises the more dualistic view which Apollinarius takes of the πνεῦμα–σάρξ dichotomy in the T. *Apodeixis vis-à-vis* the D. documents, but does

[94] Norris,p.116.
[95] Norris,p.119-120.

not emphasise what would appear to be the most obvious explanation of this: the dualism comes into Apollinarius' account because he has changed his anthropological model. Once an irrational ψυχή is included at the level of flesh (Fr.22, 88) and πνεῦμα is identified with the rational element, then the spirit-flesh dichotomy invites a dualistic rather than co-natural understanding. Norris' interpretation of the self-assimilation of the νόες (Fr.76,80) sits well with the Apollinarian assumption of the affinity between divine mind and human minds which must inform his concept of νοῦς ἔνσαρκος 'exactly as a man' in Fr.69; it also sits well with the fact that Apollinarius does not appear to regard the human mind *per se* as sinful.[97] Nevertheless, Norris' estimate of the self-assimilation seems to rely too much upon the natural model of human virtue and freedom. Fr.74,80,87 indicate a view of future salvation which is more conditional upon what human minds choose to do rather than are: e.g. ' to submit to Christ's command' (Fr.80). Norris only offers *one* explanation as to *how* the first phase of redemption won in Christ's flesh makes the future salvation of other minds possible – he alludes to eucharistic mediation. There is, however, *no* certain evidence that Apollinarius had such a scheme in mind when writing the *Apodeixis* even though Lietzmann alludes to Fr.76-80 in this connection.[98] It seems improbable that there was an important eucharistic dimension to Apollinarius' Christology which Gregory simply failed to report or quote.

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[96] Norris,p.120 n.[3] & n.[4].

[97] Some commentators have argued that Apollinarius believed that the human mind was intrinsically sinful, see(e.g.) Raven,p.183;see also, Ottley,R.L.,*The Doctrine of the Incarnation Vol.2,*1896,p.55.

[98] Lietzmann,p.136. There are several phrases in this group of fragments (Fr.76-80) and the Gregorian comments which accompany them which may explain why Lietzmann associates them with the eucharistic scheme of salvation. However, if we consider each phrase in turn there is a stronger case *against* a eucharistic interpretation. (i) There are two phrases which suggest Apollinarius understands 'flesh is joined to God without constraint partaking of pure virtue' (Fr.79) in terms of physical divinization:'there is talk of some heavenly form of flesh by reformation around the divinity' (Fr.77[c]);'he makes flesh without an intellect so it might heal by its divinity' (Fr.78). *Contra*: both these phrases are Gregorian interpretative reports and unreliable. Indeed, Fr.77[c] has been accrued to Fr.77 and the soteriological argument by Lietzmann from a passage two chapters further on in the *Antirrheticus*(§42.J.p.200,ll.15-17) where Gregory is reacting to the 'arithmetical argument' in Fr.81. (ii) The verbatim Fr.80 may be alluding to a eucharistic sharing of Christ's divinized flesh:'He *gives a share* to every mind under his command and to all those who are like Christ intellectually and are not unlike Christ in terms of the flesh.' *Contra*: Apollinarius uses the term μεταδίδωμι not the more technically eucharistic verb μετέχω. He is not talking here about automatic flesh-mediated salvation: the sharing out is conditional on the intellectual response of the human recipient (conceivably assent to the sacraments?). If we forget Gregory's interpretative comments Apollinarius' point here is that Christ's flesh is not divinized (or an intermediate substance) but *like* ours. (iii) There are two phrases which feature the language of οἰκείωσις – a term which Lietzmann connects with Apollinarius' thesis about the believers' 'appropriation' of the gifts of Christ's flesh via the eucharist '(Lietzmann, *History of the Early Church,*vol.3 p.270):'the self moved mind in us participates in the loosing in so far as it assimilates (οἰκειοῖ) itself to Christ'(Fr.74 – verbatim);'the meaning is the appropriation (οἰκείωσις) to the higher being'(Fr.80[a] – this is Gregory's non-verbatim explanation of 'he gives a share to every mind under his control'). *Contra*: in neither case does the language of οἰκείωσις conclusively demonstrate that Apollinarius has the idea of eucharistic 'appropriation' in mind. Although the verb οἰκείοω (Fr.74) can be used to denote assimilation *of food,* here it is a question of the human mind assimilating *itself* (ἑαυτὸν) to Christ. Fr.80[a] belongs to Gregory's

E. Mühlenberg argues that the soteriological basis for all Apollinarian Christology can be found encapsulated in two fragments from the *Apodeixis*. Fr.76 indicates the nature of Christ's work of redemption. Fr.80 shows how man's redemption is subsequently completed. 'The first idea is the precondition for the second.'[99] In selecting these two fragments Mühlenberg identifies the two phases in Apollinarius' soteriological scheme, but his interpretation offers a different explanation as to how the Christological phase makes the second phase possible for all human beings.

In interpreting Apollinarius' understanding of man's fallen situation Mühlenberg fastens on to a phrase in Fr.76: 'falling under the power of the flesh *because of weakness of knowledge*'.[100] Mühlenberg believes that a passage from Plato's *Theaetetus* provides the conceptual background for the Apollinarian parenthesis. In this passage Plato argues that man has a choice between two patterns of existence (παράδειγματα): he can attempt to be like/resemble God who is perfectly righteous – this leads to happiness, or he can choose to be unlike God – this leads to misery.[101] The key to making the correct (moral) choice and existential orientation is knowledge: 'Knowledge of this circumstance is wisdom and true virtue, but failure to know it is obvious stupidity and badness.'[102] In the light of this Platonic passage, and with reference to an exegetical fragment wherein Apollinarius explains that men perished like cattle because 'they did not realise that this goodness [viz. graced resemblance to God] was higher than (animal) nature,'[103] Mühlenberg offers a subtle account of Apollinarius' understanding of man's fallen situation as intimated by Fr.76.[104] Human souls exist in a state of openness and are free to form themselves: through their rationality they are open to being formed by something beyond themselves – by divine spirit. They also possess passions and emotions (the power of the flesh). These are necessary because they animate the soul and provide the urge to eat and to procreate. Man is open to being formed but, since his knowledge of what is good (God and the desire to resemble him) is weak (as Mühlenberg puts it they

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counter-argument. Gregory is arguing that Christ's flesh *cannot* be virtuous (Fr.79) without a human mind since virtue presupposes choice. Gregory then picks up Apollinarius' comment in Fr.80 to show that even Apollinarius admits this when it comes to the receipt of virtue in human beings. Gregory is saying:'it is obvious from this statement (Fr.80) that Apollinarius *does* mean assimilation to something higher',i.e. that Apollinarius means the assimilation of divine and human *minds*.

[99] Mühlenberg,pp.188-189.

[100] L.p.222,ll.22-23.

[101] Mühlenberg,pp.172-173,re Plato,*Theaetetus* 176-177.

[102] Plato,*Theaetetus* 176b8–c5.

[103] *In Ps*.48.13(see Mühlenberg p.172 n.[1]).

[104] Mühlenberg,pp.173-188(also see pp.157-172).

can 'lose the objects of their knowledge' since 'these objects have no essence'),[105] he fails to recognise what is truly good. Man has thus been seduced by the apparent good of the fleshly pleasures so that, rather than governing his carnal passions, he has allowed himself to be formed by them and, thus, rather than transcending his animal nature he has descended into it and is subject to its corruption, transitoriness and death. Human minds can improve through training and knowledge (Fr.57,75), but they have been cut off from the divine spirit and without this, whilst the law, prophetic spirit and human wisdom can bring some recognition of what is good and bad, it cannot bring 'the *effective cognition of God' (Gotteserkenntnis*) which is necessary to reorientate man.

In offering this estimate of Apollinarius' view of man's fallen situation, Mühlenberg presumes 'that Athanasian Christology and redemption doctrine provide the background for Apollinarius' doctrine',[106] and there is an obvious similarity between the Apollinarian scenario as understood by Mühlenberg and the picture painted by Athanasius in *Contra Gentes* 3-5 and *De Incarnatione* 4,11-13.[107]

Mühlenberg believes that the Athanasian explanation of *how the incarnation saves* has also influenced the Apollinarian thesis in Fr.76,80. In Mühlenberg's opinion, Athanasius' idea of the Word's saving union with a body like ours in *De Incarnatione* is not physical /mechanical/objective as Harnack *et al* have characterised it, it is *revelatory/demonstrative/ ethical.*[108] Mühlenberg interprets Fr.76 of the *Apodeixis* accordingly. The first phase/'precondition' of redemption is achieved by the incarnation of the divine mind 'which possesses the objects of its knowledge as something it could not lose'.[109] Because Christ's mind is divine his wisdom and knowledge of God has its source in his being: 'his knowledge of God is congenital'.[110] Such knowledge is so powerful it does not submit to flesh. The work of the enfleshment involves divine mind 'assimilating flesh to itself' (Fr.76). (Mühlenberg translates συναρμόζω as 'ähnlich macht'.)[111] Thus the divine object of virtuous knowledge chooses to come to us and assimilate us to himself in something of a reverse of the Platonic process in the *Theaetetus*. But once this has been done the second subjective phase is 'in principle' again possible for all men. After Christ human minds are once more able to recognise effectively what is truly good and how to orientate themselves away from the flesh by

[105] Mühlenberg,pp.157,159.
[106] Mühlenberg,p.199. For Mühlenberg's estimate of Athanasian soteriology/Christology see pp.188-196 and 'Apollinarius as Athanasius' pupil',pp.196-209.
[107] E.g. Athanasius,*Contra Gentes* 3.1-2;*De Incarnatione* 11.4.
[108] Mühlenberg,p.191.
[109] Mühlenberg,p.157.
[110] Mühlenberg,p.161.
[111] Mühlenberg,p.172.

opening themselves to formation by Christ's Holy Spirit. This is how Mühlenberg translates and interprets Fr.80:

> '"it [sc. the immutable (divine) mind] gives a share in pure virtue to every one subjected to mind (i.e. all rational beings) and to all who become like Christ in a reasonable way and who do not become unlike Christ in a fleshly way"...what is particularly important is the correct interpretation of the difference between νοερῶς and σαρκικῶς. According to Plato – and so he has been traditionally understood – assimilation (Angleichung) to God is based on recognition while the opposite process is an expression of not knowing and not recognising. Applied to Apollinarius νοερῶς would stand for recognition and σαρκικῶς for the condition of not knowing.'[112]

Assessment Such an interpretation appears to sit more happily with the Free Will Argument (Fr.87) and Apollinarius' references to the self-assimilation of the νόες (Fr.74,76) than Norris' explanation. Most of all Mühlenberg's interpretation allows him to explain how the first incarnational phase (Fr.76) makes the second phase (Fr.80) possible.[113] Nevertheless, it seems almost certain that Mühlenberg has read too much into two fragments because of his assumption that Plato's epistemological view of salvation and *one* particular Athanasian theme are here present and therefore foundational to Apollinarius' Christology. The idea of knowledge is only glimpsed once in the whole of the *Apodeixis* in the causal parenthesis of Fr.76: this parenthesis refers to man's fallen situation and *not* to the nature of the divine incarnational action which Mühlenberg rather draws out by implication. It is not obvious that 'the content even the linguistic form (of Fr.76,80) closely resemble the Platonic thoughts in *Theait.* 176ff.'.[114] Fr.76 and 80, recapitulated by Gregory in the service of his own argument from we know not where, probably belong to a soteriological argument which is one of several used to justify a Christological theory. The main point of Apollinarius' 'conclusion' in Fr.76 seems to be Christological *not* anthropological/soteriological. Apollinarius' conclusion rejects not only the divine πρόσληψις of a human mind (weak in knowledge) but 'a whole human being'. The rationale behind the latter conclusion (see Fr.81-86) seems more to do with logic and physics than the noetic scheme of salvation assumed by Mühlenberg. If, as Mühlenberg suggests, Apollinarius does not regard the human mind as a third element within man, but as his openness to divine spirit, why does Apollinarius have almost a mathematical problem about there being both divine and human minds/spirits in Christ?

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[112] Mühlenberg,pp.180-181.
[113] Mühlenberg,pp.199-200,see p.25,above.

If we look at Fr.76 and Fr.80, there are grounds for believing that Apollinarius *does* understand the first phase of salvation – the divine προσληψις of flesh – in the sort of objective, physical way which Mühlenberg discounts. The translation which Mühlenberg offers of the double negative in Fr.80 is not the most obvious. When Apollinarius says 'he gives a share in pure virtue to every mind (παντὶ τῷ νῷ) under his control and to all those (πᾶσι) who [a] become like Christ intellectually and [b] are *not unlike* Christ in terms of the flesh', it seems more probable that [b] refers not to a noetic state of flesh-orientated unknowing which those who recognise God in Christ must abandon in order to share in virtue (Mühlenberg's reading), but to the fact that Christ (divine mind) is *not unlike* men (enfleshed minds) since he has united himself to flesh/taken-on-in-addition a human likeness.[115] Here [b] corresponds to the first incarnation-based phase of salvation, [a] to the second more subjective phase – the self assimilation of human beings as νόες (νοερῶς) to the mind of Christ (Fr.74), either through natural affinity or through virtuous choice *in imitatio* of his governance of flesh. Mühlenberg's interpretation of Fr.76,80 also depends on an unusual translation of συναρμόζω in Fr.76. This term usually denotes a physical action of joining or fitting together rather than (noetic) 'assimilation'.

Evidence of a Physical (and Sacrificial) Conception of Salvation in the Apodeixis

If we look beyond the 'Soteriological Thesis' (Fr.74,76-80,87), there is more evidence that the Christological theory expounded in the *Apodeixis* is linked to an idea of salvation which is not only ethical and demonstrative, but which remains essentially physical particularly in its understanding of the efficacy of the first incarnational 'phase'.

In the first two statements of Fr.93 Apollinarius employs very physical terminology; indeed, here we encounter the language of mixture more typical of the compositional conception in the D. works: (1) 'One who remains man and is subordinated to the common corruption (φθορᾷ) of men is not able to save the world. [(2)] But we are not saved by God who has not been mingled (ἐπιμιχθέντος) with us.'[116] Even Mühlenberg admits that the second statement may pick up upon *another*

[114] Mühlenberg,p.180.
[115] The fact that God himself has taken on a 'human likeness'(=flesh, not without a soul/a carnal form) is after all one of the two main tenets behind Apollinarius' thesis in the *Apodeixis* from the title onwards.
[116] L.p.228,ll.20-22.

soteriological theme to be found in Athanasius' *De Incarnatione* to do with the vicarious sacrifice of the Word's human body.[117]

If Apollinarius has been influenced by the Athanasian soteriological explanations of '*Cur Deus homo?*', then it is not unlikely that he will have been influenced as much by Athanasius' first reason' as the 'second' (revelatory) reason.[118] Athanasius' 'first' soteriological explanation of the incarnation is not only sacrificial/expiatory, it has to do with physical solidarity: the Logos restores men, stops them sliding inevitably into physical dissolution and death (the Athanasian term φθόρα seems to denote physical more than moral corruption in *De Incarnatione*) by being in/taking a body '*like ours*' (τό ὁμοῖον σῶμα).[119] The idea of Christ's body as a sacrifice/ransom also depends on him 'taking' a 'similar' body so that we are absolved from the penalty of the law freed from death and the devil by the sacrifice/death of Christ's human body in which we are represented.[120] This sacrificial idea is again more physical than demonstrative.

If we assume that this physical-cum-sacrificial (Athanasian-influenced?) line of soteriological thinking also provides justification (or motive) for Apollinarius' Christology, then certain other fragments near the end of the *Apodeixis* become easier[121] to interpret:

***Fr.95*:** In this paradoxical statement (which Gregory may well have edited to make it appear more directly theopaschite) we seem to find the slight logical contradiction which is a feature of the physical-cum-sacrificial idea of salvation through the incarnation *and cross*. There is a judicial need for God incarnate to die (i.e. as man/in respect of his human flesh) 'to annul (the penalty of) death' and a logical need for 'how does one rise who has not died?'[122] But because it is God who is physically united to the human flesh it *cannot* be conquered by death (and therefore rises!).[123]

***Fr.98,104*:** Here Apollinarius' references to Christ's body in heaven may relate to a physical idea of salvation not unlike the one which we find in *De Fide et Incarnatione* 7:

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[117] Mühlenberg,pp.203-205. Mühlenberg downplays the influence of this theme in the *Apodeixis* and elsewhere (E.g.*KMP* 32,*Ad Jovianum* 2) arguing that the sacrificial idea of salvation which Apollinarius may have inherited from Athanasius is ultimately a sub-set of the epistemological/demonstrative scheme which Apollinarius favours.
[118] See Athanasius,*De Incarnatione* 10.6;16.5.
[119] Athanasius,*De Incarnatione* 9.2-3.
[120] Athanasius,*De Incarnatione* 10.4-5.
[121] Mühlenberg(p.208) has difficulty in accounting for why Apollinarius might have chosen to emphasise twice God's enduring post-ascension unity with a body (like ours) even in heaven (Fr.98,104).
[122] L.p.229,ll.12-13.
[123] L.p.229,ll.13-15.

because God has united himself to human flesh (in the context of the *Apodeixis* 'not without a soul'), we (in the context of the *Apodeixis* as 'minds enfleshed') are no longer cut off from God by our carnality and mortality because he has overcome this in his flesh –'like ours' – in which we are physically represented/included. In the context of the *Apodeixis* these fragments may be part of a recapitulatory conclusion; on the basis of his Christological theory Apollinarius explains not only *Mt.*24.30, but how the future self-assimilation of the νόες is no longer physically or judicially impossible.

Prior to Apollinarius' main 'Soteriological Thesis' in the *Apodeixis*, there are two other places where the surviving fragments and Gregory's (reactive) comments indicate the nature of Apollinarius' soteriological thinking. In both cases the physical-cum-sacrificial idea seems to be to the fore and we may be able to glimpse the way in which the T. model of Christ holds expositional advantages for Apollinarius (over the D. model) when it comes to explaining this soteriological conception coherently.

***Fr.32-41*:** In this section Apollinarius considers a number scriptural texts which confirm and clarify his thesis about the way in which Christ is the fully divine son. Some of these texts have soteriological implication: *Zach.*13.7; *Eph.*1.7; *Heb.*1.3 (Fr.33,35,37,38), as do texts 'passed over' by Gregory (Fr.35) which we have reason to believe featured here:[124] *Heb.*2.10 (& 12-14), *Lk.*15.4, or *Mt.*18.2. Apollinarius *may* in passing have developed the soteriological implications of these texts in line with his Christology at this stage of the *Apodeixis*. That he did so would appear to be indicated by the length and the character of Gregory's counter-interpretation of *Eph.*1.7 (and *Heb.*2.10ff., *Lk.*15.4, or *Mt.*18.2) which offers an alternative Christology allied to an (alternative?) soteriology. The soteriological idea most obviously implied by Apollinarius' proof texts is the physical-cum-sacrificial idea of Christ's vicarious suffering through the human flesh and blood (which God assumes): e.g. 'Through him we have received redemption (τὴν απολύτρωσιν [='deliverance procured by ransom']) through his blood, the forgiveness of sins through his flesh.'[125] Gregory's counter-argument[126] may provide some insight into the way Apollinarius here linked this idea to his Christology. The keynote of Gregory's counter-argument is that it is necessary that the divine Lord *assumes a whole human nature body and soul* (i.e. takes a whole sheep

[124] The presence of these texts would serve to fill in the missing links between *Eph.*1.7 and the other two definite Apollinarian proof texts. It is also indicted by the way Gregory alludes to them at the beginning of his alternative exegesis of *Eph.*1.7: '*For who does not know* the divine mystery *that* "the author of our salvation"(*Heb.*2.10) went after "the lost sheep as a shepherd"(*Lk.*15.4/*Mt.*18.12)?'(J.p.151,l.30-p.152,l.2).
[125] L.p.212,ll.19-21.
[126] *Antirrheticus* 16-17.J.p.151,l.28–p.154,l.27.

upon his shoulders!) so that corruption is stemmed in the body, and the soul is led back from sin, and the dissolution of death is prevented in both by the unity with the divine nature. Gregory, therefore, argues for a *physical salvation* of a whole human nature which allows the future salvation of us all: 'In this way the common salvation of our nature took place.'[127] Gregory concludes by acknowledging the expiatory dimension of *Eph.*1.7: 'He bought us back (ἐξωνησάμενος) like captives taken in a war by his flesh and blood which were of the same kind (συγγενοῦς) as ours'.[128] The nature of this counter-argument appears to indicate that Apollinarius here connected his Christology with a scheme of salvation whereby we are physically/objectively saved from corruption and death by means of our inclusion in the flesh (rather than the whole human nature) which God has taken on which is *like ours* and also, therefore, serves as a ransom. We find a thesis very similar to this expounded by Athanasius in *De Incarnatione* in connection with one of the same proof texts (*Heb.*2.10-16).[129]

***Fr.61-62*:** In these fragments Gregory alludes to Apollinarius' exegesis of two Johanine texts: *Jn.*10.18 (Fr.61); *Jn.*12.24 (Fr.62). Although Gregory chooses to pass over Apollinarius' interpretation of the latter, it seems likely that Apollinarius introduced it to develop the soteriological implications of Christ's comments upon his own death and self-resurrection in *Jn.*10.18. The initial reason for introducing *Jn.*10.18 is as further proof that Christ acts and wills with divine authority (ἐξουσία). That Apollinarius should use this text in the T. *Apodeixis* is significant because it is one of the very texts to which Rufinus clearly alludes when he records that Apollinarius abandoned his D. (anthropological) model of Christ because of certain texts which mention Christ's human soul:[130] 'No one takes away my soul/life (ψυχή) from me. I have the authority to set it down and raise it up'. In the context of the Christology expounded in the T. *Apodeixis*, this text no longer presents a problem because Apollinarius has specified that Christ's flesh is not without a (human) ψυχή (Fr.22). When it comes to explaining Christ's death the D. type Christology ran into another problem: in giving the divinity the role of Christ's human ψυχή (*De Unione* 12) there is a danger of implicating God in the 'defectiveness' experienced by the soul in the dissolution of the psychosomatic composite (Fr.138). Again, the T. Christology would appear to have expositional

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[127] J.p.154,ll.13-14.
[128] J.p.154,ll.17-18.
[129] Athanasius,*De Incarnatione* 10.4-5.
[130] Rufinus,*H.E.*2.20 see,p.39,above.

advantages: if the Logos is given the role of νοῦς it need not be affected by the death (=dissolution) of Christ's human ψυχή and body.

Gregory's counter-argument after Fr.62 indicates how Apollinarius may here have made use of his trichotomic analysis to explain how Christ in some real sense died and rose (as a man/according to the flesh) and thereby saved others ('the seed that dies... grows up again with many more seeds')[131] whilst remaining above death (as God). At the end of *Antirrheticus* 30 Gregory embarks upon a discussion about whether or not the ψυχή dies together with the body.[132] His own view seems to be that the flesh dies and decays into the earth, but the ψυχή (including rational faculty) does *not* – although it does die in the sense that it undergoes separation (διάλυσις/διάξευξις) from the body. This discussion may have been prompted by Apollinarius' T. analysis of Christ's death. Two of Gregory's comments seem to be particularly revealing:

> '*if, therefore, our mind endures without passion and without change* how likely is it that *this third-part God* of Apollinarius' *underwent fleshly death*?';[133] 'Everyone knows that death is the separation of the soul and the body from one another, but *how is the same soul and intelligence divided from itself so it can in itself receive death*?'.[134]

Consistently, Gregory fails to understand Apollinarius' νοῦς–ψυχή division and he believes Apollinarius' doctrine to be intrinsically theopaschite, but if we take these factors into account then the italicised phrases (above) may reveal the nature of Apollinarius' analysis. The divine subject *qua mind*, as opposed to soul, is above the physical dissolution of the fleshly death which nevertheless afflicts his human body and (animal) soul (ψυχή). This is the benefit of Apollinarius' new anthropological model, for Apollinarius is now able to combine a hylomorphic view of the relation between animal soul and body with a spiritualist view of the (immortal) higher soul. Over and above the (created) human νοῦς in Apollinarius' anthropological model, the divine νοῦς/spirit has the power to set down his flesh (soul and body) allowing it to die (through psychosomatic separation – on our behalf as sacrifice) and to take it up again (raising it from the dead/dissolution) because of its unique union with him through πρόσληψις.[135] Because of the death/resurrection of Christ's flesh (body and soul), many

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[131] L.p.218,ll.13-14. In Müller's view(J.p.177) the allusion is to *Jn.*12.24.
[132] J.p.178,l.19-p.179,l.7.
[133] J.p.178,ll.27-30.
[134] J.p.179,ll.1-4.
[135] Such a notion is reminiscent of Fr.127 wherein Apollinarius speaks of the Godhead making itself present to the needy body, or otherwise, according to God's economic purpose.

similar 'seeds' (human souls and bodies) will be raised up. Why? Gregory passes over Apollinarius' explanation, but it seems most likely that it is here to do with the fact that all human souls and bodies are included in/represented by Christ's human soul and body (the first 'seed' that dies) in the sacrificial death and saving unity with God which overcomes the corruption and mortality inherent in flesh. (We can only speculate as to whether Apollinarius made any use of the next two verses in John's gospel in order to explain the way in which human individuals (as νόες) might subsequently appropriate the immortality of Christ's (carnal) ψυχή by following his example in this life (i.e. the mode of 'self-assimilation' in the second phase of salvation): 'He who loves his ψυχή loses it and he who hates his ψυχή in this world will keep it in eternal life. If anyone serves me he must follow me and where I am there shall my servant be also. If anyone serves me the Father will honour them.')[136]

What Type of Soteriology do we find in the Apodeixis? Conclusions.

In the *Apodeixis* a new type of two-stage soteriological thesis is elaborated (Fr.74,76-86,87) which we do not find in the D. works. In the D. treatises the implicit soteriological idea seems to be entirely physical, objective, and incarnation-based – to do with the vivification of Christ's body by divinity passed on to other souls through the Eucharistic sacraments. The thesis in the *Apodeixis* has a more ethical, subjective dimension, particularly in its second stage, and this seems to have been made possible by the T. analysis of Christ/man wherein the subject is identified with the willing, rational knowing νοῦς and the corporeal element is 'not without a ψυχή' and a will of its own at war with the ruling of the mind. This is not to say that the first incarnational stage of the soteriological scheme is no longer physical as Mühlenberg has argued: if we consider the 'thesis' and the glimpses of Apollinarius' soteriology which are afforded elsewhere (Fr.31-41,61-62,93,95,98(?),104), then we find something more like Athanasius' 'first' (physical-cum-sacrificial) explanation of *'Cur Deus homo?'* than his 'second' (demonstrative) explanation. Human flesh is saved objectively by a physical action: a human soul and body is taken-on-in-addition by the divine subject. Through this flesh, like ours, we are all united to him and he stems the inevitable corruption and mortality of flesh. This takes place because of his very union with flesh. The divine mind is above death which is psychosomatic dissolution. He can thus 'set down' his human soul and body allowing them to die on our behalf and he can 'take them up' (again) into eternal

[136] *Jn.*12.25-26(R.S.V.).

life due to his unique union with them which continues in heaven. The purification of human flesh by divine mind also has an ethical dimension: Christ must overcome irrational, carnal impulses (the will of the ψυχή). The salvific process in Christ (the first stage) thus has a double aspect: from the side of the flesh it is depicted as the restoration of the natural relation between flesh, which is passive by nature, and self-governing mind – by this means flesh 'partakes in virtue'; from the side of Christ's (divine) mind the picture is more ethical, it involves mind overcoming the power of flesh and governing it in a virtuous/rational manner. The victory of the divine mind is assured because it is immutable and omniscient, but the means of the victory is subjective and therefore provides a demonstrative exemplar for human subjects/νόες who wish to appropriate the salvation which has already been won in Christ's flesh. The first Christological stage of salvation is followed by a second subjective stage. The human νόες participate in their own future salvation through their 'self-assimilation' to Christ. This process may be to do with their following a natural affinity/tendency towards divine mind (Norris), or it is (also?) to do with their making virtuous moral choices imitating the mind of Christ in overcoming the power of flesh/governing it correctly (Mühlenberg) and obeying Christ's commandments. How does the first incarnational stage make the second stage possible? There is no firm evidence in the *Apodeixis* that Apollinarius still has the idea of eucharistic mediation in mind. Whilst the second stage undoubtedly involves following the example of the divine subject/νοῦς in flesh, it is unlikely that Apollinarius understands the future efficacy of the first incarnational stage *entirely* in demonstrative/noetic terms (cf. Mühlenberg). The evidence suggests that Apollinarius grounds the future possibility of salvation also in (i) the physical fact of God's enduring incarnational unity with flesh like ours through which corruption and death have been overcome and in which we are *now* represented in heaven, and (ii) in the (related) sacrificial/expiatory fact that Christ's passion and death in soul, body and blood like ours has annulled (the penalty of) death and earned the forgiveness of sin.

This is the type of soteriological thinking which we find alongside Apollinarius' Christological conception of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh in the T. *Apodeixis*. It is present in a number of supporting arguments, but there is not sufficient reason to believe that it provides the absolute basis of Apollinarius' T. Christology. Nevertheless the soteriology in the *Apodeixis* is likely to reflect the central idea of Christological unity – just as the idea of corporeal-mediated salvation seems to reflect the compositional conception of divine-human unity in the D. works. One of the most striking features of the soteriological view in the *Apodeixis* is its double aspect. From the point of view of

the human subject/mind, salvation comes *not* through a union with flesh, but in spite of it: a human being actualises his rational nature by overcoming fleshly impulses and transcending his carnal situation. (Here the view of salvation is dualistic.) From the point of view of human flesh (and carnal soul), salvation comes through (the restoration of) a natural union with the rational mind whereby the proper nature of the flesh is fully actualised. (Here the view of salvation is holistic.) Do we perhaps find a corresponding double aspect in Apollinarius' understanding of the unitive action of πρόσληψις which provides the basis for this type of soteriology?

In the T. Apodeixis, has a 'Christology of Divine Assumption' Replaced the 'Compositional Christology' of the D. Treatises?

Once allowance has been made for Gregory's distortions it becomes apparent that in the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius is *not* expounding the same theory of Christological unity based upon a traducian interpretation of the virginal conception which is central to the D. works: he is advocating a different type of Christology – to do with the πρόσληψις of flesh (not without a soul) by a rational divine subject. This Christology appears to be linked to a different type of anthropological analysis, a different explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum* and a different more elaborate soteriological scheme with objective and subjective dimensions.

The 'Assumptional' Theme in the D. Treatises.

In my analysis of the D. treatises (above) I noted the presence of a second Christological theme which I described as 'assumptional'. The theme is found alongside the compositional thesis in the D. works and appears to be not fully systematic with it. The assumptional theme begins with the idea of the Lord as one enduring masculine individual/subject/person(?), Son of God and Son of Man;[137] it presents the unitive action of the incarnation in terms of possession/conjoining/taking/wearing rather than composition or co-mixture;[138] it suggests a more 'spiritualist' view of the Word/ψυχή-body union than the notion of the psychosomatic composite, by speaking of a descent, an

[137] E.g.*Ad Dionysium A* 1,2(L.p.257,ll.11-16),5;*De Unione* 4,5(ὁμολογεῖται δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ),14-15(L.p.191,ll.20-p.192,l.3);*Contra Diodorum* Fr.124;*Ad Jovianum* 1(?)-2;*De Fide et Incarnatione* 1-2,3(?),8-9.
[138] E.g.*Ad Dionysium A* 8(L.p.259,l.19);*De Unione* 2(L.p.186,ll.4-6),3;*Contra Diodorum* Fr.21,129,135,137;*De Fide etc Incarnatione* 3,4,6,7.

interweaving, the body as (outward) form/mould/envelope of the divinity/soul;[139] it presents the *communicatio idiomatum* in a more conventional fashion, attributing divisively where necessary and basing the reality of the transfer, not upon the existence of the divine human whole, but upon the fact that God (without changing) is uniquely united to a body (consubstantial with ours).[140] This assumptional theme comes to the fore when Apollinarius is in circumspect or apologetic mood,[141] and it exerts something of a restraining influence upon the dangerous tendency of the main D. thesis towards a notion of composition/mixture which threatens the divine immutability and implies the consubstantial 'divinity' of the flesh. Under pressure from both Diodore and more 'orthodox' 'Nicene' critics, the evidence suggests that Apollinarius was forced to qualify his compositional theory of the 'highest unity'. In *Contra Diodorum KKB*, and, to a lesser extent, *De Fide et Incarnatione*, he introduces a number of supporting arguments to show how his doctrine does not involve the elements in change and destruction; these arguments usually point away from the compositional conception in Christ towards the more assumptional idea. (Among them is a soteriological view of Christ as a purposeful divine subject who is able to transcend his physical union with a body[142] and save by what he consciously does in the flesh on our behalf.[143]) It is as if Apollinarius is beginning to withdraw from the compositional idea in favour of the less problematic assumptional conception, or at least to modify the former with the help of the latter. In all the D. documents the compositional conception remains in place as the key interpretative idea.[144] Apollinarius' qualifying provisos seem therefore to be *ad hoc* adjustments: they indicate the need for a revised (or different) conception of unity; they do not demonstrate that such a conception is already basic to Apollinarian thought together with an expositional scheme to support it.

When we come to the *Apodeixis,* however, written some years later (c.383?),[145] we find a Christology which displays most obviously many of the features of the 'assumptional' theme outlined above whilst the ideas and terminology of the compositional thesis are no longer conspicuously present. Also Apollinarius has now consciously introduced a new anthropological analysis. Whilst the T. analysis still

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[139] E.g.*De Unione* 4,6;*Contra Diodorum* Fr. 124,126,131,132,146.
[140] E.g.*De Unione* 2-4,8;*Contra Diodorum* 125,130,131,137,139,145;*Ad Jovianum* 2;*De Fide et Incarnatione* 4.
[141] E.g.*Contra Diodorum*(*KKB*) Fr.121,124-39,45-46;*Ad Jovianum* 1-2;*De Fide et Incarnatione* 3-4,6.
[142] E.g.*Contra* Diodorum Fr.122,127.
[143] E.g.*De Fide et Incarnatione* 1-2,8-9;*Ad Jovianum* 2.
[144] Cf.*Ad Dionysium A.* 2,9;*De Unione* 1,5,12-13;*Contra Diodorum* Fr.117-120,123,127-129,133-135,138-139,140-144;*Ad Jovianum* 1;*De Fide et Incarnatione* 5-7,8-9.
[145] See p.103,above.

suggests a unity of parts, the (νοῦς–σάρξ) dichotomy which is derived from it provides a key model for the Christology which Apollinarius expounds in the *Apodeixis.* The new dichotomy appears to be more conducive to an assumptional explanation of the Christological union than the psychosomatic dichotomy which is typical of the D. works. A key technical term which Apollinarius employs in the *Apodeixis* to denote the type of unitive action he has in mind is προσλαμβάνω. At first sight this is an 'assumptional' term.[146] This invites us to conclude that by the time Apollinarius came to write the T. *Apodeixis* he had all but abandoned his compositional view of the unity in Christ in favour of a less controversial 'assumptional' Christology. Such a conclusion seems to fit with what we know about the occasion of the treatise. Apollinarius may have broken with the Church, but he is concerned to show that his doctrine of Christ is 'well-examined' and true to the faith. Aspects of his thesis seem to be a response to previous criticism: he is concerned to show that according to his doctrine the flesh *per se* is not eternal nor consubstantially divine (Fr.31-41); he is concerned to show that the divinity does not change nor suffer *per se* (whatever Gregory thinks) (Fr.97,102); he is concerned to make explicit that Christ's flesh is not without a soul (Fr.22,25,62,88). Have such concerns precipitated an incarnational theory – the divine πρόσληψις of flesh (a carnal nature?) – which is but one step away (the admission of a rational human ψυχή) from the more mainstream idea of the divine Word's assumption of a human nature?

Πρόσληψις – A Distinct Type of Assumption

If we consider what remains of the section of the *Apodeixis* in which Apollinarius appears to be giving his conception of the incarnational union technical and typological definition (Fr.66-69,76[a],81[b](?)), and if we also consider some of Gregory's comments (*Antirrheticus* 39) which may afford further insight into the nature of Apollinarius' original argument via their genuine(?) reaction and descriptive allusion to what has been omitted, then the evidence suggests that the idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is *not* simply the traditional idea of the Word's assumption of a humanity, but something more specific and peculiarly Apollinarian.

The 'assumptional' view of the union as propounded by (e.g.) Athanasius, Gregory and Theodoret[147] does not preclude the assumption of a whole human nature

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[146] Certainly in the opinion of Theodoret,see *Eranistes I*(*MPG*83.104D-105A).

[147] E.g.Athanasius,*Ad Epictetum* 7(*MPG*26.1061B),*Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7(*MPG*26.804A-B);Gregory of Nyssa *Antirrheticus* 16-17(J.p.152,l.2–p.153,l.14),*Antirrheticus* 20-21(J.p.159,l.14-p.162,l.5);Theodoret *Eranistes II*(*MPG*83.109C;117B).

and it leaves room for a whole human soul in what is assumed. This is because the key unitive idea comes from scripture and traditional belief and it is not bound by any prescriptive restrictions which might come together with an anthropological or physical model of unity. This is in contrast to Apollinarius' dominant conception of unity in the D. works: the idea of Christ as an indivisible composite of vital and corporeal parts based on the model of man as a psychosomatic composite leads to the denial of the psychic part of Christ's humanity (*De Unione* 12). Christ must lack a human soul, not because this is testified by scripture or traditionally confessed, but because it is deduced out of Apollinarius' model for the real and inseparable unity. By revising his model in the T. *Apodeixis,* and by presenting the incarnation as the divine πρόσληψις of flesh, Apollinarius seems able to get round this restriction: the divinity as νοῦς *is* able to take on flesh 'not without a soul', and a carnal will and form. Yet the idea of union by πρόσληψις *still* does *not* enable the assumption of a human mind (Fr.76). Why should this be? Norris and Mühlenberg have answered this question by focusing exclusively upon the soteriological argument which is in fact one of several used by Apollinarius to justify his exclusion of a human mind from the incarnational unity. In focusing closely on certain details of the soteriological argument they have perhaps not considered as fully the significance of the second emphasis of Apollinarius' 'conclusion', which is justified by this particular argument (and other proofs): 'Therefore the human race is not saved by the assumption (ἀνάληψις) of a human mind *nor a whole human being,* but by the taking-on-in-addition (πρόσληψις) of flesh.' According to Apollinarius' conception of the saving incarnational act of union, the human element cannot include a human mind and it *must be partial.* Also, in this conclusion Apollinarius seems to be contrasting not only a true and false account of the object of the 'assumption' (flesh *not* a whole man), but a true and false account of the assumptive act itself: it is a πρόσληψις not an ἀνάληψις. Mühlenberg, who is alone in noticing this, gives a 'soteriological' explanation: in his view Apollinarius is differentiating between a term (ἀνάληψις) which properly should be used to denote God's redemptive action towards (whole) men and another term (πρόσληψις) which should be used properly of God's incarnational action involving flesh.[148] It seems more probable, given the purpose of this part of the *Apodeixis* (Fr.70-87), to demonstrate the verity of Apollinarius' doctrine of the incarnation *contra* a false psilanthropist alternative, that Apollinarius is primarily differentiating a term (πρόσληψις) which in his view *truly describes the incarnational*

[148] Mühlenberg,pp.200-201.

(and saving) action over and against another term (ἀνάληψις) which *denotes the incarnational (and saving) action in a false way.* The fact that Apollinarius takes pains to distinguish between the two compounds of λαμβάνω indicates that, if he has turned to an assumptional conception of the union in the *Apodeixis*, then he has a particular type of assumptive action in mind.

Gregory's comments after Fr.76[a] and a fragment from another work give us some insight into Apollinarius' technical understanding of προσλαμβάνω and why he favoured this term over ἀναλάμβανω for denoting the type of 'assumptive' action which occurred in the divine incarnation. Fr.121 of the *Contra Diodorum* indicates that Apollinarius understood πρόσληψις to be an action, performed by someone (τις/ὅ) towards something (τοῦτο), which by definition precludes change in the masculine subject. Gregory's comments after Fr.76[a] indicate that Apollinarius offered a pedantic quasi-grammatical discussion upon the difference between ἀνάληψις and πρόσληψις in which he drew out the semantic implications of the two differing prefixes.[149] Gregory omits this discussion, but Apollinarius must have, to some extent, stressed the main semantic difference which we find specified in our own Greek lexicons: 'ἀνά-' signifies an action of (taking) 'up' and 'πρός-' signifies and action of (taking) 'towards', and thus 'besides' or 'in addition'. It would seem that neither prefix necessarily involves the subject of the action (taking) in change. If we consider the thrust of Apollinarius' argument after the conclusion at Fr.76[a], then it seems probable that Apollinarius prefers to use προσλαμβάνω rather than ἀναλάμβανω because, when the latter term is employed Christologically, its prefix suggests an *adoptive action – the taking up of a whole man* – for this is how Apollinarius goes on to characterise the false Christology which he opposes (Fr.81,82,83,87,91,92). From these fragments it becomes clear that in Apollinarius' eyes the false conception of the incarnation which he opposes (the ἀνάληψις of a whole man) is not only adoptive, but conjunctive and, in fact, non-unitive. The implication here is that his own conception – the πρόσληψις of flesh – signifies an 'assumptional' act of union which leads, by contrast, to a real and integral unity. How can this be?

[149] *Antirrheticus* 39,J.p.193,ll.11-29(E.T.pp.146-147,above).

Fr.66 and Gregory's comments in *Antirrheticus* 39 immediately after his allusion to the semantic discussion[150] may well shed more light upon the Apollinarian meaning of πρόσληψις. In Fr.66 (which is a rather unreliable Gregorian preview/summary) Gregory gives the impression that Apollinarius prefers the idea of a union with flesh (σαρκός ἕνωσις) over the false idea of the taking-on-in-addition of a man (ἀνθρώπου πρόσληψις). Here Gregory may have simply misreported the precise compound of λαμβάνω which Apollinarius used because he does not understand the difference anyway.[151] But it could be that Apollinarius not only opposes the ἀνάληψις of a whole human being (Fr.76), but cannot conceive the πρόσληψις of a (whole) human being either (Fr.66) because the action of πρόσληψις is by definition between someone who does not change (Fr.121) and something (Fr.121) which (by definition?) is *not* a whole (e.g. flesh).

This type of logic is discerned by Gregory in the Apollinarian reasoning which lies behind Fr.81[b]. According to Gregory's report, Apollinarius introduces the argument about the impossibility of a union between two completes immediately after and in connection with the semantic discussion contrasting πρόσληψις with ἀνάληψις with which Gregory loses patience: 'For by these words he constructs/builds up (κατασκευάζει) the fallacy...'.[152] Gregory's return to the soteriological argument (Fr.76-80) in *Antirrheticus* 40-41 has rather obscured the fact, but *it is the argument in Fr.81* which offers further insight into the way in which Apollinarius elaborated upon his statement in Fr.76[a] and the semantic distinction he has drawn between πρόσληψις and ἀνάληψις. Here in Apollinarius' words (Fr.81) and in Gregory's reactive comments we find evidence of reasoning which is not primarily soteriological but logical/arithmetical. It is the version of Fr.81 which comes first in the *Antirrheticus* (§39), but second in the Lietzmann edition (Fr.81[b]), that appears to give us the clearest insight into the further logical/arithmetical rationale which Apollinarius gave for his πρόσληψις/ ἀνάληψις contrast in Fr.76[a]:

> '...he says "if perfect God (θεὸς τέλειος) had been joined (συνήφθη) to a complete man (ἀνθρώπῳ τελείῳ) they would be two' – then/therefore(?) (ἄρα), the incomplete compounded together with the complete (τὸ...ἀτελὲς... τῷ

[150] J.p.194,ll.2-27.
[151] J.p.193,ll.15-22.
[152] J.p.194,l.2(=L.p.224,l.16).

τελείῳ συντεθειμένον) is not regarded [by him (παρ'αὐτοῦ)] as two (ἐν δυάδι) [?].'[153]

It seems probable that the type of conjunctive union (συνάπτω) of two completes dismissed by Apollinarius in the first part of Fr.81[b] is the type of unitive action which he associates with the term ἀνάληψις. In Apollinarius' view such an act of union is ultimately non-unitive and no more than an 'adoption'. (We find this more expansively expressed in the verbatim version of this statement (Fr.81) which comes later on in the *Anitrrheticus*: 'If God had been joined to a man, *(the) complete to a complete* (i.e. there had been a union by ἀνάληψις (?)), *they would be two*, one son of God by nature *and one adopted (θετός) son'*.[154]) In the second part of Fr.81[b] (from 'ἄρα'), we come, by inference, to what seems to be a definition of πρόσληψις – the type of unitive action which Apollinarius believes *does* take place in the divine incarnation. This part of Fr.81[b] may indicate how Apollinarius understands there to be an act of union, πρόσληψις, which is *more integral* than mere assumption, but which, nevertheless, preserves one of the two elements from change (e.g. as implicit in union by composition): *unity by πρόσληψις is the unity which occurs when something incomplete is compounded together with a complete (unity).* Fr.81[b] is interesting because here we find perhaps the only genuine(?) reference to Apollinarius defining his doctrine of the union in the *Apodeixis* in *compositional* terms.

The second half of Fr.81[b] is *not* a verbatim Apollinarian statement in the context of *Antirrheticus* 39. The phrase 'παρ' αὐτοῦ' indicates that *Gregory* is speaking about the way Apollinarius conceives the alternative to the conjunction of two completes (ἀνάληψις). Lietzmann puts a question mark after the phrase in his edition, turning it into a scornful Gregorian question. Müller removes the question mark in the Jaeger edition indicating (more accurately?) that the later half of Fr.81[b] after ἄρα is Gregory's assessment of what Apollinarius *infers* (about πρόσληψις?) by his rejection of a union of two wholes: 'The inference then (ἄρα) is that the incomplete compounded with the complete is *not* regarded by him as two'. (It may be significant that in the Justinian source (Polemon?) the 'παρ' αὐτοῦ' has been dropped and in this variant of Fr.81[b] the statement/inference after ἄρα is preserved as Apollinarius' own.)[155] *However*, even if the statement of inference after ἄρα belongs to Gregory, the passage which follows in

[153] J.p.194,ll.3-6(=L.p.224,ll.17-19:L. gives 'συντιθέμενον').[The text in square brackets is missing from the Justinian Variant: L.p.224,ll.22-24].
[154] L.p.224,ll.14-15.
[155] L.p.224,ll.20-24.

Antirrheticus 39, wherein Gregory takes pains to show the fallacy of the 'novel arithmetic' which Apollinarius has invented, indicates that Apollinarius himself probably did *explicitly advocate* the idea of a unity between what is incomplete and the complete at this point in the *Apodeixis*. Gregory's argument after Fr.81[b] takes the form of an arithmetical discussion and to some degree he is parodying a logical debate. Nevertheless the complexity of his counter argument, the 'μέν...δέ' structure of the discussion, and the reference at one point to what 'he' (sc. Apollinarius) says[156] *does* seem to indicate that Gregory is not just elaborating, *ad absurdum*, upon an inference he has drawn, but responding to some sort of logical/arithmetical explanation of the true act of union (πρόσληψις) offered by Apollinarius himself at this point in the *Apodeixis*. The gist of Gregory's argument is that according to 'us' (and any child who can count on his fingers!) any sum of two numbers forms a single collective of these whether these be equal numbers (two 'completes') or one greater and the other 'deficient' (= lesser) – whereas Apollinarius advocates a strange form of arithmetic where the common rule of addition is accepted in the first case, but dispensed with in the second:

> 'When we take two in number of equal size we speak of two "completes". And whenever we count together the defective with the complete then also we say there are two, but one complete and one defective. And (of) this plurality *he* [sc. Apollinarius] says (φησὶ) that, according to arithmetical understanding, if each is complete according to its nature, then those things thus spoken of are counted as two; but if the one is deficient and the other is complete, then (he says that) the two together become one *fusing together* (συναλείφων), I do not know how, the incomplete with the one which exceeds it and through these opposites contriving a union for irreconcilables. For complete with complete, or incomplete with incomplete, fits more logically according to likeness. But as for the mode of the unification of two opposites, of the incomplete, I mean, with the complete, let the law-giver of this novel arithmetic explain.'[157]

If Gregory is here responding to a passage of Apollinarian exposition in which he explained the unique mode of the incarnational union (πρόσληψις) in terms of a peculiar type of composition/fusion between something incomplete and something/someone complete, then this Apollinarian conception stands at a significant moment in the development of Apollinarius' argument; if we look at the 'Suggested Reconstruction' (above), this argument may have been offered as the final thought in that section of the

[156] J.p.194,l.20.
[157] J.p.194,ll.15-27.

Apodeixis wherein Apollinarius gave technical and typological definition to his conception of the union.[158]

Elsewhere we find further indication from the arguments used by Apollinarius, and certainly from Gregory's reaction, that Apollinarius' conception of the union in the *Apodeixis* did involve some peculiar notion of asymmetrical composition. After Fr.81, wherein Apollinarius rejects the idea of a union of two completes, there is no evidence that he recommends instead the idea of a composite whole from two incompletes: this would be the expected and more logical inference of Fr.81 as Gregory points out. In Fr. 91 Apollinarius accuses his opponents of believing in a 'Man-God'. Again Gregory takes pains to point out that Apollinarius is advocating an even more absurd conception than the one based on the mythological goat-stag (ὁ τραγέλαφος), for when mythology mixes two animals it does not bind together a whole goat with half a stag! Apollinarius invites the scorn of the Greeks by speaking in such illogical terms of the incarnational mystery.[159] Gregory's reaction to the charge in Fr.91 is consistent with the discussion in *Antirrheticus* 39. He does not simply accuse Apollinarius himself of constructing a Man-God hybrid (like the mule in Fr.113). He points to the even more peculiar cross-breed that Apollinarius recommends (through his concept of πρόσληψις?). This Gregorian reaction seems to confirm that Apollinarius' conception of 'compositional' unity in the *Apodeixis* has at least moved on from the idea in Fr.113, as does the line taken by Apollinarius' own polemic: now he is able to accuse his own opponents of a symmetrical view of Christ (Fr.91). In Fr.92 Apollinarius again rejects the idea that there can be a real (Christological) unity 'from two completes' and again Gregory perceives Apollinarius to be offering a novel compositional alternative: 'according to the discourse of this man it has been given that the compound structure (τὸ σύγκριμα) is from what is lacking and the complete (ἐξ ἀπολείποντος καὶ τελείου)'.[160]

Conclusion

Gregory's assessment of the idea of unity (the divine πρόσληψις of flesh) which Apollinarius offers as an alternative to the conjunction of two completes (the ἀνάληψις of a whole man) – viz. a peculiar asymmetrical composition between something incomplete and a perfection – may, to some degree, exaggerate in the interests of

[158] See pp.117-118,above.
[159] *Antirrheticus* 49,J.p.215,l.5-p.216,l.8.
[160] L.p.228,ll.16-17.

polemic, but it seems to accord with certain features of Apollinarius' exposition in the *Apodeixis*, as noted above, and it helps to explain what would otherwise be inconsistencies.

In Apollinarius' central idea of unity in the *Apodeixis* it may be fair to say that we find an action which is assumptional from the divine side and yet compositional from the side of the flesh. In support of this, Apollinarius employs a new anthropological model which can be expressed in terms of the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy or a tripartite construction. The 'new' dichotomy illustrates the assumptional dynamic of the union and best preserves the divine/rational subject as the ultimate identity of the unity; the tripartite idea illustrates the incompleteness of the human element(s) in Christ and explains their unique and integral union with divinity. When Apollinarius explains the *communicatio idiomatum* in the *Apodeixis* he locates its basis in the divine act of union (πρόσληψις) rather than in a divine-human whole thereby constituted. This allows for the preservation of the divine subject in Christ and a more straightforward division of the attributes. Nevertheless there is a sense in which the basis for the transfer *is the resulting singularity* of Christ who is the pre-existing divine subject who now, through the unitive action, also includes the previously partial element – flesh – in himself (Fr.38). The soteriology in the *Apodeixis* also has a double aspect: from the point of view of the rational subject it involves remaining immutable, overcoming and transcending the assumed limitations of a carnal form of existence; from the point of view of the flesh and animal soul it involves acceptance of a proper natural relationship with a rational guiding principle. If we carefully consider the idea of Christological unity which we find in the *Apodeixis* together with the anthropology, predication and soteriology with which it is connected, then it seems that the less-dominant 'assumptional' idea in the D. treatises has *modified* the compositional idea and a new concept has emerged. *The Apollinarian idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is to do with a special type of assumption/composition which can occur between one who is perfect and something incomplete.* From the side of the divine/rational perfection this involves taking-something-on-in-addition whilst remaining perfect *per se*: from the other carnal side it involves being constituted/completed/perfected by and in something/someone else which serves as a 'perfect part' (cf. *De Unione* 5) and provides an actual identity. It may well be significant that when the Apollinarian author of *Quod Unus Sit Christus* explains how the divine Word 'hypostatised' flesh/a body (i.e. the carnal σχῆμα, including a soul,

taken-on-in-addition),[161] he employs a similar conception of union via asymmetrical composition:

> 'We say that one and the same (τὸν αὐτὸν) is God... we confess that the combination (τὸ συναμφότερον) is one God, one hypostasis, one person, not so that the body becomes something which co-completes (συμπληρωτικὸν) the hypostasis because this is impiety, since the divinity is perfect (τέλειον), incapable of receiving diminution, simple (ἁπλοῦν), unique and non-composite (ἀσύνθετον)... Therefore the body did not become something which co-completed the divine hypostasis. But he who was truly complete (ὁ τέλειος) also perfected what was incomplete (τὸ ἀτελὲς); he without want of more came together (συνῆλθε) and was united together (συνηνώθη) with flesh which was in need of more; he who possessed no need himself bestowed to a body which had need. For no one in their right mind would say that just as the Logos is complete (τέλειος) and subsists as an hypostasis (ἐνυπόστατος) and does not require flesh to be perfect God – so too the body did not need the Word to become a complete (τέλειος) and "hypostatised" (ἐνυπόστατος) man'.[162]

Gregory's incredulity at Apollinarius' conception of unity in the *Apodeixis* is in some degree justified. If Apollinarius is able to accept the seemingly illogical possibility of a compositional unity between a whole and a part on the grounds of his incarnational belief why can he not accept the possibility of a real unity between two wholes? We may find answers to this elsewhere in the T. treatises. In the *Apodeixis* it seems that Apollinarius elects to concede the fullness of Christ's humanity in the interests of a true account of the unity because he remains tied to a conception of unity – the divine πρόσληψις of flesh – which is still (in part) compositional. Apollinarius' thinking seems to remain bound by a logical refusal to admit the possibility of an integral unity between *two* complete beings/natures. If 'heresy' is not so much a wrong idea, but a wrong way of thinking in which the principles of an interpretative framework become more determinative of what can be true of an 'object' of interpretation than the nature of that object itself, then Apollinarius' logical refusal to admit the possibility of a genuine union between two wholes may well be the ground of his Christological 'heresy'.

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[161] *QUSC* 11,L.p.301,ll.16-18:'The redeemer does not take (λαβών) his existence/being from Adam, but takes-on-in-addition (προσλαβών) from Adam *the form* (σχῆμα), the flesh I say (yet, I say, flesh which was together with a human soul (ψυχῆς))'.
[162] *QUSC* 9-10,L.p.300,l.4-p.301,l.6.

5

THE OTHER 'TRICHOTOMIC' (T.) WRITINGS OF APOLLINARIUS

Reconstruction and analysis of the *Apodeixis* – the most extensive of the 'surviving' 'trichotomic' works upon Christology – indicate that in this treatise Apollinarius is recommending a different type of Christological thesis from the one which he advocates in his 'dichotomic' works. No longer central to his exposition is the 'compositional' conception of the union typical of the D. works, characteristically expressed in physical, vitalistic and monenergetic terms and linked to a traducian view of the origins and identity of man as a psychosomatic whole, an 'inclusive' explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum*, and a physical(-cum-eucharistic) scheme of salvation. Instead we find a more nuanced conception which we might refer to as '*the divine πρόσληψις of flesh*', since Apollinarius appears to use προσλαμβάνω as a technical term at key moments in his argument to denote the type of unitive action he has in mind, taking pains to differentiate προσλαμβάνω etymologically and its sense 'arithmetically' from another compound of the same verb – ἀναλαμβάνω. This conception of the union is based on two 'tenets' of belief: (1) it is a 'divine enfleshment', i.e. the subject of the unitive of action and ultimate unity is divine; (2) it is, therefore, 'according to the human likeness', i.e. Christ is not the same as a man, but similar, not so much in structure, but because of what he has acquired: flesh (not without a soul) which, in itself, is the same as the carnal 'form' possessed by human individuals/spirits. The unitive action is, thus, most typically described in 'assumptional' rather than compositional terms: it is a divine descent, coming, possession, bearing, wearing, taking. The enduring/underlying (rather than resulting) unity is a divine subject (the person and hypostasis (?)) who persists in his own nature, yet somehow includes/actualises the human flesh in himself because of the unitive act (πρόσληψις). Apollinarius' refusal to admit the completeness of Christ's humanity and apparent preference for the paradoxical idea of the integral unity between someone perfect and something incomplete rather suggest that his conception of union by πρόσληψις remains, in part, compositional (viz. from the side of the flesh), the term perhaps denoting a peculiar form of asymmetrical 'compounding' or 'assumptional composition'. When explaining this concept of Christological unity Apollinarius

employs a different type of 'trichotomic' anthropological model which can also be expressed in dichotomic terms – Christ as man, is νοῦς ἔνσαρκος – but this dichotomy is more 'spiritualist' by implication than the idea of the psychosomatic composite in the D. works. The concept of the divine πρόσληψις is linked to a more 'conventional' explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum* – the divine and carnal attributes are united by their belonging to a singular divine subject rather than by their inclusion in a singular divine-human nature. Apollinarius' conception of divine πρόσληψις is expounded in association with a two-stage soteriological thesis which has demonstrative, subjective and future dimensions alongside the physical idea of the (first stage of) salvation which we find in the D. works.

This chapter will consider what are regarded as the other 'trichotomic' works of Apollinarius: the *Tomus Synodalis, Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses, Ep. Ad Julianum*, *KMP* and *Anacephalaeosis*. Do these writings advocate the same type of Christology which is 'scientifically' set out in the *Apodeixis?* Scholars believe that these other 'trichotomic' works employ the same anthropological model as the *Apodeixis.* Is this, in fact, evident? And if so, do they offer a similar explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum* and the same two-stage theory of salvation? If these works do not advocate the same type of Christological thesis as the *Apodeixis*, what type of doctrine do we find? In particular, do we find the 'compositional' conception of the union recommended in any of these works *in spite of* the 'trichotomic' framework? Should any of these documents prove to profess the same type of Christology as we find imperfectly preserved by Gregory in the fragments of the *Apodeixis*, what further insights do they grant into the detail, terminological usage and motives behind this particular type of Apollinarian Christology? Alongside these T. documents it seems appropriate to consider also the fragments of two unclassifiable, but more easily contextualised, epistles – *Ep. Ad Serapionem* and *Ep. Ad Terentium* – in which Apollinarius expressly recommends the conception of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh. Do these letters reveal anything further about the motives behind this type of Christological thinking?

Synodical Tome (Tomus Synodalis)[1]

Source, Authenticity and Context

This brief confessional statement is preserved in a work by the moderate Apollinarian Valentinus – *Capita Apologiae*[2] – written against those more extreme Apollinarians who claim that Christ's body is consubstantial with God. Valentinus prefaces his apology with twelve quotations: two from Athanasius' *Ep. Ad Epictetum,* nine from 'our Master, Apollinarius',[3] and one from the Apollinarian bishop, Jobius. The *Tomus Synodalis* is the last of the citations from Apollinarius. Leontius of Byzantium has subsequently incorporated the *Capita Apologiae* together with its twelve proof texts into his *Adv. Fraudes*, and it is Leontius who provides Lietzmann with his source for the *Tomus Synodalis.*[4] The authenticity of the text is testified not only by Leontius and again by Valentinus, but the *lemma* which introduces the confession: 'Apollinarius and those with me, we think this...'.[5]

Establishing the context of the *Tomus Synodalis* is more problematic. The introduction and form of the statement is indicative of a synodical confession which is why Lietzmann gives it this title, but when it comes to the occasion of this 'Apollinarian' Synod Lietzmann admits, 'unfortunately we have no clue enabling us to fit it into the order of events of which we know'.[6] Raven is prepared to be more speculative: in his view it is either this confession or *De Fide et Incarnatione*, 'but clearly not both', which emanates from the Apollinarian Synod held at Antioch c.378-379 and mentioned by Gregory of Nazianzus.[7] If the *Tomus Synodalis* is a statement issuing from this particular Synod (and not the *De Fide et Incarnatione*, which was probably written earlier[8]), then Theodoret provides us with a (dramatised) account of the Church political situation at Antioch c.378 immediately prior to the Synod.[9] When General Sapor arrived at Antioch with Emperor Gratian's edict calling for a return to Orthodoxy and communion with Pope Damasus, he found three factions, not only those of Paulinus and Meletius, but a third represented by Apollinarius. According to Theodoret, Apollinarius tried to

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[1] L.p.262,l.24-p.263,l.14(E.T.p.324,below).
[2] See L.pp.287-297.
[3] See L.p.253,l.16.
[4] The twelve citations can be found in *Adv.Fraudes* 129-133(see,L.p.104).
[5] L.p.262,ll.25-26.
[6] L.p.149.
[7] Raven,p.218 n.[4];(see pp.89-90,above).
[8] See pp.96-97,above.
[9] Theodoret,*H.E.*5.3.

subscribe to the imperial edict, but his heterodox views were exposed by Flavianus (an influential spokesman in the Meletian party) and thus his faction received no official recognition. Consequently, Apollinarius 'continued for the future openly to preach his new-fangled doctrine and constituted himself leader of the heresy.'[10] The open departure of Apollinarius' doctrine from Eastern Orthodoxy c.379 was probably not as sudden nor as clear-cut as subsequently presented by Theodoret.[11] Thus, if the *Tomus Synodalis* does represent the confession of an Apollinarian Synod at Antioch c.379, its prime purpose may well have been apologetic/reconciliatory rather than evangelical/schismatic.

Evidence that the Tomus Synodalis is advocating the same type of (T.) Christology as the Apodeixis

Although there is no explicit denial of Christ's human νοῦς, it is very evident that this confession is informed throughout by the Apollinarian conception of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh and that the related type of anthropology, explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum* and soteriology are implicit.

In declaring the subject of their confession Apollinarius, and those with him, employ the same formula which is found in the *Apodeixis* and which encapsulates one of the two main tenets of its thesis: 'τάδε φρονοῦμεν περὶ τῆς θείας σαρκώσεως.'[12] In the *Tomus*' opening pronouncement, defining how such an enfleshment takes place, Apollinarius and his supporters confess the divine πρόσληψις of flesh: 'The living Word of God has taken-on-in-addition (προσείληφεν) flesh consubstantial with our flesh from Mary according to a union with divinity from (ἐκ) the first conception which was in the Virgin'.[13] The reference to the virginal conception, lying alongside the idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh, is *not* elaborated in the quasi-traducian terms of *De Unione* 12-13 and seems intended to serve a purpose more consistent with Apollinarius' doctrine of the union as expounded in the *Apodeixis*. Apollinarius is here emphasising that the human being Mary is the source of the (therefore) consubstantially human flesh taken on by the (pre-existing) divine spirit who is Christ. He is not emphasising that she is one of two sources of the 'holy foetus/divine child' co-constituted in the act of virginal conception (cf. *De Unione* 13). The reference to the conception is to mark the moment at which the union between the divine spirit in the subsequently acquired flesh took place

[10] Theodoret,*H.E.*5.4.1(E.T.Jackson,p.133).
[11] See Raven,p.218.
[12] L.p.262,ll.26-27.
[13] L.p.262,ll.28-30.

(cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.42) so that it is clear that Apollinarians do not subscribe to a doctrine of pre-existing divine flesh. In this context the emphasis upon the role of Mary and the virginal conception is intended to demonstrate the *distinction* between the divinity and humanity rather than the means of their inseparable unity.

Apollinarius' subsequent explanation[14] of his opening pronouncement is reminiscent of the second 'tenet' of his thesis as developed in the *Apodeixis*. In explaining how the Word genuinely becomes (as a) man the *Tomus* appears to draw upon the three notions of God Incarnate's human 'likeness' which we find in the *Apodeixis*: the Word takes on something which is exactly like/the same as ours – viz. 'flesh consubstantial with our flesh'; the Word unites with flesh and is, thereby, structurally similar to a man given a certain anthropological analysis – 'man is flesh and spirit...and it [the Word] was united with flesh as is the human spirit'; the Word Incarnate is thus also 'as' man in the sense that he is not identical in respect of his pneumatic element – ' the Lord is a man who is above us (ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς) since he is also heavenly on account of being in possession of his own heavenly spirit'.

In explaining how the Word truly became (as) man, the *Tomus* chooses not to make use of the trichotomic anthropological analysis which we find in the *Apodeixis*: the 'Synod' prefers to define man in terms of a more ambiguous (and less controversial?) πνεῦμα–σάρξ dichotomy. Nevertheless, if we take into account where the *Tomus* places the ultimate identity of the human individual, and if we note the anthropological implications of two of the *Tomus'* Christological pronouncements, then it becomes clear that the dichotomy which the Apollinarians have in mind is closer to the νοῦς-ἔνσαρκος concept derived from the T. analysis in the *Apodeixis* than the ψυχή-σῶμα dichotomy of the D. works. When the *Tomus* offers further elucidation as to how the Word's union with flesh allows Christ to conform to Paul's dichotomous analysis of the human being, it declares: ' This is what it is for the Word to become flesh: to be united to flesh in the same way as the human spirit. For in our case too the man is called flesh.' The implication of the statement seems to be that man *per se* is the spirit, but can be called 'flesh' after what is united to him (as a form, state or possession). Even Norris, who is reluctant to accept the opinion of others that Apollinarius inclined to a 'spiritualist' conception of man, admits that he appears to approach such a view in the *Tomus Synodalis*.[15] Two subsequent statements in the *Tomus* indicate that, should the Apollinarians have given a further articulation to the spirit-flesh dichotomy, they would

[14] L.p.263,ll.1-7.
[15] Norris,p.98 n.[5].

have specified that 'flesh' is not just a body but includes a carnal will/ψυχή which should be differentiated from man's (rational) spirit and the Logos: 'the Lord...has his own heavenly spirit which the will (τὸ φρόνημα) of the flesh did not counteract';[16] '[Anathema] is he who says that the divinity is passible and that the psychic (ψυχικά) passions are from it'[17] – i.e. in the view of the Apollinarians, Christ's psychic passions should be attributed to a human ψυχή included in flesh, and not to the divine Logos *per se*.

The *Tomus Synodalis* does not offer a formal explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum* which proceeds from the Apollinarian doctrine of the union, but one statement in the confession suggests that the 'Synod' would incline to a more 'conventional' explanation than the 'inclusive' type found in the D. writings: 'The Lord is a man above us since he is also heavenly man on account of being in possession of his own heavenly spirit.'[18] Here (super-) humanity and heavenliness are jointly attributed to Christ not as one divine-human composite, but as one divine subject/spirit, 'The Lord', who is man because he has taken on flesh which is consubstantial with ours, and divine because he (still) possesses *his own* spirit which is divine (by nature/substance).

Some of the ideas which feature in the two-stage soteriological *schema* elaborated by Apollinarius in the *Apodeixis* are clearly present in the section of the *Tomus*[19] which summarises the salvific consequences of the Word's πρόσληψις of flesh. The incarnational unity, thus conceived, establishes salvation because in Christ's case the will of the flesh cannot overcome the (rational) spirit against which it wars as it is governed by heavenly spirit/divine mind: 'Thus sin was loosed by Christ and the death from sin destroyed' (cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.74,76). Here the Apollinarians may have a demonstrative or physical-sacrificial view of the incarnation and cross in mind or both. The future salvation of ordinary human beings (i.e. the νόες) involves their assimilation to the heavenly one (i.e. the divine νοῦς) by faith: 'and we who participate (μετέχοντες) in the triumph by faith are saved and, although we are from an earthly father, we become in the likeness (ὁμοιώσει) of he who is in heaven.' The appropriation 'by faith' which Apollinarius has in mind here is not necessarily to do with sharing in the Eucharistic sacraments although μετέχω can have this technical sense; it may equally involve obedience to Christ (see Fr.80), or perhaps acknowledgement of the true confession of the Faith – i.e. as formulated by the Apollinarian Synod.

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[16] L.p.263,ll.5-7.
[17] L.p.263,ll.13-14.
[18] L.p.263,ll.4-6.
[19] L.p.263,ll.7-10.

The content of this confession, therefore, strongly suggests that the Apollinarians subscribe to a Christological doctrine similar in type to that recommended by Apollinarius in the *Apodeixis*. The content also reveals a little more about the motive of the *Tomus* and therefore its possible context. The Apollinarians seem concerned to show that the doctrine of the πρόσληψις of flesh is equivalent to a true 'en-manment'[20] (despite their denial of the human νοῦς/full humanity, which they choose not to make explicit in this document). Their motive here may be to dispel Nicene suspicions about the novelty of Apollinarian doctrine. The apologetic intention of the *Tomus* is most obviously indicated by the nature of its anathemas:[21] both are aimed at false interpretations/representations of Apollinarian doctrine rather than false alternatives. The first anathema rejects the doctrine of consubstantially divine flesh – this time more unequivocally than in *De Fide et Incarnatione*. The second anathema indicates another apologetic concern: to show that the Apollinarians did not make the divine Word the subject of the *psychic* sufferings of Christ. It is this which underlies the implied admission of the human ψυχή and the implicit presence of the T. anthropology in the *Tomus Synodalis*. Such an apologetic concern corresponds with one of the motives mentioned by Rufinus when explaining Apollinarius' switch from the D. to T. anthropology.[22] These apologetic motives and the tone of the confession, which is circumspect and not openly polemical like the *Apodeixis*, indicate that the *Tomus Synodalis* may well belong to the period c.378-379. Thus it may be the statement of the Apollinarian faction at Antioch who have gone locally into schism, but are still trying to demonstrate to the wider Church and its representatives (e.g. General Sapor) that their Christology – now expounded in a T. version – differs from that of the 'consubstantialists' and still accords with Orthodoxy in spite of slurs recently made against it by (e.g.) Epiphanius, Paulinus, Damasus and Flavian.

[20] L.p.262,l.28-p.263,l.6.
[21] L.p.263,ll.10-14.
[22] Rufinus,*H.E.*2.20(*MPL*21.527A),re *Mt.*26.38.

Two 'Unclassifiable' Documents in which Apollinarius Advocates the Divine Προσληψις of Flesh

Fragments of two letters survive in which Apollinarius explicitly advocates the idea of the divine προσληψις of flesh as a means of expressing what he considers to be the true doctrine of the incarnation over and against false and injudicious alternatives. The *Epp. Ad Serapionem* and *Ad Terentium* cannot be 'classified' as T. or D. documents because Apollinarius makes no allusion to an anthropological framework for his Christology in the extracts which remain (Fr.159-63). Nevertheless, these fragments are worthy of consideration in connection with the 'T.' treatises since they appear to recommend a similar type of Christological conception to that which is advocated in the *Apodeixis* and *Tomus Synodalis*, and since the letters to which they belong are considerably easier to contextualise, thereby providing some clues as to the historical background and possible motive for Apollinarius' advocacy of this type of Christology.

The Letter to Serapion (Ep. Ad Serapionem) (Fr.159-161)[23]

Sources, Authenticity and Context

Leontius of Byzantium is Lietzmann's source for all three fragments of the *Ep. Ad Serapionem.* The first two (Fr.158-160) belong, like the *Tomus Synodalis*, to the series of texts cited by the Apollinarian Valentinus as a preface to his *Capita Apologiae.* Fr.159-160 are the first of the quotations which Valentinus attributed to his own 'master' and they follow upon two extracts from Athanasius' *Ep. Ad Epictetum*, the letter to which Apollinarius' epistle appears to be reacting.[24] The third fragment of the *Ad Serapionem* (Fr.161) is quoted in the opening paragraph of a letter written by another disciple of Apollinarius, Timothy of Berytus, to the Apollinarian Bishop Homonius. Timothy's letter concludes with more quotations from 'our blessed teacher Apollinarius'. Once again it is Leontius who preserves the text of this Apollinarian disciple, and thereby the citations from Apollinarius himself.[25] The authenticity of the *Ad Serapionem* as a letter written by Apollinarius is thus attested by both Leontius' earlier Apollinarian sources. Whilst Timothy (Fr.161) may, conceivably, be quoting from a different letter to

[23] L.p.253,l.15-p.254,l.28(E.T.p.325,below).
[24] Leontius,*Adv.Fraudes* 29,see L.p.287,ll.10-15;L.p.104.
[25] Leontius,*Adv.Fraudes* 138,see L.p.254,ll.11-18-p.277,ll.19-30;L.p.104-5.

Serapion from that cited by Valentinus (Fr.159-60), it seems likely that all three fragments belong to the same epistle because they share the same dogmatic concern and point towards a similar Christological solution.

In Lietzmann's opinion, the Serapion addressed by Apollinarius is 'certainly the Bishop of Thmuis, the friend of Athanasius'.[26] This fact seems to be borne out by some comments made by Leontius (Hierosolymitanus (?)) in *Adversus Nestorianos* when describing Timothy of Berytus' *Ecclesiastical History*: 'Apollinarius... boasted countless letters which had been written to him by Athanasius and also the great Serapion and, indeed, other such men of that time who were illustrious luminaries and champions of the truth'.[27] In Fr.159 Apollinarius tells Serapion of his approval of 'the letter of my Lord which was sent to Corinth' and his disapproval of 'those who say that the flesh is "consubstantial with God."' From this it seems very likely that Apollinarius is referring to the *Ep. Ad Epictetum* written (recently?) by their mutual friend Athanasius. Apollinarius' comments give no indication that Athanasius is not still alive; therefore the *Ad Serapionem* was probably written before 373. Lietzmann is more specific: 'the letter is written soon after that of Athanasius and thus about 371'.[28] Raven has tried to argue that the *Ep. Ad Epictetum* was written in 361 and he would therefore place the *Ep. Ad Serapionem* a decade earlier, but his arguments for this early dating are not convincing.[29] Thus it seems more probable that the *Ad Serapionem*, like the *De Fide et Incarnatione*, belongs to the early 370s, a period when Apollinarius was still within the Church but being forced to clarify his position in response to the distortion of his doctrine (by certain 'consubstantialist' disciples) and to Nicene/Athanasian criticism of it (in its more 'extreme' version). More can be gleaned about the precise purpose of the *Ad Serapionem* if we consider the content of Fr.161, for here, as Mühlenberg has noticed, the evidence suggests that Serapion himself may have been impressed by the 'consubstantialist' doctrine.[30] Thus, Apollinarius may be commending *Ad Epictetum* to Serapion, not only as a means of proving his own orthodoxy, but as a means of readjusting Serapion's Christological view so as to (re)conform it to his own.

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[26] L.p.147.
[27] See L.p.279,ll.10-19.
[28] L.p.147.
[29] Raven,pp.102-110.
[30] Mühlenberg,p.62. In Fr.161 Apollinarius offers his opinion on two statements (one tending towards a 'consubstantialist' position) which Serapion and someone else (καὶ αὐτος) have made concerning the status of Christ's humanity/flesh. Perhaps Serapion has been influenced by this unnamed 'consubstantialist'.

There are some more circumspect statements in the D. documents where Apollinarius affirms that Christ's body/flesh is consubstantial with ours (e.g. Fr.126, *De Unione* 8), but his central concept of Christ as one (composite) nature and substance implies that, in a real and fundamental sense, Christ's corporeal/carnal nature and substance have become one with the divine either *per se*, or by the co-constitution of a (third) divine-human nature/substance (e.g. *De Unione* 5, Fr.119). The 'conclusion' that Christ's body/flesh is therefore consubstantially divine can certainly be derived at a terminological level from Apollinarius' compositional D. thesis of Christ as μία φύσις/οὐσία and it may have been inferred at a conceptual level. Some of his followers seem to have expressed this particular 'conclusion' too crudely and provoked Athanasian/Nicene concern and criticism. In *De Fide et Incarnatione* Apollinarius appears to be responding to those who are alarmed by the idea that Christ's flesh should be included in the *homousion* (§3): he sets out his views on the status of Christ's body in a nuanced way, but his position on whether or not its 'consubstantial' divinity is nominal or real remains ambiguous (§4) (possibly because the compositional D. thesis is still in place). In the *Ad Serapionem* Apollinarius seems able to differentiate his position from a doctrine of consubstantially divine flesh more effectively, and he does so by introducing an alternative conception which does not feature in *De Fide et Incarnatione* – the divine πρόσληψις of fresh.

In Fr.161 Apollinarius suggests an alternative doctrinal formula to the one implying the consubstantial divinity of flesh used by Serapion (and the 'consubstantialist' who has impressed him):

> 'The statement that "the flesh is not consubstantial with us since it is God's flesh" needs *a little more articulation. For it is better to say that he [sc. God] has taken-on-in-addition (προσείληφεν) flesh* which is consubstantial with us by nature (φύσει) but which he rendered/showed forth (ἀπέδειξεν) (as) divine by union (ἑνώσει).'[31]

In the context of our own investigation this Apollinarian stipulation seems quite significant. Here Apollinarius consciously introduces the idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh as a technical precision and as the preferred alternative to the statement of Serapion that implies the consubstantial divinity of the flesh, which Apollinarius here

[31] L.p.254,ll.20-24.

unequivocally rejects (Fr.159). The idea of divinity *by union* (i.e. πρόσληψις) is here preferred and contrasted with the inappropriate idea of unity *by nature* even though the concept of the natural/substantial unity of divinity and flesh is the key idea in Apollinarius' own D. treatises. In Fr.160-161 divinity pertains to the flesh, not because it has co-formed a nature/substance to which divine and human attributes apply, nor because it has been absorbed or transformed into the divine nature (for 'it is not possible for a body to become bodiless as others foolishly say'); divinity applies because of the act of union between the divine subject and his flesh: 'the flesh is divine by the union with the Word not by nature' (Fr.160); 'with greater precision it should be said that the flesh is consubstantial with us by nature and possesses distinctiveness through the union' (Fr.161). The transfer of attributes is not to do with the existence of one 'inclusive' substance/nature, but the reality of the unitive act (πρόσληψις) whereby a divine subject, whilst maintaining his own divinity of nature/substance, takes-on-in-addition flesh (a carnal 'nature' (?)) 'consubstantial with', i.e. 'exactly like', ours. Here, therefore, we find one of the notions of the Word's 'human likeness' which features in the *Apodeixis*. In Apollinarius' approval of one of Serapion's pronouncements we glimpse another. The Word-enfleshed is also 'like' us in the non-identical sense: 'You rightly say, and he does, "We and Christ are not equal"' (Fr.161).

Conclusion

Whilst the T. framework is not present in the *Ad Serapionem* fragments nor its derived νοῦς-σάρξ dichotomy, Apollinarius explicitly recommends the idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh as his preferred understanding of the union and explains the transfer of attributes and status of Christ's flesh/humanity in a manner more reminiscent of his thesis in the T. *Apodeixis* than the D. works. What is most interesting is that he offers it as a conscious alternative to a natural/consubstantialist interpretation of the Christological unity which, whilst not identical with his μία φύσις/οὐσία doctrine in the D. works, is certainly derivable from it. His motive for rejecting the 'natural' account of the divine-human unity in favour of the revised (?) idea of πρόσληψις seems to be twofold: (1) he approves of Athanasius' critique of the type of Chistology reported by Epictetus; (2) he disapproves of the 'consubstantialist' tendency of Serapion's own thought (and the unnamed other at Thmuis).

The Letter to Terentius (Ep. Ad Terentium) (Fr.162-163)[32]

Source, Authenticity and Context

The two surviving fragments of the *Ep. Ad Terentium* are also preserved by Leontius of Byzantium in the *Adv. Fraudes* because they too belong to the series of quotations which prefaces Valentinus' *Capita Apologiae.*[33] The authenticity of these fragments is attested by Apollinarius' own disciple because Valentinus attributes citations in the series both before and after Fr.162-163 to his master.[34] Mühlenberg and Raven share Lietzmann's view as to the probable context and dating of this epistle.[35] It seems likely that the addressee is Terentius, the *Comes Orientis* to whom Basil writes in *Epp.*99,214. In *Ep.*214 Basil warns Terentius about the 'Sabellianism' of Paulinus, the leader of the 'Old Nicene' faction at Antioch. Lietzmann suggests that this may be Basil's reaction to the fact that Damasus had ultimately chosen to back Paulinus as the legitimate leader of the non-Arian church at Antioch after the Pope's recent meeting with Vitalis in Rome. *Ep. Ad Terentium* was probably written in the same period (c.375-376) and therefore relates indirectly to the divided Church at Antioch which was visited by the new *Comes.* Apollinarius writes to Terentius to assure him of the orthodoxy of his own Christological doctrine and therefore the legitimacy of the Apollinarian congregation at Antioch. (At this time the Apollinarians under Vitalis had split from the Meletians, but had not fully gone into schism since Apollinarius had not yet consecrated Vitalis as an episcopal rival to Paulinus and Meletius.) In Mühlenberg's opinion the *Ep. Ad Terentium,* together with other correspondence from this period, indicates that Apollinarius' political motives were not simply self-preservatory. After the rebuff of Vitalis by Damasus and Paulinus, 'Apollinarius ... looked around for other support in order to establish and extend his position in the East'.

The Divine Πρόσληψις of Flesh Contra the Heterodox 'Synousiast' and Two Persons Alternatives

Keen to demonstrate the Christological orthodoxy of his faction to Terentius, Apollinarius aims his first anathema at the false doctrine of two persons (towards which,

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[32] L.p.254,l.29-p.255,l.14(E.T.p.326,below).
[33] Leontius,*Adv.Fraudes* 129-133-see L.p.104.
[34] See L.p.253,l.16;p.262,ll.25-26.
[35] Mühlenberg,p.54,p.218;Raven p.218;L.p.19,p.147.

in his opinion, the divisive Christology of the other factions at Antioch tends (?)). But in what survives of the epistle, Apollinarius' prime concern is to disassociate himself from certain people 'who do not hesitate to say' that the body is consubstantial with divinity: against this doctrine he directs the argument in Fr.162 and three of the four anathemas in Fr.163. Here, in Mühlenberg's opinion, Apollinarius is defending himself against 'Synousiastic false interpretations of his teaching'.[36] It seems not unlikely that those who speak too boldly about the consubstantial divinity of Christ's flesh are the more extreme ('Synousiast') disciples of Apollinarius: this explains his reluctance to name them. In the *Capita Apologiae* Valentinus attacks Timothy, together with other immoderate and unfaithful Apollinarians – notably Polemon and Jobius (regarded by historians of dogma as leading Synousiasts[37]) – for holding a doctrine which *de facto* espouses the consubstantial divinity of Christ's flesh. In so doing Valentinus reprises ('anti-consubstantialist') arguments equivalent to the logical and scriptural arguments employed by Apollinarius against the unnamed group in Fr.162 of the *Ad Terentium.*[38] This is not unsurprising since Valentinus has just quoted the fragment in his preface. There are parallels to both these Apollinarian arguments in Athanasius' refutation of 'consubstantialist' Christology in the *Ep. Ad Epictetum*[39] and extracts from this epistle also feature in Valentinus' preface. The fact that Valentinus quotes from these Epistles of Athanasius and Apollinarius in his own anti-Synousiast treatise, and that all three works share similar arguments, appears to indicate a tradition of influence and a tradition of opposition to a certain type of view (and a certain group of people (?)) first rebuked officially by Athanasius c.370-371.[40] The 'Synousiast' position upon the sense in which Christ's flesh is consubstantially divine was probably more nuanced than its detractors present it.[41] Nevertheless, as Apollinarius' own advice to Serapion indicates, in the wake of Athanasius' criticism it seems to have become important that he and his followers choose their phrases more carefully certainly in relation to the *homoousion.* The flesh may be 'distinctive', even 'divine according to the union', but it is *not* consubstantially divine nor divine by nature and it is 'consubstantial with us by nature' (Fr.161). In unequivocally rejecting consubstantially divine flesh (Fr.159-163)

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[36] Mühlenberg,p.218.
[37] Voisin,pp.117-118;Sellers,p.53 n.[2].
[38] Cf. *Capita Apologiae* 4 L.p.288,l.31-p.289,l.3(logical argument);*Capita Apologiae* 8,L.p.290,l.28-p.291,l.1(scriptural argument).
[39] Cf. *Ad Epictetum* 4(*MPG*26.1057A-B):'the divinity does not take up itself so as to put on what is consubstantial with itself' (logical argument). *Ad Epictetum* 7(*MPG*26.1061-BC)(scriptural argument re visibility of the body).
[40] In Polemon we find one Synousiast unafraid to state his open opposition to 'both Diodore *and* Athanasius'. See Fr.174.
[41] E.g.Fr.181,L.p.279,ll.1-3.

Apollinarius is arguably disassociating himself, not so much from a false 'Synousiast' interpretation of his doctrine, but *one possible* interpretation which follows as a logical and terminological consequence of his compositional D. thesis which posits the Christological unity in a singular nature and substance.

In what remains of the *Ad Terentium* Apollinarius indicates his own view in mainly negative terms, but there is one phase in Fr.162 which reveals how he himself chooses to formulate an orthodox alternative to the 'two persons' and 'Synousiast' fallacies: 'if anyone should say... that it [sc. the flesh] was not taken-on-in-addition (προσειλημμένη) by He (τῷ) who is from heaven... let him be anathema.'[42] Again, Apollinarius expresses what he regards to be the true doctrine of Christ in terms of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh. In his letter to Serapion Apollinarius recommends a formula to do with the divine πρόσληψις of flesh because it lends verbal precision to the articulation of orthodox doctrine; in his letter to Terentius his commitment to the idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh appears to have hardened because he anathematizes those who deny it.

It is interesting, that in Fr.162 in his logical argument against the Synousiasts Apollinarius seems unafraid to use the term σύνθεσις, even though such terminology is rarely employed in the other (e.g. T.) treatises wherein he recommends the divine πρόσληψις of flesh:

> 'These men dissolve outright when confessing the conjunction *(συνάφειαν)* with the body. For it (the body) is not conjoined (συνάπτεται) with itself nor the consubstantial with the consubstantial as they do not hesitate to say. For this (conjunction – αὕτη*)* is neither a synthesis *(σύνθεσις)* nor a conjunction (συνάφεια) because nothing is conjoined (συνάπτεται) to itself, but one thing is conjoined *(συναπτόμενον)* to another.'[43]

There are three possible explanations as to why Apollinarius introduces the term σύνθεσις into this statement which is in the main about the logical impossibility of something (a substance) being *conjoined* to itself. (1) It could be that he is using σύνθεσις as a near-equivalent term for συνάφεια in order to clarify the sense of the latter. According to the research of Wolfson and Norris, the technical sense of σύνθεσις was closer to πάραθεσις than μῖξις.[44] However, the evidence suggests that the Apollinarian sense of σύνθεσις in the D. writings is 'stronger' than 'juxtaposition' and

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[42] L.p.255,ll.11-14.
[43] L.p.254,l.32-p.255,l.4.
[44] See pp.53-54,above.

closer to the notion of 'Aristotelian mixture'. In the context of the argument in Fr.162 there would seem to be little point in introducing the term σύνθεσις if it is simply a near-equivalent. (2) It could be that the introduction of σύνθεσις indicates the type of conjunction Apollinarius *himself* has in mind when it comes to the incarnational union. If this is the case then the term confirms that whilst he advocates the divine πρόσληψις of flesh (Fr.163) *contra* the Synousiasts, he nevertheless conceives such a union along the lines of some sort of (peculiar?) composition (Fr.162). (3) It could be that Apollinarius in his statement to Terentius prefers to frame his own logical argument predominantly in the language of συνάφεια, but also introduces the term σύνθεσις (once) to show how his more general argument, which applies to any type of conjunction/union, would rule out a 'synthesis' too, since this is the particular term for the union which the Synousiasts themselves employ.

Given the purpose of the letter to Terentius and the fact that statements to do with composition lead closest to the idea of consubstantially divine flesh in Apollinarius' own writing, the third explanation of the presence of σύνθεσις in Fr.162 is perhaps the most likely. If we look at the surviving fragments written by those regarded as 'Synousiast' disciples of Apollinarius, then the evidence suggests that these Apollinarians favoured the language of synthesis when formulating (their own understanding of) their master's teaching.

The Letter to the Bishops in Diocaesarea (Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses)[45]

Source, Authenticity and Context

Leontius of Byzantium passes on this letter in the *Adv. Fraudes*, but claims to have found it in a more original source than the *florilegia* compiled by Valentinus and Timothy: 'by Apollinarius from an old copy (of a document) found in the library of the most blessed Andrew, Bishop of Sidon'. In this source Leontius also finds a version of *KMP* 27-31 and Fr.9.[46] Whilst Lietzmann suspects that the Sidonian manuscript may be another disciple anthology, Mühlenberg believes that it is more probably a document containing some of the original work of Apollinarius, i.e. the 'entire and unabbreviated passages of his undoubted writing' which Leontius mentions in contrast to the passages quoted by

[45] L.p.255,l.15-p.256,l.17(E.T.pp.327-328,below).
[46] Leontius,*Adv.Fraudes* 146-149,see L.p.255,ll.15-18;p.105.

Apollinarius' disciples and from which he makes selective quotations himself.[47] Whether the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* has come to Leontius directly or not, there is no reason to doubt its authenticity. From what is said in the letter, it appears to be the second epistolary overture[48] made by Apollinarius to the eleven Nicene bishops who were forced into exile in Palestinian Diocaesarea after the death of Athanasius in 373 when the Arian Bishop Lucius came to power at Alexandria supported by the Emperor Valens. A letter which the bishops themselves wrote to the Nitrian monks in Egypt confirms that they received more than one letter from Apollinarius and that they sent more than one reply.[49] In *Ep. 265* (c.377) Basil commends them upon the nature of their (final?) reply. From the contents of these three epistles, and from what we know of the church-political situation (373-378) towards the end of the reign of Valens, it is possible to build up quite an accurate picture of the probable context and motive of the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses.*

During their exile the eleven Egyptian 'Confessors' acquired the status of martyrs among those opposed to Arianism. Thus their support was courted by the various factions of Eastern 'Orthodoxy' and, since they had been displaced, they were initially unsure as to which faction was legitimate. Apollinarius sought their communion in his first letter which contained a lengthy exposition on dogma designed to show how his doctrines were harmonious with Athanasian orthodoxy. The bishops did not reply to this letter. Apollinarius, fearing that he may have failed to clarify his position, and in the face of growing disquiet about his doctrine of the incarnation instigated by unnamed parties, wrote his second letter (*Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses*) offering a more concise statement focused entirely upon incarnational doctrine. Again he insisted upon his Athanasian orthodoxy and quoted from the Christological section (§7) of the *Tomus Ad Antiochenos*. The Confessors were already in contact with Paulinus, leader of the 'Old Nicene' faction at Antioch, which may explain their initial reticence. Eventually they sent letters of reply to Apollinarius saying that they were willing to be in communion with him provided that he recognised Paulinus as orthodox. Apollinarius wrote to them insinuating that Paulinus was a heretic. This made the Confessors suspect the orthodoxy of Apollinarius, and their suspicions were confirmed when some of his writings came into their hands and they learned that he had also accused Epiphanius of Salamis, the holy 'Tarsensem' (probably Silvanus of Tarsus) and Diodore of Tyre (the Confessors'

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[47] L.pp.107-08;Mühlenberg,pp.93-95;Leontius,*Adv.Fraudes* 146(*MPG*86.1969B).
[48] L.p.255,l.21.
[49] The letter is preserved by Facundus of Hermiane in *Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum IV.*2(*MPL*67.618C-619B) and reproduced by Mühlenberg in a footnote(p.55,n.[2]).

own regional Bishop) of heresy. These details would appear to support Mühlenberg's more precise assessment of the occasion and motive of the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses*. Mühlenberg suggests that Apollinarius probably wrote the letter c.376, shortly after Vitalis' visit to Rome, and that, like the *Ad Terentium*, it belongs to a period in which Apollinarius was actively seeking to win influential support for his party and doctrines in the East in the face of growing opposition.[50]

Mühlenberg and Lietzmann[51] regard the *Epistle* as a bold and inflexible statement of the Apollinarian position. However, at first sight the purpose of the letter seems more to do with apologetic clarification in the face of criticism and misunderstanding than unrepentant 'propaganda'. Apollinarius seems anxious to explain for a second time how his doctrine indeed conforms with Athanasian orthodoxy and in spite of the 'uproar set in motion... by others concerning whom I am silent'. From what we know (via Facundus) of Apollinarius' subsequent correspondence with the Confessors it seems likely that those unnamed who have stirred up controversy and misunderstanding about Apollinarius' teaching are those whom Apollinarius goes on to name in his subsequent letters: Epiphanius, Paulinus and Diodore of Tyre (prominent leaders in the 'Old Nicene Party'), and Silvanus of Tarsus (a 'Neo-Nicene' bishop associated with Eustathius of Sebaste, Basil and the Meletian faction at Antioch who was the former tutor of the Diodore who followed him as Bishop of Tarsus).[52] If such churchmen were among his critics, then they represent two groups both of which could also lay claim to Athanasian-countenanced legitimacy, particularly in respect of the rightfulness of their candidate for the divided see at Antioch and both of which espoused the type of dualistic Christology against which Apollinarius defined his own doctrine in this Epistle. Therefore, from the tone and content and from what we know of the context, the most probable purpose of the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* was to offer certain steadfast supporters of Athanasius clear and succinct explanation as to how Apollinarius' doctrine of the incarnation c.376 conforms to that of the great Alexandrine in spite of the criticism and misunderstanding stirred up by 'dualist' political opponents from both the 'Old Nicene ' and 'Neo-Nicene' factions.

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[50] Mühlenberg,pp.53-56.
[51] L.pp.22-23.
[52] See Basil,*Ep*.244.3.

The Content of the Confession

The introductory paragraph of *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* supplies the contextual details. The second paragraph offers a confession of incarnational belief.[53] The confession contains the same three articles of belief/stipulations which feature in the orthodox confession given by Athanasius in *Tomus Ad Antiochenos 7.*

(1) The incarnation of the Word is *not* the indwelling of a holy man.
(2) The Saviour's body is *not* without soul, feeling or rationality.
(3) There is only one Son: the Only Begotten Son of God is also the subject of the incarnation.

The Apollinarian confession follows not only the form but also the words of the confession in *Tomus 7*, in one place quoting directly. The confession in *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* opens with an Apollinarian statement which, to begin with, follows closely the words of Athanasius' first article in the *Tome*: 'We confess not that the Word of God has come to reside in a holy man, that which was the case in the prophets, but, rather, that the Word himself has become flesh…'. Apollinarius then omits to follow the Athanasian confession any further. [I will call this passage of the *Tome* '*Omission (a)*'.][54] Instead, Apollinarius offers his own explanation of the first article of the Athanasian/Apollinarian confession: 'not by assuming (ἀνειληφότα) the human mind, a mind which is mutable and taken prisoner by foul thoughts, but being divine mind immutable and heavenly.' [I will call this Apollinarian statement '*Addition (a)*'.][55] The confession in the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* then offers an unreferenced verbatim citation from the *Tome* which contains the second and third articles of orthodox belief according to Athanasius.[56] The Apollinarian confession therefore presents the second and third articles of the *Tome* as if they are the consequence (διὸ καὶ) of the Apollinarian explanation of the first article (i.e. the consequence of A*ddition (a)*). Thus, in their new context, the words of Athanasius convey a specific sense apparently coherent with, but actually determined by, the Apollinarian addition. When quoting from the *Tome*, Apollinarius chooses to omit half the statement which explains the second article of belief in the Athanasian confession: 'nor was the salvation brought about by the Word

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[53] L.p.256,ll.3-17.
[54] Athanasius,*Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7,*MPG*26.804B:'καὶ ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ… Βασιλείαν τῶν ουρανῶν.'
[55] L.p.256,ll.5-7.
[56] L.p.256,ll.7-14:'οὐ σῶμα ἄψυχον... ὁ μετὰ 'Αβραάμ',cf.*Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7,*MPG*26.804B-C.

himself only of the body, but also the soul.' [I will call this missing phrase from the *Tome 'Omission (b)'*.][57] Apollinarius stops quoting from the *Tome* halfway through the third article. After affirming the singular identity of the Son ('Accordingly there was not one Son of God before Abraham and another who was after Abraham...'), the Athanasian confession goes on to explain who raised Lazarus and cured the blind man given this (third) article of belief. The Apollinarian confession offers further elucidation of the sense in which there is one Son: not two sons... 'but one perfect only begotten (Son) of God. And he is perfect by means of divine, not human perfection.' [I will call this Apollinarian precision '*Addition (b)*'.][58] Apollinarius then concludes his confession by declaring that such beliefs are his condition for ecclesial communion.

Apollinarius' T. doctrine of the 'Divine Enfleshment' as in accordance with Athanasian Orthodoxy

The contents of this epistle seem to confirm what the fragments of the *Ad Terentium* indicated: c.375-376 Apollinarius was recommending his doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh as a faithful expression of 'orthodox' (or Athanasian) belief. In the first paragraph Apollinarius refers to his own doctrine thus: 'I say these things concerning the divine enfleshment since on account of them there has been much uproar.' The peculiarly Apollinarian formula θεία σάρκωσις features in the title of the *Apodeixis* and encapsulates one of the main tenets of the incarnational thesis therein expounded using a T. anthropological framework. Although the confession in the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* takes pains to follow the form and the words of the Athanasian confession in the *Tome*, if we consider the most conspicuously 'Apollinarian' features of the former – viz. the '*additions*' and '*omissions*' – then it becomes clear that the Apollinarian version of the Athanasian confession is informed by the same type of thinking which we find in the *Apodeixis*. These additions and omissions are highly significant because they determine the sense of the Athanasian phrases which are cited; by this means Apollinarius offers a particular interpretation of the incarnation consistent with (some of) the words of Athanasius rather than a straightforward reiteration.

Addition (a) makes explicit that Apollinarius subscribes to the T. analysis of Christ which we find in the *Apodeixis*. The Word has not assumed the human mind, he

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[57] *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7,*MPG*26.804B:'οὐδὲ σώματος μόνου ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ σωτηρία γέγονεν.'cf.L.p.256,l.10.
[58] L.p.256,ll.14-15.

is divine mind (cf. Fr.76) [... together with the human ψυχή and body (cf. Fr.25)?]. Apollinarius interprets the Athanasian stipulation, 'The Saviour did not possess a body without a soul (cf. Fr.22) without feeling or rationality', against this framework (διὸ καὶ). *Addition (a)* also recapitulates aspects of the soteriological argument which we find in Fr.76 of the *Apodeixis* whereby Apollinarius justifies the non-assumption of the human mind on the grounds of mutability and ignorance. *Addition (a)* may also imply Apollinarius' rejection of the term ἀνάληψις as a means of denoting the mode of the incarnational union which we find in the *Apodeixis* (cf. Fr.76, *Antirrheticus* 39). Whilst Apollinarius does not explicitly commend the term πρόσληψις, which he prefers to use in the *Apodeixis*, *Addition (b)* and *Omission (a)* indicate that he has the same asymmetrical idea of Christological unity in mind which he likes to denote by that term elsewhere. In *Addition (b)* Apollinarius clarifies the *Tome's* denial of two Sons by stressing that there was only one perfect/complete (τέλειος) Son and stipulating that, according to his view, this perfection (τελείοτης) only belongs to/stems from the divinity and not the human element. In *Omission (a)* Apollinarius chooses to pass over a passage in the *Tome* in which the words of Athanasius offer further insight into the 'orthodox' understanding of the mode of the incarnation and its soteriological consequences: 'the Word himself was made flesh... and being in the form of God took the form of a servant and from Mary became a man for us according to the flesh and thus in him the human race is *perfectly* (τελείως) and *wholly* (ὁλοκλήρως) saved from sin'. Whilst the Athanasian adverbs described the mode of the *saving* action rather than the incarnational, because the latter is consequent upon the former, arguably these terms *imply* the completeness/wholeness of the Word's becoming man and his carnal form which he took from Mary. Whether or not Athanasius and the Council of Alexandria espoused such an incarnational view remains ambiguous. Apollinarius' doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is incompatible with such a notion and explicitly rejects the completeness of Christ's humanity (e.g. *Apodeixis* Fr.76,81,92). This could be why Apollinarius chooses to omit the passage of the *Tome* which could be taken as implying the union of two completes.

It is harder to explain why Apollinarius felt it necessary to make *Omission (b)* from the passage of the *Tome* which he quotes verbatim. On the basis of his T. analysis of Christ and related soteriology it would have been quite possible for Apollinarius to confess that 'the salvation brought about by the Word himself was not only of the body, but also the soul (ψυχή)', since, according to this theory (unlike the D. thesis of *De Unione*), the Word himself as divine νοῦς takes-on-in-addition a body *and a* ψυχή (see

Apodeixis Fr.22,25). Nevertheless, it is still possible to understand why Apollinarius *might* have chosen to omit the Athanasian phrase for the sake of the clarity of his own statement of belief. When Apollinarius quotes the Athanasian formula, 'the Saviour was not without a soul nor feeling nor intelligence', he intends this to be interpreted in a specific way: viz. according to his own (T.) framework as introduced by *Addition (a).* According to this scheme, the Saviour is 'not without intelligence' since he *is* the divine νοῦς and he is 'not without life and feeling' because he *has* an animal ψυχή. It is very unlikely that Athanasius and those with him at Alexandria c.362 had such a technical trichotomy in mind when they made their original statement. Thus, in *Omission (b),* when Athanasius refers to the 'ψυχή' he is probably not making a distinction between the (carnal) ψυχή and νοῦς. If we look at the unedited version of *Tomus* 7 and consider the logic of its original argument, then the inclusion of the human intelligence (as well as the human body) in the saving union with the divine Word seems to be treated as more or less the same thing as inclusion of the human ψυχή: 'when the Lord had become man for us it was not possible that his body should be without intelligence [ἀνόητον -i.e. without a rational soul (?)] and salvation was [thus] not only...of the body but of the (rational (?)) ψυχή.' In the context of this statement, the *Tome's* stipulation that 'the body was not without life (ἄψυχον), feeling (ἀναίσθητον), nor intelligence (ἀνόητον)' suggests another non-Apollinarian non-trichotomic interpretation, viz. because the divine Saviour *had* a vital, sentient, and rational soul (as well as a body). Thus, given that the confession in the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* is informed by the same type of Christology which we find in the *Apodeixis*, Apollinarius may have chosen to make *Omission (b)* because, in this phrase, the words of Athanasius do not so readily support his own interpretation of the *Tome* and may be misunderstood as indicating that Christ's rationality is not identical with the Word himself, but something which belongs to the human soul (ψυχή) he assumed.

Apollinarius' T. Doctrine of Christ: More Compatible with Tomus 7 than the D. Thesis?

Whilst Apollinarius make certain 'omissions' and 'additions' in *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* to demonstrate that his doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is in accordance with the Athanasian statement in *Tomus* 7, there is no need to doubt his good faith c.376. His own doctrine *is* compatible with the words of the *Tome* according to one particular interpretation. The two additions clarify the nature of this particular interpretation; the

two omissions pass over phrases which are unhelpful, not because they proscribe the Apollinarian interpretation, but because they may be suggestive of an alternative. If we accept the traditional view of (e.g.) Lietzmann[59], that the second stipulation of *Tomus* 7 was designed to curb an Apollinarian Christology which appeared to deny the vitality, sensitivity and rationality of Christ's body (i.e. to deny his human soul entire), then this stipulation may have been aimed at something not unlike the Apollinarian D. thesis. Whilst the D. thesis gives a strong account of the unity, it is suggestive of the defective physical scheme of soteriology (as recognised by Athanasius: 'not a salvation of body only but of soul also') and it implicates the divine subject in change (as recognised by Paulinus: 'the Word became flesh not in the sense that he has undergone change... for the Saviour was not without a soul').[60]

It may not have been impossible for some to hold a Christological doctrine similar to the Apollinarian D. thesis while subscribing to the words of Athanasius in *Tomus* 7 (i.e. Christ's body is 'not without life, sense and reason' because all this is supplied by the divine energy principle). Nevertheless, it is plain to see how the type of Apollinarian Christology set out in the T. *Apodeixis* conforms more readily with the three 'stipulations'[61] of the *Tome*. Apollinarius' doctrine of 'the divine enfleshment according to a human likeness' is diametrically opposed to inspired man Christology (see first 'stipulation') and committed in its 'first tenet' to the continuity of the divine subject (see third 'stipulation'). The T. framework allows a fuller account to be given of Christ's human element by admitting the assumption not only of a body, but also a sentient animal soul, which can feature in a physical scheme of salvation and also shield the Word himself from change and suffering (see second and third 'stipulations'). The identification of the Word with the mind of Christ also ensures a non-psilanthropist account of the incarnation (see first 'stipulation') which preserves the continuity of the divine subject (see third 'stipulation'). Thus, (having already made adjustments in response to Nicene criticism (?)), Apollinarius has a fair case to make to the Confessors when he insists that, despite the current uproar, his doctrine is (now) in accordance with Athanasian orthodoxy as formulated in 362.

The one notion, *perhaps* suggested by the *Tome*, which Apollinarian doctrine, even in its T. version, cannot accommodate, is the assumption of a *rational* human soul/mind. In the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* we find the soteriological justification (see *Addition (a)*) and the logical reason (see *Addition (b)* – the impossibility of the union of

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[59] L.p.7;Lietzmann,H.,*History of the Early Church vol.3*,pp.271-273.
[60] See *Ep.Ad Antiochenos* 11,*MPG*26.809A-B.
[61] See p.203,above.

two completes) which may lie at the root of Apollinarius' inability to make this final accommodation with 'Athanasian' orthodoxy.

The Letter to Julian (Ep. Ad Julianum) (Fr.150-152)[62]

Source, Authenticity and Context

The source of the three surviving fragments of Apollinarius' letter to Julian is the *Doctrina*. At the end of the *Doctrina* the author provides an appendix in which he offers a series of citations from notorious heretics. Between the citations from Manes and Severus come a group of seven Apollinarian quotations which are not found in Justinian. The introductory remarks in the *Doctrina* attest that these fragments come from letters written either by Apollinarius of Laodicea himself (Fr.150-152) or certain members of his school – Julian (Fr.180), Polemon (Fr.176-177) and Eunomius (Fr.178) – when corresponding with one another. According to the *Doctrina* Apollinarius is addressing 'his own disciple Julian' in the *Ep Ad Julianum.*[63] In Lietzmann's opinion the author of the *Doctrina* may have found the *Ad Julianum* fragments and the fragment of Julian's own letter in the works of Polemon which he had to hand.[64] Whether this is true or not, if we consider the extracts from the letters between Apollinarius, Julian and Polemon, they indicate the probable sequence of this correspondence and this offers some clue as to the context and purpose of the epistle written by Apollinarius himself.

According to the author of the *Doctrina* the epistle of Polemon to his fellow disciple Julian is a 'dogmatic letter' aimed at the 'word and manner of speaking of the Dyophysites'.[65] The epistle written by Julian to Polemon is introduced as: 'the letter written *in reply* to Polemon the fellow disciple.'[66] The content of Fr.180 indicates that this could well be Julian's reply to Polemon's 'dogmatic' letter (Fr.176-177) because it declares its allegiance to the doctrine of Christ's one 'composite' nature as defended by Polemon, and also condemns those who depart from it. In so doing Julian invokes the authority of 'our first and only father, Apollinarius.' When recapitulating the teaching of his master, Julian attributes to him a monenergetic, monothelite, monophysite view in terms which indicate that he may have in mind Apollinarius' 'compositional conception'

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[62] L.p.247,l.18-p.248,l.13(E.T.pp.328-329,below).
[63] See L.p.247,ll.19-20;pp.110-116.
[64] L.p.155,145;Mühlenberg p.157.
[65] See L.p.275,ll.31-33.
[66] See L.p.277,ll.7-8.

of the union which is typical of the D. works.[67] If we consider what remains of the *Ad Julianum*, Julian may well have employed these excerpts (from what has been categorised as a 'T'. document) to support his own particular understanding of Apollinarius' teaching. It seems not unlikely that Julian may have attached some of the letter he himself had received from Apollinarius to his own letter as a proof text when replying to Polemon. This would explain why all three epistolary fragments had been found together by the author of the *Doctrina* in his Polemon (?) source.

If the three letters are related according to the sequence, the only clue as to the historical context lies in Polemon's opening remark to Julian:

> 'Those admiring Athanasius on account of his knowledge and who have been agitated by Basil and Gregory's slippery words have been swallowed by the chasm of division since along with these men they themselves declared that the one Christ... possesses two intellectual and self-governing natures... wills and energies.'[68]

Conceivably, Polemon's words suggest that Athanasius is still alive and therefore his epistle to Julian was written before 373. However, it seems unlikely that Polemon's letter was written before that date. We know from Apollinarius' *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* (c.376) that there were those who continued 'to admire Athanasius on account of his knowledge' even *after* his death. Also, there is no evidence that Basil or either of the Gregorys actively promoted dyophysite Christology or opposed Apollinarianism this early. Basil's writings contain little upon Christology before 373 and he does not criticise Apollinarius until 376. Given that Polemon's letter indicates that Basil and Gregory (of Nazianzus (?)) are actively encouraging 'dyophysite' opposition to Polemon's form of Apollinarianism, the most likely time of its composition seems to be between 376 and Basil's death in 379.

If Julian's letter is a 'reply' then it belongs to the same period. The letter which Julian has already received from Apollinarius (*Ep. Ad Julianum*) may belong to the same period because the master is also opposing a group who hold the dualist Christology: those 'who declare that there are two minds in Christ' (Fr.150) and 'that he possesses two complete intellectual natures' (Fr.152). There is no certain way of knowing how long Julian has kept the letter from his master. The Christology of Apollinarius was conceived in opposition to the 'Antiochene' dyophysitism (of Diodore?) from the outset

[67] L.p.277,ll.9-16.
[68] Fr.176 L.p.276,ll.1-6.

(352?) according to the view of Voisin and Raven.[69] But here in the *Ad Julianum* he opposes dyophysites who insist on a *human mind* in Christ. Apollinarius seems to be referring to those who are opposed to the type of T. exposition of his doctrine which is set out in the *Apodeixis*. This version of his doctrine may have existed (and been opposed) prior to the death of Athanasius (373), but we have no datable evidence of its existence until Epiphanius mentions it c.374.[70] Thus it seems more likely that the *Ep. Ad Julianum* belongs to the period 374-379; the period in which Apollinarius' doctrine in its T. form became more widely known and opposed by the Nicene churchmen loyal to 'the wisdom of Athanasius': e.g. Epiphanius and Paulinus and those associated with the Meletian faction – Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus. Apollinarius' letter to Julian may be designed to clarify his own doctrine for the benefit of this disciple and those with him who are having to withstand growing criticism from 'orthodox' 'dyophysite' opponents.

Evidence of the T. Type Christology

In the T. *Apodeixis* Apollinarius uses certain arguments to justify his doctrine of Christ as divine νοῦς who takes on a mindless and incomplete humanity and we encounter one of the same arguments here. In *Ad Julianum* (Fr.151), Apollinarius argues that the mutability and inconsistency of the human mind make it incompatible with the divine mind since the divine mind is constitutionally different, being immutable and constant; conflict between the two will inevitably follow. The idea that the human mind is constitutionally incompatible with the divine mind may not be explicitly stated in Fr.76, but it is certainly implicit in the 'free-will' dimension of the 'Soteriological Thesis' in the *Apodeixis* (cf. Fr 74, 87).

In Fr.150 of the *Ad Julianum*, Apollinarius offers a similar argument which points to the inevitable incompatibility of two minds *even at a mundane level.* He rejects the possibility of the unified co-existence of (any) two minds in one 'underlying being', no doubt because he sees destructive psychological conflict as the inevitable consequence (as in the divine-human case). But the statement in Fr.150 suggests he understands the impossibility of the true union between (any) two minds as much in logical as psychological terms. Given the nature of mind – 'autonomous', 'moved by its own volition', 'doing what it wants according to its own self-determining primary impulse' – how can it be possible for *two* such *first* principles of movement and volition

[69] Voisin,pp.25,53-54;Raven pp.177-80.
[70] See Epiphanius,*Ancoratus* 77(*MPG*43.161B).

to be present in one being without one negating the very nature of the other? The idea that it is a *logical* impossibility for *any* two minds to be present in one underlying being because the unity of the being would be thereby divided, or the duality of the minds would be thereby negated may well be a presupposition which lies behind Apollinarius' rejection of Christ's human mind in the *Apodeixis*, but in what remains of that work he does not spell this out as clearly as in the *Ad Julianum.*

The Ambiguity of the Ep. Ad Julianum: 'One Nature, Will and Energy' - by Composition or Πρόσληψις?

Whilst it is plain enough to see that Apollinarius uses similar arguments to those in the *Apodeixis* when dismissing the false view of two minds/complete (intellectual) natures in the *Ad Julianum*, it is less obvious from the two surviving 'monophysite' statements that he is recommending to his disciple the *Apodeixis'* T. doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh as the 'orthodox' alternative. The terminology employed by Apollinarius in the first statement (Fr.151) suggests that he is advocating a monenergetic, monothelite view of the one nature of Christ more reminiscent of his thesis in the D. works, wherein the divinity supplies the 'energy part' entire (*De Unione* 5), even replacing the carnal will (*De Unione* 11), and thus co-forming one composite nature, energy and substance with an entirely passive body (Fr.117,119): 'We ourselves confess one Christ, and we worship, since he is one, one nature, will and energy, which saves by miracles and sufferings' (Fr.151).[71] In the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius seems to have moved away from this monenergetic form of monophysitism since he is prepared to acknowledge the co-presence of the carnal will (Fr.63b) in Christ and a non-intellectual ψυχή which is a source of rebellious power (Fr.22[a], 74,78) and animation (Fr.22[b]). In *Ad Julianum* (Fr.151), it is not only the terminology of the confessional statement which suggests that Apollinarius has the compositional view of the unity and mind, but also the way in which he frames his second argument against the fallacy that there are two minds in Christ, for here he talks about the union as if it is a mixing (μίγνυμι) which leads to (εἰς) the formation (σύστασις) of the (divine-human?) 'underlying being' (= hypostasis?) that is Christ. In both arguments against two minds, the Apollinarian phraseology in this epistle rather implies that the 'underlying being' is something other than the divine element since the mind and will is referred to as 'in' the underlying being (Fr.150) and something 'out of which' it is (Fr.151).

[71] L.p.248,ll.5-7.

The second confessional statement which survives from the *Ad Julianum* (Fr.152) is also monophysite and rejects the idea of the union between two complete natures, but here Apollinarius is clearly *not* advocating the alternative idea of Christ as one complete nature/being composed from *two* incompletes. As in the *Apodeixis* he insists on the continuity of the one divine subject in Christ, and he intimates a more asymmetrical mode of physical union between the one complete intellectual nature of the Word and flesh (which is not in itself complete or intellectual, or a nature): 'the Word himself became flesh and endured within his natural unity/singularity (μείναντα τῆς φυσικῆς αὐτοῦ μονάδος)'.[72] The statement in Fr.152 implies that the 'underlying being' (= hypostasis?) in Christ is not a composite individual, but the Word himself (*qua* mind) subsisting as a complete and actual intellectual nature both before and after his taking flesh. The monophysite statement which we find in Fr.152 could well be informed by the Apollinarian doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh which draws upon a more 'spiritualist' conception as to wherein lies the ultimate identity of the human individual (and the human nature?).

If, on the basis of Fr.152, we allow ourselves to conclude that Apollinarius is propounding the same doctrine of the unity to Julian which he sets out in the *Apodeixis,* then it is possible to interpret the apparently 'compositional' feature of Fr.150-151 within this context. 'It is not possible for two minds to co-exist in one and the same underlying being' – because the underlying substance of one rational being is one mind. 'A changeable mind is not mixed with unchangeable mind in the formation of one underlying being' – because the unchangeable mind is the underlying being in Christ. 'We confess Christ who is one nature, will and energy' – because the Word/divine mind endures as a single actual nature and singular active source of intellectual will and energy, whilst taking-on-in-addition flesh which is not in itself rational nor an actual nature independent of the Word/divine mind but becomes so in him/his nature. And whilst the flesh includes a carnal will and energy, this is at one with the rational/divine will and energy owing to his immutable and uniform rational governance; such flesh thereby complies fully with the divine/rational nature of the Word/mind and its own proper passivity as flesh. Thus, although it is possible to interpret the words of Apollinarius' monenergetic/monothelite declaration of μία φύσις (Fr.151) in the 'compositional' (or 'synousiast') way, this is *not* the only possible interpretation and, perhaps, not the most probable given the statement in Fr.152 and the obvious connections between the justifying arguments (Fr.150,151) and those in the *Apodeixis.*

[72] L.p.248,ll.10-12.

Apollinarius may employ compositional terminology in these arguments, but arguably this is to denote the type of view he rejects, not his own opinion.

Conclusion

In the *Ad Julianum* fragments we find compositional language and a formula for the unity reminiscent of Apollinarius' D. thesis alongside arguments and a statement of unity more typical of his T. thesis in the *Apodeixis*. This creates a certain level of ambiguity when it comes to interpreting Apollinarius' understanding of natural unity in Fr.151. The case for interpreting Fr.151 within the context of the more nuanced view of unity advocated in the *Apodeixis* is perhaps stronger; nevertheless, a more 'compositional' interpretation is possible as seems to be evidenced by Julian's epistle to Polemon (Fr.180) in which he advocates a strongly compositional understanding of his master's doctrine which must be based to some extent upon the contents of a letter which Apollinarius had sent to him. Julian may have felt encouraged in taking this estimate of his master's doctrine from the *Ad Julianum* by the presence of terminology more typical of the D. writings (with which he was also familiar?), or he may have felt encouraged by the fact that, even in its T. form, Apollinarius' understanding of the union – the divine προσληψις of flesh – does not entirely detach itself from the notion of union by composition.

The Faith (set out) in Sections (KMP)[73]

Sources and Authenticity

This confessional tract was passed down in the tradition among the writings of Gregory Thaumaturgus.[74] Caspari was the first modern scholar to attribute this work to Apollinarius, and Lietzmann shares his view since the Apollinarian authorship of the *KMP* would appear to be verified by both Theodoret and Leontius of Byzantium.[75] At the end of *Eranistes I* Theodoret quotes a number of passages taken from works written by Apollinarius. Among these are two fragments from his 'little tract upon the faith'. The first is a close variant of some of *KMP* 11. Whilst the second quotation from the

[73] L.p.167,l1-p.185,l.6(E.T.pp.329-333,below).
[74] St Gregory,Bishop of Pontus c.240-270, was present at the first Synod of Antioch(c.264-265) which condemned the Christology of Paul of Samosata.
[75] See L.p.129.

'little tract' (Lietzmann's Fr.1) is not to be found in the Gregory Thaumaturgus' version of the *KMP*, the very next quotation is the opening statement from *KMP* 28.[76] At the end of *Eranistes III* Theodoret quotes a fragment from *KMP* 35 followed by another 'from the little work on the faith' which coincides with Apollinarius' concluding words in *KMP* 11 and his opening pronouncement in *KMP* 12.[77] In the *Adv. Fraudes,* Leontius quotes two much longer passages from a work called '*ἡ κατὰ μέρος πίστις*' which he appears to have found in the same Sidonian library document as the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses.* Having attributed the epistle to Apollinarius, Leontius specifies that both extracts from the *KMP* are 'by the same author'.[78] If the order of the two Leontian fragments is reversed, they amount to an expanded version of the main Christological section of the *KMP* (§§27-31). The Leontian variant makes a number of interesting departures from the text as preserved under the name of Gregory Thaumaturgus. Lietzmann prefers to follow the 'Gregorian' version of the text in his edition, reproducing the Leontian variant in full beneath it.

Context

There is nothing outside the text of the *KMP* which can assist an attempt to establish the possible date, context and purpose of the work. Mühlenberg draws conclusions from the fact that (some of) the treatise is found together with the *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses* in the Sidonian library document:

> 'Perhaps the explanation for the introductory formula... and what follows is that the confession, which is complete in itself, was closely connected to the letter to the Confessors. Such guesses go beyond what we know, but the Christological formulae of the 'detailed creed' are so diametrically opposed to that of Epiphanius (*Anc.*19,3-12) that one might be tempted to regard it as the condemnation of Epiphanius which was lamented by the Confessors.'[79]

However, Mühlenberg's view of the possible context is, on its own admission, speculative and perhaps fails to account for the fact that the primary controversial emphasis of the *KMP* is placed upon Trinitarian doctrine. This fact appears to inform

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[76] Theodoret,*Eranistes I,MPG*83.104C-D. Theodoret specifies that the quotation from *KMP* 28 comes from 'another exposition'. Mühlenberg(p.103) explains Theodoret's comment, by suggesting that the main Christological section of the *KMP*(§§27-31) may have enjoyed an independent existence in the tradition as a self-contained passage.
[77] *MPG*83.309D-312A,see L.p.171,ll.9-12.
[78] See L.p.178(subtext)l.4;L.p.176(subtext)l.1;L.p.105(nos. 39,40).
[79] Mühlenberg,p.95 n.[2].

Voisin's opinion that Apollinarius wrote the *KMP* later on in his career: 'Apollinarius wrote the "*κατὰ μέρος πίστις*" towards the end of his life with the intention of showing that his Trinitarian teaching conformed to that of the Church and again condemning the different heresies that he was accused of sharing in.'[80]

If we take into account the nature and preponderance of Apollinarius' Trinitarian doctrine in the *KMP,* and if we also take into account what little we know about any criticism levelled against Apollinarius' doctrine of God, then Voisin's opinion appears to acquire some justification. In the introductory paragraphs of the *KMP* (§§1-3) Apollinarius affects something of a polemical tone, but in what follows he sets out his Trinitarian doctrine in a confessional style, (re)producing and explaining a series of orthodox formulae. The 'true' Trinitarian faith is defined over and against false alternatives, but this is done in an even-handed way. The Apollinarian doctrine is contrasted with Sabellianism (§§1,13,16,18,24,32,37), and Tritheism (§§19,24), and Subordinationism – in its Arian (§§1,6,10,17,27,32,34,37) and Pneumatomachian (§§1,8,10,17,20-24,27,34,37,40,42) forms. This approach indicates that Apollinarius was *not* engaged in theological controversy with one particular group when he wrote the *KMP* and it suggests that he was concerned to make a more general apology for his Trinitarian doctrine as orthodox.

There is no evidence of any criticism of Apollinarius' doctrine of God arising in non-Arian circles prior to 373. On the contrary, it seems that Apollinarius was widely respected as a friend of Athanasius and defender of the Nicene Faith.[81] Eustathius of Sebaste is the first we know to have raised doubts about the orthodoxy of Apollinarius' Trinitarian doctrine, although his main target was Basil of Caesarea by association. Our knowledge of Eustathius' accusation and Basil's reaction (what Mühlenberg calls 'The Eustathius Affair') is drawn from a series of letters written by Basil to various addressees between 373-376.[82]

The charge of Sabellianism raised indirectly against Apollinarius c.373 by the leader of the Pneumatachian faction, and promoted half-heartedly by Basil in his own self-defence c.373-376, does not, perhaps, constitute mainstream 'orthodox' criticism of the Apollinarian doctrine of God. We find such criticism in a letter written some years later by another Cappadocian after the Apollinarians had broken with orthodoxy for Christological reasons. This letter seems, at first sight, to bring a different type of

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[80] Voisin,p.411.
[81] See(e.g.) Sozomen *H.E.*4.22.
[82] Basil,*Epp.*129,131,223,224,226,244,250. For a painstaking analysis of this correspondence and reconstruction of the 'Eustathius Affair' see Mühlenberg,pp.26-44.

accusation against Apollinarian theology. Gregory of Nazianzus in his *First Epistle to Cledonius* (c.382) accuses the local Apollinarians of preaching a heretically *subordinationist* doctrine of the Trinity particularly in relation to the Spirit:

> 'But since puffed up by their theory of the Trinity, they falsely accuse us of being unsound in the Faith and entice the multitude, it is necessary that people should know that Apollinarius, while granting the name of Godhead to the Holy Ghost did not preserve the Power of the Godhead. For to make the Trinity consist of Great, Greater, and Greatest, as of Light, Ray and Sun, the Spirit and the Son and the Father (as clearly stated in his writings), is a ladder of Godhead not leading to Heaven but down from Heaven. But we recognise God the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, and these not as bare titles dividing inequalities of ranks or of power, but as there is one and the same title, so there is one nature and one substance in the Godhead.'[83]

Theodoret offers a similar estimate of the Apollinarian error which he may have derived more from Gregory's comment than his own analysis of Apollinarian works upon the Trinity with which he was familiar (e.g. *KMP* ?).[84] The change of accusation against Apollinarius need not imply a significant change in his doctrine. Apollinarius may have worked harder to emphasise the distinction between the persons after the earlier criticism from Eustathius and Basil and consequently have been perceived to have fallen into another trap. However, it is more probable that the particular form of his 'heresy' was determined by the eye of his beholder. Apollinarius' 'vertical' view of the Son's and the Spirit's divinity – derived yet identical with that of the Father – may have looked like Sabellianism to Eustathius, whilst appearing as a ranked hierarchy to Gregory and Theodoret.

The suggestion has been made that the Apollinarian 'theory of the Trinity' to which Gregory of Nazianzus alludes critically in his letter to Cledonius (*Ep.*101) c.382 is the *KMP*.[85] This would seem to be unlikely because nowhere in the *KMP* does Apollinarius make use of the Sun, Ray and Light analogy mentioned specifically by Gregory; also, Apollinarius takes extra special pains to emphasise the full divinity of the Spirit according to nature and substance.

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[83] Gregory of Nazianzus,*Ep.*101 *MPG*37.192B,E.T.Browne,p.442.
[84] See Theodoret,*H.E.*5.3:' he originated the idea of certain degrees of dignities',E.T.Jackson,p.132.
[85] See Funk,F.X.,*Kirchengeschichtliche,*2.Bd.,pp.253-291.

Conclusion

Apollinarius' even-handed rejection of both Sabellianism and subordinationism – particularly in relation to the Spirit – and his careful reiteration of orthodox formula seem to suggest that the *KMP* is a mature statement of Apollinarian doctrine, written not only in opposition to Arianism and the Pneumatomachians, but also as an apologetic to the charge of Sabellianism brought against him by the Eustathians *and* to the charge of subordinationism subsequently brought against him by more 'orthodox' opponents. This would be consistent with the view held by Voisin and others that this is an Apollinarian treatise written after his break with the Church and towards the end of his career, when not only his Christology but also his Theology came under attack even from 'orthodox' spokesmen. Voisin suggests 382 as a date for the composition of the *KMP* and Caspari puts it as late as the year of Apollinarius' death (c.390).[86]

The Leontian Variant of KMP 27-31

When compiling his edition of the Apollinarian fragments, Lietzmann came to the conclusion that the version of *KMP* 27-31 passed on under the name of Gregory Thaumaturgus is more original than the version of those paragraphs quoted in a different order by Leontius of Byzantium in the *Adv. Fraudes*. In Lietzmann's opinion 'the form of the text' of the Leontian variant 'clearly gives the impression of the second edition which must have been worked over by an enthusiastic disciple'.[87] In support of this impression, Lietzmann argues that if the Sidonian library document had specified that Apollinarius himself had written the paragraphs of the *KMP* which it preserves, Leontius would have given it much greater emphasis in his introductory comments, for this would have provided strong evidence for his Apollinarian 'fraud' theory.[88]

Since Lietzmann, a much stronger case has been made by Richard, Prestige and Mühlenberg for accepting the Leontian variant as the more original version of *KMP* 27-31 and for regarding the Gregorian *textus receptus* as a revised edition.[89]

It is therefore important to consider the interesting expansions in the Leontian variant (hereafter referred to as the *LV*) when assessing the Christology of *KMP* for not only are the expanded phrases closer to the words of Apollinarius himself, but they are

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[86] Voisin,p.219;Caspari,C.P.,*ANQ,1879*,pp.40-41.
[87] L.p.132.
[88] L.pp.107-108.
[89] See Richard,'L'Introduction du mot',pp.6-7;Prestige,G.,*St Basil and Apollinaris*,pp.60-62;Mühlenberg, pp.94-95,pp.101-102.

also likely to be particularly characteristic of (the less 'orthodox' aspects of) his doctrine since certain supporters appear to have seen fit to modify them subsequently due to their typically 'Apollinarian' nature.[90]

Location of the Main Christological Passages

Lietzmann divides the *KMP* into five main sections. This analysis is apposite and provides a helpful framework for a more detailed synopsis. [91] There are three main places in the *KMP* where Apollinarius deals with Christology. These Christological passages will be referred to thus:

(1) ***Polemical Introduction of Doctrine of the Incarnation (§§2-3)***[92]

(2) ***Preliminary Statement of Incarnational Belief (§§11-12)***[93]

(3) ***Detailed Confession of the Doctrine of the Incarnation (§§28-31,32,34,35-36)***[94]

(There is some justification for also considering Fr.1 together with this confessional material.)[95]

A Christological Confession Informed by the Doctrine of the Divine Πρόσληψις of Flesh

If we look closely at the Christological passages of the *KMP,* it is abundantly evident that this Apollinarian formulation of the Faith confesses exactly the same type of (T.) Christological doctrine which we find scientifically expounded in the *Apodeixis.*

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[90] For E.T.of *LV* see pp.331-332,below.
[91] L.p.133: 'I. In the form of a polemical introduction, the rightful Trinitarian (1) and Incarnational (2,3) doctrine is advanced. II. Preliminary remarks follow about the Logos as source of knowledge (4) and a detailed description of Trinitarian doctrine (5-10) and Christology (11-12). III. Trinitarian doctrine is treated again thoroughly (13-26) and here, especially, scriptural proof is given of the personhood of the H. Spirit. IV. The "confessional section" (27-37) lists a number of baptismal confessions one after another, ending in a great three-fold formula (35-37). V. The conclusion produces further scriptural proof of the proposed Trinitarian doctrine (38-43).'
[92] L.p.168,ll.5-21(E.T.pp.329-330,below).
[93] L.p.170,l.28-p.171,l.19(E.T.pp.330-331,below).
[94] L.p.176(subtext)l.1-p.179(subtext)l.15;L.p.180,ll.7-12;L.p.180,ll.19-21;L.p.181,ll.1-14(E.T.pp331-333,below).
[95] L.p.185,ll.4-6.Theodoret attests that this passage 'follows shortly' after a citation from *KMP* 11(*Eranistes I,MPG*83.104C).

The incarnational doctrine of the *Apodeixis* is informed by two 'tenets' of belief: (1) 'it is a '*divine* enfleshment' and (therefore) (2) 'according to human likeness'. Apollinarius presents the unitive action and unity of Christ accordingly: it is the action (πρόσληψις) of a perfect, unchanging divine subject towards the flesh (as opposed to a whole man) which he takes-on-in-addition, (consequently) the unity of Christ *is* the divine subject enduring in his singular divine nature who is together with/possesses, in addition, genuinely human flesh (not without an animal soul), which is perfected by him.

Apollinarius' first Christological statement in the *Polemical Introduction* of the *KMP* rests upon the same two tenets and employs the same term – προσλαμβάνω – to designate a similarly delineated incarnational action and unity:

> 'The confession of the church and the world saving faith is about *the enfleshment (σαρκώσεως) of the Word,* who gave himself to human flesh which he took-on-in-addition (προσελάβετο) from Mary, yet who remained in his exact identity (ταυτότητι) and he submitted to no divine change nor modification, but who came close together with flesh (συναιρεθέντος...πρὸς) *according to human likeness*, so that the flesh was united to the divinity, the divinity having taken up as its own (ἀνῃρηκυίας) the passibility (τὸ παθητικὸν) of the flesh in the fulfilment of the mystery.'[96]

This declaration in *KMP* 2 follows Apollinarius' polemical introductory statement on Trinitarian doctrine which defends the divinity of the Word as a 'person' and 'a singular and individual hypostasis'. Thus, Apollinarius has a *divine* enfleshment very much in mind when he confesses the incarnation *of the Word*, and his precise understanding of Christ's divine singularity would seem to be largely predetermined by his understanding of the Word's divine individuality in a Trinitarian context.

In his *Preliminary Statement of Incarnational Belief*, Apollinarius declares:

> '...we believe that for the renewal of humanity *the enfleshment* of *the Word [himself]*[97] has taken place – the divinity remaining unchanged. For neither exchange nor change nor limitation in spirit took place in respect of the holy

[96] L.p.168,ll.5-12.
[97] 'αὐτῆς' is given in Theodoret's variant ,see *MPG*83.104C.

> power (δύναμιν) of God. But remaining the same (power) it also fulfilled the work of the enfleshment for the salvation of the world, and the Word of God (was) living as a citizen upon the earth according to what is human...'.[98]

Despite the reference to the Word's divinity as 'power', Apollinarius is not exactly recapitulating his monenergetic thesis from *De Unione* where the divine 'travelling spirit' and 'overshadowing power' replace the human animal soul at the virginal conception. Here, δύναμις seems to be used as a near equivalent of θεότης – or, more exactly, 'the divinity at work'.[99] When Apollinarius talks about the way Christ 'lives' we do not find in *KMP* 11 the 'biological' idea, but an idea more characteristic of the *Apodeixis* – the divine subject living *as* a human being in respect of his acquired and similar humanity. In the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius explains Christ's humanity not so much with reference to a corporeal part, but, drawing on *Phil.*2.7, with reference to the carnal/human form taken by the divine subject. Here, in *KMP* 12, we find the same idea close by: 'The Lord of Glory appeared in human form (σχήματι).' If we accept the authenticity of the extra fragment (Fr.1) preserved by Theodoret and located by him in this part of the *KMP*, then we find both the dynamics of the divine πρόσληψις and also the terminology: 'We worship God who took-on-in-addition (προσλαβόντα) flesh from the holy virgin and through this (action – τοῦτο) was a human being according to the flesh and God according to the Spirit.'[100]

The Detailed Confession of the Doctrine of the Incarnation also contains a number of statements suggestive of the idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh, particularly if we follow the more original *LV* of the text. In the first excerpt of the *KMP* preserved by Leontius we find the 'first tenet' of this conception in the opening sentence: 'our faith is in the Lord Jesus Christ as God enfleshed'.[101] The 'second tenet' is intimated by the last sentence of the same excerpt: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ is truly and by nature God and yet man according to flesh.'[102] In the *Apodeixis* the divinely initiated action which seems linked with the technical term πρόσληψις is also variously presented as God's 'appearing' and 'coming in flesh', his 'descent', his 'taking' and 'bearing of flesh'. All these descriptions of the incarnational action are present in the *Detailed Confession* of the *KMP*:

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[98] L.p.171,l.1-8.
[99] For this sense of δύναμις see Lampe,p.390,11. Apollinarius may be reacting in *KMP* 11 to the type of criticism brought against him by Gregory of Nazianzus in *Ep.*101,viz.'God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit... are not bare titles dividing inequalities of ranks and power'(see p.216,above).
[100] L.p.185,ll.4-6.
[101] *KMP*30,L.p.178(subtext),ll.5-6.
[102] *KMP*31,L.p.179(subtext),ll.14-15,cf.*Apodeixis* Fr.81.

> 'He who is fleshless [was] made manifest in flesh' (§31); 'the Word was enfleshed and was made manifest in fleshly birth which was from a virgin' (§34); 'we believe... in the glorious coming of the Son of God' (§32); 'the same pre-existing Son set himself down (κατέστη) having united himself with flesh from Mary' (§36, cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.97); the Son of God took (λαβόντος) flesh from a virgin' (§32); 'God was united to flesh... bearing/leading (ἄγων) the flesh and the carnal movements in a divine way' (§30).

It seems not insignificant, therefore, that Apollinarius chooses to use the term προσλαμβάνω in his first formulation of his *Detailed Confession of the Doctrine of the Incarnation* in the *KMP*: 'And further, we confess that the Son of God has become Son of Man, *not in name but in truth, having taken-on-in-addition (προσλαβόντα) flesh from Mary the Virgin*' (§28).[103]

What indicates further that Apollinarius has here chosen προσλαμβάνω as a technical term to denote the truly incarnational action is the pains which he subsequently takes (evident in the *LV*) to distinguish this from the false notion of God's conjunction with a whole man designated by another compound of λαμβάνω favoured by his opponents:

> 'Since some have troubled us greatly, attempting to overthrow our Faith which is in the Lord Jesus Christ as God enfleshed, representing him as a man who has been joined (συναφθέντα) to God, because of this we make the confession concerning the aforementioned Faith, throwing out the false contradiction and its fair-faced *formal presentation* (σχηματισμόν) which says that *God was man having assumed (ἀναλαβών) a whole man*' (§30 [*LV*] cf. *Apodeixis*, Fr.76; *Antirrheticus* 39).[104]

In a subsequent *LV* expansion Apollinarius specifies precisely the proper sense in which he believes that the term ἀναλαμβάνω should be applied to (the saving work of) Christ:

> 'We anathematise as blasphemers those who posit a man in the divine doxology... but we declare that the whole man *is* assumed/taken up (ἀναλαμβανόμενον) by God *for salvation* (namely) each one of us who is being sanctified and receives/takes on (λαβανόντων) a likeness to the heavenly man and who is divinized towards the likeness of... our Lord Jesus Christ' (§31 [*LV*]).[105]

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[103] L.p.177(subtext),ll.5-7.
[104] L.p.178(subtext),ll.4-10.
[105] L.p.179(subtext),ll.9-15.

The way in which Apollinarius uses the two compounds in *KMP* also seems to accord with and confirm the apparently 'arithmetical' rationale for the distinction to which Gregory alludes in *Antirrheticus* 39 and which is to some extent discernible in certain surviving fragments from the *Apodeixis*. The rejection of the view that the incarnation is God's ἀνάληψις of a whole man in *KMP* 30 leads to Apollinarius reiterating his own counter-thesis that the real mode of union is between God (*qua* mind) and human flesh (without mind).[106] His opening statement of *KMP* 31 indicates that it is by this means (πρόσληψις?) that he understands there to be a true unity which is from the perfect (and the incomplete) and certainly not from the union of the two completes (ἀνάληψις): '... And he is [thus] truly one (εἷς ἀληθινὸς) – he who is fleshless made manifest in flesh, perfect in true and divine perfection, not two persons, not two natures complete in themselves.'[107] When Apollinarius introduces his preferred term προσλαμβάνω at the beginning of this same *Detailed Confession*, the expanded text of the *LV* again indicates that the term is linked to the idea of a proper and possible union between the perfect and the (incomplete) flesh as opposed to a (non-) union of two completes: 'We confess that the Son of God became Son of Man not in name but in truth having taken-on-in-addition flesh from Mary the Virgin *and he is [thus] one perfect (son/individual-ἕνα) and not two complete things united*'.[108]

It is interesting that the subsequent editor of the *KMP* 28-31 has chosen to leave out the *(LV)* phrases which indicate the rejection of ἀνάληψις in favour of πρόσληψις and which emphasise the 'novel arithmetic' which may lie behind the distinction. It could be that the editor considers the distinction to be typically 'Apollinarian', or not sufficiently important. Nevertheless, it is also interesting that the Athanasian passage from *Ad Adelphium* which he inserts into *KMP* 28[109] employs the favoured compound when alluding to *Phil* 2.7. Athanasius' rejection of the union of two 'equals', also, to some extent, provides a parallel to Apollinarius' rejection of two completes: 'we worship him who became man for our salvation not as one who became equal (ἴσον) in an equal (ἴσῳ) body, but as a master who took-on-in-addition (προσλαβόντα) the form of a servant.'[110] Taken in isolation the Athanasian statement is not inconsistent with Apollinarius' conception of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh which is expounded in the *Apodeixis* and *KMP* and it may have lent it authority, but there is no evidence elsewhere

[106] L.p.179(subtext),ll.1-4.
[107] L.p.179(subtext),ll.4-6.
[108] L.p.177(subtext),ll.5-8.
[109] See Prestige,G.,*St Basil and Apollinaris*,1956,pp.60-61.
[110] L.p.178,ll.2-3.

that Athanasius was reluctant to use the term ἀναλαμβάνω to refer to the same assumptive act of union,[111] nor that he believed such an act necessarily involved an incompleteness in its object.

Anthropology

In the *KMP* Apollinarius does not make open confession of the trichotomic analysis of man which informs his doctrine of Christ in the *Apodeixis*; he may have considered this too contentious for a confessional document designed to demonstrate the orthodoxy of his belief. Neither does he openly confess the consequence of this analysis – that Christ's flesh lacks a human mind. Nevertheless, if we consider the *Detailed Confession*, it is obvious that the T. analysis of Christ is implicit from what Apollinarius says about the role of the divinity in Christ and the nature of his human flesh. Thus implicit in the rejection of the assumption of a whole man is the rejection of Christ's human mind as in Fr.76 of the *Apodeixis*:

> 'God was united to human flesh and possessed his own pure energy *being a mind* (νοῦς...ὢν) unconquered by *psychic* (ψυχικῶν) and fleshly passions and bearing the flesh *and carnal movements* (τὰς σαρκικὰς κινήσεις) in a divine way and sinlessly'.[112]

God is here directly identified with Christ's νοῦς – his intellectual energy principle which remains undeflected in implementing its purpose. This is not, as in the D. thesis, because it is the *only* energy principle. Apollinarius' allusion to Christ's flesh indicates a further articulation within the human flesh which (potentially) has *psychic* passions and therefore, by implication, a vital/animal soul which must be source of the 'carnal movements' to which Apollinarius also refers. The idea of the divine mind being 'unconquered' is suggestive of the Pauline idea of the war between the flesh and the spirit which Apollinarius uses to justify his trichotomic analysis in the *Apodeixis* (see Fr.22,74,76,88). We noted how the T. analysis of man and Christ in the *Apodeixis* tends to point Apollinarius towards a more 'spiritualist' understanding of what constitutes the ultimate unity/identity of the rational individual. This also seems to be implicit in the *KMP* 30: the divine subject in Christ bears/leads the flesh, but he *is* (ὢν) the mind. In the (*LV*) statement which precedes this Christological thesis Apollinarius rejects the

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[111] See(e.g.).*Ad Adelphium* 4,*MPG*26.1077A.
[112] L.p.179(subtext),ll.1-4.

alternative – the assumption of a whole man – in terms which rather suggest that he ultimately identifies a whole man with his rational governing principle: 'A whole man is not pure of sin... because he is not able to lead/bear (ἄγειν) his own (ἑαυτοῦ) energy/actions [i.e. unlike the divine mind who *is* able] to the same end as the divine.'[113]

Communicatio Idiomatum

As is evident from the *Polemical Introduction*, Apollinarius wishes to distinguish his own 'orthodox' position as much from the theopaschite as the dualist error (§3). Thus, his predication of Christ's attributes in the *KMP* tends to be carefully divisive. Where Apollinarius does predicate both divine and human attributes to Christ, the basis for the joint predication seems not to be the existence of one inclusive divine-human nature but, as in the *Apodeixis*, the singularity of the divine subject/person to whom both sets of attributes apply – the divine because of his enduring divine nature, the carnal in respect of the human flesh (not without a soul) which he has taken-on-in-addition:

> 'We confess the suffering of the Lord in respect of the flesh, the resurrection in the power of the divinity' (§29); 'the divine (power) kept the impassibility which was its own. Therefore, godless is he who attributes the suffering to the power. For the Lord of Glory appeared in human form having taken responsibility for the human economy upon the earth and fulfilled the law on behalf of human beings by (his) actions and dissolved (their) suffering by (his) suffering and destroyed death by (his) death and raised up life by *his* (αὐτοῦ) resurrection' (§§11-12).

Whilst the 'αὐτοῦ' is present in only one manuscript,[114] Apollinarius appears to be predicating both divine and human attributes to the one divine subject – the Lord of Glory. The human attributes are predicated because of the 'human form' he is in, they do not apply to his divine power (= nature?) which endures unchanged. In a similar fashion, all attributes are attributed to the Son of God (who took flesh) in §32.

Soteriology

Also to be found in the Christological passages of the *KMP* are formulations indicating the same two-stage *schema* of soteriology, which is linked to Apollinarius' (T.) Christology in the *Apodeixis*. In the *Polemical Introduction* (§2) Apollinarius alludes to

[113] L.p.178(subtext),ll.10-12.
[114] See L.p.171,l.16-note.

the first physical 'objective' phase of salvation achieved by the divine Word's unity with flesh whereby in his flesh he has overcome the inevitable mortality and corruption formally associated with carnal existence. Apollinarius also alludes to the second 'subjective' phase of future salvation which depends on human beings (somehow) 'appropriating' the beauty and the immortality of the Word's fleshly existence by faith.[115] In the *Apodeixis*, Apollinarius' understanding of the first physical-objective phase of salvation also has a sacrificial dimension and we find evidence of this aspect of his thinking in two of the *KMP* formulae. In both cases Apollinarius presents the sacrificial act as that which makes future salvation possible, although, in keeping with the *Apodeixis*, he also specifies that the second phase is conditional upon belief, obedience and merit and therefore has a 'subjective' dimension:

> '...he took flesh from a virgin which he filled with the holy spirit for the sanctification of us all, and having handed over the flesh to death, he destroyed death through the resurrection for the resurrection of us all and he ascended up into heaven lifting up and glorifying human beings in himself and he comes a second time giving back eternal life *to us who believe and keep his commandments*' (§35);[116] 'The Lord of Glory appeared in human form... and fulfilled the law on behalf of human beings by (his) actions and dissolved their sufferings... and destroyed death... and raised up life by (his) resurrection. And we look forward to the glorious coming from heaven for the life and judgement of all and *the resurrection of the dead will be for the repayment of all according to desert*' (§12).[117]

The concluding words of each formulation indicate the 'moral' view of the future self-assimilation of the νόες which we glimpse in the *Apodeixis* (see Fr.80) over the 'natural' interpretation suggested by Norris. Nevertheless, in both formulations the fact that the Word has handed over and taken up again his human flesh in which we are all now *already* lifted up seems to be the decisive aspect of the first phase – the incarnation (understood on the basis of the T. analysis) is conceived primarily as a physical-sacrificial act of salvation rather than a demonstrative act (*contra* Mühlenberg's interpretation).

The most obvious soteriological echo of the *Apodeixis* occurs in the major expansion of the *KMP* 30 offered by the *LV.* Rejecting the false contradiction that God assumed a whole man, Apollinarius adds 'for since a whole man is not pure of sin in the present life... because he is not able to lead his own actions to the same end as the divine

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[115] L.p.168,ll.10-16.
[116] L.p.181,ll.1-7.
[117] L.p.171,ll.12-19.

actions and, because of this, he is not free from death – God was united to human flesh…'.[118] This puts even more clearly the type of soteriological rationale for rejecting the assumption of a whole man and a human mind which we find in *Apodeixis* Fr.76 – although here Apollinarius does not specify why human being/mind inevitably fails in the practice of virtue, e.g. due to its natural mutability and/or weakness of knowledge. The picture of the divine mind's 'purity of action' which follows would appear to be primarily 'natural' rather than 'moral'.

The soteriological argument in *KMP* 30 (*LV*) occupies an important place in the work's most detailed Christological confession, but it remains somewhat parenthetical to the main statement which is primarily concerned with giving a true definition of the incarnation of unity (God enfleshed) and the mode of the union (God/mind united to human flesh). This is why the subsequent Apollinarian editor is able to leave it out. In this respect this particular line of soteriological thought occupies a similar place in relation to Apollinarius' Christological exposition in the *KMP* as it does in the *Apodeixis*; it is *not* confessed as if the primary motive for Apollinarius' incarnational doctrine; it is offered more as a justifying argument. Neither is it the only justifying argument from the *Apodeixis* which is present in the *Detailed Confession*. Apollinarius supports his contention that a whole man is not assumed also with reference to the fallacious alternative – belief in a Tetrad (*KMP* 31, cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.82). In the *Apodeixis* the 'Tetrad argument' appears to be a supplement to the 'arithmetical argument' against Christ's full humanity: Apollinarius rejects the completeness of Christ's human element because of his logical refusal to believe that there can be an integral unity between two wholes. In the *Apodeixis* this premise more than any appears to precipitate the notion of πρόσληψις – the possible unity between one who is perfect and something which is partial. If we look at the *Detailed Confession* of the *KMP* (§§28-31[*LV*]), the principle Apollinarian formulation is *framed* in its first and last paragraphs by two statements which indicate that this type of 'arithmetical' logic, not soteriology, is the primary basis of the 'true' (Apollinarian) understanding of the Incarnation – here as in the *Apodeixis*.[119]

An Idea of Union by Composition?

The near absence in the *KMP* of the language and logic of the 'compositional' conception of the union more typical of the D. treatises is perhaps unsurprising given the

[118] L.p.178(subtext),l.10-p.179,l.1.
[119] L.p.177(subtext),ll.5-8;L.p.179(subtext),ll.4-6.

way Apollinarius rejects the idea of composition (σύνθεσις) as a suitable means of understanding God's unity-in-plurality when it comes to the doctrine of the Trinity. The implication of Apollinarius' argument against Sabellianism in §1[120] is that union by synthesis does not (and cannot?) involve a multiplicity of persons and features a union of elements all (?) impersonal within something/someone else. On this analysis the synthetic view of the unity in Christ would sit quite well with Apollinarius' rejection of two persons, but would need careful justification if Apollinarius is to preserve the enduring unity of the divine person as both an element within the overall unity and that unity itself/himself. In *KMP* 18 Apollinarius rejects Sabellianism again in terms which give even clearer insight into how he understands unity by σύνθεσις and why he considers this concept/term to be theologically inadequate.[121] Here Apollinarius specifies that in the synthetic unity *all* the constituent elements are partial which is why it is unsuitable to denote the Trinitarian unity of three *fully* divine persons. Given his opinion that the Word is not only a person/hypostasis (§1), but also a perfect person (§37),[122] it is very hard to see how Apollinarius could in the very same treatise use union by composition as a helpful concept for explaining the Christological unity of the perfect Son of God and his flesh.

Implicit in Apollinarius' definition of σύνθεσις in *KMP* 18, therefore, there may be a recognition of the unsuitability of this term (and concept) in the sphere of Christology as well as Trinitarian theology, and this seems to be borne out by the near absence of the terms and ideas of the compositional D. thesis from the Christological passages of the *KMP* and the preferred emphasis upon the divine πρόσληψις of flesh and related ways of understanding the unity. Nevertheless, there are *two* places in the *KMP* where Apollinarius presents the union in quasi-'compositional' terms. In both cases, however, he intimates a unique asymmetrical view of co-mixture/co-constitution which remains in keeping with his conception of Christological unity in the *Apodeixis* where the incarnational action (πρόσληψις) is not only presented as the divine assumption, but sometimes also as a special type of 'assumptional composition' as can occur between someone perfect and something incomplete: assumptional from the perspective of the one who is complete; compositional from the perspective of what is partial.

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[120] L.p.167,l.18-p.168,l.4.
[121] L.p.173,ll.14-15.
[122] L.p.181,ll.14-15:'God the Father being a perfect person(τέλειον...πρόσωπον) has the perfect(τέλειον) Word truly begotten from himself.'

In *KMP* 11 Apollinarius proclaims: 'The Word of God, living as a citizen upon the earth according to what was human, at the same time maintained the divine presence over all things filling all things and yet peculiarly (ἰδίως) co-mingled (συγκεκραμένος) with flesh'.[123] The verb συγκεράννυμι here denotes the unique and intimate way in which the divine subject filled/was present to one thing – Christ's flesh/human element – whilst maintaining his universal presence. In this context the verb, which is frequently used by Gregory of Nyssa in his 'orthodox' refutation of Apollinarius, need not convey the symmetrical conception of unity by composition which the derived noun denotes in *De Unione* 5.[124]

Further on, in a quasi-creedal formulation (§36), Apollinarius also uses the verb συνίστημι which he sometimes employs elsewhere as a near-equivalent to συντίθημι when advocating his compositional view of the union (cf. *De Unione* 5,11; Fr.107). In the context of the *KMP* 36 formula, the term indicates a more asymmetrical unitive act than the constitution of a divine-human composite: 'God the Word is not one person and the man Jesus another (person), but the same pre-existing Son was [literally = 'set himself down' (κατέστη)] united with flesh, constituting *himself* (συνιστὰς ἑαυτὸν) a perfect, holy and sinless human being'.[125] Significantly, the enduring divine person who 'sets himself down' by uniting with flesh does *not* thereby (as a co-constituent) constitute *something else* (cf. *De Unione* 5,11; Fr.107) but constitutes *himself* a perfect human being. Yet, by this action, he does not constitute himself *into* a complete human being. The other verb Apollinarius uses to denote the mode of this divinely initiated action – κατίστημι – is also used in a conclusive statement at the end of the *Apodeixis* which makes this point in connection with the T. thesis: 'How does God become man without being changed away from being God unless mind has set itself down (κατέστη) in man?' (Fr.97).[126] In both the *Apodeixis* and the *KMP*, Apollinarius makes it abundantly clear that a man *per se* is not involved in the union and certainly not a complete man – rather flesh. If the action in Fr.36 involves a (co-)constituted and perfect(ed) humanity and yet also involves the continuity of the divine subject/mind, then the action of being (co-)constituted and completed as a perfect human being can only belong to the carnal element. This suggests the peculiar conception of a union which is

[123] L.p.171,ll.7-9.
[124] Cf.L.p.187,ll.4-6
[125] L.p.181,ll.9-12.
[126] L.p.229,ll.30-31.

assumptive in one direction and compositional in the other which we noted in the *Apodeixis* and associated with the term πρόσληψις.

Further Insights Afforded by the KMP into Apollinarius' T. Doctrine of the Divine Πρόσληψις of Flesh

(1) Future Salvation

The *KMP* allows further insight into an unclear aspect of the two-stage soteriological thesis which is found in the *Apodeixis* and alluded to in the other T. documents: how do rational human beings appropriate for themselves the fruits of salvation won by the Word in his flesh? In *KMP* 2, Apollinarius states that the restored beauty of Christ's flesh (secured in the first physical-cum-sacrificial incarnational stage of salvation) is 'bestowed (χορηγέω) upon all human beings by/in the appropriation/relationship of faith (ἐν τῇ τῆς πίστεως οἰκειώσει)'.[127] If we consider the immediate context of this phrase (*KMP* 1-4) then it becomes apparent that Apollinarius is not talking primarily about receipt of the eucharistic sacrament (as Lietzmann believes), nor a subjective reorientation *in imitatio Christi* (as Mühlenberg has argued), rather he is talking about *acknowledgement and confession* of the authentic and saving (articles of the) Faith as professed by the Apostles and the true Church and as correctly interpreted and formulated by Apollinarius.

We need not look further ahead in the *KMP*, nor to the 'eucharistic' fragments of other works, to determine the most likely sense of the ambiguous phrase in §2; there are a number of clues in the *Polemical Introduction* to which it belongs. Apollinarius indicates the purpose of his work in the title: he is giving an account of '*The Faith* - point by point'. He begins by attacking the false views of 'those who are most hostile and alien to *the Apostolic Confession'* (§1). He introduces his own doctrine of the incarnation in the same terms: 'The *Confession of the Church* and the world-saving *Faith* is to do with the enfleshment of the Word' (§2). And he rejects those who do not subscribe to this doctrine thus: 'But if some people here falsify *the sacred Faith...* these people are outside *the ecclesiastical and saving Confession*' (§3). In this context Apollinarius' assertion that the fruits of salvation in Christ are given 'to all by/in the 'οἰκειώσις' of (the) Faith' seems not most obviously to be about acceptance of the eucharistic

[127] L.p.168,ll.15-16.

sacrament, but about acceptance, submission and *acknowledgement* of the correct/faithful version (Apollinarius') of the Church's Confession. Future salvation is dispensed according to merit (§12) and this involves both obeying Christ's laws/following his ethical example *and* belief: 'and he comes a second time giving back eternal life *to us who hold the Faith* (πιστεύουσι) *and* keep his commandments (§35).'[128] The verb used by Apollinarius does not simply denote an attitude, but acceptance of the Christian Faith (initially by baptism and) by being in the Church and confessing the true 'apostolic and ecclesiastical Faith' (§43) as set out in the *KMP*. The *KMP* indicates that Apollinarius understood the self-assimilation of the νόες to Christ and the benefits of his holy body in ecclesiological terms as well as ethical.[129] And it is perhaps unsurprising that in this work, written after his break with orthodoxy (?), he is striving to define the true Church in terms of the true set of beliefs – that is, those which he and his party confess and which others have rejected. This soteriological imperative has not been introduced by Apollinarius simply as a proselytising tactic. There is no doubt that what he himself confesses he himself believes to be a matter of eternal life and death – but this dimension of his soteriology encourages his readers to consider most seriously the doctrines set out in the *KMP* and whether or not they are prepared to accept and co-confess this 'orthodox' version of the Faith.

It is true that some of the ideas present in *KMP* 4 cohere well with Mühlenberg's 'epistemological' interpretation of Apollinarius' soteriological argument in *Apodeixis* 76-80, and this type of thinking may indeed inform that thesis.[130] However, in *KMP* 4 soteriology is not the context nor the primary purpose of what Apollinarius is saying. After his *Polemical Introduction* (§§1-3), Apollinarius prefaces his *Preliminary Statement of Doctrine* (§§5-12) by this paragraph (§4), the primary purpose of which is to explain by means of an analysis of the structure of revelation, the divinity of the Trinity. Thus the main thrust of the passage is Trinitarian rather than Christological. It is also possible to understand Apollinarius' references to 'knowledge' and 'recognition' not, as Mühlenberg does, in terms of the saving *gnosis* of authentic existence, but in terms of '*acknowledgement*' of the true and saving (Trinitarian) confession of the Church. Such a reading of *KMP* 4 is in keeping with the theme which we find in §§1-3.

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[128] L.p.181,ll.6-7. The sense of πίστις here is 'that which is believed' – based on scripture and as transmitted by the apostles/Church(see Lampe,p.1087,III).

[129] Note Apollinarius' paraphrase of *Gal.*1.8-9 in §§41(L.p.183,ll.22-p.184,l.4). Although the allusion to scripture is primarily used to prove the divinity of the Spirit, it contains all the elements of the type of view of future salvation which we find in the *KMP* e.g. 'if he who comes preaches another Christ whom we do not preach...or another gospel which you have not received, then you are rightly held fast'.

[130] Mühlenberg,pp.187-188.

In this context the noetic verbs denote the correct confessional stance, as well as the epistemological process, which leads to (future) salvation.[131] Apollinarius links the possibility of knowing God to an *acknowledgement* (επιγνώσκω) of the co-equally divine status of the Son as perfect wisdom and connects the proper approach to God of the one who knows him to 'a correct invocation' (ὁ επικαλούμενος ὀρθῶς)[132] of the Triune God – through the divine Son and through the divine Spirit. 'Therefore' (οὖν)[133] the Trinitarian confession which follows in §5ff.

(2) Christological Terminology

If the aim of Apollinarius was to produce a confessional formulary, demonstrative of his orthodoxy, and upon which the appropriation of future salvation and membership of the true Church ultimately depended, then he must have considered his terms very carefully both in the Christological sections of the *KMP* and in the Trinitarian sections which provide their larger context.

Significantly, the *KMP* seems to confirm the status of προσλαμβάνω as a technical term favoured by Apollinarius for denoting the mode of the incarnational union when expounding his T. Christology. The term is employed at key moments, introducing the first and third Christological sections (§§2,28), and it may well have featured also in the second Christological section (§§11-12, see Fr.1). Other terms used to describe this mode of union indicate that προσλαμβάνω conveys a similar range of meaning here as it does in the *Apodeixis*, signifying a divine action which is primarily assumptive, irruptive and possessive (§§11,12,30-36) and yet also, in some sense, co-constitutive (§§11,36). This conception of the union is contrasted with another inappropriate idea – the conjunction of two wholes (§28,31[*LV*]) – which is explicitly linked with another technical term ἀναλάμβανω (§30[*LV*]). Apollinarius makes plain his view that ἀναλάμβανω signifies a unitive action which more properly describes God's assumption/adoption of a whole human being in (future) salvation (§31[*LV*]).

Apollinarius' preferred usage of what were to be the key Christological terms – φύσις (οὐσία) πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις – within the context of his T. Christology also

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[131] See also *KMP* 6, where the 'unbelief' of the Jews who do not 'hold the faith' that the Word is God and who do not 'confess' him Son of God is compared to that of the Arians who 'destroy the knowledge of God' by 'saying' the Son is a creature; also *KMP* 8: he who 'repudiates'(ἀρνέομαι) religious belief in the Holy Spirit as divine sanctifier 'abrogates Holy Baptism'.
[132] L.p.169,l.5.
[133] L.p.169,l.11.

seems to be confirmed and clarified by the *KMP*, where it is perhaps possible to discern a process whereby his sharpened definition of the technical sense of these terms in the sphere of Trinitarian theology brings about a consequent precision in his related Christological usage. In the D. works all four terms are used with a certain amount of imprecision to denote Christ as a complete composite unity and Apollinarius is also able to use φύσις and οὐσία in their more 'generic' sense when maintaining the distinction in Christ. Apollinarius' sense of πρόσωπον (and ὑπόστασις) is also ambiguous, for it remains unclear whether this singularity is equivalent to, or supported by, the concrete physical unity, or whether it denotes, rather, the enduring divine subject. In the *Apodeixis*, *Tomus Synodalis*, *Epp. Ad Diocaesareenses*, *Ad Julianum* [*Ad Serapionem* and *Ad Terentium*], φύσις and οὐσία are very rarely used to denote the unity of Christ (e.g. Fr.151) and such terminology is used almost exclusively to refer to the Word Incarnate's full divinity or the true humanness of his acquired flesh. The central idea of unity in these 'T.' works is that of the singular divine subject/Son, but on no occasion does Apollinarius *explicitly* identify this singularity as the one person (Fr.67 (?)) or hypostasis (Fr.38 (?)) in Christ. In *KMP*, in the interests of his non-Sabellian, non-subordinationist Theology, he has to make clear distinctions between the singular divine personhood of the Word and his singular divine nature/substance, and this is carried over into his doctrine of the divine Word's enfleshment:[134] the Word is a fully divine

[134] In differentiating his position from the Sabellian, Apollinarius actually defines what he means by person using hypostatic language and *contrasting* this idea of the personal individuality of the Father, Son and Spirit with the idea of their 'natural' unity:'For "person" signifies the very being and objective/hypostatic existence of each individual (πρόσωπον...ἑκάστου τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ καὶ ὑφεστάναι δηλοῖ), but the divinity (θέοτης) is the Father's characteristic property (ἴδιον) and whenever the one divinity of the three is spoken of it bears witness to the specific character (ἰδιότητα) of the Father *being present in* the Son and Spirit (παροῦσαν υἱῷ τε καὶ πνεύματι)'(§15)(L.p.172,ll.10-13). According to this definition Apollinarius understands a person to be the individual existing object (hypostasis) in which a set of qualities (a 'generic' nature/substance) inheres. This definition employs 'ὑφίστημι' in its active and intransitive sense: it refers to the concrete individual reality which objectifies a nature/substance which subsists (is present) in it. Here there is something of a reversal of Apollinarius' terminological usage in the D. writings where φύσις and οὐσία are terms used to denote Christ/man as a concrete existing reality (in which his person/hypostasis exists?). Apollinarius' clarified and consistent employment of the terms φύσις, οὐσία, πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις in the Trinitarian sections of the *KMP* seems to be carried over into his Christological exposition and it is hard to see how it could not be so given the way that the Christology is introduced. Following on from his assertion that the Word/Son is a fully divine person *qua* hypostatic individual, not a part or faculty of something else (§1), Apollinarius declares (§2) that the same Word became enfleshed (by πρόσληψις cf.Fr.121) 'yet stood firm in his identity (ταυτότητι)' i.e. as an individual divine hypostatic person 'and submitted to no divine change nor modification' i.e. in whom the fully divine nature/substance continued to inhere. The opening statement of Apollinarius' *Detailed Confession of the Doctrine of the Incarnation* (§28[*LV*]) has been prefaced by a much more thorough exposition of Trinitarian doctrine confirming the status of the Word/Son as an unchanging, eternal hypostatic person who actualises the divine nature (§§13-27). In this context, the statement which proclaims the unity of Christ as a masculine individual/Son, hypostasis and person can only be a reference to the subject person and hypostasis of the Son of God himself, who is also Son of Man because he has taken on flesh which is not *per se* a complete (i.e. hypostatic?) entity which can exist individually. In the

hypostatic (perfect) person in whom the divine nature/substance (i.e. a set of qualities (ἰδίοτης) belonging to God the Father) inheres. It is this hypostatic person who becomes incarnate without changing his divine nature, taking-on-in-addition flesh which, whilst possessing human characteristics, is not a second 'nature complete in itself'. Apollinarius may here (*KMP* 31) be referring obliquely to the idea of a non-actual, unhypostatic, impersonal human nature – but he probably still understands the incompleteness of Christ's humanity in terms of it being *something partial*, given his ultimately objective understanding of unity of person and/or actual nature which both relate to there being one singular thing, be it simple or composite (or, via πρόσληψις, both!).

Despite the greater flexibility which the Trinitarian differentiation of person/hypostasis from φύσις/οὐσία gives him (the most obvious sign of the Trinitarian influence upon his Christological usage is the fact that he prefers *not* to use φύσις and οὐσία when affirming the unity of Christ), Apollinarius still holds back from admitting two 'generic' natures in the one divine hypostasis and from admitting that Christ's carnal acquisition is *per se* a nature. We see this demonstrated most clearly in the final formula of the Leontian passage: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ is Son of God according to nature, but according to flesh Son of Man.'[135] The suggestion here is that the divine person/hypostasis of Christ possesses/individualises only one nature (the divine), but in addition has human attributes through his union with flesh which is not his nature nor a human nature *per se.* (We meet a similar idea in *Ad Julianum* (Fr.152).) For Apollinarius this is not, however, a question of the absorption of the carnal qualities into the divine because he continues to predicate Christ's human characteristics to the flesh. Why then does he draw short of admitting that the flesh of Christ *per se* is *a* nature (or *a* substance) in any sense even in the *KMP*?

If we consider the other point at which the term φύσις features in a Christological formulation of the *KMP* then perhaps we may begin to answer this question: 'And he is

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quasi-creedal formula which follows, 'the one, Lord Jesus Christ' is directly identified with the Son of God/the eternal Word, whose individual divine identity is described in hypostatic terms:'We believe... in one Lord Jesus Christ, true God... the Son of God and only begotten offspring living, actual/hypostatic (ὑφεστῶτα) and active eternally co-existing with the Father'(§32). Here, significantly, we find the attribute of 'being hypostatic' predicated of the Word alongside the vital-dynamic qualities (ζῶντα/ἐνεργόν) which Apollinarius tends to stress in the context of his D. Christology when explaining the Word's role in the Incarnation. When this idea is carried through into Christology it becomes clearer how the Word can contribute the energy 'part' to something partial, 'completing' the incomplete whilst remaining perfect (cf.*De Unione* 5) and why this completed (or 'composite') entity is not something else but identified with the individual hypostasis in which it inheres. The Word does this by, what could be called, the *'hypostatisation'* of a 'progressive and passible body'(i.e.flesh) which does not 'exist hypostatically/independently (ἰδιαζόντως ὑφεστός)'(§3).

[135] L.p.179(subtext),ll.14-15.

truly one – he who is fleshless made manifest in flesh complete in true and divine completeness: not two persons nor two natures complete [feminine] in themselves' (§31[*LV*]).[136] Here the gender of τέλειαι indicates a different sense in which there are not two natures from the sense in which there are not two persons. There are not two persons because there is one 'he' (εἷς) – the divine person of the Word. There are not two natures because there are not two natures 'complete' in themselves. There is one complete nature – that of the divine person of the Word who remains 'complete in true and divine completeness' – and there is a sort of incomplete (non-actual/non-hypostatic) carnal 'nature' which is completed, actualised, hypostatised in the person of the Word but not in itself. Why will Apollinarius not call this a nature? His reasons may be indicated by the type of word he employs with reference to whether or not the divine or carnal 'natures' are actual or hypostatic in their own right – he speaks about whether they are 'complete'. This word suggests that Apollinarius still understands the idea of being an *actual* nature in a concrete, objective way and the idea of hypostatising or personalising a nature along similar lines, as follows.

Being an actual nature either involves being an individual object (a complete person/hypostasis) in which a particular nature subsists (as is the case with the divine Word) or it involves being part of a physical object which has become that physical object (an individual nature/hypostasis) by combining with something else (as is the case with human flesh). While both cases are not identical, because in the first case the actual hypostasis is logically prior to the actual nature and in the latter case it comes into being along with it and is more or less the same thing, in both cases there is a necessary numerical correlation between there being one hypostasis and there being one actual nature, because the existence of both is conceived primarily in relation to there being one individual object. The hypostasis is either the single thing which objectifies and individualises a nature (as a single thing), or it is that single thing which is produced when one actual nature comes into being from parts. In the *KMP*, the force of the Trinitarian argument ensures that the hypostasis and person of Christ is understood in the first of these two ways. The singular actuality of the divine nature follows. Because there is not a human hypostasis/person, similarly there cannot be an actual human nature. At this point, to account for the simultaneous reality of Christ's humanity, Apollinarius could have turned to a more abstract and 'generic' understanding of Christ's fully human

or carnal φύσις/οὐσία as perhaps suggested by his Trinitarian usage of these terms.[137] Could not such a 'nature' also inhere in the divine hypostasis together with his actual nature? Is this what Apollinarius implies when he says that 'there are not two natures perfect in themselves'? Does he thus admit, in effect, 'but there *are* two natures'?

When Apollinarius makes this reference to φύσεις in *KMP* 31, one suspects that he is *not* suggesting that Christ has two natures, one actual in itself, the other abstract and 'generic' in itself but actual in something/someone else. One suspects, rather, that he has in mind the idea of one hypostatic divine nature and one *partial* human nature completed by the divine hypostasis. If the 'completing' of the partial human nature is still understood along concrete physical lines, then it is hard to see how the unity of hypostasis can preserve the unity of nature because the divine-human physical object cannot be identical to the divine physical object. But if he were to understand such 'completing' in terms of the existential, ethical or personal realisation of something which is incomplete, not in the sense of partial, but in the sense of non-actual, or morally defective or impersonal, then Apollinarius' idea of one divine hypostasis, one actual (divine) nature and an incomplete human nature completed by the divine hypostasis (and nature), is well on the way to the Chalcedonian conception of the Christological unity (at least according to its 'Cyrilline' interpretation; here Raven's 'liberal' appraisal may not be so wide of the mark[138]). The knowing and volitional characteristics of the divine hypostasis *qua* νοῦς – the rational and moral subject who is Christ himself in the T. Christology – seems to point Apollinarius towards a less objective and more 'personal' understanding of the one hypostasis in Christ, and this is perhaps reflected by the extended account given of Christ's carnality which is 'not without a soul' in the T. works. Nevertheless, in the interests of preserving one divine hypostasis, Apollinarius will not award the carnal element a νοῦς because, according to his ways of thinking, such a νοῦς would either supply another hypostasis in itself or make the incomplete flesh into another complete nature and thereby another non-identical or non-integral human object, so undermining the unity of the divine Christ.

[137] The, strictly speaking, 'non-generic' and eternally actual way in which he understands the Word as 'one nature' in the context of Trinitarian theology may not have encouraged such a view of 'nature'.
[138] Raven,pp.231-232.

Summary (Anacephalaeosis)[139]

In this 'T.' document, unlike the others, we find not only many of the ideas and arguments which belong to the type of Christology which Apollinarius sets out in the *Apodeixis*, but also the language and ideas typical of his compositional monenergetic account of the unity found in the D. works. The two ways of explaining the unity are juxtaposed rather than fully integrated and it is the compositional conception which sits in the final conclusion (§29) to the series of syllogisms, offset by a qualifying paragraph (§30) which admits some sort of independent agency at the level of flesh to avoid theopaschitism. Lietzmann does not go along with the 'trichotomic' classification of the *Anacephalaeosis*[140] and it may be fairest to say that the *Anacephalaeosis* is an interesting piece of deductive reasoning which lacks a 'category' as well as a verifiable literary or historical context. The syllogisms attempt to prove variously what Apollinarius believes about who Christ is and how, and because they are self-contained and categorical they arrive at more than one answer. Thus we find two types of answer side-by-side rather than synthesised – the compositional view of the unity alongside the idea of the divine assumption of psychic flesh. The dialectic between the two may offer something of a stylised representation of the reasoning going on in Apollinarius' mind as he tried to bring together his somewhat paradoxical Christological beliefs into a singular concept of unity. Here in the, as yet, unresolved tension between Apollinarius' compositional theory of the union and his traditional belief in the divine Word's assumption of a real humanity, we perhaps see the origins of Apollinarius' conception of the divine προσληψις of flesh.[141]

[139] L.p.242,l.23-p.246,l.18(E.T.pp.333-338,below).
[140] L.p.145:cf.Riedmatten[2],p.209 n.[1].;Norris,p.83.
[141] For a detailed analysis of this document see pp.385-399,below.

6

CONCLUSIONS

(A) THE APOLLINARIAN CHRISTOLOGIES

In the dogmatic writings of Apollinarius we find two basic types of incarnational conception: a 'compositional' idea about the integral union of the divine and the corporeal in a singular entity and an 'assumptional' idea about God himself taking human flesh. In the D. works (and the *Anacephalaeosis*) the two ideas are juxtaposed: the compositional idea is in the ascendancy informing Apollinarius' main incarnational thesis and the assumptional idea is introduced occasionally and unsystematically to offset the problematic implications of the compositional idea. In the T. works the assumptional idea is the more dominant and there is little evidence of the main D. thesis or its terminology. However, the compositional idea is not altogether absent because both ideas are found together synthesised in the Apollinarian notion of the divine προσληψις of flesh which is central to Apollinarius' main incarnational thesis in the T. works. Thus, when we look at the D. and T. writings of Apollinarius, we do *not* find a single type of 'Apollinarian' Christology consistently advocated (as scholars since Lietzmann have argued), rather we find two distinct types of Christological doctrine, and their difference reflects the significant change (or development) which has occurred in Apollinarius' foundational conception of the union. The two doctrines make use of two distinct types of anthropological model; they offer two distinct types of explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum*; and they are justified by allusion to two differing schemes of salvation.

The type of Christology most typical of the D. works I have referred to as 'Apollinarius' compositional D. thesis' and its characteristics are as follows:

(1) The incarnational union is primarily conceived as a 'compositional' action (σύνθεσις, σύγκρασις) in which divine and human elements come together *as parts* to co-constitute one living, monenergetic, physical whole.

(2) The incarnational unity is primarily identified with the resulting composite, typically described as τὸ ὅλον, τό ζῷον, μία φύσις/ἐνέργεια/οὐσία. This unity is nearly equivalent to the one person/hypostasis in Christ, or provides its existential basis.

(3) The mode of the union is explained and (deductively) understood with reference to the 'dichotomic' model of the human individual as one psychosomatic being/nature/person(?) co-constituted in a traducian act of procreation in which the father supplies the soul/vital energy and the mother the passive flesh. In Christ's unique case (the virginal conception), the divine power supplies the 'energy part' (entire) and Mary the soulless flesh.

(4) The real and inclusive *communicatio idiomatum*, evident in scripture, is explained with reference to the existence of the composite being.

(5) The salvation which follows from the union is understood primarily in a physical way. Through the shared corporeal element, human beings have been re-united to the life-giving divinity and are thereby represented in the composite reality which has triumphed over death and subsists within the Trinity. The advantages of Christ's sanctified body are passed on to believers in the sacraments.

(6) The mode of the union (as shown by its model) preserves the 'natural' properties of the two elements without confusion. But it is also understood to ensure the reality of their unity in a way – the formation of a *tertium quid* (with an intermediate generic nature (?)) – which implicates them both in real, intrinsic or relational, change, this being, to some extent, accepted as preferable to division and in the interests of the physical/eucharistic soteriology.

The type of Christology most typical of the T. writings I have referred to as 'Apollinarius' T. doctrine of the divine προσληψις of flesh' and its characteristics are as follows:

(1) The incarnational union is primarily conceived as the divine Word's πρόσληψις of flesh (including a human ψυχή) since it is a 'divine enfleshment' and (therefore) 'according

to a human likeness'. The unitive action is typically described in terms of 'divine assumption' rather than physical composition: a divine descent, coming, possessing, wearing, bearing, taking-on-in-addition of truly human flesh. Occasionally compositional language is used to denote the real (i.e. integral) union and therefore identification of the carnal acquisition with the unchanging divine subject.

(2) The incarnational unity is primarily identified with the (enduring/underlying) divine subject, (the person and hypostasis of) the Word himself, who persists in his own singular and fully divine nature and yet, somehow, includes the human flesh in himself by means of his unique unitive action towards it (πρόσληψις).

(3) The mode of the union is explained and understood (in a more nuanced way) with reference to a 'tripartite' model of the human individual as made up of spirit (mind), soul (animal ψυχή), and body: a model which is at one level 'compositional' but at another, 'assumptional' since it suggests a revised (more 'spiritualist') conception of the unity. Christ, like a man, is νοῦς ἔνσαρκος since he is a rational subject/substance who is 'enfleshed'/ 'in flesh'/'takes on' a carnal 'form'. The admission of an animal ψυχή (from Mary) and the 'spiritualist' implications of νοῦς ἔνσαρκος indicate a genuine departure from the monenergetic, traducian D. thesis and invite an understanding of the Word-flesh relationship which is ethical as well as spiritual.

(4) Linked to this account of the union we find a more 'conventional' explanation of the *communicatio idiomatum.* Divine and carnal attributes are predicated to Christ because they jointly belong to the one (divine) subject (the divine eternally, the carnal by πρόσληψις).

(5) The T. doctrine of the union allows and develops a more elaborate two-stage soteriological thesis/justification which has demonstrative, subjective and future dimensions as well as the physical-cum-sacrificial conception which pertains to the first incarnational phase as in the D. works. The idea of the eucharistic mediation of the physical advantages of Christ's body in the second phase seems no longer present. The future appropriation of salvation by the νόες seems more conditional upon acknowledgement of the true (incarnational) Faith of the Church.

(6) The conception of union/unity remains, like its anthropological model and soteriology, in part compositional, because on these bases (and for logical/arithmetical reasons) it will not accept the possibility of the true (integral) unity from two completes and therefore the assumption of a complete human being/nature (including the noetic part). This asymmetrical Apollinarian conception of the assumption and completion of what is partial by and in one who is perfect to some extent 'anticipates' in concrete (and therefore paradoxical) terms the more metaphysical idea of the divine hypostasis of the Word hypostatising a non-hypostatic human nature.

Such an analysis of the type(s) of Christology and underlying conception(s) of unity which are to be found in the D. and T. works of Apollinarius would appear to confirm the validity of Lietzmann's subsequently discounted hypostasis – 'Rufinus and Epiphanius report, and an analysis of the Apollinarian fragments proves them correct, that two different theories about the person of Christ were advanced...'[1] – whilst also giving a much fuller and more apposite[2] account of the two theories and identifying the two ways of thinking which lie behind them.

(B) A DEVELOPMENT IN APOLLINARIAN DOCTRINE

In line with Rufinus' testimony that Apollinarius converted 'afterwards'[3] to his trichotomic account of Christ, Lietzmann regarded the type of Christology found in the D. works as the 'first' or 'earlier' theory and the T. Christology as the 'second'. Lietzmann suggested that Apollinarius' T. theory 'grew (erwachsen) out of argument with opponents'[4] – i.e. over the earlier D. theory. Scholars before and after Lietzmann have generally accepted Rufinus'

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[1] L.p.5.
[2] Lietzmann(pp.5-6) fails to discern the 'vitalistic' role of the Logos and the 'biological' sense of μία φύσις (later identified by de Riedmatten) which are typical of the 'first theory'. Even in the context of the D. theory Lietzmann believes that Apollinarius understands the Word's role as that of 'subject', his flesh as 'garment', and the 'one nature' to be that of the Word:'einer Natur des Fleisch gewordenen Logos'. Lietzmann fails to delineate the 'second theory' sufficiently, mentioning only the denial of the νοῦς and the 'heavenly man' formula found in the *Apodeixis* – a formula which appears to be more central to Gregory's refutation than Apollinarius' actual T. doctrine.
[3] Rufinus,*H.E.*2.20(*MPL*21.526C).
[4] L.p.6.

testimony as to the sequence but, apart from Furlani[5], none have suggested that the shift in anthropological vocabulary reflects a genuine change or process of development in Apollinarian Christology.

Contrary to this preferred opinion, my own analysis of the dogmatic writings of Apollinarius indicates that Lietzmann and Furlani were not mistaken when they suggested that the terminological shift from D. to T. marks a real evolution in Apollinarius' doctrine – an evolution which is primarily Christological rather than anthropological. My survey not only finds and delineates two distinct types of Christology – one predominating in the D. and the other in the T. works – but also the outline of the evolutionary process whereby and wherefore the T. type Christology emerged or was developed from the D. type.

The Apollinarian texts which I have analysed indicate that there were a number of factors which caused Apollinarius to qualify and revise the type of Christology expounded in the D. works and to advocate subsequently by preference a different type of doctrine in his T. works. It may not be possible to put these factors in a strictly chronological order due to the lack of firm evidence as to the exact time and context of the surviving Apollinarian material, but if we take into account what can be established about the various documents and look carefully at their dogmatic content then it does seem possible to place these factors in a logical sequence (and one which is not chronologically impossible).[6] If we do so then this sequence suggests the stages of a process by which Apollinarian Christology genuinely developed – a process proceeding by thesis, antithesis and synthesis both at the 'internal' level of Apollinarius' own expositional self-dialogue and at the 'external' level of Apollinarius' controversial dialogue with those who oppose or misunderstand his Christology.

The D. Christology – an Incarnational Thesis and Anti-Thesis

An analysis of *Ad Dionysium A*, *De Unione* and *Contra Diodorum* (Fr.117-120,140-144) indicates that Apollinarius devised his D. thesis of the ἄκρα ἕνωσις in order to explain the nature of the unique indivisible and saving union between the divine and human which occurred in Christ. Apollinarius chooses to explain this in a daring and innovative fashion,

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[5] See p.14,above.

[6] A possible chronology for the theological, literary and political activities of Apollinarius, his followers and those who opposed him (c.346-390) is suggested below (pp.400-422).

bringing together the idea of a physical union by composition/co-mixture, the particular example of a human individual as (unconfused) psychosomatic composite, and a traducian theory of procreation cleverly adapted to suit the unique circumstances of the virginal conception. The D. thesis thereby offers a persuasive account of the unity which sits well with a physical understanding of salvation and the scriptural practice of the *communicatio idiomatum* – but the same thesis prescribes necessary limits upon the fullness of Christ's humanity. The evidence suggests that Apollinarius devised such a thesis not simply as a new attempt to give proper explanation to the incarnational beliefs of the Church, but as a counter-thesis to a certain Christological view which he opposed. If we look at *Ad Dionysium A* 1-2 and *Contra Diodorum* (*Ad Heraclium*) then it seems probable that the D. thesis originated not out of a general opposition to Christological dualism/psilanthropism, but as an antithesis to the particular view of those (e.g. Diodore)[7] who 'amaze' Apollinarius because they, like him, believe in the divine incarnation and the virginal conception and yet somehow espouse a doctrine of two natures/substances. Thus Apollinarius' compositional D. thesis is to some extent a *reactionary* Christology and this may explain why it proved less than sufficient in itself as a means of articulating all that the Church (and Apollinarius himself) held to be true about the mystery of the incarnation. Preoccupied with countering the idea of two natures as tending towards a two Sons fallacy, Apollinarius perhaps pushes too hard in the opposite direction, adopting a monophysite defence which tends towards another sub-incarnational fallacy, as soon demonstrated by overenthusiastic advocates and certain critics and consequently recognised by Apollinarius himself.

The D. Thesis Encounters Difficulties

'Internal' Expositional Difficulties

In combating dyophysitism Apollinarius offers a monophysite thesis which is not without problematic implications of its own. In dynamic, terminology and appearance, Apollinarius' conception of union via σύνθεσις/σύγκρασις bears some resemblance to Aristotle's concept of union by 'mixture' because it locates the reality of the union in a *tertium quid* (τὸ σύνθετον). In the Aristotelian concept, the *tertium quid* has an intermediate generic nature

[7] Compare *Contra Diodorum* Fr.144 with *Ad.Dionysium A*1.

which implies that both elements, whilst formally distinguishable, have undergone some sort of qualitative change/limitation in co-forming something else. Two 'unclassifiable' fragments (Fr.111,113) indicate that Apollinarius may have gone so far as to explore the Christological possibilities of this radical understanding of Christ's nature. *De Unione*, which offers the best insight into the precise mode and origin of the type of physical unity and anthropological analogue which Apollinarius had in mind in the D. works, indicates a conception of Christ as one composite nature which is more dynamic than Aristotle's static mixture from parts: a conception more to do with the *existential interdependence* of two elements, serving 'as' parts within a living whole, but remaining unchanged and unconfused at a qualitative level. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how this vitalistic understanding of the psychosomatic composite ultimately spares its elements from some degree of implication in reciprocal change and partialisation. If we consider Apollinarius' conception of 'biological' synthesis (*De Unione* 5,12-13), it would seem that in composing a living thing corporeal matter and the animating ψυχή *do* undergo a level of change. A living body has different characteristics from the flesh supplied by the womb, and an animating principle exists in a different form both before it has a body to animate (e.g. when conveyed in spermatic matter) and after the dissolution of the body (see Fr.138). The 'whole' which these two elements form is not some abstract singularity somehow simultaneously fully equivalent to either of the individual elements, but a concrete living organism – an ensouled body – which actually exists as something distinct from either of its constituent parts. In line with this a number of statements in *De Unione* (§§1,2,4,6,11,13) seem to acknowledge some sort of real transformation in the divine or human elements, and elsewhere Apollinarius seems to make use of this idea in his 'eucharistic' scheme of salvation (Fr.116).

The idea of unity by composition and its psychosomatic model of a human individual creates for the faithful Christologian another expositional problem. Even if the composition/co-mixture of the divinity and flesh after the example of the soul and body allows there to be one nature which is an unconfused aggregate of all the qualities of both parts – who is the subject of that nature? Where do we place the singular 'person' in relation to it? If the Christologian looks to the psychosomatic analogue, then this line of anthropological thought tends to identify the human subject/person with the composite rather than with either of the parts, as Apollinarius himself recognises in two exegetical

fragments.[8] Thus the compositional idea of union, particularly when modelled on the psychosomatic analogue, encourages the identification of Christ himself with the composite rather than with the divinity serving as the psychic part. The concept of personal singularity may not be clear in Apollinarius' writing, but Grillmeier notes his tendency (sometimes) to make his idea of Christ's unity of person more or less equivalent to his idea of Christ's actual (composite) nature, since the latter provides the concrete basis for the former.[9] The D. thesis, therefore, preserves the unity of Christ's nature and person against the dualists, but seems to imply that Christ is neither the Word himself, nor a man, but a (third) composite person/hypostasis: 'Maintaining the one person and the undivided manifestation of one living thing he [sc. Christ] attributes the sanctifying and being sanctified to the whole' (*De Unione* 10; cf. Fr.144, *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3,6; *Ad Dionysium A* 2).

Such implications are not simply problematic for the faithful Christologian, given the way 'orthodox' Christology was subsequently defined; they are problematic for Apollinarius himself, given what he *also* wants to say about Christ in the D. documents. He not only wants to overcome dyophysitism by means of his compelling D. thesis, he also wants to uphold the traditional view of the Gospel against psilanthropists (and Arians), that Christ is none other than the (person of the) Word himself who is fully divine and pre-exists and yet who also unites himself to real human flesh from Mary for our salvation without involving his own consubstantially divine nature in change or suffering. This is what I identified as the 'other' theme which is present in the D. works: it understands the incarnation as a divine 'assumption' and it may be more basic to Apollinarius' thinking than his anti-dyophysite thesis (see *De Unione* 5, *Ad Dionysium A* 2). The 'internal' expositional difficulty for Apollinarius in the D. works is that his own assumptional understanding of the incarnation is not, strictly speaking, systematic with his anti-dyophysite thesis which threatens to undermine the immutability, impassibility, simplicity and continuity of the Word's divine nature, and which threatens to make Christ the Word Incarnate another subject/person as distinct from the divine Son himself. Because Apollinarius does not want this, he is sometimes forced to qualify the undesirable implications of his compositional theory of the union with qualifying provisos which in the D. works seem *ad hoc* rather than systematic: e.g. 'the Word jointly contributed the energy part to the whole by means of the divine

[8] See p.150,n.[67],above.
[9] Grillmeier,p.338.

perfection just as in the common human being brought into existence out of two imperfect parts' (*De Unione* 5; cf. *Contra Diodorum* Fr.133,134,138).

In the D. works we find the assumptional idea present in parenthetical passages (e.g. *De Unione* 6,8,17) exerting a restraining influence upon the compositional thesis – but this leads to *a lack of clarity,* for Apollinarius seems unprepared to admit two natures or substances in any sense in his main thesis (which presents the unity in these terms), yet Apollinarius is prepared to refer to the enduring divinity and real humanity of Christ's flesh using the language of nature and substance in the parentheses. In two D. works (*Ad Jovianum, De Fide et Incarnatione*), where the political circumstances appear to have encouraged Apollinarius to offer a very carefully considered account of his Christological views as orthodox, we again find the compositional and assumptional conceptions of the union juxtaposed rather than synthesised. As a result the key formulae wherein Apollinarius defines his precise understanding of the unity remain ambiguous. In *Ad Jovianum* 1 the famous phrase, 'one enfleshed nature of God the Word which is worshipped together with his flesh', seems both to include the Word in the one (composite) divine-carnal nature and yet to distinguish the one nature (of God the Word?) from the flesh which the Word possesses. In the formulae of *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3,6 – given the tension between the ideas and terminology typical of the compositional D. thesis (§§3,4,6,7,9) and the co-presence of the assumptional idea of the divine Word's possession of flesh (§§4,6,7) – it is hard to understand what Apollinarius means by 'one person and hypostasis' as opposed to (?) one composite and monenergetic nature. Is he talking about a composite hypostasis/person, or the hypostasis/person of the Word himself? In the short term, the ambiguity of these formulae and the tension between the assumptional idea and the main thesis is helpful because Apollinarius himself wants to have it both ways. But in the long term, such ambiguity is unhelpful, because it leaves room for more than one (mis)understanding of the paradoxical notion of union which Apollinarius actually has in mind and which is perhaps somewhere between the two.

The *Ep. Ad Serapionem* reveals that those sympathetic to Apollinarian Christology began to struggle with some of its internal difficulties. It appears that Apollinarius was driven to rethink and reformulate his explanation of the incarnation. Such a revision may have been precipitated by Apollinarius' own recognition of the expositional insufficiency of his 'compositional' thesis, but the evidence suggests that he was encouraged to come to such a recognition by the fact that some began to misunderstand or misrepresent his D.

Christology and others to bring telling criticisms against it, or, at least, against the derived 'misrepresentation' of it.

External Difficulties - Criticism and Mis(?)interpretation

Analysis of the D. documents together with the *Epp. Ad Serapionem* and *Terentium* suggests that Apollinarius' D. Christology, as advocated by himself or represented by others, provoked several types of criticism from more than one quarter. Two works which have been traditionally regarded as anti-Apollinarian, Athanasius' *Tomus Ad Antiochenes* and *Ep. Ad Epictetum*, appear to censor a Christological doctrine with similar characteristics and/or implications. What we know about the circumstances of those Athanasian works as well as their content indicates that they are reacting to a doctrine advocated by people associated with Apollinarius. Analysis of these, therefore, affords further insight into the type of criticisms levelled against Apollinarius' D. Christology. The D. documents themselves reveal the nature of the criticism in a number of ways: in some fragments Apollinarius tells us directly what his opponents (*Ad Dionysium A* 7)), and in particular Diodore (Fr.140-44), say against him; in others his apologetic preoccupation indicates the area which must have been probed by his opponents (Fr.121-139); in others his concern to distance himself from or anathematize views derivable from his D. thesis (*De Fide et Incarnatione* 3, *Ad Jovianum* 3, *Ad Terentium*) indicate that he may have been accused of teaching such things, or have been implicated by association with those who do. The criticisms brought against the D. Christology of Apollinarius are as follows:

(1) The Divinity Changes and Suffers

The primary and most serious change brought against the D. Christology by all its critics is that it implicates the Word in change and suffering, thus diminishing and denegrating the Godhead. It is not surprising that this is the first and most basic criticism (e.g. Paulinus (c.362) in his *addenda* to the *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 11) given that all the opponents of the D. Christology and Apollinarius himself were united in their opposition to the Arians who sought to diminish the Son's full divinity, sometimes with reference to the incarnation. Apollinarius appears to be seeking to dispel this criticism of his Christology in the circumspect statement of his D. doctrine which he formulates for Emperor Jovian in 363,

hence the carefully divisive exegesis (κατὰ σάρκα and κατὰ τὴν θεότητα) of texts referring to Christ's passion, death, and ascension (*Ad Jovianum* 2), and hence the second and third anathemas: 'if someone teaches... that the divinity was changed into flesh, or that it was confounded (συγχυθεῖσαν) or became different, or that the divinity of the Son was subject to passion... let him be anathema!' (§3). This type of criticism is basic to Diodore's opposition to the Christology of Apollinarius and the 'Synousiasts'.[10] We find Apollinarius counter-attacking this criticism directly in *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔ): 'You mock the "highest unity" and you say that the properties of God do not still remain...' (Fr.140,142). In these fragments Apollinarius holds fast to his D. doctrine of the union. In the more apologetic and elucidatory *Contra Diodorum KKB*, his primary concern is to show that his doctrine does not in fact undermine the Word's divinity by implicating it in change, confusion or suffering (Fr.121-4,127,133-35,138). This further indicates that this was Diodore's criticism. In *De Fide et Incarnatione* 9, Apollinarius seems to be reacting to the same criticism of his D. doctrine when he reverses the argument of his detractors against them – viz. that he 'changes' (verwandeln) the divine Saviour by making him the subject of the birth and death. Athanasius brings the same charge against the type of Christology which Epictetus reports to him: 'What lower region spewed forth this... that the Word has been changed into flesh, and bones, and hair and a whole body, and altered from his own nature?' (*Ep. Ad Epictetum* 2). Athanasius goes on to accuse those who hold such a view of making the Word's perfect divinity imperfect and hanging it upon the cross.[11] We find Apollinarius again trying to disassociate himself from this type of theopaschite charge in his letter (c.375) to the new *Comes Orientis* (Fr.163).

(2) The Body Is Changed or Divinized

To a slightly lesser extent, critics of Apollinarius' D. Christology also accused him of changing Christ's human flesh/body into something with different or divine qualities. Apollinarius reveals in *Ad Dionysium A* 7 that some of the dualists accuse him of saying that the flesh is from heaven. He attempts to dispel such criticism by his first anathema in *Ad Jovianum* 3. In *De Unione* 8 he may be reacting to a similar criticism when he qualifies his doctrine of μιά φύσις by asserting somewhat unsystematically: 'the nature of the body is

[10] See Grillmeier,pp.359-360;see also Sullivan,pp.186-187.
[11] *MPG*26.1052C-1053A.

not changed by the union with he who is consubstantial with God'. Diodore attacks Apollinarius' doctrine of the 'highest unity' equally for destroying the properties of the flesh (*Contra Diodorum* Fr.140,142), and in the *KKB* Apollinarius seems to be reacting to the charge that he has divinized or changed Christ's human body into something novel (Fr.125,128,129,133,134). Athanasius brings the same charge to bear against the doctrine of those (Apollinarians) reported by Epictetus (*Ep. Ad Epictetum* 2).

(3) The Practice of 'Inclusive' Predication is Dangerous and Misleading

One of the reasons the D. Christology faces criticisms (1) and (2) is because of its 'inclusive' use of the *communicatio idiomatum.* This precipitates controversial statements designed to affirm the unity but suggestive to Apollinarius' critics of real change and confusion of the divine and human properties: e.g. 'The Lord is rightly confessed a holy offspring from the beginning even in respect of the body' (*De Unione* 1). The care with which Apollinarius explains and justifies his practice of inclusive predication in *Ad Dionysium A* and *De Unione* indicates that he may be responding to or anticipating, misunderstanding, misuse, or criticism of this practice. In *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔ) we find evidence that Diodore not only questioned the contradictory statements arising from the *communicatio idiomatum* – 'How is the created "uncreated "?' (Fr.143) – but also criticised the *convention* of inclusive predication in itself: 'If he [sc. Diodore] wonders how the creature is united to the appellation of the "uncreated"...' (Fr.144). In a fragment of his own work[12] Diodore provides an exact description of the type of *communicatio idiomatum* characteristic of Apollinarius' D. Christology. He then counters it by suggesting a more divisive system of predication: 'If someone wishes in improper manner to call the Son of God also "God the Word, Son of David", he names him thus on account of the temple of the Word of God which is of David, and he who is of the seed of David is called "Son of God" through grace and not through nature.'[13]

[12] Fr.26,Brière,pp.269-270.
[13] Fr.27,Brière,p.270.

(4) The Anthropological D. Model Implies the Compounding of the Divinity

Diodore also criticises the practice of 'inclusive' predication because he knows it to be founded upon a false compositional view of the incarnation based upon the D. analogy of man as a psychosomatic unity, as made plain to him by Apollinarius (Fr.144). In fragments of Diodore's own work, the Apollinarian (D.) account of the union is described and criticised on the grounds that it involves God the Word in a compositional mixture and unity of substance by compounding him with a body, thereby undermining his independence, priority and immutable divinity:

> '[They] teach that the One from heaven and the one from earth are one and the same, just as if he were, so to speak, a single human being, immortal in respect of his soul, but mortal in respect of the body. So, they say, this one and the same being is before the ages and of the seed of David ... There are not two different beings, but one composite being (*syntheton?*) ... one Son brought to perfection in the two, the body and God the Word.'[14] '...just like the human being who is composed (se compose) from the soul and body... and who is called man... the two forming a single hypostasis and single complete Son, for it is neither the soul apart, nor the body apart which is called the Son of the one who gave birth but the two together... in the same way God the Word took the body from David and he became composite to (make) a single Son and (to make) a single hypostasis'.[15]

Diodore is alarmed by the injury this type of compounding or 'mixture' (mélange)[16] does to the Word: 'τίς ἡ ὕβρις τοῦ συντιθέναι [sc. τὸν θεὸν λόγον] μετὰ τοῦ σώματος'.[17] He points out that the psychosomatic analogy breaks down because of the Word's independent pre-existence: 'Deus verbum ante carnem est rex. Itaque non sicut animae et corpori ita Deo Verbo et carni.'[18] Although these criticisms may have been directed later (?) against 'synousiast' disciples of Apollinarius, the *Contra Diodorum* fragments indicate that Diodore directed the same type of criticism against Apollinarius himself. In the *KKB* we find apologetic arguments and paradoxical qualifying statements which suggest he is reacting to Diodore's charge that his doctrine is one of composition and mixture, *thereby* involving the Word in defectiveness and confusion (Fr.127,133,138). In Fr.134 Apollinarius reminds

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[14] Fr.2,Brière,p.260(E.T. Greer,R.A.,'The Antiochene Christology of Diodore of Tarsus',*JTS* 17,1966,pp.334-335).
[15] Fr.26,Brière,p.269.
[16] Fr.20,Brière,p.267.
[17] *Contra Synousiastas* Fr.2,in Leontius,*Adv.Incorrupticolas et Nestor.(MPG* 86.1388B).
[18] Severus of Antioch,*Contra Impium Grammaticum III.*25,Lebon,J.,(ed.&tr.),*CSCO* 102,1933(this volume is cited hereafter as 'Lebon'),p.33-34.

Diodore that a psychosomatic κρᾶσις does not destroy the properties of a (human) ψυχή and σῶμα, and then argues *a fortiori* that therefore God is less likely to be changed since he is *not* (!) συμφυὴς with a body. When Athanasius attacks the doctrine of the union reported by Epictetus he too presents the (Apollinarian) fallacy in compositional terms: 'they say that the body... was ever co-eternal with it [sc. the divinity of the Word] since it was constituted (συνέστη) out of (ἐκ) the substance of wisdom.'[19]

(5) The 'Traducian' Account of the Virginal Conception is Suspect

There is some evidence that both Diodore and Athanasius expressed technical disagreement with the Apollinarian theory of the virginal conception which is an important component of the D. Christology. It is his understanding of this unique event which leads Apollinarius to affirm a union 'according to flesh' (Fr.140) as opposed to Diodore's union 'by grace' between the one from the seed of David and God (Fr.141). In a fragment of his own work Diodore offers his own account of the conception and birth of the Son of Mary – temple of the Word, and human by nature. This may be intended as a counter-thesis to the type of Apollinarian analysis which we find in *De Unione* 12-13, offered as a reply to the Apollinarian charge that he fails to account properly for the virginal conception (Fr.142). Diodore's explanation overcomes a contradiction inherent in Apollinarius' quasi-traducian account of the event: how can Christ be 'born of the seed of David' (*De Unione* 9) in any sense (Diodore raises the question directly in Fr.143) given that, according to Apollinarius' theory, the seed of the human father does not feature in Christ's conception at all (*De Unione* 13)? Diodore advocates an interesting solution: he traces the lineage of Christ's human nature/seed back to David and Abraham *through his mother Mary*. Not only does this make *Heb*.2.16 and *Rom*.1.3 easier to explain, it actually offers an alternative traducian scheme to Apollinarius' which leaves room for a human substance (and soul) in Christ in spite of his fatherless birth.[20] Athanasius may be criticising the vitalistic Apollinarian D. doctrine of the virginal conception wherein the divinity supplies the animating soul when he affirms this (alternative) view in *Ep. Ad Epictetum* 8: 'He became flesh by assuming *living* (ζῶσαν) flesh on our behalf and became man.'[21] In the next paragraph (§9) Athanasius refers to the

[19] *Ep Ad Epictetum* 2(*MPG*26.1053B).
[20] See Fr.26,Brière,pp.269-270.
[21] See *Ep.Ad Epictetum* 8(*MPG*26.1064A).

human body prior to incarnational union as 'ψυχικόν'.[22] In *Ep. Ad Epictetum* 5, like Diodore, Athanasius chooses to interpret *Heb.*2.16 with reference to Mary's ('traducian') role in the conception: 'he "takes hold of the seed of Abraham" as the apostles said whence it behoved him to be made like his brethren in all things and to take a body like us. This is why Mary is truly presupposed in order that he might take it from her...'.[23] In another place the implication of Athanasius' argument against the false (Apollinarian) doctrine of the virginal conception is that he would extend Mary's 'traducian' role to provision of a human soul as well as a body like ours: 'They will all rightly condemn themselves who think this flesh from Mary existed before her or before her (πρὸ ταύτης) the Word possessed a human soul (ψυχὴν)' (§8).[24]

(6) Christ's Humanity is Incomplete/Lacks a Human Soul

Somewhat surprisingly, that which became the main charge against Apollinarianism appears to feature fairly low in the list of criticisms first brought against the D. Christology, and it is hardly pressed by Diodore at all. If the 'second stipulation' of *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7 was designed to constrain Apollinarian Christology c.362, then it does seem concerned to oppose its denial of Christ's human soul by prescribing that 'the Saviour did not possess a body without soul, sense, or intelligence'. That this formula is aimed at the D. rather than the T. form of Apollinarianism is indicated by the fact that the term ἀνόητον is employed rather than ἄνουν, and by the fact that the Word's body's being 'νοητόν' is more or less equated with the Word having a ψυχή as well as a body in the argument which follows the formula.[25] The stipulation attempts to rule out the denial of the human soul (entire) with which go the attributes of intelligence, sensibility, etc. There is no reason for believing that Diodore, or Meletians influenced by him, were present at the Nicene conference in Alexandria. Thus this criticism of, or restriction upon, the Apollinarian D. Christology may have been imposed by Athanasius and those connected with the 'Old Nicenes' at Antioch. Paulinus certainly seems keen to reiterate this stipulation in his appendix to the *Tomus* (§11).

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[22] See *MPG*26.1065B.
[23] See *MPG*26.1057A(E.T. Robertson,p.572).
[24] See *MPG*26.1064B.
[25] See *MPG*26.804B and p.206,above.

There is one text which indicates that Paulinus' 'Eustathian' Party at Antioch may have already criticised the denial of Christ's human soul as advocated by certain Arians in the interests of diminishing the full divinity of the Word by attributing change and psychic suffering to the divine spirit.[26] W. Haugaard has persuasively argued that (with the possible exception of this fragment) there is no firm evidence that Arius or his earlier followers advocated a proto-Apollinarian Christology which explicitly denied Christ's human ψυχή, replacing it with the Word.[27] The evidence does, however, suggest that later Arians did adopt something very similar to the Apollinarian (D.) Christology (e.g. Gregory of Nyssa criticises such a doctrine in his *Contra Eunomium* 11.13 and both Gregorys compare the doctrine of Apollinarius to Eunomius in the 380's[28]). Grillmeier has made the point very succinctly that it seems far more probable that the later Arian denial of Christ's human soul was influenced by the teachings of Apollinarius rather than *vice versa.*[29] But the fact that certain Arians may also have been denying Christ's human soul in the late 350s might explain why Paulinus, the Eustathian faction at Antioch, and Athanasius all sought to suppress this aspect of the Apollinarian D. Christology in 362. If we look at the *Creed of Eudoxius* (c.360) (Eudoxius was the Arian bishop of Antioch c.357-359), it not only denies the soul of Christ but does so in exactly the same compositional terms as Apollinarius' D. Christology.[30] It seems unthinkable that Apollinarius, a life-time opponent of Arianism, might have borrowed his compositional D. Christology from Eudoxius and the Arians in order to expound his belief in the full divinity of the Word who became incarnate. It does not seem unimaginable, however, that a leader of the Arian faction at Antioch might have heard of the Christological doctrine emanating from Laodicea in the 350s and made use of it in his own theology, recognising the (useful) 'subordinationist' implications of the idea of composition and the psychosomatic model.

If the second stipulation of *Tomus* 7 does amount to Athanasian/'Old Nicene' criticism of the soulless aspect of the Apollinarian D. Christology on the grounds that it has similarities to a (derived?) form of Arian theory, then (like Eustathius) it probably opposes the 'incompleteness' of Christ's humanity more to defend the immutability and impassibility

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[26] Eustathius of Antioch,Fr.15,see Theodoret *Eranistes III(MPG*83.285C).
[27] See pp.21-22,above.
[28] Gregory of Nyssa,*Antirrheticus* 45;Gregory of Nazianzus,*Ep.101(MPG*37.184A).
[29] Grillmeier,pp.329-330.
[30] Hahn,A.,*Bibliothek der Symbole,*§191,pp.261-262,see Grillmeier,p.244:'μία τὸ ὅλον κατὰ σύνθεσιν φύσις'.

of the divinity (if substituted for the human soul) than because it wants to preserve the fullness of Christ's humanity for theological/soteriological purposes. Nevertheless, we do perhaps find the germ of Gregory of Nazianzus' famous 'what is not assumed is not healed' argument in the soteriological justification which Athanasius attaches to the second stipulation of *Tomus* 7: 'the salvation which occurred in the Word himself was not only of body, but also of soul'. The effectiveness of this criticism (against both types of Apollinarian Christology) may explain why Apollinarius omits this phrase when quoting the *Tome* to the Confessors (c.376).[31] Athanasius develops the same argument against the doctrine of those (Apollinarians) reported by Epictetus.[32] Athanasius, in countering this doctrine, advocates a physical and sacrificial view of salvation which necessitates the Word himself taking/possessing a 'living' (§8) and 'ensouled' (§9) body from Mary who supplies both the truly human body and ψυχή (§8). Given that Apollinarius' D. Christology is wedded to a similar type of physical understanding of the incarnation as a saving event, such criticism of the D. thesis by Athanasius may well have struck home.

(7) *Christ's Human Body/Flesh is Made 'Consubstantial' with the Trinity*

This particular criticism of the Apollinarian D. Christology is the most specific and may well have been the most widespread and effective. It is a version of (2) but it is related to most of the other criticisms. It is a nominal consequence of the 'inclusive' predicative practice (3); it is an actual and/or terminological consequence of the idea of a composite nature/substance modelled on the psychosomatic example (4); it rebounds on the divinity thereby undermining the immutable divine substance of the Trinity (1). These criticisms are thus all brought into focus *vis-à-vis* the use of one particularly controversial term – '*homoousios*' – the exact sense of which has already been defined with some precision in the Trinitarian controversy.

At the root of this criticism is Apollinarius' idea of the unity of the divinity and a body in one actual nature both human and divine (*De Unione* 5). In the D. works he also uses the term οὐσία to denote this concrete idea (Fr.117,119). Whilst a couple of fragments (Fr.111,113) suggest that Apollinarius may have actually explored the idea of Christ having one composite nature/substance in the 'generic' sense, generally in the D. works, he seeks to

[31] L.p.256,l.10.
[32] *Ep.Ad Epictetum* 7(*MPG*26.1061A-B).

preserve the distinction of the divinity and the body within the concrete unity of nature/substance and does so somewhat unsystematically by using the language of nature/substance (*De Unione* 8,17). In the one extant fragment wherein Apollinarius appears to admit the consubstantiality of the divine human elements he is actually trying to illustrate their enduring distinction: '*God being consubstantial with human beings according to the flesh* is of a different substance according to (his being) Word and God' (Fr.126/146). But it is easy enough to see how the form of words (italicised above) might have been interpreted as a straight assertion of the Word Incarnate's consubstantiality (in a generic sense) with flesh, or *vice versa*, particularly given the other statements about God's unity with flesh in one nature/substance, and the associated implications that this is an intermediate generic nature. Apollinarius also defines the unity using a near-equivalent term to *homoousios* which later became associated with his more extreme disciples: 'his flesh makes alive because of the divinity which is essentially one (συνουσίοω) with it' (Fr.116). Apollinarius also steers close to an admission of the consubstantial unity of the flesh and the divinity due to his 'inclusive' predication. In *De Fide et Incarnatione* he defends this as a legitimate *way of speaking* (§4). Yet, whilst he protests that he does not say that the flesh is consubstantially divine *per se* (§3), his view of the real unity and the salvation grounded in it implies a *very real sense* of the flesh's consubstantial divinity for it subsists, through the incarnation, within the Trinity (§4).

It is not surprising, therefore, that this nuanced, terminologically inconsistent and ultimately ambivalent position as to whether Christ's flesh is consubstantially divine or human (Apollinarius' eucharistic soteriology may want it both ways – see Fr.116) was mis(?)interpreted by some of his followers, who went on to affirm the consubstantial divinity of Christ's flesh implicit in the terms and conceptuality of their master's D. thesis in a crude way, 'throwing the East into great turmoil' as Epiphanius reports.[33] From what Apollinarius says in *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3, it appears that his D. doctrine is causing alarm and provoking criticism from those concerned to defend the Nicene watchword itself. In this treatise Apollinarius does not retract too much from the ambivalent position which is typical of the other D. works – but other documents suggest that the 'turmoil' may have impacted upon his own pro-Nicene sensibilities because Apollinarius becomes much more unequivocal in his rejection of the idea of consubstantially divine flesh and those who

[33] *Panarion* 77,2.3-5.

promote such a view: e.g. *Ep. Ad Serapionem* (Fr.159); *Ad Dionysium B* (Fr.164). The most strident criticism of the Apollinarian conclusion that the flesh is consubstantially divine comes from the most celebrated upholder of Nicaea, Athanasius, in his *Ep. Ad Epictetum.*[34] Athanasius launches a scathing attack against those who hold that 'the body from Mary is consubstantial with the divinity of the Word'[35] and who thereby include the body in the Trinity. He considers this expressed or implied fallacy to be at the root of the novel doctrine reported by Epiphanius, which is why he deals with it first (§4), condemning it by the doctrine of Nicaea:

> ' But the fathers who also assembled at Nicaea say that not the body, but the Son Himself is co-essential with the Father... the body, as they admitted according to the scriptures, is of Mary. Either then deny the Synod of Nicaea and as heretics bring in your doctrine from the side; or, if you wish to be the children of the fathers, do not hold the contrary of what they wrote.'[36]

(8) *The D. Christology as the Antithesis of the Divine Assumption of Flesh*

Given the nature of the 'internal difficulties' of the Apollinarian D. Christology,[37] it seems significant that both Diodore and Athanasius stress the 'assumptional' view of the incarnation when countering the Apollinarian D. thesis. They thereby present what was probably Apollinarius' most basic incarnational belief as if it is the antithesis of the D. doctrine of the union which he has devised and advocates as his own antithesis to dyophysitism. In the fragments of his own work against the 'Synousiasts', Diodore offers his own alternative account of the incarnation using some of the terms which are typical of Apollinarius' 'assumptional' conception of the union: 'We worship the purple because of the one who wears it, the Temple because of the one who indwells it, the form of a servant because of the form of God, the lamb because of the high priest, the one who was assumed (assumptum) because of the one who assumed.'[38] Unlike Apollinarius' notion of πρόσληψις, Diodore's conception of 'assumption' is entirely non-compositional (it is offered as an antithesis), thus it allows the possibility of a full account of Christ's humanity:

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[34] This is how Epiphanius,writing a few years later, presents the epistle, see p.97,above.
[35] *MPG*26.1052C.
[36] *MPG*26.1056B-C(E.T. Robertson,p.571).
[37] See pp.242-246,above.
[38] Severus,*Contra Gram.III*,25,Lebon,p.30(E.T.Greer,p.338).

'Deus perfectus ex Deo perfecto assumpsit hominem perfectum.'[39] As a result Diodore is able to espouse the doctrine of two natures which holds through divine assumption spoken of as an act of grace rather than physical integration. Consequently, Diodore fails to distinguish the idea of two natures very clearly from that of two Sons.[40] Diodore's doctrine of the assumption of a whole human nature/Son thus goes too far for Apollinarius, but the apologetic emphasis upon union by divine assumption in the *Contra Diodorum KKB* suggests that Diodore's thinking may have had some impact upon Apollinarius' own doctrine. What may well have had more impact ('and the letter of my Lord which was sent to Corinth we welcome most strongly' (Fr.159)) is the thesis which Athanasius directed against the 'consubstantialists' in his *Ep. Ad Epictetum.* This letter carried the personal authority of its author and reached a wide audience, for it was sent to the Bishop of Corinth and then published: 'I ask your piety in the first place and *secondly those who hear* to take my letter in good part' (§12).[41] It was then widely circulated (e.g. to Thmuis, Laodicea and Salamis) as offering official comment upon the Christological questions raised by the Synod mentioned by Epiphanius (*Panarion 77*,2.6) and reported in Epictetus' memoranda. As his antithesis to the 'consubstantialist' error which is based upon a false view of the Johanine 'becoming', Athanasius advocates the orthodox, scripturally authentic view that the Word himself 'assumed' (ἄνα/ἔπι-λαμβάνω) and 'possessed' (not another Son, nor, explicitly, another nature but) a living/ensouled human body/flesh (§§5-12). Such a doctrine must have resonated with Apollinarius for it is not simply a strong counter-thesis to his compositional D. thesis as taken to the extreme by others, it also accords with a similar line of antithetical thought already present in his own mind – as evidenced by the co-presence of the 'assumptional' conception of the union in the D. works.

The T. Christology Anticipated – Evidence of a 'Shift' in Thinking in the D. Works

The *Contra Diodorum KKB* and *De Fide et Incarnatione*, in particular, allow some insight into the process whereby, in response to the Diodorean and Nicene criticisms outlined above, Apollinarius may have begun to distance himself from ideas and terminology central

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[39] Severus,*Contra Gram.III*,26,Lebon,p.45;also *Contra Synousiastas* Fr.1 in Leontius,*Adv.Incorr.et Nestor.MPG*86.1385D:'τέλειον τὸν ἐκ Δαβὶδ ἀνείληφεν γιὸς θεοῦ υιὸν Δαβίδ'.
[40] See Fr.30,Brière,p.271.
[41] E.T.Robertson,p.574.

to his D. thesis. He does so by introducing apologetic qualifying arguments containing terms and ideas which point him towards a different type of understanding of the ultimate unity in Christ and the mode of the union between God and flesh, and towards a different type of anthropological analysis as providing a more apposite analogy.

In the *Contra Diodorum KKB* we find Apollinarius qualifying his use of the language of mixture and composition as applied to the incarnational union. This creates a series of terminological paradoxes: the mixed-unmixed ingredient (Fr.127); the non-composite component (Fr.133); the natural mixture with a body of one who is not naturally one with the body (Fr.134); the component who is above the composition and unaffected by its dissolution (Fr.138). These indicate his recognition (due to Diodore's critique?) of the problematic implications for the would-be-orthodox Christologian of this type of terminology and unitive conception. The necessary production of such paradoxes may have led him to ask whether these terms and conceptions were in fact helpful for his expository task.

Apollinarius' idea of composition/co-mixture in the D. works is modelled on the psychosomatic *exemplum* and in some of the *KKB* fragments he still holds this up as if he considers it to be a special case of composition without change or confusion (Fr.123,129). Yet, significantly, in the same work he admits the inadequacy of the psychosomatic *exemplum* as an incarnational model: 'in the dissolution he [sc. the Word] did not possess the defectiveness which comes from dissolution as the soul does' (Fr.138). In another D. work written shortly after *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7, Apollinarius, wishing to demonstrate his orthodoxy to the new Emperor, chooses not to emphasise his compositional terminology and the soulless aspect of his D. Christology. Instead, he puts emphasis upon the continuity of the divine subject and *his* nature, preferring to use the more ambiguous spirit-flesh dichotomy, which would allow the T. analysis (*Ad Jovianum* 1). In the *Contra Diodorum KKB* we find him offering apologetic arguments which actually lead him towards the T. analysis of Christ (i.e. away from the psychosomatic and towards the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy). In order to explain how the divine substance can be substantially bound to flesh without change, Apollinarius *emphasises the rationality* of man's psychic element/Christ's divinity, arguing that the human *exemplum* shows how a rational substance can endure whilst 'lying close' to an irrational carnal substance (Fr.126,132). In so doing Apollinarius, by implication, identifies the subject of his dichotomy more directly with the

rational element (= substance) than with the whole or the carnal/irrational element to which he is bound. This line of thought seems to lead Apollinarius away from the idea of the human individual/Christ as a composite substance towards the idea of a man/Christ as a rational substance who possesses flesh with an irrational essence.

Such thinking leaves room for a further 'articulation' within the corporeal/carnal element. This is again potentially useful for Apollinarius as a means of sparing the Word *per se* from involvement in (psychic) change and suffering, and there is some evidence that, against Diodore, he begins to explore this line of thought, for in two of the *KKB* fragments, contrary to his customary monenergetic view, he seems to refer to Christ's human/carnal energy (Fr.130,131). In the *Anacephalaeosis* (which rather eludes its customary 'T.' classification) we find a much clearer example of this apologetic move. In *Anacephalaeosis* 16 Apollinarius defines the Christological unity using the ambiguous πνεῦμα-σάρξ formula, but the formal conclusion to the treatise (§29) indicates that he has the psychosomatic dichotomy in mind because he explains the divine-human unity in the monenergetic, vitalistic terms typical of his D. thesis. Then in *Anacephalaeosis* 30, which appears to be an *addendum*, he introduces an unsystematic argument which admits carnal energies and, by implication, treats the divine spirit as νοῦς. The *addendum* seems to be anticipating or reacting to *theopaschite* criticism of the D. thesis (in §29) and by introducing the term νοῦς Apollinarius, here more plainly, moves towards his T. thesis using one of the proof texts (*Rom.*7.23) which he employs to justify his trichotomic analysis of man/Christ in the *Apodeixis* (Fr.22,88): 'God in taking flesh from this possesses the impulses which make war on the mind... But if this is the case he himself is not the one who suffers in so far as being God'. This type of 'shift' does not amount to a complete revision of Apollinarius' anthropological thinking. The ambiguous πνεῦμα-σάρξ dichotomy leaves room for a more 'spiritualist' understanding of the divine-human unity, and some passages in the D. works indicate that Apollinarius already has this type of anthropological analogy in mind: e.g. in the more 'parenthetical' paragraphs of *De Unione*, Apollinarius speaks of the incarnation as a 'descent' and an 'interweaving' and refers to the body as the Word's 'form', 'mould' and 'envelope' (§§4,6). This more 'spiritualist' interpretation of the dichotomy is encouraged by the introduction of the Pauline idea of the incarnation as *kenosis* – again in the interests of preserving the divinity from change. The implication is that the bodily form (περιβολή) is a

quasi-'nature' acquired by the enduring divine subject rather than a part which combines with the divinity (*Contra Diodorum KKB* Fr.124).

This 'spiritualist' interpretation of the anthropological model is apologetically useful to Apollinarius in the D. works and nominally possible, given the ambiguity of the πνεῦμα-σάρξ dichotomy, but not, strictly speaking, compatible with the monenergetic, vitalistic theory based on the traducian analysis of the virginal conception (*De Unione* 12-13). If Apollinarius is to enjoy the Christological benefits of this line of anthropological thought, he needs to be more precise in identifying the divine element with man's rational spiritual substance and he needs to extend the 'nature' of the carnal form to include some sort of irrational and animal energy. This involves redefining the term ψυχή as distinct from νοῦς, and attributing the former to Christ's carnal acquisition, thereby clearly establishing the more 'spiritualist' understanding of the πνεῦμα-σάρξ formula as the intended interpretation. This clarification is achieved by the introduction of the T. anthropology which marks a departure from the monenergetic, monophysite, psychosomatic understanding of the πνεῦμα-σάρξ dichotomy which is basic to Apollinarius' account of the union in the D. works.

The 'shift' towards the T. presentation of πνεῦμα-σάρξ appears to have been precipitated, not only by Diodorean criticism and by Apollinarius' own awareness of the negative impact of the D. theory of union upon the Word's immutable divinity, but in particular by the Nicene criticism about the negative implications of his theory for the *homoousion*. The *De Fide et Incarnatione* and *Ep. Ad Serapionem* may offer some insight into Apollinarius' reaction to such criticism, and aspects of his arguments in both 'anticipate' the T. Christology. In *De Fide et Incarnatione* Apollinarius, to some extent, holds unrepentantly to his D. thesis and its physical-cum-eucharistic view of salvation, but he also emphasises another soteriological theme: 'God himself saves' – we are saved by what the consubstantially divine Word consciously does on our behalf. (This argument is also developed for apologetic reasons in *Contra Diodorum KKB* Fr.121,127.) Apollinarius also attempts to explain the *communicatio idiomatum vis-à-vis* the 'divine consubstantiality' of Christ's body in a more nominal and less provocative way (*De Fide et Incarnatione* 4). He also removes the term οὐσία (cf. Fr.117,119) from his keynote formulae for the unity, preferring to use 'person' and 'hypostasis' alongside 'nature' and 'energy' (§§3,6). It may be that he regards these ideas as near-equivalents, but there is some evidence that in the T. works he learns to contrast the idea of Christ's divine person/hypostasis with the idea of his

enduring consubstantially divine nature and his acquired human 'nature' – 'not perfect in itself' (*KMP* 31 [*LV*]). The appearance of the terms 'hypostasis' and 'person' in the monophysite formulae of *De Fide et Incarnatione* may, therefore, anticipate the T. Christology where the primary emphasis is upon the unity of divine subject rather than the unity of divine-corporeal substance/nature, and where the unitive idea of divine πρόσληψις to some extent resembles hypostatisation. The *Ep. Ad Serapionem* reveals Apollinarius renouncing the 'consubstantialist' implication of his D. thesis more clearly and recommending the unitive idea of πρόσληψις above that of natural union (Fr.160,161). We cannot 'classify' this document and it may be that it has already formulated the T. doctrine in response to Athanasius' scathing critique as circulated by Epictetus.

One common feature of the more 'apologetic' D. documents (*Contra Diodorum KKB* and *De Fide et Incarnatione*) and the more 'circumspect' confession *Ad Jovianum* is the increased emphasis upon the 'assumptional' rather than 'compositional' conception of union. The assumptional idea better preserves the Word as enduring divine subject and nature, treating the human element less as a part of a third substance and more as an acquired possession similar to a second quasi-generic 'nature'. The assumptional idea is more germane to the 'spiritualist' view of the soul-body relation. Thus Apollinarius to some extent 'anticipates' the T. Christology when he emphasises the assumptional idea in order to override the implications of the compositional. It is for this reason that he introduces, what appears to Theodoret to be, an 'assumptional' term[42] – προσλαμβάνω – in the *Contra Diodorum KKB* (Fr.121): 'if one is not changed into what one assumes (προσλαμβάνει) and Christ assumed flesh he was not changed into flesh'. This is the only place we find this term in the D. works, but in the T. works Apollinarius employs it in several important passages, apparently using it as a key technical term for his precise understanding of the incarnation. The semantic argument against Diodore (Fr.121) and the advice to Serapion (Fr.161) may show how and why this term was originally introduced and developed in response to Diodorean and Nicene criticism of the idea of natural/substantial composition. Analysis of the Apollinarian usage of πρόσληψις in the *Apodeixis* and *KMP* indicates that this term denotes a peculiarly Apollinarian notion – an asymmetrical assumption of something incomplete by someone perfect. We find this novel idea most clearly 'anticipated' in the unsystematic proviso which Apollinarius introduces in *De Unione* 5

[42] See *Eranistes I*,*MPG*83.104D.

when setting out his idea of union by co-mixture on the psychosomatic model. The Word supplies the 'energy part', but does so 'as a perfection'. Perhaps, therefore, the feature of the D. works which most anticipates the 'shift' or development to the T. doctrine of the divine προσληψις of flesh is the underlying and *unresolved* tension between the compositional theory of the incarnational union and Apollinarius' 'orthodox' belief that this was a divine assumption. (We find a similar dialectic between the two ideas in the syllogistic *Anacephalaeosis*.)

Motives for Expounding the T. Christology

Analysis of the T. documents and what we know of their circumstances affords some insight into Apollinarius' motives for advocating the T. Christology. It is apparent that Apollinarius had a number of *expositional concerns* when formulating this Christology and it is these which help determine the character and terminology of the T. thesis. The doctrine of the divine προσληψις of flesh displays obvious advantages in ensuring such concerns are met – advantages, in particular, over and above the D. Christology which has been less than successful in these respects. Apollinarius' basic concern has not changed – to formulate a doctrine of the incarnation which does justice to his 'orthodox' beliefs in the divinity and the unity of the Saviour. The particular concerns he has in the T. writings also plainly relate to the 'internal' and 'external' difficulties experienced by his D. Christology (see above). Thus it may be fair to say that one of the chief motives for expounding the T. Christology was the relative failure of the D. Christology as an effective expression of what Apollinarius actually believed and in the face of several types of criticism brought against it. This failure and these criticisms led Apollinarius to reformulate a revised type of Christology, again offered as an antithesis to a false dualism, but this time more carefully designed to show its 'orthodoxy' in those areas.

In the most substantial of the T. works – the *Apodeixis* – Apollinarius sets out to (re) present his doctrine in a systematic way and his exposition has a number of evident concerns. (1) He is, above all, concerned to uphold the divine identity of the subject of the incarnation (Fr.33-38,49-62) against false psilanthropist alternatives (Fr.14-16) to the most basic tenet of his belief , 'it is a divine enfleshment', and he sets out to show how this can be (Fr.17-18). (2) When offering this explanation he is therefore concerned to show that the

divinity of this subject was not diminished, changed or injured in itself (e.g. Fr.65,97,102). (3) He is also concerned to show that the divine subject's carnal acquisition includes a human ψυχή (Fr.22,25,88), and to show that his incarnational theory is justified by, and integrated with, a cogent soteriological theory which has an ethical dimension involving the (psychic) impulses of the flesh and (in the second phase) a rational human subject (Fr.74,76-80,87). (4) He is concerned to make clear in what sense he holds Christ to be consubstantially divine – to show that he does not teach consubstantially divine flesh and to demonstrate the conformity of his doctrine with Nicaea (Fr.39-42). (5) Despite his commitment to the divine subject enduring in his consubstantial divinity, Apollinarius is concerned to uphold the reality of his incarnation, not only with reference to the real 'likeness' of the Word's carnal (and psychic) acquisition, but also by explaining the mode of the real and indivisible union between the Word and his flesh which is more (integral) than mere inspiration, or the conjunction of wholes. *And*, perhaps due to certain preconceptions about what constitutes a real union, Apollinarius seems concerned to confirm and justify his contention that the Word's carnal acquisition is necessarily 'incomplete' in itself (Fr.76,81-83,92).

Given these concerns, the expositional advantages of the T. doctrine, particularly over and beyond the D. type, are apparent from the way Apollinarius develops his argument in the *Apodeixis*.

(1) The T. analysis of man/Christ, and particularly its νοῦς-ἔνσαρκος equivalent which is more 'spiritualist' in character than the hylomorphic psychosomatic dichotomy of the D. works, better illustrates why the subject in Christ should be identified with the divine element (*qua* νοῦς) rather than the (sub-) divine-carnal 'whole': 'man *is* a mind in flesh' (Fr.72); 'The Lord is (a) mind-enfleshed' (Fr.70); 'God is mind' (Fr.74).

(2) Since the mind-flesh dichotomy is more 'assumptional' than 'compositional' in character, it better illustrates how the Word can acquire flesh without change in his essential (rational) substance: 'How does God become man without being changed from God unless mind has set itself down in man' (Fr.97).

(3) The T. analysis of man/Christ allows for a fuller account of Christ's humanity: (a) as a carnal 'form' of the spiritual subject (encouraged by Paul's words (*Phil.*2.5-11), and by his anthropological analogue, Apollinarius presents Christ's humanity not as a part, but as the quasi-generic 'nature' which the Word *underlies* (Fr.43-45)); and (b) as a body 'not without' an animal and irrational soul (Fr.22). This further articulation in the flesh allows for a more subtle and ethical scheme of salvation than is possible in the purely physical context of the D. Christology. The T. scheme allows Apollinarius to incorporate *Jn.*10.18 (Fr.62). This is a not insignificant Christological/soteriological advantage because it accords with Rufinus' testimony as to the motive for the Apollinarian revision.[43] Rufinus records that the gospel's reference to Christ's *psychic* suffering (*Mt.*26.38/*Jn.*12.27) was similarly instrumental in Apollinarius' change to the T. Christology. Gregory has greatly mangled the sections of the *Apodeixis* in which Apollinarius explains the passion and death of Christ (Fr.63-65,93-95,101-103), but it seems probable that Apollinarius attributed the suffering and death to the Word 'according to' his acquired flesh/carnal form – the increased (psychic) scope of which better enabled him to account for all aspects of the passion: e.g. the (human) will of Christ's agonising in the garden (*Mt.*26.39) (Fr.63) and, perhaps, the (psychic) death and resurrection of Christ as the seed that dies (Fr.62, re *Jn.*10.18).

(4) No longer tied to the psychosomatic model, the T. Christology set out in the *Apodeixis* does not rely upon the language of composition and co-mixture in μία φύσις when describing the mode of the union. Modelled upon νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, the unitive action is described mainly in assumptional terms – e.g. προσλαμβάνω. This makes it easier for Apollinarius to show that his doctrine does not imply consubstantially divine flesh even at a terminological level. In *De Unione* 1, he is led to speak of the common 'beginning' of the divine-human 'holy offspring', the 'one nature' co-constituted in the virginal conception In the *Apodeixis*, on the basis of the more 'spiritualist' T. model, he can talk of the pre-existing, co-eternal spirit/subject/hypostasis (Fr.38) of the Word who is consubstantially divine (Fr.41) according to his own enduring (rational) substance. The Word 'subsequently' (Fr.42) acquires a human form which, because of the union, is also identified with the divine self (Fr.38) – its underlying subject – but not confused with the divine nature/substance. The main concept of post-incarnational unity is not a divine-human composite substance but

[43] *H.E.*2.20 *MPL*(21.526C-527A) .

the divine subject of the Word (*qua* νοῦς), 'together with' 'his' flesh 'put on' and 'taken-on-in-addition'.

(5) The T. analysis allows for a real account of the union which is more integral than inspiration or a conjunction of wholes, or the assumption of one whole by another (Fr.76). In rejecting the ἀνάληψις of a (human) mind or a whole human being, Apollinarius indicates he has a particular type of assumptive action in mind when he speaks of the πρόσληψις of flesh. From the human side this still involves the completion of the partial by the divine Word which is thereby integrated into the flesh. This is not just a paradoxical theological idea as in *De Unione* 5, it is now, to some extent, facilitated by the T. analysis which is *both* a 'spiritualist' νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy and a revised (tripartite) form of composition. The revised dichotomy suggests the sense in which the Word can be perfect whilst serving as a 'part' in the revised (trichotomic) composite. Yet the compositional characteristic of the trichotomy also supports Apollinarius' apparent prejudice that in a real (integral) unity the elements (or at least some of them) must be incomplete in themselves.

The other T. documents reveal Apollinarius driven by the same concerns to advocate the same type of Christology as we find in the *Apodeixis*. These documents allow more insight into the context of these concerns – particularly if we also take into account the *Epp. Ad Serapionem* and *Ad Terentium* which both recommend the idea of union via πρόσληψις, albeit without reference to the T. anthropology. In the face of growing criticism and misunderstanding of his teaching from c.370 onwards, Apollinarius' main purpose in all these writings seems to be the (re)clarification of his Christological doctrine as orthodox for the benefit of Nicene critics (*Tomus Synodalis, KMP*), or for the benefit of potential 'orthodox' supporters (*Ad Diocaesareenses, Ad Terentium*), or for those among his friends who have misinterpreted his doctrine (*Ad Serapionem*) or who have been criticised on account of it (*Ad Julianum*). This need for (re)clarification pertains to the same specific concerns which Apollinarius again meets by recommending his T. Christology and demonstrating its expositional advantages. For example:

(1) Concerned to show that he upholds the divine identity of Christ in line with the first and third 'stipulations' of *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7, Apollinarius identifies the Word with the

mind of Christ in his 'first addition'[44] to the Athanasian formula in *Ad Diocaesareenses* 2. This allows him not only to oppose dualism but, accordingly, to account for the divine singularity of the Son who remains 'perfect by divine perfection and not human' (in the 'second addition').[45]

(2) As divine mind fulfilling the proper relation between a rational spirit and his flesh, the Word is held out of change and suffering, for, from the side of the νοῦς, this type of union is ethical more than physical. We find Apollinarius emphasising this 'advantage' of his revised νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy in *KMP* 30: 'God was united with human flesh and possessed his own energy pure, being a mind unconquered by psychic and fleshly passions and bearing the flesh and carnal movements in the divine way and also sinlessly'. In the *Tomus Synodalis* he indicates how it is the psychic 'extension' of the flesh in the T. thesis which allows him to better explain how the Word *per se* remains above such sufferings which are attributable to Christ's human ψυχή.[46]

(3) When Epiphanius visits Antioch (c.376-377) to interview Vitalis, Vitalis attempts to counter Paulinus' accusation that he denies the full humanity by offering Apollinarius' T. analysis of Christ: 'he is a perfect man... of flesh and soul and the divinity instead of mind' (*Panarion* 77,23.2). Vitalis' statement of the T. Christology as baldly reported in the *Panarion* does not dispel the concerns of Epiphanius and Paulinus, but we can see how Apollinarius' more subtle presentation of his T. Christology c.376 to the exiled Nicene bishops makes a much better case for the conformity of Apollinarian doctrine with the Athanasian stipulation about Christ's body being 'not without soul, sense or intelligence' (*Ad Diocaesareenses* 2). To this end the T. analysis enjoys advantages over the D. It allows for a fuller account of Christ's human element: the assumption not only of a body, but of a sentient animal soul which can feature in a physical scheme of salvation. The identification of the Word with the mind of Christ leaves room for an ethical or 'rational' account of his human perfection (e.g. Dorner's interpretation), 'perfect by divine perfection', which does not deny the human free will (Fr.87) and allows for the perfecting of the flesh and ψυχή in relation to the divine νοῦς (Fr.74). Apollinarius and those with him may have these aspects

[44] L.p.256,ll.5-7(see pp.204-206,above).
[45] L.p.56,ll.14-15.
[46] L.p.263,ll.13-14.

of the T. thesis in mind when they affirm with confidence (c.378-379) that their doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is truly one of divine 'en-manment' (and thus in keeping with Nicaea).[47]

(4) By speaking of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh rather than natural union, Apollinarius is able to distinguish his position from that of the 'consubstantialists' more effectively in *Ep. Ad Serapionem* than in *De Fide et Incarnatione* 4; and he is thus able to anathematise the 'consubstantialist' fallacy unequivocally in *Ad Terentium* and *Tomus Synodalis*. The evidence suggests that Apollinarius successfully avoided association with the 'consubstantialist' teaching of some of his pupils c.370-377, even though such an idea was to some extent implicit in his D. works (Fr.117,119,126,116). Even Epiphanius (c.377) believes that the D. doctrine circulated at Cyprus was an exaggerated departure from what Apollinarius actually taught (*Panarion 77*,2.5). Apollinarius' success in disassociating himself from the 'consubstantialists' may have been facilitated by his development of the revised T. Christology, for, in spite of Athanasius' attack on his pupils (c.370), Apollinarius was not criticised personally until 377 and then the focus of the Nicene attack was upon his false doctrine of the incomplete humanity rather than the consubstantially divine flesh.

(5) In *KMP* 30-31 [*LV*], as in the *Apodeixis*, Apollinarius' expositional concern to avoid psilanthropism and a non-unitive conjunction of wholes still overrides any apologetic concern to sign up to the fullness of Christ's human nature. But here he appears to react to the famous soteriological criticism of his doctrine: 'We declare that a whole man *is* assumed by God for *our salvation*'.[48] In this respect the two-stage soteriology made possible by the T. analysis better facilitates an explanation than the purely physical conception of the D. works.

The T. Christology as a Synthesis

At first sight, the evident difference between the apparently 'assumptional' thesis of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh which we find set out in the *Apodeixis* and the monenergetic, virginal conception-based, compositional thesis which we find in the D. works might lead us

[47] L.p.263,l.1.
[48] L.p.179,(subtext),ll.11-12.

to ask: did Apollinarius in the face of criticism and misinterpretation come to abandon his compositional conception of the union in favour of a less controversial Christology based upon the more mainstream idea of 'divine assumption'? Closer inspection of the T. texts suggests that the answer to such a question should be 'No', or 'Not entirely'.

When we consider carefully those surviving parts of the *Apodeixis* wherein Apollinarius gives his T. conception of the incarnational union technical and typological definition (Fr.66-69,76[a], 81[b]), and when we consider also Gregory's comments in *Antirrheticus* 39, which offer insight into the content of a passage of semantic and logical clarification that sits at a key moment in the scientific development of Apollinarius' exposition,[49] then the evidence suggests that the Apollinarian conception of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is not simply equivalent to the traditional idea of the Word's assumption of a humanity. The concept of πρόσληψις is something more specific and peculiarly Apollinarian: it is different from the 'dichotomic' idea of 'composition', but not entirely disentangled from it.

Unlike the traditional idea of the Word's assumption of a humanity, the idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh will not allow the assumption of the human mind *nor a complete* human being (Fr.76). Not only does Apollinarius appear to contrast the object of such an action, partial rather than complete, he appears to be contrasting the type of action – πρόσληψις and not ἀνάληψις. 'Πρόσληψις' denotes the assumption, without change, by someone perfect (Fr.121) of something partial which leads to a real and integral unity, as opposed to 'ἀνάληψις' which denotes the assumption of someone/something complete by someone/something complete which is ultimately an adoptive, non-unitive, conjunction of wholes (Fr.81-83,87,91-92). Thus, πρόσληψις is not assumption *per se* but a special type of assumption which, on closer inspection, appears to be conceived also as a peculiar form of asymmetrical composition. Gregory certainly discerns and reports this type of conceptuality in *Antirrheticus* 39 (Fr.81[b]), and *Antirrheticus* 49-50 (Fr.91,92):

> '...he says, "if perfect God has been joined to a complete man they would be two" – the inference, then, is that the incomplete compounded (συντιθέμενον) with the complete is not regarded by him as two'[50]; '...according to the discourse of this

[49] See *Reconstruction*,pp.117-118,above.
[50] L.p.224,ll.17-19.

man it has been given that the compound structure (τὸ σύγκριμα) is from what is lacking and the complete'.[51]

In the concept of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh, therefore, we appear to find a *synthesis* of the two different ways of understanding the union which we find co-present in the D. works and juxtaposed in the syllogisms of the *Anacephalaeosis*. The less dominant 'assumptional' idea of the D. works has not replaced the main compositional idea, but modified it, and a new concept has emerged. The Apollinarian idea of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is to do with a special type of assumption-composition which can occur between one who is perfect and something incomplete. From the side of the divine/rational perfection this involves taking-on-something-in-addition whilst remaining perfect *per se*; from the carnal side it involves being constituted/completed/perfected by and in something/someone else which serves as a perfect part and provides an actual identity. It is interesting that the Apollinarian author of *Quod Unus Sit Christus* presents the Word's hypostatisation of a body in terms of an asymmetrical composition.[52] It could be that, within the limits of its own conceptuality, this revised and synthesised Apollinarian conception of unity foreshadows the 'orthodox' idea of the 'hypostatic union'.

The anthropology, *communicatio idiomatum* and soteriology of the *Apodeixis* also display the double aspect of being both 'assumptional' and 'compositional' and may further reflect the way in which Apollinarius has arrived at his T. thesis – not so much by replacing one way of thinking with another but by synthesising the two. *Anthropology*: the revised T. model represents on the one hand a new type of tripartite composition whereby human body and soul are integrated into a unique and indivisible unity with the divinity serving as noetic part; and yet, on the other hand, the model presents a new type of dichotomy which is not so much to do with bipartite composition, but rather the assumption of an external form by and enduring rational substance which 'takes on' the acquired form and 'underlies' it. *Communicatio idiomatum*: in the *Apodeixis* the exchange of predicates occurs because of the divine act of union rather than because of the existence of the divine-human whole which possesses both sets of attributes. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the divine subject is now a singular 'complete' who includes/possesses/actualises both sets of attributes in himself (Fr.38) if not (?) in his own divine nature. *Soteriology*: despite the new 'subjective'

[51] L.p.228,ll.16-17.
[52] *QUSC* 9-11(E.T.p.185,above).

and ethical dimension of his thesis in the *Apodeixis* (Fr.74,76-80,87), Apollinarius makes it equally clear that, from the point of view of the flesh, he understands the act of salvation (particularly in the first incarnational phase) in physical-cum-sacrificial 'objective' terms (Fr.32-41,61-62,95,98,104). Thus, his scheme has a double aspect. From the point of view of the human subject/mind in the second phase and the divine mind (providing decisive 'recognition') in the first phase, salvation comes about not so much through the union but in spite of it. Despite being in an acquired carnal form, the rational individual overcomes fleshly impulses and actualises/maintains his rational nature transcending his carnal situation. From the point of view of the human flesh and carnal soul, the (future) possibility of salvation comes about because the assumed flesh and ψυχή is (in Christ) reintegrated into a proper natural relationship (through physical composition) with the rational mind (of God), whereby the proper passive nature of flesh, no longer source of negative impulses, is fully actualised.

The *KMP* offers the confessional formulation of the same of T. Christology as set out in the *Apodeixis*. Analysis of this document further confirms that Apollinarius has synthesised his 'assumptional' and 'compositional' conceptions of the union to arrive at this particular view of the incarnation which he describes as the divine πρόσληψις of flesh in his introductory statements to the first and third of three Christological statements (*KMP* 2,28) and possibly also in the second (Fr.1). It is again apparent that Apollinarius does not have any type of assumptional action in mind because he explicitly contrasts his 'orthodox' unitive conception with a false notion favoured by his opponents, namely 'that God was man having assumed (ἀναλαβών) a whole man' (*KMP* 30 [*LV*]) – a notion, which in Apollinarius' opinion, properly applies with reference to the salvation of the human individual (*KMP* 31 [*LV*]). The opening statements of *KMP* 28 and 31 indicate that Apollinarius uses προσλαμβάνω to denote the idea of the inseparable, proper and possible union between the perfect and the incomplete:

> 'We confess that the Son of God became Son of Man, not in name but in truth, having taken-on-in-addition (προσλαβόντα) flesh from Mary the Virgin, and that he is one (Son/individual) and not two complete things united – Son of God and Son of Man, one hypostatis and one person... And he is truly one – He who is fleshless made manifest in flesh, perfect in true and divine perfection: not two persons, nor two natures which are perfect in themselves.'[53]

[53] L.p.177(subtext),ll.5-9;p.179(subtext),ll.4-6.

There is only one statement in the *KMP* where Apollinarius uses compositional language, but here again he uses it to denote an asymmetrical type of 'assumptional composition': 'God the Word is not one person and the man Jesus another (person) but the same pre-existing Son set himself down united with flesh (co)-constituting himself (συνιστὰς ἑαυτὸν) (as) a perfect, holy and sinless human being'.[54] The divine person of God the Word *qua* νοῦς/rational substance constitutes *himself* as a human individual by taking on/possessing/being in flesh. By the same action the incomplete carnal form/'nature' (§31 [*LV*]) is co-constituted (into) a perfect, holy and sinless actual human being by and in the divine person himself.

Apollinarius' synthesis of the conceptions of union by divine assumption and union by physical composition in his T. Christology brings him very close to the idea of one divine person/hypostatis in whom a singular divine nature actually inheres, at the same time hypostatising/personalising another otherwise non-actual human nature in himself. But because Apollinarius understands being an actual nature in two different ways yet, in both cases, in a concrete way (i.e. in relation to there being one complete actual object), his synthesis of the two conceptions creates an idea of unity which, ultimately, has the appearance of a paradox or a contradiction. The assumptional conception of the union rather suggests that the one nature of Christ is the divine nature of the Word, corresponding in singularity and characteristics to the individual divine object in which it inheres. Somehow this nature 'takes-on-in-addition' flesh without changing. The 'somehow' is presented by turning again to the compositional conception, but only on the human side of the equation. Whilst the divine nature is and remains a perfect object, the flesh is an imperfect object and needs completing to be an actual nature. Here we perhaps find the weakness of the conception: the impersonal, non-actual, non-hypostatic nature of Christ's humanity is *also* understood in a concrete way – in terms of it being a part which is able to become a(nother) complete object through its union with the Word. Here apparent contradictions arise. How can a perfect thing take on an extra part of something else and remain the same thing? And how can something partial be combined with something else to form a whole thing equivalent to its new part? Thinking along such lines, the outcome of the union can only be the original whole thing, a different composite thing or two non-united things – not the sort

[54] L.p.181,ll.9-12.

of paradoxical alternative which Apollinarius tries to sustain. Such a paradox might be better held out of contradiction if the idea of Christ's singular unity, actuality and completeness both as God and man were not only understood in relation to their being a single thing, but also understood, at the same time, in a different way, on one side of the equation or another.

7

THE WIDER SIGNIFICANCE

In the context of the ongoing discussion upon the nature of Apollinarian Christology, the conclusions which have been drawn above are not insignificant, because they appear to vindicate Lietzmann's subsequently discounted 'hypothesis' that Apollinarius' Christology changed and developed, and because they provide a clearer definition of the nature of that change and a fuller explanation of the manner and motive of that development, showing how this is, indeed, linked to the discernible shift in anthropological vocabulary noted by Rufinus. These conclusions may also have a wider significance because they provide a means of explaining otherwise problematic issues which attend the Christological writings of Apollinarius and the opinions of those who have subsequently interpreted them: e.g. (1) the interpretive arguments between Apollinarius' disciples; (2) Apollinarius' ambiguous position *vis-à-vis* the 'orthodox' 'Alexandrine' tradition; (3) the interpretive disagreements among modern commentators.

(1) The Interpretive Argument between Apollinarius' Disciples

It is not so much the fact that Apollinarius taught two distinct types of Christology, but more the presence of the two differing conceptions of the unity which lie beneath them which helps us to understand the nature of the (theological) argument which divided Apollinarius' disciples soon after his retirement and/or death. The argument does not seem to have been a simple case of Polemon and the 'extremists' continuing to espouse the D. Christology and the 'moderates' adopting the T. Christology, as Augustine's report in *De Dono Perseverantiae*[1] and comments in Gregory of Nazianzus' *Ep.*102[2] might seem to suggest. Polemon appears to endorse the T. Christology when he declares against 'Cappadocian Gregory' that 'Christ was fully God and was united to a completeness of flesh and became a man *not* having mixed (καταμίξας) with himself a changeable mind, something which is

[1] See p.42,n.[38],above.
[2] *MPG*37.196BC.

contrary and moved by natural desire'.[3] Nevertheless, it is interesting that no extant text written by Polemon or the other 'extremists' (viz. Jobius, Julian or Eunomius) explicitly admits the human ψυχή. This may be because their monenergetic/monothelite understanding of their master's doctrine rather overlooks Apollinarius' references to a carnal will and soul in his later T. works (e.g. Fr.63, 22). By contrast, the moderate Valentinus takes pains to stress the psychic nature of Christ's human flesh when interpreting *Jn.*1.14 and defending the 'true' Apollinarian doctrine against Timothy.[4] However, the most obvious cause of the disagreement between the extremists and the moderates over what their master taught is the ambiguity in his dogmatic writings created by the co-presence of the 'compositional' and 'assumptional' explanations of the union. Apollinarius may have tried to synthesise these two conceptions in his later works, but, as we have seen, the doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh and its tripartite anthropological model is still, on one level, compositional and (intellectually) monenergetic which is why it cannot admit the completeness of Christ's human nature. Thus, despite the shift in Apollinarius' doctrine from the D. to the T. position, there seem to have remained those 'extreme' disciples, like Polemon, so fiercely opposed to the dyophysitism of Diodore – now endorsed by the 'orthodox' opponents of Apollinarius – that they continued to emphasise the compositional, *synousiastic*, monenergetic understanding of the union which was central to their master's earlier D. works, and, from their point of view, still implicit in his T. works, particularly when understood in the light of his earlier exposition.

It may, therefore, be fair to say that the 'Polemianists' (or 'Synousiasts') were those Apollinarians who remained dedicated to Apollinarius' compositional conception of the union (as advocated most radically in his earlier D. works). This is precisely the reason that Theodoret gives for the emergence of the 'Polemianist' faction in his *Hareticarum Fabularum Compendum* 4.9: 'Polemon, one who possessed proof texts from the treatises of this man [sc. Apollinarius], said that there was a *synousiastic* union (συνουσίωσιν) and a mixture (κρᾶσιν) of the divinity and the body. From this the heresy of the Polemianists sprouted forth.'[5] When we look at the fragments written by Polemon and his supporters they interpret and defend their master's doctrine in monenergetic and compositional terms

[3] Fr.173,L.p.274,ll.6-8.
[4] *Capita Apologiae* 4,L.p.289,ll.3-5.
[5] See L.p.273,ll.27-30.

thereby approaching the 'consubstantialist' conclusion which their master decided to renounce c.371.

Polemon fiercely opposes all dyophysites, 'since they declare that the one Christ, that is to say the one nature of the Word synthesised (συντεθεῖσαν) with flesh, possesses two intellectual and self-governing natures and two faculties of will and as many energies'.[6] (N.B. It is interesting that Polemon's interpretation of his master's doctrine of 'one enfleshed nature of the Word incarnate' in Fr.176 suggests more the *absorption* of the carnal in the divine nature rather than the co-formation of a (third) divine-human nature.) When castigating Timothy, Polemon reveals what he regards as the correct interpretation of Apollinarius' famous monophysite formula in *Ad Jovianum* 1, reminding his fellow Apollinarian that he is 'not ashamed to confess one enfleshed nature of the Word *as one composite* (καθάπερ μίαν σύνθετον)'.[7]

Eunomius, the Apollinarian Bishop of Borea in Thrace, defends the true doctrine of the union *qua synthesis* against those (in Egypt, Cappadocia and Rome) who would divide the wills and natures:

> 'This is not a synthesis! (σύνθεσις)...how can there be a synthesis from things opposed by nature? It (the synthesis) would be torn apart by the wills as a consequence of dissimilar energies'; [8] 'The Word having been enfleshed did not become two natures and wills...but a composite (σύνθετος). For he who was enfleshed did not invoked a quantity of natures, but out of simplicity he became composite (ἐξ ἁπλοῦ γέγονε σύνθετος)'[9] (cf. Apollinarius Fr.123).

Julian, agreeing with Polemon's interpretation writes in reply:

> 'Our first and only Father Apollinarius spoke loud and clear that from what is movable and unmoved, from what is active and passive Christ was one composite substance and nature (μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν σύνθετον) moved by only one will and that he has worked miracles and sufferings by one energy'[10] (cf. Apollinarius, Fr.117,107).

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[6] Fr.176,L.p.276,ll.3-6.
[7] Fr.174,L.p.274,ll.17-19.
[8] Fr.179,L.p.277,ll.1-4.
[9] Fr.178,L.p.276,ll.23-26.
[10] Fr.180,L.p.277,ll.9-13.

Bishop Jobius is more careful to distinguish between his master's doctrine of the 'highest union' (cf. Fr.140-142) between the Word and his flesh and a 'consubstantial' union. Nevertheless, he understands Apollinarius' ambiguous (if not conventional) understanding of the one hypostasis in Christ (cf. *De Fide et Incarnatione* 6, *KMP* 28 [*LV*]) along explicitly compositional lines, alluding to his master's idea of Christ as mediator/middlebeing(?) (cf. *Anacephalaeosis* 18, Fr.113): 'God the Word, having united himself to flesh from the holy Virgin, in the last times is God and man, one and the same, one composite hypostasis (ὑπόστασιν μίαν σύνθετον) which mediates (μεσιτεῦον) between God and *men* (ἀνθρώποις).'[11]

Although the terms and ideas favoured by the Polemianists clearly derive from their master's earlier teachings, Voisin's opinion that their doctrine was a 'faithful' reproduction of their master's thoughts 'in all their crudity'[12] is an inadequate assessment. It does not seem to have been a simple case of the Polemianists being robustly faithful to the true nature of Apollinarius' doctrine (unlike the moderates[13]); it seems more the case that they chose to stress *one* of his key unitive ideas, rather than the other or both together. In so doing they were being faithful to an aspect of their master's thought but not to the more complex whole. It is not surprising that their favoured proof texts have been gathered mainly from the D. works of Apollinarius. If we look at the texts which the 'Polemon source' has chosen to preserve,[14] all the citations are either from D. works (*Contra Diodorum Ad Heraclium, Ad Jovianum, Ad Dionysium A*) or highly 'compositional' statements from 'unclassifiable works' (Fr.113,111,149,106-107). The only citations taken from T. works are the ambiguous monophysite/monenergetic excerpts from *Ad Julianum* (Fr.150-152) and the most 'compositional' statement which survives from the *Apodeixis*: Fr.81^{b}. The 'Polemon source' may also have exaggerated the compositional nature of Apollinarius' teaching by turning the Gregorian inference into an Apollinarian declaration.[15] (N.B. We should at the same time remember that these '*synousiastic*' quotations have survived, not only because they appealed to the Polemianists, but because they caught the eye of the anti-monophysite polemicists who subsequently preserved them.)

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[11] L.p.286,ll.20-23.
[12] Voisin,p.119.
[13] See Voisin,p.126.
[14] L.p.113.
[15] Compare L.p.224,ll.22-24(Fr.81^{b} from the 'Polemon source') with L.p.224,ll.16-19,Fr.81^{b} from Gregory's *Antirrheticus*.

It may also be fair to say that the 'moderate' wing of the Apollinarian party, anxious to remain within orthodoxy, chose to emphasise the more 'assumptional' statements to be found in their master's writing, particularly in his T. works, which were less controversial to orthodox ears. They also turned to those texts in which Apollinarius (and Athanasius) had rejected the 'consubstantialist' position of the earlier disciples (c.370-373) – accusing the 'Synousiasts' of adopting a position which their master had clearly condemned.

If we examine the *Capita Apologiae*[16] – the work in which the moderate Valentinus attacks the 'false' Apollinarianism of Timothy and his master Polemon – it is almost entirely in 'assumptional' terms that he condemns the error of the 'Synousiasts' and recommends his master's 'true' doctrine: e.g. 'The flesh was not consubstantial, for it was a robe (στολὴ) and an envelope (περιβόλαιον), and it was taken on (προσείληφεν) as a veil of the hidden mystery and on behalf of men he offered it and through it he was revealed to men.'[17] Valentinus avoids talking about the union in the compositional, vitalistic, substantialist or physical terms found in his master's D. works: 'By the union which is with God the Word the flesh is deemed divine, not by nature'[18] (cf. Apollinarius, Fr.160); 'The statements of our thrice blessed father and teacher Apollinarius... are indicative of a possessional relationship (σχέσεως) and honour, not nature'.[19] The Apollinarian terms favoured by Valentinus for depicting the divinely initiated act of union with 'ensouled (ἐμψύχῳ) flesh'[20] denote bearing or wearing[21] (φορέω – cf.. *Apodeixis* Fr.43, *KMP* 30) and (a specific type of) taking – προσλαμβάνω (§§2,4,6).[22] The first unipersonal statement from Valentinus is surprisingly symmetrical: 'Christ has been shown to be one person who is from (ἐκ) flesh and Word.'[23] The second is more indicative that this 'moderate' Apollinarian (like his master in his later works) understands the person of the Word as the locus for the special type of 'compositional' unity between flesh and divinity which occurs in him: 'Let both [sc. divinity and flesh] be posited together (συντιθέσθω) in/upon (ἐπὶ) the one person'.[24] (This

[16] L.pp.287-291.
[17] *Capita Apologiae* 4,L.p.289,ll.12-14.
[18] *Capita Apologiae* 2,L.p.288,ll.9-10.
[19] *Capita Apologiae* 7,L.p.290,ll.17-18.
[20] *Capita Apologiae* 4,L.p.289,l.5.
[21] *Capita Apologiae* 2,4,L.p.288,ll.17-20;p.289,l.8;p.287,l.33.
[22] L.p.288,l.5;p.289,l.13;p.290,l.9.
[23] *Capita Apologiae* 2,L.p.288,ll.7-9.
[24] *Capita Apologiae* 8,L.p.291,ll.1-2.

differs from Apollinarius' more compositional D. idea of 'into' (εἰς μίαν φύσιν), cf. Fr.107.)

The citations with which Valentinus prefaces the *Capita Apologiae*[25] allow us to see which Apollinarian works inspired this 'moderate' 'assumptional' interpretation of his doctrine. Valentinus quotes from the (T.) *Tomus Synodalis*, and the 'unclassifiable' documents which advocate union by πρόσληψις rather than nature (Fr.159,160,162,163). He quotes from only one D. document (*Ad Dionysium A*) and from this gives only two extracts, featuring Apollinarius' more 'assumptional' view of the union (§1,§10). He also prefaces these with the *Second Letter to Dionysius* (Fr.164) in which Apollinarius unambiguously rejects the 'consubstantialist' position. Valentinus has been influenced (like his master) by Athanasius' *Ad Epictetum* which he quotes twice. By stressing the 'assumptional' aspect of their teacher's work it seems that the 'moderates' were soon able to reintegrate with the Church, signing up to the Orthodox formulae which safeguarded the completeness of Christ's rational human nature. Voisin suggests there may have been some deception involved,[26] but it seems more probable that the 'moderates' did not understand their master's idea of πρόσληψις in the same (semi-) compositional way as the Synousiasts (or, indeed, Apollinarius himself) and, being less tightly bound to the 'arithmetical' preconception that two completes cannot make a true (integral) unity, they were more prepared to admit God's πρόσληψις of a *full* humanity at a theoretical level.

If it is appropriate to account for the interpretive disagreement between the Polemianists and 'moderate' Apollinarians in this way – that they each emphasised one aspect of their master's view of the union over and against the other – then it is perhaps unsurprising that both groups eventually rejected Timothy of Berytus' interpretation of Apollinarianism. There is some irony in this, because Timothy's nuanced and ambivalent statements about a substantial union which is real/integral but *not* consubstantial perhaps comes closest to the compositional-cum-assumptional doctrine of divine πρόσληψις which Apollinarius himself came to advocate, e.g.: 'The flesh of the Lord, by the union acknowledged as divine and confessed as consubstantial with God remains, by nature, human (flesh) and consubstantial with us'[27] (cf. Apollinarius, *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3-7). Among the proof texts gathered by Timothy to correct the more 'moderate' Apollinarian

[25] See L.p.104.
[26] Voisin,p.126.
[27] Fr.181,L.p.279,ll.1-3;also *Ep.Ad.Prosdocium 6*,L.p.285,ll.22-25.

Homonius[28] we find, as we might expect, many fragments from the 'compositional' D. works (e.g. Fr.117-118,140-146 from *Contra Diodorum*; *De Unione* 2,8; Fr.116, etc.) but Timothy's understanding of his master's doctrine may also have been moderated by the later works of Apollinarius: e.g. *Ep. Ad Dionysium B* (Fr.164), and *Ep. Ad Serapionem* (Fr.161) which he quotes in the body of the text.[29]

(2) The Ambiguous Position of Apollinarius' Doctrine vis-à-vis the Christology of the 'Orthodox' 'Alexandrine' Tradition

At first sight the problem of whether Apollinarian Christology is very close to the orthodox 'Alexandrine' position or a novel departure from it appears hard to resolve, particularly when we consider the ambiguity of the 'orthodox' reaction to the teachings of Apollinarius.[30] This apparent ambiguity becomes easier to explain when we recognise the internal ambivalence in Apollinarian Christology (found also in the tradition in which it stood), and the fact that it changed and developed thereby inviting more than one understanding from both friends and enemies. It thus offered its 'orthodox' political opponents a target which was moving and often indistinct from its background. When they attempted to eradicate the Apollinarian 'heresy', they tended to deal with its strange 'symptoms' and implications rather than looking at their underlying causes: i.e. the basic conceptions which Apollinarius used to explain the incarnational union, which were, to some extent, shared by those in the 'Alexandrine' tradition. Shorn of the tell-tale signs of the Apollinarian 'heresy', certain statements by Apollinarius did not simply appear to affirm more mainstream 'Alexandrine' ideas, that was their original intention. Such ideas persisted in the tradition which had spawned them long after the condemnation of Apollinarius.

Malchion and the Fathers of the 268 Synod

Historians of dogma attempting to trace the origins of Apollinarian Christology earlier in the Alexandrine tradition have sometimes suggested that certain pronouncements made by

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[28] See L.pp.104-105.
[29] L.p.277,ll.27-29.
[30] See pp.42-44,above.

Malchion and other 'Origenist' bishops when prosecuting Paul of Samosata at the 268 Synod of Antioch seem to foreshadow, and may have influenced, Apollinarius' view of Christ. Raven finds in one of the Synod's phrases ('οὐσία οὐσιωμένη ἐν σώματι') the very source of Apollinarius' 'substantial' rather than 'accidental' view of the union, and therein implicit his conclusion that Christ's humanity must be incomplete in itself and impersonal/soulless.[31] De Riedmatten cannot accept the oversimplistic way in which Raven has drawn the connection. In his book devoted to the documents connected to the 268 Synod de Riedmatten develops his own view that whilst there are 'undeniable links' between the Christology of Paul's prosecutors and Apollinarius (e.g. they use some of the same physical terms for the union, notably συνουσιόω and σύνθετον, and refer to the psychosomatic *exemplum*), there are '*clear differences*'.[32] For example: (1) Malchion and the Fathers do not use the language of οὐσία to account for the *mode* of the union but as a means of emphasising the full divinity of Christ. For them the Word must be understood as 'le sujet de ce qui affecte le Christ'.[33] (2) When they use the psychosomatic analogy they do not, like Apollinarius, equate the Word with the soul *qua* 'energy part', they treat the substance of the Word as the 'inner man': '"Inner man" doubtless means "soul" but this does not prevent the term conveying an essentially personalist, we might say hypostatic, conception of the human spirit... les Actes professent une dichotomie de type platonisant où l'espirit est considéré comme une personne dans un corps.'[34] Thus, de Riedmatten links the 268 Fathers with the type of 'spiritualist' anthropological conception which he and Norris argue is *not* the basis of Apollinarius' vitalistic, biological understanding of μία φύσις/οὐσία.[35]

Given the conclusions that have been reached in my own study – that *two* underlying conceptions of the substantial unity of Christ are co-present in the Christological writings of Apollinarius – de Riedmatten's observations are most interesting. Although de Riedmatten has a singular view of Apollinarius' Christology and, therefore, ends up contrasting it with the doctrine of the 268 Fathers, his study of the texts actually shows how the roots of *both* the Apollinarian conceptions which I have highlighted are co-present in the writings of those who initiated the 'orthodox' anti-dualist tradition of Christology in which Apollinarius saw

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[31] Raven,p.65;also p.177.
[32] Riedmatten,H.de,*Les Actes du Procès de Paul de Samosate(Paradosis 6)*,1952,pp.49-58.
[33] Riedmatten,*Les Actes*,p.55.
[34] Riedmatten,*Les Actes*,p.57.
[35] Riedmatten[2],pp.225,Norris,pp.96-98.

himself standing. The Fathers do not develop the idea of a composition from parts into a thesis, nor do they use the psychosomatic *exemplum* as a determinative model leading to the explicit denial of the human soul, and generally they prefer the idea of unity of divine substance (*qua* person) towards which Apollinarian Christology developed. Nevertheless, the co-presence of the language and ideas of both 'Apollinarian' conceptions would appear to indicate *two* lines of influence upon the thinking of the subsequent 'heresiarch'.[36] It would also explain why Apollinarian Christology even in its 'compositional' D. form was, at first, treated without suspicion in 'Alexandrine' circles – for there was a long-standing familiarity with these 'orthodox' ways of speaking about the divine reality of the incarnation among those who opposed Monarchianism and its correlate adoptionist Christology.

The Relationship between Athanasian and Apollinarian Christology

The conclusion that there were two types of Apollinarian doctrine drawing upon more than one basic conception of the union allows us better to understand the otherwise ambiguous relationship between the 'heresy' of Apollinarius and the 'orthodox' Alexandrine Christology of Athanasius. Athanasian Christology apparently failed to criticise Apollinarianism effectively and failed to make the soul a theological factor in Christ; it was at once clearly different from Apollinarian Christology, yet also influential upon it, sometimes showing such similarities that the works of the two former friends have often been conflated.

If we look at the Christology of Athanasius we find all the features of what we have described as the 'assumptional' conception of the divine incarnation. This understanding of Christ seems to be a mainstream 'Alexandrine' view shared and developed by both Athanasius and Apollinarius. By contrast we do *not* find much evidence in Athanasius of the terminology and ideas typical of Apollinarius' 'compositional' conception of the union, apart from one striking similarity: Athanasius frequently presents the Word as the 'life-giving' (ζωοποεῖν) principle in Christ,[37] and given his near silence over the human soul and his conception of the body as the passive 'instrument' of the Word, some scholars have

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[36] One fragment (S.36) is particularly revealing, for Malchion brings together *both* the anthropologically-based 'Apollinarian' conceptions of the incarnational unity in a statement which is thus doubly suggestive of the 'orthodox' position:'τὸ σύνθετον ζῶον' or 'τινός ὄντος ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ'. See Riedmatten,*Les Actes*,p.158, pp.51-52.

[37] E.g.*De Incarnatione* 17;*Ad Adelphium* 8;*Ad Epictetum* 9.

suggested that Athanasius' understanding of the Word's relationship with his inanimate flesh may come very close to Apollinarius' vitalistic D. doctrine.[38] Unlike Apollinarius, however, Athanasius does not find himself obliged to deny explicitly the human soul; this is because his understanding of the relationship between the life-giving Word and his body is *not* determined by a prescriptive anthropological model to do with a compositional unity from parts initiated by a quasi-traducian pro-creative act.

Because Athanasius does not develop his 'vitalistic' understanding of the Word-flesh relationship along the same compositional quasi-psychosomatic lines as Apollinarius, he does not have to deny explicitly part of the Word's humanity. His 'assumptional' conception of the union therefore remains open to the full paradoxical 'σκοπός'[39] of the Church's incarnational faith, both in respect of the Word's divinity and the full 'natural' likeness of the human flesh which he took. Thus, he is only 'Apollinarian' in the sense that he shares and/or influences Apollinarius' 'assumptional' view of the union. When he encounters the novel consequences of the (Apollinarian) 'compositional' conception – the explicit denial of the human soul, the transformation of the Word into something else, the consubstantial divinity of the flesh – he tries to contain it (*Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7), and then launches a fierce attack (*Ad Epictetum*) reaffirming strongly his 'assumptional' understanding of the divine incarnation. In so doing he explicitly recognises the *physical* inclusion of the human soul in what is assumed to preserve the reality of the incarnation and the fullness of the salvation achieved in it. He does not develop the idea of the human soul 'theologically' because the denial of the (rational) human soul does not have a 'theological' justification in the (D.) type of Apollinarianism encountered by Athanasius, which primarily denies the soul in the interests of theory of monophysite/synousiast union.

If we understand the similarities and dissimilarities between the Christologies of Athanasius and Apollinarius in this way, it becomes apparent that Athanasius was *not* a 'closet Apollinarian' in any heretical sense; he actually attacked the Apollinarian heresy but (only) in the earlier D. form in which it was being advocated in his own lifetime (d.373). The nature of this attack – a scornful exaggeration *ad absurdum* of the consequences of union by composition and a strong emphasis upon the (shared) theme of divine assumption –

[38] Grillmeier,p.312.
[39] *Contra Arianos III* 29.

may well have influenced the shift in Apollinarius' own Christology (c.370-374) towards his revised T. doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh.[40]

The Influence of Apollinarian Conceptions of Unity upon the 'Orthodox' Christology of Cyril of Alexandria

If we recognise the two distinct conceptions of the incarnational union which together inform Apollinarius' exposition and contribute towards the development of his doctrine, then connections between this 'heteredox' Alexandrine Christology and the 'orthodox', yet influenced, doctrine of Cyril become plainer to see, and the similarities and differences become easier to explain. For Cyril also developed his Christology, in controversy with a form of dualism, making use of more than one conception (or 'model')[41] of the union, drawing these from the 'orthodox' Alexandrine-cum-Western tradition with which he was familiar (including certain pseudonymously entitled texts written by Apollinarius himself). But Cyril used such ideas in a different way and was ultimately able to develop them further than Apollinarius because his thinking was also determined by another, more recent, 'orthodox' preconception: he began by acknowledging the unacceptability of certain outlawed Apollinarian conclusions, albeit that these were logically related to some of the traditional 'Alexandrine' terms and concepts with which he was still working. Thus, he was able to combine 'compositional' and 'assumptional' notions of the unity without necessarily deferring to the prescriptive logic of the former, since such deductions were now to be overruled according to a ratified Christological principle.

The conception of the union most obviously shared by Athanasius, Apollinarius and Cyril is the one I have called 'assumptional'. Like Athanasius and Apollinarius, Cyril had a

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[40] When presenting the incarnation in 'assumptional' terms Athanasius sometimes uses the term προσλαμβάνω favoured by Apollinarius (e.g. *Ad Adelphium* 5 (*MPG*26.1077B); 7 (1081C/1083A)), but, unlike the heresiarch, he is equally happy to use ἀναλαμβάνω with reference to *Phil.*2.7 (e.g. *Ad Adelphium* 4 (*MPG*26.1077A)). The fact that Athanasius speaks of the divine Word's πρόσληψις of a human form (i.e. an 'unequal' body) in the very passage of *Ad Adelphium* 8 which Apollinarians later chose to insert into *KMP* 28 (L.p.177,l.12-p.178,l.3, see Prestige, *St Basil and Apollinaris*, pp.60-61) may betray the Athanasian influence behind the revised Apollinarian T. Christology. In *Ad Epictetum* 9 Athanasius develops the interesting idea (*contra* the Apollinarian D. doctrine) of a form of (one-sided) 'addition received (προσθήκην λαμβάνειν)' which is reminiscent of the (Athanasian influenced?) Apollinarian idea of union by πρόσληψις: 'They have failed to see that the Word became flesh not by means of an addition to the divinity... but, rather, a great addition has come to the human body by the fellowship of the Word and the union of the Word to(wards) it... though an ensoulled body, it became spiritual' (*MPG*26.1065A-B).

[41] Norris,R.A.,'Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria',*Studia Patristrica* 13,1975,pp.255-268.

basic commitment to the idea of the continuity of the divine subject in Christ as attested by scripture and the creeds. Thus, Cyril was faced with the same expositional problem: the incarnational 'becoming' cannot involve the divine subject in change, but he is nevertheless, in a real sense, the sole subject of the action. In order to describe this action Cyril turns, like his Alexandrine predecessors, to the idea of the Word's assumption of flesh/what is human as suggested by Paul in *Phil.*2.7. In his study of the incarnational formulae found in Cyril's earlier works J. Liébaert has noted the typical use of ἀναλαμβάνειν.[42] The notion of the divine Word 'taking on' flesh (and blood) (λῆψις/πρόσληψις) is also employed by Cyril in his later works when combatting the dualism of Nestorius, alongside other unitive ideas typical of the 'assumptional' conception in the writings of Apollinarius and Athanasius – that is the divine *possession* and *wearing/bearing* of flesh.[43] Norris connects this type of thinking with what he regards as the most basic and determinative 'model' in Cyril's Christology which he describes as the 'subject-attribute model'.[44] The presence of a similar 'assumptional' theme in the writings of Apollinarius may help to explain why Cyril believed them to be orthodox, perhaps taking up some of the more novel terms and ideas which were co-present. It may also indicate the nature of an *orthodox line of Apollinarian influence* upon Cyril, for Apollinarius' νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy found in his T. works offers a 'subject-attribute model' as well as a physical model for understanding the mode of the divine Word's πρόσληψις of flesh.

There are characteristic terms and ideas in the writings of Cyril which indicate that his understanding of the incarnation has also been directly influenced by Apollinarius' conception of union by composition, known to him through the pseudonymously 'orthodox' works (e.g. *Ad Jovianum, Ad Dionysium A, KMP*). Like Apollinarius in his D. works, Cyril understands Christ to be 'μία φύσις' primarily in the sense of singular concrete existent (i.e. one hypostasis) and is thus at first reluctant to talk of Christ's possession of two actual natures, preferring, like Apollinarius, to make more oblique reference to the enduring 'natural' qualities of the Word and his flesh. Therefore, when he insists that the incarnational union is 'natural' (κατὰ φύσιν, ἕνωσις φυσική), or 'hypostatic', rather than a looser (non-integral) conjunction between God and a man, he seems, like Apollinarius, to imply that the 'one nature' is a *tertium quid* out of two different (if not partial) 'natures'

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[42] See Grillmeier,p.417,n.[5].
[43] E.g.*Ep.*17.3:*Ep.*4.7;*Ep.*45.6.
[44] Norris,*Christological Models*,p.261.

since Christ is 'εἷς ἐκ δύο'. Even more reminiscent of the Apollinarian D. thesis is his explanation of the mode of the natural union as 'κατὰ σύνθεσιν' with reference to the psychosomatic analogy.[45] There are other passages where Cyril stresses the life-giving role of the Word in relation to his flesh in a way which seems to recapitulate not only the traditional Athanasian theme but Apollinarius' vitalistic D. thesis and its related eucharistic soteriology.[46] The fact that Cyril employs terms and ideas typical of Apollinarius' 'compositional' conception of the union is quite remarkable, given that he is also concerned to make clear that he is *not* advocating an Apollinarian doctrine of 'a strict and tight union' involving a confusion (σύγχυσις/φυρμός) or co-mixing (σύγκρασις) of the Word with the body, or the body changing into the divine nature.[47] Cyril may understand 'σύνθεσις' according to the more 'juxtapositional' sense which it had in the secular philosophy, or it could be that Cyril failed to recognise the characteristic terms and ideas of Apollinarius' D. thesis because he associated Apollinarianism only with its censored 'symptoms' – the νοῦς-less, imperfect humanity of the T. thesis, and the exaggerated 'misrepresentations' of the D. thesis – heavenly flesh or a confusion of the divinity.

For whatever reason, when Cyril unknowingly recapitulates the terms and ideas typical of Apollinarius' compositional and semi-compositional theses, *he does not and cannot* be thinking along the same lines as Apollinarius because his view of the union is also influenced by *a priori* conceptions established more recently in the orthodox 'Alexandrine' tradition. Ultimately, Cyril is prepared to accept (unlike Apollinarius, cf. *KMP* 31 [*LV*]) that *this is a compositional union between two (whole) natures.*[48] Also, Cyril unequivocally specifies (going one step further than Apollinarius (cf. Fr.22) and Valentinus (cf. *Capita Apologiae* 4)) that the Word took-on-in-addition flesh which was not only ensouled, but endowed with an intellect: 'the Word... afterward came forth as man from a woman by taking on (κατὰ πρόσληψιν) flesh, not soulless (ἄψύχον) flesh, but flesh endowed with soul (ἐψυχωμένης) and intellect (νοερῶς)'.[49] In so doing Cyril shows that when he talks about 'composition', he is *not* talking about a union of two partial natures in a whole nature; when he talks about 'πρόσληψις', he is not talking about the assumption of a partial nature by a complete nature; and when he uses the psychosomatic example to illustrate the case of

[45] *Ep.*45.7.
[46] E.g.*Ep.*17.12 – eleventh and twelfth 'anathemas'.
[47] *Ep.*45.5.
[48] *Ep.*45.7.
[49] *Ep.*46.3.

a coming together of two natures without confusion, he cannot mean that this should be regarded as a prescriptive model for the incarnational union – because he admits the full human soul as included in Christ's bodily element. Thus, Cyril's 'compositional' conception of the unity may sometimes look like the Apollinarian, particularly because he continues to use the term 'φύσις' for the unity as well as the duality, but in his Christology the 'assumptional' conception (or the 'subject-attribute model') has prevailed over the 'compositional' more completely than in Apollinarius' doctrine of the divine προσληψις of flesh. Cyril's anti-Apollinarian provisos rule out the ideas of symmetrical or asymmetrical composition at a purely physical level, although some might argue that the asymmetrical version persists at a metaphysical level.[50]

(3) The Interpretive Disagreements among Modern Commentators

When we recognise the difference between the D. and T. Christologies of Apollinarius and the two distinct conceptions of unity which underlie them, we are better able to understand the interpretive disagreements which have arisen between the leading twentieth century commentators and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their differing analyses. Such scholars, not without reason, have rather assumed the consistency of Apollinarius' thought. Consequently, when their attention has been drawn by one type of Apollinarian doctrine, or the conception of unity most typical of it, they have tended to treat this as if fully representative of *the* Apollinarian Christology and then attempted to interpret all the material accordingly. Thus, the interpretations tend to be more acute and persuasive when applied to *some* of the documents, as are their criticisms of other interpreters who have chosen to treat a doctrine/unitive conception more typical of the other documents as normative. Their interpretations become less effective when applied to such other documents, but are rarely without some genuine insight, since, as we have seen, more than one conception of unity tends to be co-present to varying degrees in most of the Apollinarian material.

Thus, it may be fair to say that:

[50] Raven,pp.231-232.

Voisin's interpretation of Apollinarian Christology[51] has focused primarily upon the 'Dichotomite' doctrine which Apollinarius advocates against 'Antiochene' dyophysitism. In so doing it moves away from Dorner's distinctive interpretation which focuses more upon ideas – 'eternal manhood', the assimilation of the νόες to the divine νοῦς – which are found in the main T. work, the *Apodeixis*. Because Voisin treats the D. Christology as typical, he concludes that Apollinarius' doctrine was fundamentally monophysite[52] and he dismisses the idea that the change in anthropological vocabulary marks a real change in Christological doctrine.[53] By so doing he fails to see, and therefore admit, any similarity between Apollinarius' 'heterodox' understanding of the union and the 'orthodox' view held by Athanasius and Cyril, which is more obvious when we look at his 'revised' T. doctrine with its 'assumptional' emphasis. Although Voisin focuses his attention upon the monophysite doctrine found in the D. works, he fails, as de Riedmatten later points out, to discern the uniquely Apollinarian conception of *vital* composition which informs it. However, because of this failure, and perhaps aided by a conservative presupposition that Apollinarius' doctrine must be similar to subsequent monophysitism, Voisin *is* able to recognise that the Apollinarian idea of μία φύσις is based (*also*) upon an 'assumptional' idea of unity where unity of subject and person is prior to, and determinative of, the unity of the nature possessed.[54] Voisin perhaps goes too far when he suggests that this is a philosophical 'axiom' which determines Apollinarius' monophysite conclusion, but his observation allows us to see that there is more than one conception of unity at play even in one of the D. works (*Ad Dionysium A* 2) where the compositional idea is to the fore.

Raven's interpretation,[55] by contrast, prefers to focus upon the type of Christology advocated in the T. documents. Raven treats this as typical since he believes that Apollinarian thought is completely consistent,[56] and he rejects the 'evidence' of Voisin *inter al.* that Apollinarius ever espoused a Christological or anthropological 'dichotomy'.[57] Consequently, Raven 'neglects' the novel 'aspects' of the Christology which Apollinarius expounds in the radical D. works *De Unione* and *Ad Dionysium A* and instead emphasises the way arguments to be found in the D. fragments of the *KKB* seem to be germane with the

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[51] See pp.12-13,above.
[52] Voisin,p.52,pp.273-276.
[53] Voisin,pp.77-79.
[54] Voisin,pp.54-55,pp.278-279,pp.289-290,p.406.
[55] See pp.14-15,above.
[56] Raven,pp.175-176.
[57] Raven,pp.169-175.

Christology of the T. works.[58] Thus, like Voisin, but for different reasons, Raven fails to discern the nature of the compositional conception of union which lies behind Apollinarius' doctrine of μία φύσις in the D. works. Because he treats the Apollinarian concepts of one nature, one person and one hypostasis as near equivalents,[59] and because he focuses on the more 'assumptional' T. Christology where the idea of the unity of divine subject is more to the fore, Raven tends to (over)emphasise the (genuine) similarity which exists between the Cyrilline idea of the Word assuming an impersonal humanity and the Apollinarian idea of the Word's πρόσληψις of (ensouled) flesh *qua* νοῦς.[60] Whilst he fails to delineate the type of Apollinarian *communicatio idiomatum* which is most typical of the D. works, Raven's approach allows him correctly to observe the proximity of Apollinarius' more 'conventional' practice to that of the 'orthodox' tradition in which he stood,[61] but Raven probably goes too far when he discerns also a proto-Cyrilline *kenotic* 'theory'.[62]

De Riedmatten's interpretation[63] begins by refocusing upon the type of Christology in the Apollinarian D. documents and thus shows up the limitations of Raven's liberal T.-based analysis. His attention is drawn to the unusual quasi-traducian account of the virginal conception which is to be found in *De Unione* 12-13, and he shows how a uniquely Apollinarian notion of μία φύσις is linked to this which is not metaphysical, but dynamic, vitalistic and 'biological'.[64] He notices that this concept (sometimes in certain D. documents) is different from and prior to Apollinarius' concept of one person/hypostasis, and that it provides the basis for a type of *communicatio idiomatum* and physical(-cum-eucharistic) soteriology which are peculiarly Apollinarian, differing, like the μία φύσις conception, from those typical of the more mainstream 'orthodox' tradition.[65] De Riedmatten thus identifies key features of what I have called Apollinarius' 'compositional D. thesis'. His interpretation is less convincing, however, when it tries to show that the T. works, which manifest several characteristically different arguments,[66] are basically informed by the same physical monenergetic theory of the union.[67] De Riedmatten seems

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[58] Raven,pp.172-173.
[59] Raven,pp.220-226.
[60] Raven,pp.227-232.
[61] Raven,pp.209-211.
[62] Raven,pp.200-208.
[63] See pp.18-20,above.
[64] Riedmatten[1],pp.240-260.
[65] Riedmatten[2],p.218;Riedmatten[1],p.248.
[66] Riedmatten[2],pp.209-213.
[67] Riedmatten[2],pp.217,pp.222-233.

unable to decide whether Apollinarius' physical theory spares the elements from change[68] or intentionally implies the *de facto* divinization of the body for soteriological reasons.[69] He is also critical of Voisin's earlier view that Apollinarius espouses a notion of personal unity which is prior to the physical idea[70] but sometimes accepts the possibility of such an idea without delineating it.[71] These unconvincing aspects of de Riedmatten's interpretation are resolved when we recognise that the Christological doctrine found in the T. works is of a different and revised type, drawing upon a (more 'personal') notion of unity through the divine assumption of flesh – a notion which is also co-present in the D. works where it sometimes serves to restrain the radical implications of Apollinarius' compositional theory of the union.

Mühlenberg's interpretation[72] rejects the view of those who, like de Riedmatten, interpret the incarnational-cum-soteriological doctrine of Apollinarius in physical terms.[73] He offers a different view by reshifting the focus back onto the Christology of the T. works – reconstructing the *Apodeixis*[74] and identifying its νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy as the key Apollinarian idea.[75] Such a view of Christ (made possible by the T. analysis) is as much to do with divine assumption as physical composition, and Mühlenberg therefore draws attention to passages where Apollinarius presents the incarnation accordingly – as an irruptive and revelatory event in which God himself *qua* νοῦς decisively demonstrates the 'ethical' victory of the mind over the will of the flesh and the nature of authentic rational existence to the enfleshed human νόες. Mühlenberg argues that this view of the incarnation is connected with a Platonic/Athanasian view of salvation through knowledge and draws attention to the soteriological argument which Apollinarius sometimes employs in the T. works to justify his denial of Christ's human νοῦς.[76] Thus, Mühlenberg successfully highlights the more 'assumptional' nature of the T. Christology and the 'ethical' dimension of its characteristic soteriology. But he fails to recognise the importance of the physical-cum-sacrificial (Athanasian) idea of salvation which is *also* present[77] and depends on the

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[68] Riedmatten[1],p.260;Riedmatten[2],p.214.
[69] Riedmatten[2],pp.219-222;Riedmatten[1],pp.248-250.
[70] Riedmatten[1],pp.254-255.
[71] Riedmatten[1],p.256;Riedmatten[2],p.218.
[72] See pp.23-26,above.
[73] Mühlenberg,pp.188-196.
[74] Mühlenberg,pp.65-91.
[75] Mühlenberg,pp.149-156.
[76] Mühlenberg,pp.196-215.
[77] See pp.168-173,above.

reality of an integral union which, in Apollinarius' view, can only occur between the perfect divinity and incomplete/mindless flesh (a unitive idea – the divine προσληψις of flesh – which is still, in part, compositional). In effect, Mühlenberg makes the soteriological justification of this idea of physical unity – which is one of several differing justifications – the key to all Apollinarian Christology. Thus, his attempt to show that Apollinarius' T. idea of Christ as νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, and its related soteriological defence, are foundational to the incarnational doctrine advocated in the earlier Apollinarian documents is unconvincing.[78] Significantly, he chooses to pass over those D. documents which de Riedmatten treats as the *loci classici* of Apollinarian doctrine (*De Unione, Ad Dionysium A*) where the compositional idea of physical unity is most to the fore, since he believes these to be 'pieces of occasional writing', 'probably authentic' but representing 'only a very one-sided view of Apollinaris' teaching'.[79]

CONCLUSION

These and other seemingly problematic issues to do with the primary and secondary interpretation of Apollinarian doctrine become easier to resolve when we recognise that Apollinarius advocated more than one type of Christology based upon more than one type of unitive conception, and when we recognise that his doctrine changed and developed as he responded to criticisms and strove to give clearer definition to a complex understanding of the divine incarnation, as sincerely held by one who tried to stay true to the beliefs of the Church and his own ability to interpret them scientifically:

> 'He says that only the orthodox Faith should be deemed good. But, since the unexamined Faith was not profitable to Eve, it is also right that the Faith of the Christians should be well examined, so that it does not, in some part, escape cognition, having fallen in with the opinions of the Greeks or the Jews.'[80]

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[78] Mühlenberg,pp.215-230.
[79] Mühlenberg,pp.108-109.
[80] Gregory of Nyssa thus records the comments made by Apollinarius at the beginning of the *Apodeixis* – his great work upon Christology (*Antirrheticus* 4, J.p.135,ll.12-17=L.(Fr.13) p.208,ll.24-28).

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Appendix 1

TRANSLATIONS OF APOLLINARIAN TEXTS

Ep. Ad Dionysium A.

(Lietzmann, p.256, l.18-p.262, l.4)

The First Letter to Dionysius

1. I am amazed, having heard tell of some men who confess the Lord (to be) God enfleshed (θεοὺ ἔνσαρκον), but fall into the division which was wickedly introduced by those who are followers of Paul of Samosata. For those men **[L.p.257],** who are enslaved by Paul of Samosata speak of one individual (ἄλλον) who is from heaven, confessing that he is God, yet (speak) of another individual who is a man from earth, saying that the one (is) uncreated and the other created, the one eternal and the other of yesterday, the one master and the other servant, acting profanely, both if they worship him who they say is servant and created, and if they do not worship him who redeemed us by his own blood.

2. But they who confess that God from heaven has been enfleshed (σεσαρκῶσθαι) of the virgin and is one individual (ἕνα) with the flesh (μετὰ τῆς σαρκὸς) randomly jumble (this) up being carried away into the sayings of impiety of those men [viz. those in §1]. For, as I hear, they themselves say 'two natures' (δύο φύσεις), and yet John clearly expounds that the Lord is one individual (ἕνα) saying, 'The Word became flesh' [*Jn.*1.14], and Paul in the saying 'Our Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things' [1 *Cor.*8.6]. For if he who was brought forth from the holy virgin was designated 'one individual' (εἷς) and is the same (αὐτός) as he 'through whom all things were made', there is one nature (μία φύσις ἐστίν), since one person does not possess a division into two (ἐπειδὴ πρόσωπον ἓν οὐκ ἔχον εἰς δύο διαίρεσιν), and (?) since the body is not a proper nature and the divinity is not a proper nature in respect of the enfleshment (ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἰδία φύσις τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἰδία φύσις ἡ θεότης κατὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν), but just as a man is one nature, so also is he who was made in the likeness of men (ἐν ὁμοιῶματι ἀνθρώπων) – Christ.

3. But if they do not acknowledge what is one according to a union (τὸ καθ' ἕνωσιν ἕν), they can also divide the one individual (τὸν ἕνα) into many and speak of many natures, since the body is something (made from elements) of many kinds (πολυειδὲς) – from bones and sinews and veins and flesh and skin and, also, from nails and **[L.p.258]** hair, from blood and, also, spirit, all of which possess distinction (διαφορὰν) from one another, but are (in fact) one nature (μία δὲ φύσις ἐστὶν). So too the reality (ἀλήθεια) of the divinity together with the body is one thing (ἕν) and is not divided into two natures.

4. For it would not be possible for the whole entity (τὸ ὅλον) to be called the Son of Man who descended from heaven [*Jn.*3.13] and the Son of God brought forth from a woman [*Gal.*4.4.(?)], if it admitted a division of two natures. Rather that (τὸ) which descended from heaven would be called Son of God and not Son of Man, and that (τὸ) which was born of a woman would be called Son of Man and not Son of God. And this follows the division of Paul of Samosata.

5. But the divine scriptures instruct (us) to conceive of the Lord as one (ἑνὸς) in regard to the descent from heaven and the birth on earth from a woman. Therefore let not those who think thus go off into unison with those who think everything opposite, lest, whilst pious in thought, they blaspheme by what they say.

6. For it is necessary that those who say there are two natures worship the one (nature), but do not worship the other (nature), and are baptized into the divine (nature), but not baptized into the human (nature). But if we are baptized into the death of our Lord, we confess one nature of the impassible **[L.p.259]** divinity and the passible flesh, so that thus our baptism into God and into the death of the Lord might be accomplished.

7. For we do not fear those false people who divide the Lord into two persons (εἰς δύο πρόσωπα), if, since we uphold the unity which is according to the gospel and the apostles, they falsely accuse us of being those who say that the flesh is from heaven, whenever we acknowledge the divine scriptures which say the Son of Man is from heaven. For neither, when we say that the Son of God was brought into being from a woman, can we be falsely accused of saying that the Word is from the earth and not from heaven. But we say both things: that the whole (person(?)) (τὸ ὅλον) is from heaven through the divinity, and that the whole (person(?)) is from a woman through the flesh, and we do not conceive a division of the one person (τοῦ ἑνὸς προσώπου), nor do we sever the earthly (person(?))

(τὸ γήϊνον) from the heavenly nor the heavenly (person(?)) (τὸ οὐράνιον) from the earthly, for (such) severance is impious.

8. Therefore let not those who say 'two natures' give a pretext for those who divide. For the body is not of itself a nature (οὔτε γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καθ' ἑαυτὸ φύσις) in the one Christ, since it is not life-giving according to itself (μηδὲ ζωοποιὸν καθ'ἑαυτὸ) and it cannot be saved away from the life-giving Word. Nor is the Word by itself divided into its own nature (καθ'ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἰδίαν μερίζεται φύσιν), which it possesses (ἔχει) in respect of being that which is fleshless (τὸ ἄσαρκον), since the Lord came and dwelt (ἐπεδήμησε) in the world in flesh and not fleshlessly. Nor was the created body alive (ἔζη) without the divinity, so that someone might separate a created nature. Nor, in truth, did the uncreated Word come and dwell without a body, so that someone might divide a nature of the uncreated.

9. But if both things are one **[L.p.260]** thing (ἕν ἑκάτερόν ἐστι) according to the union, and the combination and the composition in human form (κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν καὶ τὴν σύνοδον καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὴν ἀνθρωποειδῆ), then one name is suitable for what is composite (τῷ συνθέτῳ) – '(that which is) uncreated' (τὸ ἄκτιστον) in virtue of (ἀπὸ) the divinity, '(that which is) created' in virtue of the body, '(that which is) impassible' in virtue of the divinity, and '(that which is) passible' in virtue of the body. And just as we hear from Paul that Christ suffers [*Acts* 26.23] (and) we do not hear (that this is) 'in part' (μερικῶς), nor do we hold that the divinity suffers, so too '(that which is) creature and servant' is not said of part (μερικῶς), nor does it make the divinity a creature or servant. And further, '(that which is) uncreated' does not make the flesh uncreated, nor is it said in part (μερικῶς) – only of the divinity. And so let those who think such things remain silent, since they shun useless enquiry, and let us not divide the fixed teachings because of things said (by them).

10. Confessed together and in harmony were the body from the virgin and the divinity from heaven, the body formed in a belly and the divinity uncreated and eternal – the body enduring as a body in the synthesis (τῇ συνθέσει) and the divinity as divinity – so that when the Word was united with the body the divinity might remain undivided. But, if in scripture it is customary to speak of the whole as God (τὸ ὅλον θεολογεῖν) and to speak of the whole as man (ἀνθρωπολογεῖν), let us also follow what has already been divinely said and let us not divide indivisible things, nor sever the divinity from the body, due to reverence, whenever the body is said to be formed in the belly. And (let us) not divide the

body from the divinity because the (divine) 'coming' (παρουσίας) is confessed whenever the uncreated divinity **[L.p.261]** is thought of. For one thing (τὸ ἕτερον) shares with the other in being named in virtue of the one life (κατὰ τὴν μίαν ζωὴν), without that which is disembodied (τὸ ἀσώματον) changing into a body, or the body into the disembodied.

11. How then is it not a painful thing that they who thus confess or conceive these things rightly – just as they received them – should form faction against one another on account of words (διὰ ῥήματα)? [e.g. As] when some use the name of the body for the Word, just as John who says that the Word became flesh [*Jn.*1.14], while others take the name of the divinity (conferring it) upon the whole servant, just as Paul who says, 'The final Adam became a life-giving Spirit' [1 *Cor.*15.45].

12. According to the flesh, Christ professes to worship the Father saying, 'We ourselves worship what we know' [*Jn.*4.22], and he does not separate the divinity. The body is worshipped in respect of the divinity and it is not separated by the worship of the divinity. And we should not put away the body when we worship, for it is not possible that he suffered + [text defective] – (without (?)) the body and the divinity is not separated. For it was united. For it was necessary for death to be conquered by God and it has been conquered.

13. But you exhort those who differ concerning these things in vain. Let the confession be preserved according to doctrine and not divided because of the terms (διὰ τὰ ῥήματα). But those who hold this in agreement, that Christ is God enfleshed (θεὸς ἔνσαρκος), both from heaven and earth, the very same individual (ὁ αὐτὸς) **[L.p.262]** servant in form (τῇ μορφῇ) and God in power (τῇ δυνάμει), let them abide in unanimity and let them not disagree fruitlessly, and let them not fall out into the empty argument of heretics, but let them strive more after the unity of the Church. Remain steadfast, my Lord!

De Unione

(Lietzmann, p.185, l.7-p.193, l.2)

Concerning the Union of the Body with the Divinity in Christ

1. The Lord is rightly confessed a holy offspring from the beginning (ἅγιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέννημα) even according to the body, and, in respect of this, he differs from all bodies, for he was not conceived in a womb (ἐν μήτρᾳ συνελήφθη) wholly apart from divinity, but he was united (ἡνωμένος) to it (ταύτην), as the angel says: 'The Holy Spirit will come upon you and the power of the Most High will overshadow (ἐπισκιάσει) you, wherefore the holy one that is begotten (τὸ γεννώμενον ἅγιον) will also be called Son of God' [*Lk.*1.35]. And it was a heavenly descent, not only a genesis from a woman. (For) not only this is said, 'One who came into existence from a woman, one who came into existence under **[L.p.186]** the law' [*Gal.* 4.4], but also, 'No one (οὐδεὶς) has ascended into heaven, if not he (ὁ) who came down (καταβάς) from heaven – the Son of Man' [*Jn.*3.13].

2. And this is *not* to say that the body, by itself (ἰδίως), is a created being – because it is altogether inseparable from that one (ἐκείνου) whose body it is; but (rather) it has partaken in the title (κεκοινώνηκεν ἐπωνυμίας) and the name (κλήσεως) of God because it was conjoined (συνῆπται) into a unity with God (πρὸς ἑνότητα θεῷ), as is said: 'The Word became flesh' [*Jn.*1.14], and, from the apostle, 'the final Adam became a life-giving Spirit' [1 *Cor.*15.45].

3. But just as we attribute the glorious things to the body as a consequence of the divine assumption/conception (συλλήψεως) and the unity with God, it is necessary also that we do not deny the inglorious things which are from the body, such things as: 'to have been born (γενέσθαι) of a woman', according to the apostle [*Gal.*4.4], and 'to have been formed (πλασθῆναι) from the womb a slave to God', according to the prophet [*Is.*49.5], (and) to be reckoned after Abraham (by the) many generations after which he became man.

4. There is, certainly, a need to speak and hear (of him) in human terms, as when he is called wholly (ὅλον) man, (but) no one should deny the divine substance (οὐσίαν) which is signified together with the body by the (human) title; and when he is called a slave in accordance with the body, no one should deny the Lordly nature (φύσιν), which is signified

together with the body by a servile title; and, again, when he is proclaimed a heavenly man (ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος) [*Jn.*3.13; 1 *Cor.*15.48] **[L.p.187]**, no one should deny the interweaving (συμπλοκήν) of the body from the earth with divinity. For he is not disunited neither in fact (πράγματι) nor in name, when the Lord is called 'slave' and the uncreated is designated 'moulded' (πλαστὸς) by (way of) the conjunction (συναφείᾳ) which is with the form (μορφὴν) of a slave and with the moulded body.

5. And it is confessed that, in Him (ἐν αὐτῷ), the creature is in a unity (ἑνότητι) with the uncreated, the uncreated in a co-mixture (συγκράσει) with the creature, one nature being constituted out of each of two parts (φύσεως μιᾶς ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους συνισταμένης), the Word having contributed (συντελέσαντος) the energy part (μερικὴν ἐνέργειαν) to the whole with (μετὰ) the divine perfection (τελειότητος), just as in the common human being brought into existence out of two incomplete parts (ἐκ δύο μερῶν ἀτελῶν), which complete one nature (φύσιν μίαν πληρούντων) and which are called by one name, since the whole (τό ὅλον) is called 'flesh', although the soul (ψυχῆς) is not stripped away by this, and the whole is addressed 'soul', without the body being discarded, (as) if it is something else beside (ἕτερόν τι...παρὰ) the soul.

6. Therefore, the God who became man (ἐνανθρωπήσας), the Lord, and He who surpasses (creaturely) generation, *is* Lord, even if He has been born of a woman, and He *is* Spirit, even if He has been formed after the slaves, and He *is not* a man according to the apostle, even if He has been declared flesh in respect of the union with flesh (and) even if He is proclaimed a man by the same (apostle). Yet – speaking of the whole – invisible God *is* transformed (μεταμορφούμενος) by a visible body, uncreated God *is* made manifest by a created envelope (περιβολῇ) **[L.p.188]**, having emptied himself according to the form of a slave [*Phil.*2.7]. But He is unemptied and immutable and undiminished according to the divine substance (οὐσίαν) – for there is no alteration concerning the divine nature (φύσιν) – neither is it diminished nor increased.

7. And when he says, 'Glorify me!', the voice (is) from the body and the glorification concerns the body and the whole is referred to because the whole (τὸ ὅλον) is one (ἕν). And again in continuing, '...by the glory which I used to have with you before the world existed' [*Jn.*17.5], he signifies the eternally glorious divinity, but (even) if this belongs to the divinity in particular (ἰδίως), it was said inclusively (κοινῶς) of the whole.

8. Thus, he is also consubstantial with God according to the invisible spirit, even the flesh being understood by that name since it is united with He who is consubstantial with God, but he is also consubstantial with human beings, even the divinity being understood by 'the body' because it has been united to what is consubstantial with us. (And) the nature (φύσεως) of the body is not changed by the union with He who is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον) with God, nor by sharing in the title (ὀνόματος) of 'consubstantial', just as the nature (φύσις) of the divinity is not altered by the communion (κοινωνίᾳ) with a human body, nor by the designation of 'flesh consubstantial with us'.

9. For Paul, when saying, 'of him, who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh' [*Rom.*1.3], says that the 'Son of God' has received the same genesis, **[L.p.189]** and he does *not* say, having designated the flesh as something separate: 'The flesh came from the seed of David.' And when he says, 'Let this be held in mind by you, which was also in Christ Jesus, who, existing in the form of God, did not consider being equal to God a thing to be grasped...' [*Phil.*2.5-6], he does not make a division and say, 'the *divinity*, of whom, (being) in the form of God, did not consider being equal to God a thing to be grasped'. Furthermore, the divinity was not called Jesus before the genesis from the virgin, nor did it have the unction of the Holy Spirit, because the Word of God is the giver of the Spirit, not he who is made holy by the Spirit.

10. And he says, 'I do sanctify myself on their behalf so that they might be sanctified in truth' [*Jn.*17.19]. He does not divide and say, 'I sanctify the flesh', rather he conjoins and says, 'I sanctify myself.' And yet, (it is apparent) to one who reflects carefully, that it is not possible for the same individual to be sanctified by himself. For if the whole individual (ὅλος) sanctifies, what (τί) is that which is sanctified? If the sum total (ὁ σύμπας) is sanctified, what (τί) is the sanctifier? But, still maintaining the one person (πρόσωπον) and the undivided manifestation of one living thing (τὴν ἀμέριστον ἑνὸς ζώου δήλωσιν), he posits the sanctifying and the being sanctified of the whole, so that it might be precise and clear to us that one individual (ἄλλος) does not sanctify another in the prophetic or apostolic mode, in the same way as the Spirit sanctifies the prophets and apostles, as Paul says about the **[L.p.190]** whole Church, 'They are called holy and have been made holy in Christ Jesus' [1 *Cor.*1.2], and the Saviour himself about the apostles: 'Make them holy in truth' [*Jn.*17.19].

11. For the whole human nature (ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις) (is) in the act of being sanctified (ἐν τῷ ἁγίαζεσθαι), but not in the act of sanctifying. And the angelic order, just as also the whole creation, is sanctified and illuminated, but the Spirit sanctifies and illuminates. But the Word sanctifies and illuminates through the Spirit, but is in no way sanctified for (he is) creator and not a creature. But here (there is) an act of being sanctified, and here (also) an act of being embodied (τὸ σεσωματῶσθαι), and these acts (τὰ πράγματα) might be divided, but they are united according to the union of the flesh with divinity, so that one who (τὸν) sanctifies is not divided from another who is sanctified, and the enfleshment itself is wholly a sanctification (αὕτη δὲ ὅλως ἡ σάρκωσίς ἐστιν ἁγιασμός).

12. For to those who said, 'You are a man and you make yourself God' [*Jn.*10.33], the Saviour gave back a statement about his own humanity saying, 'Do you say of the one whom the Father sanctified and sent into the World, "You blaspheme", because I said, "I am the Son of God"?' [*Jn.*10.36]. What sanctification is he speaking about here if not that of the flesh by the divinity? For thus (οὕτω) the body lived (ἔζησεν) by the sanctification of the divinity and not by the equipment (κατασκευῇ) of a human soul (ψυχῆς) and the whole (τὸ ὅλον) is completely in a union (συναφείᾳ). And when he says, 'the one whom the Father sanctified and sent', he says that which sanctifies and what is sanctified are (both) sanctified **[L.p.191]**, having joined together (συνάψας) what sanctifies with what is sanctified.

13. And in any case, elsewhere, he [the Saviour] interprets the same sanctification saying that it was a genesis which was from a virgin: 'For I have been born for this and for this I have come into the world so that I might bear witness to the truth' [*Jn.*18,37]. For the common human being is endowed with a soul and lives (ψυχοῦται καὶ ζῇ) out of the will (ἐκ θελήματος) of the flesh and the will of a male (ἀνδρὸς), since the spermatic matter is sent forth conveying the life-giving power (τὴν ζωοποιὸν δύναμιν) into the womb which receives it. But the holy foetus from the virgin is constituted from the approaching Spirit and the overshadowing power (ἐκ δὲ πνεύματος ἐφόδου καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπισκιασμοῦ [see *Lk.*1.35] τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τῆς παρθένου συνίσταται βρέφος), and spermatic matter does not make the divine life (ζωήν), but the spiritual and divine power endow the virgin with the divine conception (κύησιν) and bestow the divine childbearing (τοκετόν).

14. Thus, indeed, after the mode of the unity Christ is exalted and the name bestowed upon him which is above every name [*Phil.*2.9], and yet properly (ἰδίως) the exaltation is of the flesh which ascends from below. But because it does not ascend separately, through this, the whole (τὸ ὅλον) is inclusively (κοινῶς) entitled 'exalted'. And the glorification is posited together with the same (whole) on account of the flesh which is raised to glory from disgrace. For glory by means of grace is not attributed to the Word, who possesses glory eternally. For the very same (Word) subsists and endures; he subsisted in the form of God and was equal to God.

15. And (when) in the flesh, he says that he is equal to God, saying, according to John, that his own father **[L.p.192]** is God [*Jn.*5.18] – making himself equal to God. The equality with God did not therefore change, rather, the immutable divinity remained identical. The attributes which he has are impossible to receive, even though because the flesh receives what it did not have – (viz.) impassibility in place of passions, a heavenly way of life in place of an earthly one, royal status in place of servitude under men, to be worshipped above every creature in place of worshipping – it is said of the whole that the name which is above every name has been given to him [*Phil.*2.9].

16. And if someone were to separate rashly the graced subject from the name which is above every name, neither of the two would be spoken of appropriately. For if he [sc. someone] bestows attributes to the Word as if he did not possess them, then the name that is above every name (could) never be given, not even through grace. And if he [sc. the Word Incarnate] possesses this (attribute) not by gift but by nature (ἀπὸ φύσεως) – just as he possesses attributes according to his divinity – then it is not possible for this to be *given* to him.

17. Wherefore, what is corporeal and what is divine are both of necessity said of the whole and he who is unable to perceive in unified distinctions (ἡνωμένοις διαφόροις) what belongs to both, (being) at variance **[L.p.193]**, will fall foul of contradictions, but he who knows the properties (τὰ ἴδια) and defends the union will not falsify the nature (τὴν φύσιν) nor fail to know the union.

Contra Diodorum [Ad Heraclium] (Fr.117-120)

(Lietzmann, p.235, l.18-p.236, l.35)

A Syllogistic Discourse against Diodore to Heraclius

'And this document, written earlier upon paper, happens to be in the library of the then undefiled, patriarchal see, entitled, "from the perplexities of Apollinarius" of which the beginning is, "*The Life is the cause (αἰτία) of those living*".'[1]

Fr.117 (a) God takes up (ἀναλαβὼν) an instrument (ὄργανον) and is God in so far as he is active/operates (ἐνεργεῖ) and is man in respect of the instrument. Since he remains God he has not changed.

(b) The instrument and the moving element (τὸ κινοῦν) make complete one energy (μίαν πέφυκεν ἀποτελεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν). **[L.p.236]** But if the energy is one, so also is the substance one. Therefore one substance has come into being (μία ἄρα οὐσία γέγονε) of the Word and the instrument.

'and in the syllogistic discourse of which the beginning is...'

[*Fr.118*] "*Such things which are two and united (ἑνοῦται) in outward appearance (εἴδει) or unanimity (ὁμονοίᾳ) remain two*", he says these things'... ***[Fr.117(b)]***

'by him [sc. Apollinarius] against Diodore to Heraclius'...[2]

Fr.119 That there be one and the same worship of one and another substance is unlawful – i.e. (worship) of Creator and Creature, (worship) of God and man. But the worship of Christ is one, and, in accordance with this, God and man are known by one name. Therefore, God

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[1] This is the introduction to the longer version of Fr.117(a)-(b), preserved in a résumé of doctrine attached to the decrees of the Council of Constantinople 680. The shorter version – Fr.117(b) – is preferred by Timothy of Berytus in Leontius' *Adv.Fraudes* 145 with a different introduction and title: (Fr.118).
[2] *Doctrina* 16.

and (the) man are not one and another substance, but one (μία) according to a synthesis (κατὰ σύνθεσιν) of God with a human body.

Fr.120 For how is not the deed impious that another substance (οὐσίαν), created and servile, is given one and the same worship as the Creator and Lord?

Contra Diodorum [ΠΔα΄ and β΄] (Fr.140-146)

(Lietzmann, p.241, l.3-p.242, l.22)

The First Book Against Diodore (Fr.140-142)

'and in *the first discourse against Diodore* (ἐν τῷ πρὸς Διόδωρον λόγῳ τῷ πρώτῳ), after the statement concerning the Trinity in section "δ" he speaks thus'...[3]

Fr.140 The union (ἕνωσις) of God with flesh was something unique and miraculous that occurred (only) once and not a second time. This (union) your soul does not accept nor (the souls) of those drawing you towards the same impiety and diabolical unbelief. And you mock the 'highest unity' (τὴν ἄκραν ἕνωσιν) and you say that the properties (τὰ ἴδια) of God do not still remain nor do the properties of the flesh if there is (such) a union, and that the 'highest unity' is destroyed, if it is confessed that it is according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα) from David.

'and in section "ζ" he says' ...

Fr.141 But, anyway, you are angry because we do not believe that by the grace (χάριτι) of God what was from the seed of David has taken on (προσειληφέναι) immortality. And if

[3] Timothy of Berytus introduces Fr.140 thus, in his work against fellow Apollinarian Homonius. The *Ad Homonium*, including Fr.140-146, has subsequently been preserved by Leontius in *Adv.Fraudes* 143-145. The comments between the fragments, indicating the original structure of Apollinarius' works *Contra Diodorum*, are Timothy's.

we were asked the reason [why we do not believe, etc.] we would say, 'Because of the "highest unity"'.

'again in section "ξ"' ...

Fr.142 And he is not ashamed in saying that the nature (is) the same but (its) genesis different, and that the birth from the virgin comes to something vain and superfluous, if that which is born is not worthy of the (virginal) birth and is the same as the things begotten of a man (ἐξ ἀνδρὸς) and a woman. He mocks the 'highest unity' (ἄκραν ἕνωσιν) as the 'highest (ἄκραν) impiety' – that which the divine scriptures clearly introduce, neither making what is human (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον) destructive of God, nor overthrowing what is human by means of the divinity.

The Second Book Against Diodore (Fr.143-144)

'And in *discourse "β" (τῷ β΄ λόγῳ)* which was *against the same Diodore*, in section "β" (ἐν κεφαλαίῳ κβ΄) he speaks thus' ...

Fr.143 And, since you beseech us to give answer to, 'How is the seed of David that which is from the divine substance (οὐσίας)?' – listen! – 'According to the enfleshment (κατὰ σάρκωσιν)!' (And) 'How is the created uncreated?' – 'Since it was united (ἑνωθὲν) to the uncreated!' 'How is the fashioner of creation the fruit of David's belly?' – 'Since it was united to the Creator!' 'How is that which was after Abraham, before Abraham?' – 'Since it is united to what/him who (τῷ) was before Abraham'. **[L.p.242]**

'and in section "λ" of the same discourse'...

Fr.144 But let him who talks nonsense answer these things: How is that which was conjoined (συναφθὲν) to God according to a unity of person (καθ'ἑνότητα προσώπου) not God with him? How is that which was united to the Uncreated according to a vital unity (καθ' ἑνότητα ζωτικὴν) not uncreated with him? For if there (is) not a common title

(κοινὴ ἡ ἐπωνυμία), then neither is what has been co-mixed (τὸ συγκεκραμένον) thus [i.e. something in common]. But what is most irrational of all, is if we name that which is disembodied by the names of the body saying [e.g.] that 'The Word became flesh' [*Jn.*1.14] but, then, will not address the body in virtue of the union by the name(s) of the Incorporeal who is nevertheless (united) with that body. And if he wonders how the creature is united to the appellation of the Uncreated, how much more will another rightly wonder how the Uncreated is united to the name of created flesh!

The Summary – of the Second Book Against Diodore (Fr.145-146)

'And in the *Summary* (ἀνακεφαλαιώσει) of this same discourse he says'...

Fr.145 If the Word was called 'flesh' because of the union (ἕωσιν), then it comes about also that the flesh is called 'Word' because of the union. But as the Word, so also (is the flesh) 'uncreated', not because it has not been created, but because it made manifest (ἀπεφάνθη) the Word by means of the union.

'Again, next, he speaks thus'...

Fr.146 ***[=Fr.126]***[4] As (ὡς) human beings are consubstantial with irrational living beings (ἀλόγοις ζώοις) in respect of the body which (in both) is irrational, but they are of a different substance (ἑτεροούσιοι) in respect of their being rational (λογικοί), so also the Lord (ὁ κύριος) is consubstantial with men in respect of the flesh (κατὰ τὴν σάρκα), but of a different substance according to (his being) Word and God.

[4] Fr.146 is nearly identical to Fr.126 (below), presented by Theodoret in *Eranistes II*, minus the opening ὡς and preferring ὁ θέος for ὁ κύριος. This near equivalence suggests that the book which Theodoret calls the *Contra Diodorum (KKB)* may be the '*Summary*' at the end of ΠΔβ΄.

Contra Diodorum [KKB] (Fr.121-139)

(Lietzmann, p.237, l.3-p.241, l.2)

Against Diodore, or The Book Set out in Paragraphs

'For I will now introduce one belonging to your admirable heresy – the teacher Apollinarius – and I will show that he understood the (text), "the Word became flesh" almost (the same way) as the Holy Fathers. Therefore, listen to what he wrote about this in his *book set out in paragraphs* (ἐν τῷ κατὰ κεφάλαιον βιβλίῳ)'...[5]

Fr.121 If someone (τις) is not changed into what (τοῦτο) he (ὃ) takes-on-in-addition (προσλαμβάνει), and Christ took-on-in-addition flesh, then he was not changed into flesh.

'and further renewing (the point) he says straight away' ...

Fr.122 For he bestowed himself on us in a relationship (συγγένειαν) through the body, in order that he might save us. But what saves (τὸ σῶζον) is more beauteous (κάλλιον) by far than what is saved. Therefore, in the corporeality (σωματώσει) he/it was much more beauteous (κάλλιον)[6] by far than us. But if he had changed (τραπείς) into flesh, he would not have been what was more beauteous (κάλλιον).

'and after a few words he speaks thus'...

Fr.123 A simple thing (τὸ ἁπλοῦν) is one, yet a composite thing (τὸ σύνθετον) is unable to be one. Therefore, he who claims that the Word has been made flesh says that there is a change in the one Word. But if the composite thing is one just as (ὥσπερ) a man is one, he who says that the Word became flesh due to (its) union (ἕνωσιν) with flesh says (there is) one thing according to a composition (τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἓν).

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[5] The introduction is provided by Theodoret's 'Orthodoxus' when in dialogue with a monophysite in *Eranistes I.*

[6] Here there is significant text variation. De Riedmatten, *Apollinaire à l'Eranistes* (p.207), and Ettlinger, *Eranistes* (p.110), prefer the masculine 'κάλλιων' for the second and third 'κάλλιον'. Lietzmann prefers to follow *V* manuscipt and *Bodl. Clark 2*, consistently using the neuter.

'And, in turn, after a few words he also says thus' ...

Fr.124 Enfleshment is an 'emptying' (σάρκωσις κένωσις) [*Phil.*2.7]. But emptying makes known not a man, but the Son of Man who emptied himself according to the outer form (περιβολήν), and not according to (essential) transformation (μεταβολήν).

'But so that you might know that even Apollinarius said that the unity came into being without confusion (ἀσύγχυτον), I will introduce to you the very words of this man ... from the *book set out in paragraphs*'...[7]

Fr.125 **[L.p.238]** Therefore the attributes (τὰ) of God and of a body are united: Creator, Venerated One, Wisdom and Power, He who exists eternally – these (are) of the Divinity. Son of Mary, brought forth at the end of time, worshipping God, advancing in wisdom, made strong in power – these (are) of a body. The suffering on account of sin and the curse ‖[8] came upon it and it will not pass by/away (προῆλθεν/παρῆλθεν), nor will it turn into something disembodied.

'And in turn after a few things...'

Fr.126 = Fr.146 (see above).

'And in another place he speaks thus'...

Fr.127 The qualities (ποιότητες) of things which are co-mixed (συγκιρναμένων) are mixed (κεράννυται) but not also destroyed, with the result that certain things even stand apart (τινὰ καὶ διΐσταται) from things which have been co-mixed such as wine and water. And there is not a co-mixture (σύγκρασις) with a body, nor (a co-mixture) such as of bodies with bodies, but that *(the co-mixture) has also what is unmixed (τὸ ἀμιγές).* And so (likewise), the energy (ἐνέργειαν) of the divinity is either independent (ἰδιάζειν) or mingled (ἐπιμίγνυσθαι) with a view to what is needful on each occasion – as happened, accordingly, in the case of the fasting of the Lord: in so far as the divinity was mingled,

[7] Fr.125-136 are quoted by Theodoret/'Orthodoxus' at the end of *Eranistes II.*

[8] The more recent editions offer a helpful expansion at this point...'the curse *passed away and changed into impassibility and blessing. But the flesh did not pass away*, nor will it turn into something different.' See De Riedmatten, *Apollinaire à l'Eranistes* (p.208,ll.2-3), Ettlinger, *Eranistes* (p.184,ll.15-16).

according to (its) imperviousness to need, the hunger was prevented, but when (the divinity) did not match (its) imperviousness to need against need, the hunger came into being for the destruction of the devil. And if the mixing (μίξις) of bodies does not change (them), by how much more the (mixing) of the divinity?

'And in another passage he says these things'...

Fr.128 If an admixture (ἀνάκρασις) (of fire) with iron did not change the nature (of the iron) by manifesting the iron itself as fire, in that it also produces the properties (τὰ) of fire, neither is the union (ἕνωσις) of God with a body an (essential) change (μεταβολὴ) of the body, even though the body manifests/extends the divine energies to those who are able to partake/touch it (τοῖς ἐφάψασθαι).

[L.p.239] 'To these words he adds forthwith'...

Fr.129 If a man possesses both soul and body, and these things endure whilst being in a unity – by many times more Christ, whilst possessing divinity with a body, possesses each enduring and not confounded (συγχεόμενα).

'And again after a few things'...

Fr.130 For the human (energy (?) – ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη) partakes of the divine energy according to as much as it can attain (ἐφικνεῖται), but (the human energy) is also distinct (ἑτέρα) as the smallest from the greatest. And a man is a servant of God, but God is not a servant of a man, nor of himself. And he is a creature of God, but God is neither a creature of man, nor of himself.

'and after a few things'...

Fr.131 If someone took this as referring to the divinity in Christ, (viz.) 'the things he sees the Father (do) he himself does' [*Jn*.5.19], and not referring to the flesh according to which he who has been enfleshed is distinct from the non-enfleshed Father, this (someone)

separates two divine energies. But it (the divine energy) is not divided. Therefore it [sc. *Jn.*5.19] does not speak (about) the divinity.

'then, in turn, he also posits these things'...

Fr.132 Just as a man is not irrational (ἄλογος) because the rational (element) (λογικοῦ) lies close (προσκειμένου) to the irrational, so also the Saviour is not a creature because the creature lies close to the uncreated God.

'and to these words he adds these'...

Fr.133 The Invisible even (when) compounded (συντεθὲν) with a visible body, and through this observed, also remains invisible. But *it remains also uncompounded (ἀσύνθετον)*, as it does not share the limitations of the body. And that (body) which remains within its own limit receives (προσλαμβάνει) a union with God according to which it is made alive, and what is made alive does not also make alive.

'And after a few things he further speaks thus'...

Fr.134 If the mixing (κρᾶσις) of a soul (ψυχῆς) with a body, even though this (mixing), from the beginning, takes the form of a physical/organic growing-together (κατὰ συμφυΐαν οὖσα), does not make the soul visible because of the body, nor changes it into other characteristics (ἰδιώματα) of the body, so as to make it capable of being cut up or diminished – by how much more is God united to a body without change! – *since He is not naturally/organically one with a body* (μὴ σώματι συμφυὴς). And if the body **[L.p.240]** of a man persists in its characteristic nature (ἰδίας φυσέως), and (does) this even when ensouled (ἐψυχωμένον), then in Christ the co-mixture (σύγκρασις) does not change the body so as not to be a body.

'and after many more things he posits those words'...

Fr.135 He who confesses that the soul (ψυχὴν) and the body are set together (παρίστασθαι) as one by the scriptures disagrees with himself in alleging that such a union

of the Word with a body is an (essential) change (μεταβολὴν), although this (change) is not observed in a soul.

'Listen to this man proclaiming explicitly'...

Fr.136 If those who say that the flesh of the Lord does not endure are blaspheming, by how much more are those who deny the enfleshment altogether!

'Further listen to what has been written by Apollinarius which preaches the impassibility of the divine nature and confesses that the suffering is of the body...from the *book set out in paragraphs*'[9]...

Fr.137 John says that the destroyed temple, namely the body of the one who raises it up, is Him (Himself - αὐτὸν) and that the body is altogether (πάντως) one with Him, and is not some other (masculine individual) in addition [*Jn.*2.19]. But if the body of the Lord has become one with the Lord, the characteristic properties (τὰ ἴδια) of the body have been made his in virtue of (διὰ) the body.

'And again'...

Fr.138 For this is true, (viz.) that the conjunction (συνάφεια) with the body (was) not according to a circumscription (κατὰ περιγραφὴν) of the Word, so that he did not possess anything more than his corporeality (σωματώσεως). Accordingly, even in death his immortality remains about him. For if *he is above this composition* (ὑπὲρ τὴν σύνθεσίν), he is also above the dissolution of it. Death is a dissolution. And yet *he is not encompassed by the composition* (οὔτε ... τῇ συνθέσει περιελήφθη). For if he were, the world would have been nullified. Nor, in the dissolution, did he possess the defectiveness (ἐνδεὲς) (which comes) from the dissolution, as the soul (ψυχή) does.

'and in turn'...

Fr.139 Just as the Saviour says that the dead go forth from their tombs and yet (their) souls (ψυχῶν) do not go forth, so **[L.p.241]** he says that he himself will be raised from the dead and yet (only) the body is what is raised up.

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[9] Fr.137-139 are cited by 'Orthodoxus'/Theodoret at the end of *Eranistes III.*

Ad Jovianum

(Lietzmann, p.250, 1.1-p.253, 1.14)

To Jovian

1. We confess the Son of God, who was eternally begotten before ages, who in the last times has been brought forth from Mary for our salvation according to flesh, as the divine apostle teaches saying, 'But when the fullness of time came, God sent forth his Son who came into being from a woman' [*Gal.*4.4]. And that the same is Son of God and God according to Spirit (κατὰ πνεῦμα), yet Son of Man according to flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), the one Son being not two natures (φύσεις), one (μίαν) **[L.p.251]** an object of worship and (the other) one not to be worshipped, but one enfleshed nature of God the Word (μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην) and (the one nature) is worshipped (προσκυνουμένην) together with His (αὐτοῦ) flesh in one act of worship. Nor (are there) two sons, one the true Son of God and worshipped, but the other a man from Mary who is not worshipped, having become Son of God according to grace (κατὰ χάριν) as also (other) men, but he is the one from God (ἐκ θεοῦ), as I said, one (ἕνα) and the same (τὸν αὐτὸν) and not another – being Son of God and (also) brought forth from Mary according to flesh in the last days. As the angel said (in reply) to God-bearing (θεοτόκῳ) Mary asking, 'How will this be, since I do not have a husband (ἄνδρα)?' [*Lk.*1.34]: 'The Holy Spirit will descend upon you, and the power (δύναμις) of the Most High will overshadow (ἐπισκιάσει) you, and for this reason (διὸ) the holy offspring (τὸ γεννώμενον ἅγιον) will be called Son of God' [*Lk.*1.35].

2. Consequently, he who was brought forth from the virgin Mary is Son of God by nature (φύσει) and true God, and not by grace, or participation (μετουσίᾳ), being a man only according to the flesh which was from Mary, but the same (ὁ αὐτὸς) was the Son of God according to Spirit and God who suffered our sufferings according to flesh, as has been written: 'Since Christ suffered on our behalf in flesh' [1 *Peter* 4.1]; and again, 'Indeed, he did not spare his own Son, but handed him over on behalf of us all' [*Rom.*8.32]. **[L.p.252]** But he remained impassible and immutable in respect of the divinity, according to that which is said by the prophet: 'I am God and I did not change' [*Malach.*3.6]. He died our death according to flesh for the sake of our sins, so that he might abolish death on our

behalf, according to the apostle who says, 'Death is swallowed up in victory. O death where is your victory? O grave where is your sting?' [1 *Cor.*15.55]; and again, 'Christ died for the sake of our sins according to the scriptures' [1 Cor.15.3]. But he remained immortal and invincible to death because of the divinity, since (he was) the impassible power (δύναμις) of the Father according to Peter who says, 'For it was not possible that he be vanquished by death' [*Acts* 2.24]. He ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand of the Father, being elevated from earth to heaven in respect of (κατὰ) the Word's flesh, according to what is said by David: (viz.) 'The Lord said to my Lord "Sit at my right hand"' [*Ps.*109.1; *Mt.*22.44]. And it is confirmed by the Lord himself and the apostles. But in respect of (κατὰ) the divinity, he is uncircumscribable, encompassing every space together with the Father from eternity, since he is the Father's ineffable power according to Paul who teaches, 'Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God' [1 *Cor.*1.24]. The same (ὁ αὐτὸς) being Son of God and God is coming, as promised, to judge the living and the dead, as the apostle says: 'Since he judges the hidden things **[L.p.253]** of the heart and bears the commendation and the blame to each one according to worth' [1 *Cor.*4.5].

3. But, if someone teaches things contrary to what is from the divine scriptures, saying that the Son of God is one being (ἕτερον) and the man from Mary another (ἕτερον) – who has been adopted as a son (υἱοποιηθέντα) according to grace as we (are) – so that there are two sons, one Son of God according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν), who is from God, and one according to grace, who is a man from Mary, (or) if someone says either that the flesh of our Lord was from above / the first (ἄνωθεν) and not from the virgin Mary, or that the divinity was changed into (τραπεῖσαν...εἰς) flesh, or that it was confounded (συγχυθεῖσαν), or became different (ἀλλοιωθεῖσαν), or that the divinity of the Son was subject to passion, or that the flesh of the Lord is not to be worshipped since it is of a man, and is not worshipped since the flesh of (our) Lord and God – this the Catholic Church anathematizes, being persuaded by the divine apostle who says, 'If someone should preach to you a gospel other than what you have received, let him be anathema!' [*Gal.*1.9].

De Fide et Incarnatione

(Lietzmann, p.193, l.3-p.203, l.24)[10]

On the Faith and the Incarnation

1. Our Lord Christ, the only Son of God, deemed us worthy of great mysteries – great (mysteries) which no man knows (how) to recount, as they are mysteries which only faith in their basis is (able) to grasp. Great and of such a kind were they, that we were not worthy of them, yet it was worthy of Him to bestow them. For if one considers our lack of faith (it is apparent) that not only are we unworthy of the gift of (these) splendid mysteries, but we are even culpable for punishment and torment. But because He is good and Son (*read*: Creator) of the good, He not only set us free from punishment, but also gave us eternal life, which is more praiseworthy and wonderful than this preliminary life, and He has allowed us to enter another world and has created us into a new creation.

2. Now, he who is in Christ is a new creation [2 *Cor.*5.17]: what is the new creation if not the fact that he has led us up to heaven? In the case of these first things we had already been found unbelieving, and yet he has put greater things than these in our hands. In the presence of a single tree we were not able to preserve our souls and, behold, he gave to us eternal bliss! We did not control ourselves in paradise, and he offered us heaven and he gave us the kingdom of heaven, and, what is greater than all this, he came to us, God to humankind, the Lord to his vassals, the rich man to the poor, the living and the life-giver to a house of the dead, to those who in their whole lives were subjected to the slavery of death, *and, not only this, he gave his body and blood for us.* **[L.p.194,l.15]**

3. [Therefore][11] Let no one disparage the Lordly (δεσποτικὴν) and saving flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ on the pretext (προφάσει) of the *'homoousion'*. For *neither we, nor our Synod (σύνοδος), nor any who possess human reasoning say or understand that the body is 'homoousios' in itself (καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὁμοούσιον)*, yet neither do we say that the flesh

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[10] For §§1-2 I translate Lietzmann's German translation of Syriac manuscript *B* – the only extant source. For §§3-7 I translate the Greek version preserved in manuscript *V*, which Lietzmann gives beneath *B*. For §§8-9 I translate Lietzmann's German translation of the Syriac mss. *G/U*, which he considers more reliable (pp.135-137) and gives beneath *B*.

[11] Version *B* links the soteriological prolegomenon (§§1-2) to what follows in this way: '*Deshalb*...' (L.p.194, l.1).

of our Lord Jesus Christ (was) from heaven, but we confess that God the Word has been enfleshed (σεσαρκῶσθαι) from the virgin Mary and we do not divide him from his own flesh, rather *he is one person, one hypostasis, wholly man, wholly God (ἓν πρόσωπον, μία ὑπόστασις, ὅλος ἄνθρωπος, ὅλος θεός).*

4. If, therefore, **[L.p.195,l.13]** we believe that our master Jesus Christ has come in the likeness (καθ' ὁμοιότητα) of a human being, by the same virginal conception according to which the Virgin has also been shown to be 'God-bearer' (θεοτόκος) – and this is the mystery of our salvation, (viz.) that the Word of God was enfleshed – (then) he is inseparable and indivisible from his own flesh and, *according to its union with God the Word, the flesh of Him, of whom the flesh indeed is, shares in the name (ὀνόματι) of the natural consubstantiality [!] (τῆς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ὁμοουσιότητος) of the Word with the Father*, if, indeed, we truly confess that the Word of God became flesh. For if it does not share [in the name of the natural consubstantiality, etc.] it would be completely alienated *and salvation would not follow from the enfleshment (σαρκώσεως) for those who believe, if it (the flesh/the enfleshment (?)[feminine]) subsists (ὑπαρχούσης) outside the Trinity.*

5. For there is nothing which is worshipped and no salvation outside the divine Trinity. But **[L.p.196,l.17]** the enfleshment (ἡ σάρκωσις) will be shown to be something superfluous and importunate by these men, and according to them the words of holy scripture will be found to be false – such as this: 'The Word became flesh' [*Jn.*1.14]; and this, 'Today has been born for us in the town of David a Saviour (who is) Christ the Lord' [*Lk.*2.11]; and this also (will be found as) false, 'a Mighty God,' and this, 'a child,' and all similar (scriptural) sayings as these, and neither will the virgin still be believed (to be) 'God-bearer', a thing which is lawless and impious and alien to every devout soul. For every hope of Christians will be overturned by them and Christianity will be counted as nothing since the great and most precious gift of Christians – the cleansing (λουτρόν) accomplished in the death of Christ – will *not* be reckoned as something divine, **[L.p.197,l.15]** but human, if, indeed, the enfleshment (σάρκωσις) of our Lord Jesus Christ is not counted among the divine Trinity.

6. But (according) to us, one must confess him Son of God and the true (Son) before eternity, (Who is) '*homoousios*' with the Father, Christ Jesus our Lord, Whom the virgin begat (as) Saviour and deliverer and to Him we deservedly offer worship and his flesh is not cut off from the worship. For what is worshipped cannot be divided without the divine life

(ζωῆς) being divided; and one does not worship him (τοῦτον) the flesh of whom (οὗ) one does not worship. [Accordingly, in the union of the Word with his ensouled and rational (ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὴν) flesh, as to one Son is one worship also offered **[L.p.198,l.16]** by us.][12] As the evangelist, proclaiming the one life (μίαν ζωὴν) of the Word and the flesh says: 'The Word became flesh' [*Jn.*1.14]. If, therefore, the Word has become flesh, someone worshipping the Word worships the flesh and someone worshipping the flesh worships also the divinity. And the apostles who worship Christ Jesus, in worshipping (him) in body are worshipping God the Word. And the angels served him as their own Lord when they approached his body, and the Virgin, in bearing the flesh at the beginning, brought forth the Word and was 'God-bearer,' and the Jews, having crucified the body, crucified God, and not one division of the Word and of his flesh is put **[L.p.199,l.16]** forward in the divine scriptures – but *he is one nature, one hypostasis, one energy (ἐνέργεια), one person, the same individual (ὁ αὐτός) wholly (ὅλος) God and wholly man.*

7. For his substance (οὐσία) (is) the divinity with regard to what is invisible, but flesh with regard to what is visible. Therefore the enfleshment[13] of our Lord Jesus Christ is neither alienated nor has it been divided from the divine Trinity. For in the numbering of the Trinity He declares that baptism is given [*Mt.*28.19(?)] for the forgiveness of sins and the resurrection of the body and this is a work of divinity not a created nature. For one and the same (individual - ταὐτὸν) is the body and God, whose body (it is), without the flesh having been changed into the incorporeal, but possessing its own property (τὸ ἴδιον) which is from us according to the genesis from the virgin, and (also possessing) that which is over us according to the union (ἕνωσιν) [or co-mixture (σύγκρασιν)][14] with the Word of God. **[L.p.200,l.16]**

8. If we really believe in the coming of God, it befits us to accept this and not to sin through heresy. He who professes the coming of God with the mouth and thinks in his thoughts, that it was a human being who was born of a woman, as we (are), and who (thereby) maintains that it was not God who was born of a woman, such a person is against the faithful and is counted among the unbelievers. But it befits us to protect the divine

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[12] Lietzmann believes that the phrase in the square brackets is an interpolation (see L.p.137) – hence its 'anti-Apollinarian' precisions. Its equivalent is not found in the Syriac versions and, earlier, *V* offers a similar expansion in §4, adding 'νοερῶς ψυχωθεῖσα' to 'σὰρξ' (see L.p.195,l.20, apparatus).

[13] Here, as in §§4,5, manuscript *V* posits the 'σάρκωσις' in the Trinity – the Syriac versions, more controversially, 'the flesh' or 'the corporeality'.

[14] Lietzmann brackets 'σύγκρασιν' because it is found only in *V*.

tradition and not human arguments. Therefore, we did not become faithful on the basis of arguments, but rather through the divine words which came to us through the testimony of the blessed apostles who, when they beheld the supernatural majesty **[L.p.201,l.18]** of our Lord and heard the heavenly witness, proclaimed to the world – that the Word became flesh and that the animating spirit (belebende Geist) of our Lord Jesus Christ was fatherless (vaterlos) in his birth on the earth, because it was God who descended from heaven and not a man springing from human seed (aus menschlichem Samen hervorsprosste) ‖[15], and that he was designated 'Son of Man,' yet he showed divine sovereignty and through the blood of his hypostasis he redeemed the whole creation and held sway over the heavenly ones and the earthly, and he has a throne over heaven and is worshipped by the angels and praised with the Holy Spirit.

9. If a person strays from those who **[L.p.202,l.15]** have taught thus, his peril is great because he (Christ) said, 'Blessed is he who is not offended by me' [*Mt.*11.6]. And he *is* offended who, on account of the flesh and its injuries, changes the Saviour and thinks of him as a man instead of God. Whoever calls the one who was born, a human being, and (whoever) calls the one who was crucified, a human being, changes him into a human being instead of God. For it is not possible to find the life which (stems) from God from a human being. For he who suffered bestows life and he who was born of a woman bestows life. By means of the birth from one woman he created life for the woman because she brought forth life as fruit for the world, and because he became a man among men he raised up men to a communion with his life. For through his **[L.p.203,l.15]** death he loosed the dominion of death and changed (us) into life, which results from the resurrection. Therefore if the redemption is (a deed) of God and (likewise) the renewal of the world, thus it is not (the deed) of another. But life-giving is he who was born and crucified. He was not a man, he whom Mary bore, and not a man was he whom the Jews crucified, but, on the contrary, He, who was born of a woman, was God and He, who was crucified by the Jews, was God.

[15] The rest of §8 is given only in *U*. Lietzmann (p.137) suggests that *G* has left it out 'by oversight'.

Fr.111

(L.p.233, ll.27-29)

Christ (is) one man as the Father (is) one God – this (latter) one-ness being by nature (φυσέως). So, too, the former – by means of a composite nature being between God and men (φύσεως συνθέτου μεταξὺ οὔσης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων).

Fr.113

(L.p.234, ll.13-20)

Intermediate states (μεσότητες) come into being by different properties (ἰδιοτήτων διαφόρων) coming together into one thing (εἰς ἓν συνελθουσῶν) – as the property (ἰδιότης) of an ass and of a horse in a mule, and the property of white and black in a grey colour, and as spring is made from the atmosphere of summer and the property of winter. But no intermediate state possesses both extremes (ἀκρότητας) in (their) entirety (ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου), rather, they have been mixed together in part (μερικῶς ἐπιμεμιγμένας). And (there is) an intermediate state (μεσότης) between God and men (ἀνθπώπων) in Christ. Therefore, he is neither a whole man nor God, but a mixture of God and man (οὐκ ἄρα οὔτε ἄνθρωπος ὅλος οὔτε θεὸς, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου μίξις).

Fr.149

(L.p.247, ll.14-15)

We say that the Lord is God by nature and a man by nature. But this is by one co-mixed nature (μιᾷ δὲ συγκράτῳ φύσει) both fleshly and also divine.

Fr.116

(L.p.235, ll.8-17)

But his flesh makes us alive because of the divinity which is substantially united (συνουσιωμένην) to it. The life-giving element (τὸ ζωποιὸν) is divine. Therefore, divine is the flesh because it is conjoined with God (θεῷ). The flesh saves, and we are saved partaking of it as food (τροφῆς). *But the nourishing thing (τὸ θρεπτικὸν) which energises him (ὃν) who is being made to grow is consubstantial with him (αὐτῷ) and not something likewise being made to grow.*[16] And, if what gives life is not being made alive like what is given life, it is not consubstantial with it. For otherwise it would be a body of death like our own in need of vivification. But the body of Christ is not a body of death, but of life. Therefore, what is divine is not consubstantial with what is human.

Fr.107

(L.p.232, ll.10-21)

The flesh is altogether (πάντως) moved by something else (ἑτεροκίνητος), that is, by a mover (κινοῦντος) and driver (ἄγοντος) – whatever this thing (τοῦτο) might be – and it cannot be a complete (ἐντελὲς) living being (ζῶον) of itself; but ([Christ's] flesh), having been compounded (συντεθειμένη) in order to become a complete living being (ζῶον ἐντελὲς), came together into a unity with a guiding principle (ἡγεμονικῷ) and was synthesised (συνετέθη) with the heavenly guiding principle, having been appropriated (ἐξοικειωθεῖσα) by it according to its passibility and receiving (λαβοῦσα) what is divine appropriated to itself as the active element (κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργητικόν). Thus one living thing (ἓν ζῶον) was constituted (συνίστατο) out of what is moved and what moves, and not out of two complete and self-moving things (δύο τελείων καὶ αὐτοκινήτων), as a result of which (there would be) some other living being besides God (who is) a man and not God, but a slave of God. And even if some power [i.e. by grace/inspiration] were to be from heaven he would still be thus. But the flesh, having become the flesh of God, is thereupon a living thing, having been synthesised into one nature (συντεθεῖσα εἰς μίαν φύσιν).

[16] The italicised phrase remains ambiguous. Does Apollinarius mean: (i.) the eucharistic flesh is consubstantially divine; (ii.) the eucharistic flesh *is* consubstantial with the one being made to grow, but *also not* consubstantial since life giving; (iii.) the vital principle of the eucharistic flesh is consubstantially divine?

Tomus Synodalis

(Lietzmann, p.262, l.24-p.263, l.14)

Synodical Tome

Apollinarius and those with me, we think this concerning the divine enfleshment (θείας σαρκώσεως):

The living (ζῶν) Word of God has taken-on-in-addition (προσείληφεν) flesh consubstantial with our flesh, according to a union (καθ' ἕνωσιν) with the divinity from (ἐκ) the first conception which was in the Virgin, and **[L.p.263]** thus (οὕτως) he became man (ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν). Because man is flesh and spirit (πνεῦμά) according to the apostle. And this is what it is for the Word to become flesh: to be united to (ἑνωθῆναι πρὸς) flesh in the same way as the human spirit. For in our case too the man is called 'flesh' (καλεῖται γὰρ καὶ ὁ καθ'ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος σάρξ). But the Lord is a man above us (ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς), since he is also a heavenly (man) [1 *Cor.*15.47] on account of having his own heavenly spirit, which the will (τὸ φρόνημα) of the flesh did not counteract. And thus sin was loosed (ἐλύετο) by Christ and the death from sin destroyed and we who participate (μετέχοντες) in the triumph by faith are saved and, although we are from an earthly father (πατρός), we become in the likeness (ὁμοιώσει) of He who is in heaven. Anathema, therefore, is he who does not say that the flesh was from Mary and who says that it is of the uncreated nature (φύσεως) and consubstantial with God. And (anathema) also is he who says that the divinity is passible and that the psychic (ψυχικά) passions are from it.

Ep. Ad Serapionem (Fr.159-161)

(Lietzmann, p.253, l.15-p.254, l.28)

The Letter to Serapion

Fr.159 Master, I received the written communication of your love and, with **[L.p.254]** regard to the request made by the bearer of the letter, we co-operated with him in doing what we could. And the letter of my Lord which was sent to Corinth we welcome exceedingly strongly. And we have laid a charge of great madness against those who say that the flesh is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον) with God.

Fr.160 For the flesh is divine by the union (ἑνώσει) with the Word not by nature (οὐ τῇ φύσει). Consequently, it is in the union that the flesh possesses constant existence (τὸ διαμένειν ἔχει), just as he himself says, (viz.) that 'the spirit is the giver of life (ζωοποιοῦν)' [*Jn.*6.63] (to) the flesh. For indeed it is not possible for a body to become also bodiless (ἀσώματον) as others foolishly say.

Fr.161 Therefore you say rightly and he (αὐτὸς) (does), 'We and Christ are not equal (ἴσον)'. But the statement that 'The flesh is not consubstantial with us since it is God's flesh' needs a little more precision (διαρθρώσεως). For it is better to say that He-has-taken-on-in-addition (προσείληφεν) flesh, which is consubstantial with us by nature (φύσει), but which He rendered / showed forth (ἀπέδειξεν) (as) divine by union (ἑνώσει). But you yourself also say this: '...according to this, it is not consubstantial with us since it is God's flesh'. But, this should be said with greater precision (μᾶλλον διηρθρωμένως) in this way: (viz.) that the flesh is consubstantial with us by nature (φύσει), but divine by union (ἑνώσει), and possessing distinctiveness (τὸ δίαφορον) through the union.

Ep. Ad Terentium (Fr.162-163)

(Lietzmann, p.254, l.29-p.255, l.14)

The Letter to Terentius

Fr.162 John attests that Jesus is 'the Dissolver (τὸν λύοντα)', but these men 'dissolve' outright when confessing the conjunction (συνάφειαν) with the body. **[L.p.255]** For it (the body) is *not* conjoined (συνάπτεται) with itself, *nor* the consubstantial with the consubstantial as they do not hesitate to say. For this (sort of conjunction – αὕτη) would be neither a synthesis (σύνθεσις) nor a conjunction (συνάφεια) because nothing is conjoined (συνάπτεται) to itself, but one thing is conjoined (συναπτόμενον) to another. And if the Word is consubstantial with the body, and the body is consubstantial with the Word, no doubt both would be invisible in accordance with this: 'No one has seen God and no one is able to see Him' [*Jn.*1.18 (?)]. According to this, therefore, he has *not* been revealed *nor* touched, being untouchable, and John is *not* true in saying, 'We have looked upon (it) and our hands have touched (it)' [1 *Jn.*1.1].

Fr.163 If anyone should say that the Son is two persons, or that the flesh is consubstantial with God and not (consubstantial) with our flesh, or that it (the flesh) descended from heaven and was *not* taken-on-in-addition (προσειλημμένην) by He who is from heaven, saying that the divinity suffers, let him be anathema!

Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses

(Lietzmann, p.255, l.15-p.256, l.17)

The Letter to the Bishops in Diocaesarea

To my most honoured Bishops who are in Diocaesarea. Greetings in the Lord!

1. Having sent communications of honour, we expected that we, likewise, would obtain love from you, most honoured Lords, that which we obtained from the blessed Bishop Athanasius, who thought we were harmonious with him in doctrines and obedient in all things. Thinking that the length of the letter had, perhaps, not made our meaning clear to you, since you did not write (back) yourselves, lo! we write plainly to you things which follow from both your and our common teacher. And I say these things concerning the divine enfleshment (θείας σαρκώσεως) **[L.p.256]** since on account of them there is much uproar, set in motion not by us, but by others concerning whom I am silent.

2. We confess not that the Word of God has come to reside in a holy man, that which was the case with the prophets, but rather, that the Word himself has become flesh... ['omission (a)'][17]... ['addition (a)'→][18] not by assuming (ἀνειληφότα) a human mind (νοῦν), a mind which is mutable and taken prisoner by foul thoughts, but being divine Mind (θεῖον ὄντα νοῦν) immutable and heavenly. And accordingly (διὸ καὶ)...[verbatim citation from Athanasius' *Tomus Ad Antiochenos*→][19] *the Saviour did not possess a body without soul, without sense, or without rationality (οὐ σῶμα ἄψυχον οὐδὲ ἀναίσθητον οὐδὲ ἀνόητον), for it was not possible that when the Lord became man for us his body should be irrational (ἀνόητον)*...['omission (b)'][20]*...And being truly Son of God he became also Son of Man, and*

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[17] Up until this point the Apollinarian confession in §2 follows closely the Athanasian statement in *Tomus Ad Antiochenos 7* (*MPG*26.804AB), but it omits to follow what Athanasius says next: 'and being in the form of God, took the form of a servant and from Mary after the flesh became man for us, and thus in Him the human race is *perfectly* and *wholly* delivered from sin and quickened from the dead and given access to the kingdom of the heavens' (804B, E.T. Robertson, p.485).

[18] 'Not by assuming...accordingly' is then inserted by Apollinarius into the quasi-Athanasian confession to provide the *context* for the Athanasian quotation which follows.

[19] The italics indicate an unreferenced direct citation from *Tomus 7* (*MPG*26.804B), which is here presented as if a *consequence* of Apollinarian 'addition (a)'.

[20] Apollinarius omits a phrase when quoting from Athanasius' *Tomus 7,* viz. 'nor was the salvation effected in the Word himself a salvation of body only but of soul (ψυχῆς) also' (see *MPG*26.804B, E.T. Robertson, p.485).

being only-begotten Son of God he became 'first born among many brethren' [*Rom.*8.29]. *Accordingly there was not one Son of God before Abraham and another after Abraham,* ['addition (b)' →][21] but one perfect (τέλειος) only-begotten (Son) of God. And he is perfect by means of divine, not human perfection (τέλειος δὲ θείᾳ τελειότητι καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ). We confess that we are in communion with those who think these things. But we are not in communion with those who think and write contrary things.

Ep. Ad Julianum (Fr.150-152)

(Lietzmann, p.247, l.18-p.248, l.13)

The Letter to Julian

Fr.150 With a finger they engrave stone, those who assert the dogma that two minds (νόας) are in Christ – I mean, a divine and a human. For, if every mind is autonomous (αὐτοκράτωρ), being moved (κινούμενος) by its own volition (ἰδικῷ θελήματι) according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν), it is impossible that, in one and the same underlying being (ὑποκειμένῳ), two (minds could) coexist, willing the opposite to each other with each doing what it wants according to its own self-moving primary impulse (καθ' ὁρμὴν αὐτοκίνητον).

Fr.151 Nor were they able to see this, even though it is obvious to all, that the divine mind is self-moving and moved uniformly (ταυτοκίνητος), **[L.p.248]** since immutable (ἄτρεπτος), but the human (mind) is self-moving but *not* moved uniformly, since mutable, and that a mutable mind is *not* mixed (μίγνυται) with immutable Mind in the formation (σύστασιν) of one underlying being. For he / the underlying being would be at odds (with himself) torn apart by the opposing wills (θελήμασι) of which he consists. For this reason

[21] After '... Abraham', Apollinarius leaves behind the Athanasian confession and offers his own elucidation of the nature of the Son's singularity.

we ourselves confess one Christ and we worship, since *he is one, one nature (φύσιν), will (θέλησιν), and energy (ἐνέργειαν), which saves by miracles and sufferings.*

Fr.152 For those who say that Christ is one and (yet) allege that he has two intellectual (νοερᾶς) natures complete in themselves (ἀυτοτελεῖς), do not know that *the Word himself became flesh and endured within his natural unity* (μείναντα τῆς φυσικῆς αὐτοῦ μονάδος ἐντός), and they present him cut up into dissimilar natures and energies.

'Η Κατὰ Μέρος Πίστις (= KMP)

(Lietzmann, p.167, l.1-p.185, l.6)

The Faith (set out) in Sections

(1) ['*Polemical Introduction of the Doctrine of the Incarnation*' (*KMP* 2–3)]

(L.p.168, ll.5-21)

2. The confession of the Church and the world-saving faith is about the enfleshment (σαρκώσεως) of the Word, Who gave himself to human flesh which He took-on-in-addition (προσελάβετο) from Mary, yet Who remained in his exact identity (ταυτότητι) and Who submitted to no divine change nor modification, but Who came close together with (συναιρεθέντος...πρὸς) flesh according to a human likeness (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθπωπίνην), so that the flesh was united to the divinity, the divinity having taken up as its own (ἀνῃρηκυίας) the passibility of the flesh in fulfillment of the mystery. And after the abolition of death, in the case of the holy flesh (there was) a continuous impassibility and an immutable immortality, the original human beauty having been restored by the power of the divinity and being bestowed upon all human beings by / in the appropriation / relationship of Faith (ἐν τῇ τῆς πίστεως οἰκειώσει).

3. But if some people here also (should) falsify the sacred Faith, or attribute to the divinity human properties – (e.g.) progressions, and also passions, and a glory which comes about subsequently – or (if some people should) divide the progressive and suffering body from the divinity as if subsisting/existing as a hypostasis (?) independently (ὡς ἰδιαζόντως ὑφεστός), these people are also outside the ecclesiastical and saving Confession.

(2) [*'Preliminary Statement of Incarnational Belief' (KMP 11–12 + Fr. 1 (?))*]

(L.p.170, l.28-p.171, l.19 + L.p.185, ll.4-6)

11. But the principal (element) of our salvation **[L.p.171]** is the enfleshment (σάρκωσις) of the Word. Thereupon we believe that for the renewal of humanity the enfleshment of the Word <himself>[22] has taken place, the divinity remaining unchanged. For neither exchange nor change nor limitation in spirit took place in respect of the holy power (δύναμιν) of God. But, remaining the same (power), it also fulfilled the work of the enfleshment for the salvation of the world; and the Word of God, living as a citizen (πολιτευσάμενος) upon the earth according to what was human (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον), at the same time maintained the divine presence over all things, filling all things, and yet peculiarly (ἰδίως) co-mingled (συγκεκραμένος) with flesh, and, despite the occurrence of sufferings in respect of the flesh, the (divine) power kept the impassibility which was its own.

12. Therefore, godless is he who refers the suffering to the divine power. For the Lord of Glory appeared in human form (σχήματι), having taken responsibility for the human economy upon the earth, and fulfilled the law on behalf of human beings by (his) actions, and dissolved (their) sufferings by (his) sufferings, and destroyed death by (his) death, and raised up life by (his) resurrection. And we look for the coming in glory from heaven, for the life and the judgement of all – (and) the resurrection of the dead will be for the recompense of all according to desert (εἰς τὸ πᾶσιν ἀνταποδοθῆναι κατ' ἀξίαν).

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[22] αὐτῆς is given in the Theodoret variant of §11 (see *MPG*83.104C).

'and after a few words'...[23]

Fr.1 We worship God who took-on-in-addition (προσλαβόντα) flesh from the holy Virgin and through this (action - τοῦτο) was a human being according to the flesh and God according to the Spirit.

(3) *['Detailed Confession of the Doctrine of the Incarnation' (KMP 28-31[LV],32,34,35-36)]*

(Lietzmann, p.177 (subtext), l.5-p.179 (subtext), l.15; p.180, ll.7-12; p.180, ll.19-21; p.181, ll.1-14)

28[LV].[24] And further, we confess that the Son of God has become the Son of Man, not in name, but in truth, having taken-on-in-addition (προσλαβόντα) flesh from Mary the Virgin, and that the same individual (αὐτόν) is *one* (ἕνα) perfect (τέλειον) (son / individual) <*and not two complete things (τέλεια) united*>, Son of God and Son of Man, <*one hypostasis and*> one person, and the worship of the Word and the flesh is one. And we anathematize those who <*say there are two and*> make different acts of worship, one divine and one human, and <*those who*> worship the man who is from Mary, as if he is another (individual - ἕτερον) besides the God who is from God.

29[LV]. We confess the suffering of the Lord according to the flesh, the **[L.p.178 (subtext)]** resurrection in the power of his divinity, *(the) ascension into heaven, (and the) glorious parousia which is to come* for the judgement of the living and the dead and for the eternal life of those *who have been made holy*.

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[23] Fr.1 is quoted by Theodoret in *Eranistes I* after the excerpt from *KMP* 11 with this introductory comment, indicating its proximity in the same work (see *MPG*83.104C).

[24] For *KMP*28-31 I have translated the *more original* 'Leontian variant' [*LV*], which Lietzmann gives beneath the *textus receptus*. The italics and <triangular brackets> are employed here, as by Lietzmann, to indicate the expansions and differences between the *LV* and the version Lietzmann prefers in his edition.

30[LV]. Since some have troubled us greatly, attempting to overthrow our Faith, which is in our Lord Jesus Christ *as* God enfleshed (σαρκωθέντα), *representing* him as a man who has been joined (συναφθέντα) to God, because of this, we make a confession concerning the aforementioned Faith throwing out the false contradiction *<and its fair-faced formal presentation (σχηματισμόν), which says that God was man having assumed a whole man (ἄνθρωπον ὅλον ἀναλαβών). For, since a whole man is not pure of sin in the present life according to the scriptures because he is not able to bear / lead (ἄγειν) his own (energies) to the same thing as the divine energies (ἐνεργείαις) and because of this he is not free from* **[L.p.179 (subtext)]** *death>, God was united to human flesh (and)* possessed his own pure energy, being a mind unconquered by psychic and fleshly passions (νοῦς ἀήττητος ὢν τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ σαρκικῶν παθημάτων) and bearing (ἄγων) the flesh and the carnal movements (σαρκικὰς κινήσεις) in a divine way and also sinlessly, and (being) not only invincible to death but also dissolving death.

31[LV]. And He is truly *one* (εἷς), He who is fleshless made manifest in flesh, perfect (τέλειος) in true and divine perfection (θείᾳ τελειότητι), not two persons, *not* two natures *<perfect in themselves (φύσεις τέλειαι καθ' ἑαυτάς). And it is not rightful to say that there are two sons> nor* to worship a Tetrad-God, and a Son of God, and *a son of man*, and a Holy Spirit *<nor to glorify a man instead of the Holy Spirit>*. On account of this we anathematize *as* blasphemers those who posit a man in the divine doxology *<together with God and the Son instead of the Spirit>. But we declare that a whole man is assumed (ἀναλαμβανόμενον) by God for salvation (namely) each one of us <who is being sanctified> and who receives / takes on (λαμβανόντων) a likeness (ὁμοίωσιν) to the heavenly man and who is divinized towards a likeness* of our Lord Jesus Christ, *who is truly and by nature (φύσει) God*, yet man *according to the flesh.*

32. Accordingly we believe...**[L.p.180, l.7]** in the glorious coming of the Son of God, who took (λαβόντος) flesh which was from a virgin, (and) who, on our account, submitted to suffering and death and on the third day was taken up into heaven, and (we believe) in his glorious parousia and in one Holy Church, a remission of sins, a resurrection of flesh, (and) eternal life.

34. And we confess that the Word was enfleshed and made manifest in fleshly birth which was from a virgin, not that he was active (ἐνεργήσαντα) in a man…

35. …**[L.p.181]** The Son sojourned (ἐπεδήμησε) in the world, taking (λαβών) flesh from a virgin, which he filled with the Holy Spirit for the sanctification of us all, and, having handed over the flesh to death, he destroyed death through the resurrection, for the resurrection of us all; and he ascended into heaven, taking up (ἀνῆλθεν) and glorifying human beings in himself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ), and he comes a second time, giving back eternal life to us who believe and keep his commandments.

36. One Son, both before the enfleshment and after the enfleshment. The same (Son) is man and God, each as one. And God the Word is not one person (πρόσωπον) and the man Jesus another (person (?) ἕτερον), but the same pre-existing Son was/set himself down (κατέστη) united (ἑνωθεὶς) with flesh from Mary, constituting *himself* (συνιστὰς ἑαυτὸν) a perfect (τέλειον), holy and sinless human being and providing for the restoration of humanity and the salvation of the world.

Anacephalaeosis

(Lietzmann, p.242, l.23-p.246, l.18)

Summary

1. When God operates (ἐνεργήσαντος) in a man, a prophet or an apostle is produced, not a Saviour of the World.
But Christ (is) Saviour of the World [*Jn.*4.42].
Therefore, *Christ was not produced by God operating in a man.*

2. Every man is part of the world and no part of the world takes away the sin of the world, under the power of which it also lies.

But Christ takes away (the sin of the World) [*Jn.*1.29].
Therefore, *Christ (is) not a man.* **[L.p.243]**

3. Every man (is) under death, and no one who is under death abolishes death.
But Christ abolishes (death) [1 *Cor.*15.26].
Therefore, *Christ (is) not a man.*

4. All men (are) of dust.
Yet Christ (is) not of dust, but of heaven [1 *Cor.*15.47].
Therefore, *Christ is not a man, unless he is the same as man by homonymy.*

5. Since he gives power to become children of God [*Jn.*1.12], he himself does not also become (γέγονεν). Rather, Christ bestows (power). Therefore, *he does not become Son, but is (Son) by nature (φυσέι).*

6. No one (among) men exists before his own ancestors.
But Christ exists before his carnal ancestors [*Jn.*8.58].
Therefore, *he is not a man, unless according to (his) flesh.*

7. No one (among men) possesses glory before the ages.
But Christ possesses (it) [*Jn.*17.5].
Therefore, *Christ is not a man.*

8. If God is in Jesus, all things are not through him, but through the one in him.
But all things *are* through him [1 *Cor.*8.6].
Therefore, God is not in Jesus, but he, himself, is God.

9. The one who saves is above sin, and Christ saves [*Mt.*1.21].
But no one among men is above sin.
Therefore, *Christ is not a man.*

10. Every man has a division (διάστασιν) of flesh against mind (νοῦν) [*Rom.*7.23].

But Christ does not have (this).
Therefore, *Christ is not a man.*

11. Every man mortifies the flesh to be brought to perfection in virtue [*Col.*3.5].
But Christ (does) not.
Therefore, *Christ is not a man.*

[NB] 12. The flesh of not one man has been said to be from heaven.
But the flesh of Christ has been said (to be) from heaven [*Jn.*3.13].
Therefore, *Christ is not a man in respect of the divinity, which has taken-on-in-addition (προσλαβοῦσαν) the flesh.*
So too, therefore, *(the flesh) is said (to be) 'from heaven' because it was united (ἡνῶσθαι) to what was from heaven.*

13. No one among men gives life. For they are not Christ.
But Christ gives life [1 *Cor.*15.22; *Jn.*5.21; 1 *Tim.*6.13 (?)].
Therefore, Christ is not a man.

14. The name that is above every name is appropriate for no one among men, nor the glory which is of God alone.
But it is appropriate for Christ [*Phil.*2.9].
Therefore, Christ is not a man.

15. If God dwelt in a man, he (the man) was not 'emptied' (ἐκενώθη).
But He who **[L.p.244]** was in the form of God *was* emptied, taking the form of a slave [*Phil.*2.6-7].
Therefore, he *(God) did not dwell in a man.*

[NB] 16. God dwelling in a man (ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ κατοικῶν) is not a man.
But man is a spirit united with flesh (πνεῦμα δὲ σαρκὶ ἡνωμένον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν).
Christ is a man by name, as has been said [§4, *above*].
Therefore, *divine spirit is what was united with flesh.*

17. (It is) of men to have risen from the dead, but (it is) of God to have raised (the dead).
But Christ (does) both things.
Therefore, *the same (Christ – ὁ αὐτός) is God and man.*

18. If Christ was only a man, or if only God, he would not be *the one who is in the middle (μέσος) of God and men* [1 *Tim.*2.5; *Gal.*3.20].

19. If Christ was only a man, he would not have saved the world, and if only God, he would not have saved (it) by sufferings.
But Christ (does) both.
Therefore, *he is both God and man.*

20. If Christ was only a man, he would not make the dead alive, but if only God, he would not, independently of the Father, make some of the dead alive [*Jn.*5.21].
But Christ (does) both things.
Therefore *he himself / the same individual (ὁ αὐτός) is both God and man.*

[NB] 21. A man operated (ἐνεργούμενος) by God is not God, but a body conjoined (συναφθὲν) to God (is) God [witness?!].
But Christ is God.
Therefore, *he is not a man operated by God, but a body which has been compounded (συντεθέν) to God.*

22. If a 'temple (νὰος) of God' was brought forth from Mary, the novelty of the birth from the virgin is nonsensical. For men are 'temples of God' without this (form of genesis).

23. If the very same nature (ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις) is of Christ, such is also of us – he is a 'man of old', [*Rom.*6.6], 'a living soul' [1 *Cor.*15.45] and not **[L.p.245]** a life-giving spirit, and one such as this will not make alive.
But Christ does make alive and he is a life-giving Spirit [1 *Cor.*15.22,45].
Therefore, *he is not of our own nature.*

24. Does Christ live by means of his own nature, or by the grace of God? If (he lives) through his own nature, *he is God*, but if through the grace of God, he is not above (ὑπὲρ) us nor will he make us alive.

25. If *he is more virtuous as by free choice* (προαιρέσει) how has this been possible? For the free choice of men does not successfully achieve true righteousness. But if he is made righteous as by the energy (ἐνεργείᾳ) which is from God, yet he himself is inert / passive (ἀνενέργητος), then those who act (freely) are more virtuous.

26. If a man has been combined (συμπέπλεκται) with God in Christ, did he legislate by his own authority or not? If by his own (authority), *he is God*, but if not by his own (authority), how (is it that) he did not say, 'The *Lord* says this', but, rather, '*I* say to you' [*Mt.* 5.22], not differentiating one who is not speaking from the One who speaks?

27. And, moreover, did he himself accomplish the miracles or not? If he accomplished them *he was not a man*, but if not, how does he say that he accomplished them or how is he himself (related) to the one who accomplishes (them)?

28. Is a man worshipped by angels [*Heb.*1.6] or not? But if he is not worshipped, *how was the Son <of man> united* and how does he send out his angels [*Mt.* 24.31]? But if he was worshipped because divine power (δύναμιν) indwelt (ἐνοικῆσαι) in him, why is he worshipped by those (angels) who possess eternally the indwelling divine power? And, furthermore, would we ourselves worship a man or not? But if we will not worship (a man), how will we consider him to be united and how are we baptized into his death [*Rom.*6.3]? If we thus worship the man even as God, we will behave impiously, holding the creature in equality with the Creator. And if we suppose that the man is a judge together with God, bringing to light the hidden secrets of darkness [1 *Cor.*4.5], we will ascribe the judgement of God to a man. But if not, how has the Father given to him authority to make judgement [*Jn.*5.27], since he is the Son of Man, and *how was he united* to the one who judges?

[NB] 29. *A man joined together (παραζευχθεὶς) is one who is other (ἕτερος) than God by (way of) his vital, rational* **[L.p.246]** *and, also, emotional/passible movements* (ταῖς ζωτικαῖς κινήσεσι λογιστικαῖς τε καὶ παθητικαῖς). Not only in suffering does he (the man) suffer as another, but also, in being worshipped, he is worshipped as another. *But the flesh of God is an organ of life (ζωῆς ὄργανον), adapted for sufferings because of the divine purposes, and neither words nor actions belong to flesh, and the flesh, submitting to suffering according to what belongs to flesh, is strong against the sufferings because it is God's (flesh), so as to instate impassibility for bodies which are not dissimilar, yet share the same life (τοῖς οὐχ ὁμοίοις μέν, ὁμοζώοις δὲ σώμασιν). And it is worshipped as the flesh of God, God being thus what is worshipped, and the owner (οὗ) of the body gives us conjunction (συνάφειαν), and it is not worshipped as a creature because no creature is a part (μέρος) of God.* Therefore, those who believe that *God took (λαβεῖν) flesh* – and do not change to that other (opinion) of those who hold the contrary, saying that a man was conjoined (παραζεῦχθαι) to God – they (the former) are in possession of the benefits.

[NB] 30. If the flesh, as making war with the mind, has been divided (κεχώρισται) from the mind (νοῦ) according to the apostle [*Rom.*7.23], *God, in taking (λαβὼν) flesh, from this (flesh) possesses the impulses which make war upon the mind (ἀπὸ ταύτης ἔχει τὰς ἐπιστρατευομένας ἐπὶ νοῦν κινήσεις), and they are no more obedient to him than to (the) mind, their opponent.* [Compare with §§10,29, above!] But, if this is the case, he himself is not the one who suffers in so far as being God.

Appendix 2

COMMENTARY UPON THE FRAGMENTS OF APOLLINARIUS' *APODEIXIS* (FR. 13 - 105) AS TRANSMITTED BY GREGORY OF NYSSA IN THE *ANTIRRHETICUS*.

Introductory Note

Instead of offering a straightforward translation of Fr.13-105 together with Gregory's immediate comments as they are presented in Lietzmann's edition (L.p.208,l.9-p.231,l.32), I here **translate and highlight** the significant Apollinarian statements and Gregorian paraphrases from the *Apodeixis* and present them within a commentary of my own. By this means I hope to give the reader a fuller understanding of the subsequent context of Fr.13-105 in Gregory's argument in the *Antirrheticus*, and a better idea of the probable or possible shape of Apollinarius' original argument in the *Apodeixis* (in so far as I am able to understand it, given the imperfect evidence). The commentary gives a more detailed insight into the exegetical decisions which lie behind my shorter '*Suggested Reconstruction*' of the *Apodeixis* (see pp.110-124, above) and, where necessary, it contrasts these with the decisions already made by Ekkehard Mühlenberg, when devising his own differing 'Reconstruction' (see, Mühlenberg, E., *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 1969, pp.64-90).

Commentary

Fr.13-15

In this group of fragments the full title of the Apollinarian treatise which is to be examined by Gregory is given. The introduction of the work is briefly described (Fr.13) and an opening section is reported in which Apollinarius speaks of the existence and the origins of a false ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος Christology (Fr.14-15).

***The Title*:** In *Antirrheticus* 2-3 Gregory refers to the title of the Apollinarian work on three occasions and attacks its twin peculiarities with an analytical precision which confirms that he is quoting Apollinarius' original formula: **'An Exposition/Demonstration**

(ἀπόδειξις) of the *divine* enfleshment which (was) according to the *likeness* of a man'. The term *Apodeixis* suggests that Apollinarius intended the treatise to be a formal exposition of the type of Incarnational Christology designated by the title, and in what follows he often seems to come back to its two main ideas: e.g. Fr.38,56-58,99-100 (a *divine* enfleshment); Fr.42,45,103 (according to a human *likeness*). The term *Apodeixis* also suggests formal demonstration and the fragments indicate that Apollinarius presented scriptural evidence (e.g. Fr.26-31,33-41,42-47,88) and syllogistic proofs (e.g. Fr.70-80) in support of his incarnational thesis. It suits Gregory's polemic to assume that two false ideas inform the novel formulation of the title – heavenly flesh and docetism – but what immediately follows (Fr.13-15) indicates that the primary purpose of the title in both its aspects is anti-psilanthropist: 'a divine enfleshment' since God was the subject of the incarnation; 'according to the *likeness* of a man' since God (incarnate) was not *a* (divinized) man.

***Fr.13*:** Gregory offers a short description of some thoughts which Apollinarius went on to develop more fully as a 'preface' to his discourse.[1] According to Gregory's report, Apollinarius asserted that it was important for Christians not only to hold to the orthodox faith, but also to *examine* it well (ἐξετάζω), **'lest it should, in some part, fall in with the opinion of the Greeks or Jews'.**[2] Although Fr.13 follows on from Gregory's own resolution not to leave what Apollinarius has written 'unexamined'[3], it seems likely that he is reporting the main theme rather than a detail from Apollinarius' introduction. The sentiments expressed in Fr.13 provide justification for the scientific, dialectical and (apparently) novel doctrinal exposition which follows. The warning about lapsing into non-Christian doctrine leads into the first section of the *Apodeixis* which depicts a false type of Christology which has arisen.

***Fr.14*:** Although Mühlenberg argues against the editor, the case for Lietzmann's decision that this is the first *verbatim* quotation from the *Apodeixis* seems stronger.[4] This statement may well be Apollinarius' opening proposition in the first expository section of the *Apodeixis* after his theoretical/methodological introduction.

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[1] L.p.208,ll.28-29.
[2] L.p.208,ll.25-29.
[3] L.p.208,l.24.
[4] The transitional phase between Fr.13 and Fr.14 is more suggestive of a verbatim citation than a further paraphrase: τὸν λὸγον refers to the discourse not another paraphrased 'thought' (L.p.208,l.29). The πάλιν before Fr.15's paraphrase (L.p.209,l.4) does not indicate a sustained *Referat*, but a return to the mode of allusion after direct citation (in Fr.14) *contra* Mühlenberg, p.65.

'By the faithless and the heretics it has already been noised abroad that it is not possible for God to become man and to come into contact with sufferings, an assertion which is added to the rule of faith by the heresies, which say that Christ was a divinized man (ἄνθρωπον ἔνθεον) because of his birth from a woman and his sufferings.'[5]

***Fr.15*:** In what he admits is a summary, Gregory describes the passage of the *Apodeixis* which follows 'next' (probably immediately after Fr.14) in which Apollinarius traces the origins of the heretical 'divinized man' Christology back to notorious heresiarchs: **'to call Christ a divinized man is contrary to the apostolic teachings and alien to the Synods, but Paul (of Samosata) and Photinus and Marcellus made a beginning of such a distortion'.**[6] Mühlenberg is correct to notice that Apollinarius chooses not to attack his 'orthodox' opponents directly at the beginning of the *Apodeixis*. Gregory's description of Apollinarius' dialectical method indicates that he does not himself feel implicated.[7] Mühlenberg possibly reads too much into Apollinarius' reference to Greek and Jewish opinion (Fr.13) when he classifies the primary target of Apollinarius' opening polemic as 'the extra-Christian thesis that God is incapable of suffering'.[8]

Fr.16-22

In these fragments Apollinarius introduces his own explanation (Fr.19,22) of how Christ is not *a* man (from earth), but both God (from a woman) *and* man (from heaven), as a counter-thesis to the false divinized-man conception. The explanation arises out of a quasi-dialectical discussion about who Christ is and what type of man (Fr.16-18).

***Fr.16*:** In this verbatim rhetorical question, Apollinarius asks those who espouse the false Christology: **'How can you say that the man witnessed as having descended from heaven [*Jn*.3.13] is a man from earth, and that he who is proclaimed God and Son of God is a son of man?'**

***Fr.17*:** Although Gregory introduces the next fragment as if it is part of a theopaschite thesis being developed in the *Apodeixis*, it is much more obviously a statement of the 'true' Christological implication of *Jn*.3.13 as drawn out by Apollinarius. The Christ of the gospels is 'man' in a unique sense, but somehow also in a real sense:

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[5] L.p.208,l.30-p.209,l.2.
[6] L.p.209,ll.3-18.
[7] L.p.209,ll.10-11; cf.Mühlenberg, p.74.
[8] Mühlenberg, p.87.

'The man who descended from heaven is not a man from earth. And (is) nevertheless a man even if he descended from heaven. For the Lord did not disown such an appellation in the gospels.'[9]

***Fr.18*:** Apollinarius then comes to what Gregory calls his 'chief point' (τὸ κεφάλαιον). This verbatim statement is a conclusion framed as another rhetorical question. If *Jn.*3.13 and *Gal.*4.4 (?) apply to the same Son/masculine individual, then he must be (not a man, but) both God and man: **'But if (he is) both Son of Man from heaven and Son of God from a woman, how is the same (ὁ αὐτὸς) not (both) God and man?'**[10]

***Fr.19*:** Mühlenberg believes that this statement is too compressed to be Apollinarius' *verbatim* answer to Fr.18,[11] but Lietzmann's original editorial judgement seems preferable. The conjunction 'ἀλλὰ' has probably been supplied by Gregory because he returns to what Apollinarius says at the beginning of *Antirrheticus* 7 after a short digression featuring his own doctrine of the virgin birth in response to Fr.18,[12] but there seems to be no reason why the rest of the sentence need not be Apollinarius' pithy answer to the rhetorical question raised in Fr.18. In Fr.19 Apollinarius explains how the same Son/masculine individual can be both God and man: it is here that he first introduces his own Christological (counter)-thesis. **'God by the spirit which was enfleshed and man by the flesh taken-on-in-addition (προσληφθείσῃ) by God.'**[13]

***Fr.20-21*:** Apollinarius' first statement of incarnational doctrine is followed immediately by allusion to two incarnational proof texts, the purpose of which seems to be to confirm that the subject of the incarnation is divine and that the human element is flesh. **'The Mystery was manifested in flesh'** [1 *Tim.*3.16] (= Fr.20). **'The Word became flesh according to the union'** [*Jn.*1.14] (= Fr.21).[14]

***Fr.22*:** The first part of this fragment (22^a) starts after Gregory's one sentence response to Apollinarius' last statement (Fr.21). Lietzmann regards 22^a as verbatim and links it to another statement (22^b) (which he also believes to be verbatim) that follows one sentence later.

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[9] L.p.209,ll.17-20.
[10] L.p.209,ll.21-24.
[11] Mühlenberg, p.66.
[12] *Antirrheticus* 6 (J.p.139,l.23-p.140,l.2).
[13] L.p.209,ll.25-26.
[14] L.p.209,ll.28-30.

***Fr.22[a]*: 'But the flesh is not without a soul (οὐκ ἄψυχος) for it was said to fight against the Spirit and to war with the ruling of the mind [*Rom.*7.23].'**[15]

***Fr.22[b]*: 'And we say that the bodies of irrational beings are also ensouled (ἔμψυχα).'**[16]

If Lietzmann is correct, then Fr.22 expands upon the incarnational thesis introduced in Fr.19 – by giving more information about the flesh taken-on-in-addition by which Christ is able to be a man as well as God: the flesh taken by God includes a ψυχή – an irrational soul. Apollinarius justifies this contention with two arguments. (i) He alludes to *Rom.*7.3, which speaks of the ethical battle in a human being between a carnal impulse and the ruling of the spirit/mind (22^a). (ii) He points out that even irrational creatures have a body *and* an (animal) ψυχή (22^b). Mühlenberg has questioned Lietzmann's editorial decisions: he believes that 22^a is *not* verbatim and argues that 22^b is a statement which does not belong to Apollinarius in any sense – it is part of *Gregory's* refutation. Again, the case for accepting Lietzmann's original judgement appears to be stronger.[17]

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[15] L.p.209,ll.31-32 = J.p.140,ll.17-19.

[16] L.p.209,l.33.

[17] Mühlenberg argues that 22^a is Gregory's 'summary' of 'a more detailed explanation of how we are to understand body' (p.75): 'The introductory "But" is the link in the context of Gregory's thoughts, though of course we do not know Apollinarius' preceding sentence' (p.67). Mühlenberg argues that 22^b belongs to Gregory's counter-argument: 'The last part arrived there by way of false punctuation now corrected by Müller; after "as the prolific author says" there should be a semicolon (J.p.140,l.22) and Gregory's refutation follows' (p.66). *Pro Lietzmann contra Mühlenberg*:***22[a]***: There is no reason why the introductory 'ἀλλά' should not belong to Apollinarius, who is picking up the term 'flesh' from the verbatim Fr.19-21 and adding a qualifying proviso. The flesh has been taken on by the divine Spirit (Fr.19), Mystery (Fr.20), Word (Fr.21),'*but* that is not to say that' it lacked a soul. ***22[b]*** cannot be rejected as an Apollinarian statement on the basis of 'incorrect' punctuation, for punctuation is decided by editorial interpretation. The only guide for separating Apollinarius' argument from Gregory's refutation and for punctuating, is the *sense*. Given that Gregory's argument (prior to Apollinarius' introduction of his T. anthropology) is very inept, it is difficult to decide, but on balance Gregory's counter-argument makes more sense if Apollinarius' voice supplies 22^b. Gregory's counter-argument (see,L.p.210,ll.1-6) seems to work as follows: Apollinarius admits that the flesh is 'not without a soul (οὐκ ἄψυχος)' (i.e.the catchphrase from Athanasius' *Tomus ad Antiochenos*). Does he not, therefore, have to admit that it is ensouled (ἔμψυχος) and thus 'in attaching flesh and that ensouled to the Word, he attaches nothing other than a complete man' (i.e. the very thing Apollinarius rejects)? Prior to the introduction of Apollinarius' T. analysis (Fr.23), Gregory is probably thinking of ψυχή in its more inclusive sense and, therefore, is missing Apollinarius' precise point here. Apollinarius (not fully understood by Gregory) says that the flesh 'is not not ensouled'. Gregory suggests: 'Accordingly let us enquire whether the flesh taken by the Word of God was *ensouled*!' If Gregory himself then exclaims 'we say that the bodies of animals are ensouled!', this has nothing to do with whether in Apollinarius' argument οὐκ ἄψυχος is the same as 'ensouled'. What seems more likely is that Gregory then quotes a second Apollinarian statement (22^b), which proves that the circumlocution of 22^a does mean 'ensouled' and therefore that *de facto* Apollinarius admits a complete (psychosomatic) manhood. Confirmation that 22^b is Apollinarius' own proposition is supplied by Gregory later on in the treatise. 'The beast without intellect is ensouled (ἔμψυχον), the very thing which this man [sc. Apollinarius] does not run away from as unnatural/absurd' (*Antirrheticus* 45 - J.p.208,ll.23-24).

Fr.23-31

In the next group of fragments Apollinarius gives his incarnational thesis further precision and authority. He introduces a *trichotomic* anthropological analysis (Fr.23-24) as a framework for understanding the introductory statement of his own doctrine (Fr.19-22), and also for understanding the orthodox pronouncements of the critics of Paul of Samosata, and the declaration of the Council of Nicaea (Fr.24). This precipitates a second more technical statement of doctrine (Fr.25). Apollinarius then furnishes scriptural proof for this Christological conception citing from 1 *Cor.*15.45-47 (Fr.26-31).

Fr.23-24

These fragments offer only Gregory's *report* of what came next in the *Apodeixis*, but his account is probably reliable because, after brief criticism of the trichotomic scheme,[18] he is content to describe without comment the structure of Apollinarius' argument. **'But let us leave these things so that we do not proceed against them singly and draw out the counterstatement to excess. But let us proceed with the sequence of the argument.'**[19] Gregory's report suggests that Apollinarius' argument was developed in a series of steps designed to produce the conclusion in Fr.25.

(1) **'A demonstration by means of several proofs that man is composed from three (elements) (ἐκ τριῶν συνεστάναι)' *(Fr.23).***[20]

(2) Mention is made of, **'some (words) of the dogmatic Synods which assembled against Paul of Samosata, he who said that the Lord had been deified from heaven' *(Fr.24).***[21]

(3) Words of the Nicene declaration are cited. **'"He descended from heaven, and was enfleshed and made man"' *(Fr.24).***[22]

It is easy enough to see how the Nicene pronouncement upon the incarnation fits in with *Jn.*3.13, *Jn.*1.14 and 1 *Tim.*3.16 which lie behind the first statement of Apollinarius' theory (Fr.19-22). We can only speculate as to which of the statements issued by Malchion and the Fathers of the 268 Synod of Antioch was mentioned (– God incarnate was 'a substance substantially existing in a body', perhaps (!?)). The T. framework allows a more technical way of understanding Apollinarius' thesis and the synodical pronouncements. The Synods

[18] *Antirrheticus* 8 (J.p.142, ll.12-18).
[19] L.p.210,ll.11-13.
[20] L.p.210,ll.7-10;cf. also ll.13-14.
[21] L.p.210,ll.14-16.
[22] L.p.210,ll.17-19.

thereby seem to lend their authority to the thesis and the framework. Thus Apollinarius, in Gregory's eyes, arrives at the 'preconceived'[23] conclusion which follows.

***Fr.25*:** In this verbatim fragment, Apollinarius applies the T. analysis to Christ to explain how he is God and a (heavenly) man.

> **'Indeed, Christ, possessing God (as) the Spirit (πνεῦμα), that is, the mind (τὸν νοῦν), together with a soul (μετὰ ψυχῆς) and body, is rightly called "a man from heaven".'[24]**

For the first time in the treatise Apollinarius equates the more flexible term 'πνεῦμα' with the intellectual soul/νοῦς on the basis of the T. anthropology, although this is already implicit in his interpretation of *Rom.*7.23 (cf. Fr.22[a]).

***Fr.26*:** Having argued against Apollinarius' use of the Nicene declaration in support of his T. theory, Gregory picks up a verbatim[25] statement which indicates that Apollinarius next turned to scripture to justify his T. definition of Christ as (heavenly) man. 1 *Cor.*15.44-45 is a helpful text because it allows Christ, on Apollinarius' analysis, to *conform* to a scriptural definition of man through his assumed ψυχή and body. This may be one of the reasons why Apollinarius reminds us that **'Paul also calls the first Adam a soul which is together with a body'.**[26] The other reason becomes apparent in the next reported fragment.

***Fr.27*:** 1 *Cor.*15,45-47 offers *two* anthropological definitions: one of the ordinary man (first Adam) and one of Christ as man (second Adam). Thus the rest of the Pauline passage allows Apollinarius to confirm his T. analysis of how Christ, *qua* heavenly man, *differs* from a man in his spiritual element.

> **'"The second man from heaven" is called "spiritual" [1 Cor.15,46] and this is made to imply that the man who is mixed with God is mindless.'[27]**

***Fr.28*:** This verbatim statement contains further Apollinarian exegesis of 1 *Cor.*15.45 wherein Apollinarius explains how the text is fully compatible with his T.

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[23] L.p.210,ll.19-22.
[24] L.p.210,ll.23-25.
[25] Mühlenberg (p.67) argues that Fr.26 is a *Referat* on the grounds that the 'also' which introduces it betrays Gregory's voice. This is insufficient evidence; Fr.28 is introduced in the same way and Mühlenberg accepts Lietzmann's judgement that this is verbatim.
[26] L.p.211,ll.2-3.
[27] L.p.211,ll.5-7.

analysis. When Paul calls the first Adam 'a living soul', he is not saying that this (ordinary) man has a ψυχή but no (human) spirit. Rather Paul is speaking **'according to syllepsis'**[28], i.e. calling the whole man (spirit, soul and body) by the title of one of its elements, 'soul'. This fragment gives the lie to one of the counter-arguments employed by Gregory at this stage in the *Antirrheticus* in which he supposes (wrongly and perhaps deliberately) that Apollinarius employs 1 *Cor.*15.45 so that he can argue that *all* men prior to Christ were irrational.[29]

***Fr.29, 31*:** In these reported statements, Apollinarius points to the evidence that Paul calls the Spirit of Christ 'life-giving' rather than 'living' [1 *Cor.*15.45], and that he calls the second Adam 'a man from heaven' [1 *Cor.*15.47], as providing further confirmation of his Christological T. thesis (Fr.25).

> **'But the last [Adam] ... Paul calls a "life-giving spirit"'** ***(Fr.29).***[30] **'This (man) is in truth called "from heaven" for the reason that the heavenly Spirit was enfleshed'** ***(Fr.31).***[31]

***Fr.30*:** This statement should be discounted when reconstructing the *Apodeixis* because it is a (misrepresentative) assessment of Apollinarius' interpretation of 1 *Cor.*15.45-47, made by Gregory in the service of his own counter-argument.[32]

Fr.31-41

These fragments seem to belong to a section of the *Apodeixis* wherein Apollinarius introduced and interpreted a series of texts to confirm *the first tenet of his thesis*, viz. that the subject = spirit/mind (= hypostasis?) in Christ 'the man' (ὁ ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς)[33] (from heaven) is God. The texts allow Apollinarius to clarify the way in which he understands Christ (and *in some sense* his humanity?) to pre-exist and be the divine Creator and Saviour who is consubstantial with God the Father.

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[28] L.p.211,ll.12-13.
[29] See *Antirrheticus* 10-12 (J.p.144,l.25-p.146,l.27).
[30] L.p.211,ll.17-18.
[31] L.p.211,ll.23-24.
[32] Gregory argues that Paul calls the first Adam 'soul' because of his sinfulness and calls Christ after the whole spirit because he does not sin ...**'But he [Apollinarius] does not accept the interpretation, for he says that the former [Adam] was of dust from the earth since his body made from the earth was ensouled'** (i.e. and lacked a spiritual element). See *Antirrheticus* 12 (J.p.146,ll.15-23).
[33] L.p.211,l.25.

Gregory and Mühlenberg perhaps over-emphasise the centrality of the issue of Christ's pre-existence in this section of the *Apodeixis*.[34] Apollinarius' choice of texts and the care he takes to show that it is not the flesh *per se* which is consubstantial and pre-exists (Fr.32,40, 41) may betray an apologetic concern to distance himself from the heavenly flesh error (with which he had come to be associated) with the help of the T. thesis. Nevertheless, in the context of the opening phase of the exposition in *Apodeixis* (Fr.15-47), this section is primarily there to support Apollinarius' view that there is one enduring subject in Christ – not a man from earth , but God the Word who is also a 'man' from heaven. This scriptural/pious paradox can be explained if we accept Apollinarius' T. analysis of the incarnation (Fr.19-31); it is further confirmed and clarified by the set of proof texts (Fr.31-41). In Christ, God (the Word) supplies the divine subject (= spirit/mind): *this is why* scripture speaks of Christ the saviour as pre-existing and consubstantial with God the Father.

Gregory's misunderstanding/misrepresentation of the main point of Apollinarius' exposition obscures the real reason why Apollinarius brought together this series of texts. It was *not* to show that Christ's flesh/humanity pre-existed and was fully divine *per se*. Apollinarius' original argument can be best estimated from the verbatim fragments (Fr.32,38,41) and by looking for the probable connections between these statements and the series of proof texts mentioned and borrowed (?) by Gregory. It seems possible to discern a development of Christological insights from the connected series of texts, which matches the conceptional development in the surviving fragments of Apollinarius' exposition.

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[34] It is in *Gregory's* polemical interest to seize upon Apollinarian statements and novel proof texts (e.g. *Zach.*13,7) which suggest the doctrine of a pre-existing divine man/flesh, and Gregory's preoccupation with this theme in *Antirrheticus* may give a false impression as to the importance of Christ's pre-existence *per se* in the development of Apollinarius' argument in *Apodeixis*. E.g. On the strength of Fr.32, and a list of proof texts (Fr.33), Gregory devotes *three* chapters of his own work to attacking his own (mis)interpretation of this Apollinarian notion (see *Antirrheticus*,13-15,J.p.148,l.10-p.151,l.15). Gregory offers several counter-arguments *ad absurdum*, all beginning with a *false* (if we take the statement in Fr.32 as representative) representation of Apollinarius' position: 'if the flesh existed before the ages...' (J.p.148, ll.14,27-28); 'if the flesh existed before all things...' (J.p.149,ll.2-3); 'if the flesh always existed...' (J.p.149,l.8,p.150,l.12). Fr.34 is part of one such argument and therefore unlikely to correspond to what Apollinarius was actually arguing at this point in the *Apodeixis*. *Mühlenberg* (p.76) has perhaps been over-impressed by Gregory's attention to the theme of pre-existence. 'Fr.32 starts a new subject without a linking passage. For reasons of internal coherence Gregory writes not a word of introduction. *We should recognise a new chapter* with questions about the pre-existence and eternal life of Jesus the man.' *Contra Mühlenberg* (pp.87-88), there is no need to see a third main section of the first part of *Apodeixis* (Fr.32 ff.) centred on the doctrinal issue of Christ's pre-existence. There *is* a shift in Apollinarius' exposition in the environs of Fr.32, but this is more to do with the introduction of a new series of proof texts to clarify and confirm the thesis which has emerged (Fr.18-31). *Doctrinally* there is no topic change between Fr.31 and Fr.32. In Christ, the subject/spirit/mind is divine (Fr.29,31); witness the *way* Christ pre-exists as a divine subject/spirit (Fr.32) as testified by scripture (Fr.33).

***Fr.32*:** This verbatim statement follows on from Apollinarius' last contention (Fr.31) that Paul calls Christ the 'spiritual' man 'from heaven' [1 *Cor.*15,45-47] because in him *divine* spirit was enfleshed. In Fr.32 Apollinarius makes a statement about the way in which Christ pre-exists (which he then supports by proof texts (Fr.33)), not suddenly to clarify his doctrine of the pre-existent humanity, but to prove his thesis that in him there is a subject = spirit who exists before the earthly Christ and Saviour – *and, therefore, must be the divine spirit* because such texts do not refer to a pre-existing human individual subject/spirit. Thus, Fr.32, in effect argues from the impossibility of a pre-existing humanity to establish the divinity of Christ's Spirit.

> **'And (he says) the human being Christ does not pre-exist as (if) the spirit is another alongside him that is God, but in the sense that in the nature of the God-man the Lord is the divine spirit.'**[35]

***Fr.33*:** Gregory reports a series of texts used by Apollinarius **'as evidence for the conception'** advocated in Fr.32. The masculine subject [*Jn.*1.15; *Col.*1.17] and ego [*Jn.*8.58] in Christ pre-exists and is therefore none other than the divine Lord who created the world [1 *Cor.*8.6].[36] Gregory also mentions **'some saying of Zachariah which we will pass by since he has distorted its content violently'.**[37] This text is probably *Zach.*13.7, which is cited by Gregory and discussed in *Antirrheticus* 18-19 (cf. also Fr.37,40), **'Awake O sword against my shepherd and against the man of my stock (ἄνδρα σύμφυλόν μοῦ)'.**[38] *The Zachariah text is particularly significant* in connection with the statement in Fr.32. More than the N.T. texts it suggests a pre-existing 'man'. No doubt it is Apollinarius' use of this (more unusual) text that allows Gregory to embark upon his accusations of pre-existing flesh, etc. because Gregory does not even regard the text as Christological.[39] Within the context of the first group of proof texts (Fr.33), Apollinarius' exegetical point may have been similar to the one paraphrased by Gregory in ***Fr.37*: 'Apollinarius says the sword is raised against the Lord because of the designation**

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[35] L.p.211,ll.25-28.

[36] The fact that these texts identify Christ with the pre-existing divine subject rather than spirit may explain why Apollinarius identifies the Spirit within Christ's (quasi-human) nature with its subject/person in Fr.32: **'in the nature of the God-man the Lord is the divine Spirit.'**

[37] L.p.212,ll.5-9.

[38] *Antirrheticus* 18 (J.p.155,ll.3-4).The version of *Zach.*13,7 quoted by Gregory is probably the same as that used by Apollinarius, which Mühlenberg (p.76) believes to be the *Aquila* version.

[39] See *Antirrheticus* 18 (J.p.154,l.28).

"shepherd"'[40] (i.e. in an O.T. text there is mention of the subject in Christ the man – the Shepherd who suffered for his sheep). This is clearly the divine Lord (not a pre-existing human spirit). Thus σύμφυλος refers to his identity with God the Father *qua* divine spirit, it does not refer to his flesh/manhood (see Fr.40-41). The Zachariah text is significant, not only because of its important role in the first group of proof texts (Fr.33), but because it links up with the exposition in the *Apodeixis* that follows, which is to do with the divinity of the *Saviour* (suffering Shepherd) and his full identity with God the Creator [*Heb.*1.1-3].

***Fr.34*:** This allusion to what Apollinarius 'says', viz. **'that the divine enfleshment did not have a beginning from the Virgin, but was even before Abraham, etc.'**[41], belongs to a Gregorian counter-argument. It is probably a (misrepresentative) interpretation of Apollinarius' original words rather than a report of anything he actually said.

***Fr.35*:** Gregory admits to passing over another group of Apollinarian proof texts. He chooses to mention only *Eph.*1.7 and gives this explanation of its usage by Apollinarius:

> **'For the purpose of a testimony that he exists eternally both in flesh and blood he [Apollinarius] furnished the Apostle saying..."Through him we have received redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins through his flesh".'**[42]

Gregory then goes off on a long digression in which he sets out his own Christology/soteriology. He brings this to a conclusion by asking his reader **'to judge which is the most pious interpretation (of the words of the Apostle)'** (i.e. *Eph.*1.7).[43]

The second group of Apollinarius' proof texts seem to spring from *Zach.*13.7 (for it is to this text that Gregory also returns after his analysis of *Eph.*1.7[44]). It seems likely that not only *Eph.*1.7, but *Heb.*2.10, *Lk.*15.4 or *Mt.*18.12 featured in this group because these are taken up by Gregory at the onset of his own counter-exposition on the true nature of Christ – as Saviour and Good Shepherd.[45] Apollinarius' second group of texts (cf. also *Heb.*1.3, Fr.38) have the common purpose of attesting to the divinity of *the Saviour* (*qua* subject/spirit) who redeemed us from sin by 'his' flesh and blood.

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[40] L.p.212,ll.27-28.
[41] L.p.212,ll.10-14.
[42] L.p.212,ll.18-21.
[43] *Antirrheticus* 16-17(J.p.151,l.28-p.154,l.23). Lietzmann's Fr.36 follows immediately.
[44] *Antirrheticus* 17-18(J.p.154,l.24-p.155,l.9). cf.Fr.36-37.
[45] *Antirrheticus* 16(J.p.151,l.28-p.152,l.2). Later on Gregory admits that this is a method he favours – using the same proof texts as Apollinarius to refute his argument (*Antirrheticus* 10,J.p.158,l.32-p.159,l.3).

[*Hypothesis*: Apollinarius *may* have developed his text-based argument thus: *Zach.*13.7 testifies that a Shepherd/'man' pre-existed and was consubstantially divine. This is a reference to the pre-existing subject/spirit who is 'the author of our salvation' [*Heb.*2.10], i.e. the divine subject who 'goes after the sheep like a shepherd' [*Lk.*15.4/*Mt.*18.12] and who saves us, 'since in him we have redemption through his blood and forgiveness of our trespasses through his flesh' [*Eph.*1.7]. *Eph.*1.7 has soteriological links with *Heb.*2.14-16, which in turn connects with *Heb.*1.3, the text which stands at the end of the soteriological group (Fr.38).]

***Fr.36*:** At the conclusion of Gregory's own exposition on how the Good Shepherd saves by 'acquiring' flesh and blood for providential 'dwelling in our land', he suggests that the whole point of Apollinarius' use of *Eph.*1.7 (and other soteriological texts e.g. *Zach.*13.7) has been to support Apollinarius' claim that **'the flesh does not become acquired by the divinity on account of his well-doing, but belongs essentially to it (συνουσιωμένη) and is of the same stock (σύμφυτος)'.**[46] This fragment therefore, like Fr.34, offers Gregory's (mis)interpretative summary of what he thinks Apollinarius means to say on the basis of his proof texts. It does not report an actual Apollinarian statement.

***Fr.37*:** Having passed over it earlier (Fr.33), Gregory now reports Apollinarius' interpretation of *Zach.*13.7 (see above[47]). Gregory's comments indicate that Apollinarius had linked this text with *Eph.*1.7 and, as suggested above, the text serves to connect the first group of proof texts (Fr.33), which are to do with the eternal divine subject, to the second 'group' (Fr.36), which are to do with the divine Saviour who saves through 'his' flesh and blood. *Zach.*13.7 also leads into Apollinarius' next proof text (*Heb.*1.13), where both these themes are brought together (Fr.38). *Zach.*13.7 also supplies a term (σύμφυλος) whereby Christ the Creator, and the Saviour's pre-existing divinity can both be given more technical definition (Fr.39-41).

***Fr.38*:** In this verbatim fragment Apollinarius quotes from *Heb.*1.1-3.

> **'But by these (words) it is made manifest that the human being himself, who speaks to us the things of the Father is God the Creator of the Ages "the effulgence of (his) glory" the "exact impression (χαρακτὴρ) of his hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως)" in as much as he is God (in very truth) by his own Spirit and not (because) he possesses God in himself as someone else beside himself; the**

[46] L.p.212,ll.24-26.
[47] See pp.348-349, above.

very same (individual) through himself (αὐτὸς ὁ δι' ἑαυτοῦ), that is, through the flesh, has purified the sins of the world.'[48]

This was probably the clinching proof text in this section of the *Apodeixis* (Fr.32-41). It confirms Apollinarius' view that Christ is a fully divine subject (= Spirit), who is Creator and Saviour and therefore pre-exists as such. The text from Hebrews also confirms (and may even be foundational to) Apollinarius' central thesis thus far (Fr.19,22,25,32,38). In keeping with (the first tenet of) this thesis, the divinely uni-subjective/spiritual/intellectual view of Christ can be developed, if Apollinarius desires, using Hebrews' more metaphysical term 'hypostasis'. Apollinarius in Fr.38 does *not* use this text **'as proof that the manhood of God is something eternal'**[49] as Gregory suggests. He uses the text, but to support and clarify his theory that 'the man himself (αὐτὸς)' (i.e. the subject in the human Christ) is 'God the Creator of the Ages' (i.e. the Word), 'who radiates God's glory' (i.e. shares the divine attributes/generic nature), and who is 'the exact impression' of God the Word's hypostasis, because he *is* God the Word by spirit (= hypostasis?), and because he is not another human or divine-human 'he' in whom God is. Nevertheless, and this is what Gregory may have picked up upon, the flesh somehow (by bearing the impress of the divine hypostasis?) is identified with the divine 'himself' by Apollinarius, as the last sentence of Fr.38 indicates.

***Fr.39*:** Gregory reports that Apollinarius, **'mentions the doctrine of Nicaea in which the universal Synod of the fathers pronounced the "*homoousion*"'.**[50]

***Fr.40*:** Gregory reports that Apollinarius offers another interpretation of the technical term 'σύμφυλος', the word which describes the relationship of God the Father and the Shepherd/man in *Zach.*13.7:

'he says that...in the mouth of the Father, the Son is called "of the same stock (σύμφυλον)", that is, naturally united (συμφυῆ) and consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον).'[51]

***Fr.41*:** Gregory then quotes Apollinarius verbatim, offering further elucidation:

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[48] L.p.213,ll.1-6.
[49] L.p.212,ll.30-34.
[50] L.p.213,ll.24-25.
[51] L.p.213,ll.27-29.

'The prophetic Word uses these things to show that he is *homoousios* with God not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit which has been united with flesh.'

Fr.39-41 seem to mark the end of this particular phase of text-based exposition in the *Apodeixis* (Fr.32-41) and they indicate how Apollinarius' original line of argument may have concluded. [*Hypothesis*: Returning to *Zach.*13.7, Apollinarius explained how his account of the divinity of 'the human Christ' based on *Heb.*1.1-3 (Fr.38) fits in with the Nicene '*homoousion*' (Fr.39). As with the introduction of the theme of pre-existence (Fr.32), there may have been an apologetic motive behind this move. (Apollinarius may be reacting to the accusation that he has made Christ's flesh not only pre-existent, but consubstantially divine.) But, in the context of the unfolding exposition of *Apodeixis*, this reference to Christ's consubstantiality was probably intended primarily to confirm the first tenet of Apollinarius' Christological theory. When the Father calls the Son/Shepherd/man 'σύμφυλος', he means '*homoousios*' (Fr.40), and the prophet (Zachariah) says these things to indicate that he (the divine Son/Christ) is fully divine according to his Spirit (= hypostasis?) (as *per* Apollinarius' theory), not according to the flesh (Fr.41).]

Fr.42-47

The next group of fragments indicate a passage of exposition in which Apollinarius turns to a Pauline text [*Phil.*2.6-10] to confirm and clarify the way in which he understands Christ's humanity – not *a* man, but a divine subject, who is enfleshed '*according to the likeness of a man*' (i.e. the second tenet of his Christological thesis, which can be found in the title, and which has been given some definition (Fr.19,22,25)).

***Fr.42*:** Apollinarius' interpretation of *Phil.*2.6-7 allows him to move from the first tenet of his Christological thesis which stresses the pre-existing fully divine subject in Christ (*v.*6) to the second tenet on the nature of Christ's humanity (*v.*7). Mühlenberg agrees with Lietzmann's reconstruction of this verbatim fragment from two shorter units divided by Gregory's comments in *Antirrheticus* 22.[52]

[*42*^{a}] 'Lo! the equality [*v.* 6] with the Father of the same Jesus Christ pre-exists, the likeness (ὁμοιότης) [*v.* 7] with men comes into being afterwards.

[52] Mühlenberg (p.67) re L.p.214,ll.1-4; cf. *Antirrheticus* 22 (J.p.162,ll.10-19).

[*42^{b}*] And what (is) more plain than these things so as (to make evident) that he is not one individual with another (μὴ ἕτερον μεθ'ἑτέρου), a perfect God with a complete man (θεὸν τέλειον μετὰ τελείου ἀνθρώπου)?'

The conclusion (42^{b}) which Apollinarius draws from Paul's words, and the sequence of events they describe, is not as Gregory misunderstands it, viz. that in Christ *both* the Godhead and the manhood are imperfect.[53] Apollinarius concludes, rather, that there is one enduring perfectly divine individual who, after the *kenosis*, is 'together with' (μέτα) a 'human likeness', which is something other (less?) than a complete man. The Philippians passage offers Apollinarius further suggestions as to how this 'likeness' should be understood. In Fr.43-45 Apollinarius draws on the terminology of *Phil.*2.7 to describe the *mode* of the incarnational action by the divine subject and the type of (incomplete) humanity which is the object of this action.[54]

***Fr.43*:** is not a verbatim citation, but Gregory claims to be reporting the terminology employed by Apollinarius in his novel exegesis:

'"He was a man in body (σώματι)," he says, "who wore/bore (φορέσας) the inglorious form (ἄδοξον μορφήν) of human beings." These words are uttered by him of his own invention, not from our (catechetical) teaching.'

The fourfold repetition of 'inglorious form' by Gregory suggests that this *was* Apollinarius' original expression to denote Christ's humanity, and the twice repeated verb, φορέω, may be the one which Apollinarius employed to speak of the incarnation – or ὑπέρχομαι, its near equivalent.[55]

***Fr.44*:** Gregory reports that Apollinarius says that **'the Lord appeared in servile form (ἐν δουλικῷ ... σχήματι)'**. In *Phil.*2.7 Paul talks about Christ taking the form of a servant (μορφὴν δούλου) and being found in frame (σχήματι) as man. If Gregory's report is accurate, Apollinarius appears to have reversed the Pauline terms in Fr.43/44 indicating that he regards them as semantic equivalents denoting what constitutes the 'human likeness' taken /worn by the divine subject.

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[53] *Antirrheticus* 22 (J.p.163,ll.7-13).
[54] *Phil.*2.7 may be foundational to the Christological thesis expounded in *Apodeixis*; cf. the title of the work.
[55] L.p.214,ll.18-26. Gregory dislikes the novelty of the Apollinarian formula 'inglorious form', but Apollinarius has probably derived it from scripture: 'form' comes from *Phil.*2.7 and 'inglorious' from reversing the attribute which applies to the divine spirit on the authority of *Heb.*1.3(cf.Fr.38). See L.p.214,ll.19-21.

***Fr.45*:** Mühlenberg argues *contra* Lietzmann that this fragment is not verbatim. Mühlenberg's argument is unconvincing.[56] The statement plainly arises from the Pauline language of *Phil.*2.7 ('found in form as a man (ὡς ἄνθρωπος)') and seems completely germane to the anti-psilanthropist thesis which Apollinarius has been developing from the title of this work onwards. **'Not a man, but like a man (ὡς ἄνθρωπος) since he is not consubstantial with a man according to the most dominant element (τὸ κυριώτατον).'**[57] Here the 'likeness' is explained not in terms of sameness (e.g. of carnal form assumed or spirit-enfleshed structure), but in terms of non-identicality. Although this may seem at odds with Apollinarius' opening proposition ('Certainly a man' (Fr.17)), this from the outset was balanced by the counterpoint '*not* a man from the earth', and now, in the light of the trichotomic analysis and 1 *Cor.*15.45-47 (Fr.24-31), this can be given more precision: he is not the same as *a* man because his (divine) κυριώτατον (= νοῦς?) is essentially different from the human equivalent.

***Fr.46, 47*:** In these fragments Apollinarius offers exegesis of *Phil.*2.8-9. Given that Phil.2.6-7 attests a divine subject taking on a human 'likeness'/'form' 'as man' (but not a man), Apollinarius needs to explain to whom or what Christ's abasement (ταπεινόω), even so far as death on the cross (*v.*8), and exaltation (ὑπερυψόω) (*v.*9) should be predicated. Gregory sees a contrast between an Apollinarian statement which he reports in ***Fr.46*, 'he says that he abased himself in flesh, but that he was exalted by God in divine exaltation'**[58], and a verbatim statement wherein Apollinarius approaches 'orthodox' doctrine: **'He is glorified as a man who ascends from ignominy. But he possesses the glory before the world as God who pre-exists the ages' *(Fr.47)*.**[59] If we look at the two statements, Apollinarius' position is much more consistent than Gregory's interpretive comments suggest. Abasement and exaltation (Fr.46), glorification and ascension out of ignominy (Fr.47) are all predicated to the same (divine?) masculine subject. In Fr.46 Apollinarius does *not* say as Gregory suggests **'the flesh has been humbled ... the divinity**

[56] Mühlenberg, p.68: 'There is no way this fragment can be a genuine quotation even if the style could lead one to suppose it is a fragment of one of Apollinarius' sentences. It is a polemical conclusion drawn by Gregory. For Gregory's assertion is purposely one-sided to enable the reproach of Docetism.' *Contra Mühlenberg*: The fragment is too short to make judgements about 'style'. The content of the fragment fully coheres with Apollinarius' interpretation of *Phil.*2.6-10 (and the Pauline terminology) and the Christological theory he is developing. At the end of his counter-argument, Gregory recapitulates verbatim part of Fr.45; this indicates that he is citing a specific Apollinarian formula. See *Antirrheticus* 23 (J.p.165,ll.25-26=L.p.214,ll.30-31; cf.J.p.165,ll.8-9).
[57] L.p.214,ll.28-29.
[58] L.p.214,ll.32-33.
[59] L.p.215,ll.3-5.

has been exalted'.[60] There are some grounds for Gregory's confusion because Apollinarius makes distinctions between what applies 'in flesh'/'as man' and what applies 'in divinity'/'as God', which seems to indicate divisive attribution between flesh/a man and divinity/God, and yet he also predicates all attributes to the same (divine) subject.

Fr. 48 ff.

Following Lietzmann, who noticed parallels between Fr.14 and Fr.48 wherein Apollinarius compares those who do not accept the incarnation of God (i.e. his own incarnational doctrine) with Jews and Greeks, Mühlenberg argues that Gregory's comments in the environs of Fr.48 (see *Antirrheticus* 24) indicate the beginning of the second 'Main Section (*Hauptteil*) B' of the *Apodeixis*. Mühlenberg is right in pointing to the terminological parallel and to the change in polemical tone, but perhaps unjustified in making a major structural division of the *Apodeixis* on this basis alone. There are perhaps stronger grounds for seeing the *Apodeixis* as a more singular and cohesive piece of exposition; the more directly polemical tone which enters at Fr.48ff. seems to indicate the beginning of a new series of expository steps (in the service of the same thesis), but not the beginning of a second 'part'.[61] The 'directness' of the polemic from Fr.48 onward may also be to do with

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[60] L.p.215,ll.1-2.

[61] *Mühlenberg*, pp.77-78.*Contra*: (i) 'τῷ λόγῳ' need not denote the entire treatise as Mühlenberg's translation suggests: '"Now *in his book* he runs around the pure doctrine as a turning post and again embarks upon the course of error"' (see J.p.166,ll.17-19). Gregory seems to be referring to *a more localised departure* in what Apollinarius says; he is not discussing the structure of the book. At the beginning of *Antirrheticus* 24, Gregory notes that Apollinarius' exegesis of *Phil.*2.10 approaches his own orthodox interpretation (J.p.166,ll.12-17); he then reports that Apollinarius *re*-embarks on a long passage of erroneous teaching prefaced with polemical abuse. When Gregory speaks of Apollinarius' 're-embarkation' (ἐπανατρέχει) he denotes the shift from orthodox exegesis (in Fr.47) to the heretical exposition, which follows next. Gregory's comments in Fr.48 offer a review/preview of the errors to which Apollinarius returns, but he does not appear to preview *the rest of the book* (i.e.'Main Section B'). The reference to the glorification of the crucified one (L.p.215,ll.26-27) may still be an allusion to Apollinarius' exegesis of *Phil.*2(v.12?), and the reference to 'I myself work' (L.p.215,l.30) looks no further ahead than Fr.59. The νοῦς ἔνσαρκος formula mentioned by Gregory twice in the Fr.48 review/preview does not feature in a verbatim fragment until Fr.69, but it is implicit (and may have already been used) in the pre-Fr.48 exposition (cf.Fr.19,25,31,45). (ii) There is evidence of a cohesiveness in Apollinarius' exposition that is more suggestive of a singular argument which bridges the hypothetical 'two part' division at Fr.48. E.g. In Fr.33 Apollinarius cites *Zach.*13.7 and *Col.*1.17 as two of his proof texts that the subject/spirit in Christ is divine. In Fr.40-41 Apollinarius recapitulates *Zach.*13.7 to explain the sense in which Christ is σύμφυτος/ὁμοούσιος (=σύμφυλος in Gregory's report Fr.40) with the Father. In Fr.55, according to Gregory's report, he further consolidates the case for his thesis by arguing polemically that those who disagree with his theory 'deny the truths of the faith' and again he returns to a Fr.33 proof text and the terminology of *Zach.*13.7: 'He says that, unless we say that that thing (ἐκεῖνο=spirit?) pre-exists the birth from earth and "was before al things" (*Col.*1.17) we are denying that it is akin (σύμφυλον) to God.' (L.p.217,ll.9-12) These connections suggest a singular exposition emerging in interlinked stages, rather than one divided into two (analogous?) parts. (iii) Mühlenberg makes an artificial distinction between the 'general complaint' against 'the non-Christian idea of ... God's inability to suffer' (Fr.14) and the (more specific) complaint against those

Gregory's changing perception of whom Apollinarius is opposing with his Christological (counter-)thesis, as Gregory gets deeper into the *Apodeixis*, becoming more familiar with Apollinarius' doctrine and more sympathetic to the type of Christology Apollinarius opposes.

***Fr.48*:** Of the 'reported' type of Apollinarian statements this should be considered as one of the less reliable because it consists mainly of Gregory's estimate of the 'heretical vomit' (re)produced by Apollinarius. The dogmatic content of Fr.48 is a *review/preview* of Apollinarius' novel doctrine *as Gregory understands it*:

> **'...moulding the eternal flesh round Christ...(he says)...that the son, being a mind enfleshed, has been brought forth from a woman, not becoming flesh in the virgin but having passed through (διεξελθόντα) transiently; one such as he existed before the ages and the same was manifested – and what appeared was fleshly God (σάρκικον ... θεὸν) or as he calls it "enfleshed mind", etc'.**[62]

Gregory's comments are useful in so far as they report the renewed polemical turn taken by Apollinarius' exposition at this point in the *Apodeixis* and identify a key technical formula – νοῦς ἔνσαρκος – which features in the exposition and proofs which follow.

Fr.49-58

This group of fragments belongs to an openly polemical section of the *Apodeixis* aimed at 'those who do not believe in the form of faith' or, as Gregory puts it, 'we who do not accept his [sc. Apollinarius'] reinvented fable'.[63] Apollinarius brings a general charge against his opponents (Fr.49,51,52) and offers his own counter-position (Fr.50,53). Apollinarius then makes a more technical accusation and brings a more technical picture of his own doctrine into view (Fr.54,55). Apollinarius urges his opponents to accept his thesis by asking three rhetorical questions (Fr.56-58).

***Fr.49,51,52*:** In these three verbatim statements Apollinarius accuses his opponents of being like disbelieving Jews and Greeks (Fr.49) because they will not admit/are ashamed of the fact, **'that God was born of a woman and crucified by the Jews' (*Fr. 49/52*).**[64] He

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who 'attack the idea of Jesus as the incarnated God'(Fr.48). The attack in Fr.14 is aimed *primarily* at those who deny the divine incarnation as well: 'the faithless and heretics...(who say) ...that *it is not possible for God to become man and* come into contact with sufferings'(L.p.208,ll.30-32).

[62] L.p.215,ll.20-31.

[63] L.p.216,ll.12-14.

[64] L.p.216,ll.1-3,14-16.

implicates his opponents by association with the false Christological view held by Greeks and Jews **'that he who was brought forth is "a divinized man (ἄνθρωπον ἔνθεον)" just as Elijah' (*Fr.51*).**[65]

***Fr.50,53*:** Apollinarius' alternative to making a divinized man the subject of Christ's birth and sufferings is reported by Gregory. In spite of Gregory's statement of intention to set out what was actually said, there is reason to believe that his two paraphrases are (mis)interpretations of Apollinarius' words rather than reliable reports:

> **'...he says, "But God, being enfleshed before the ages, after this, was brought forth through a woman, and came with a view to experiencing sufferings according to natural necessity (κατὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκην)"' (*Fr. 50*); '...and he says that God was enfleshed at the beginning and thus that in the last days *the visible body*, which was brought forth and little by little increased by additions through human food, *is that* which was before all existing things and (that which) made human beings and the whole creation both visible and touchable, and is that which has sensory perception of suffering and in distress accepts the experience of death' (*Fr. 53*).**[66]

***Fr.54,55*:** According to Gregory's report, Apollinarius' accusation against his opponents shifts from the more general charge of psilanthropism to more specific charges which stem from their denial of his precise Christological theory e.g.:

> (i) **'he says that we say that he who was crucified had nothing divine in his own nature, not even that very principle element (τὸ κυριώτατον) which is Spirit' (*Fr. 54*);**[67] (ii) **'(other) things ... by which he imagines that those who hold a different opinion from his own have denied the truths of the faith';**[68] (iii) **'he says that unless we say that that thing (ἐκεῖνο = τὸ κυριώτατον/πνεῦμα (?)) pre-existed its birth on earth and was before all things, we are denying that it is akin (σύμφυλον) to God' (*Fr.55*).**[69]

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[65] L.p.216,ll.9-11.

[66] Given what Apollinarius has argued (Fr.32-47), it seems unlikely that Apollinarius would then declare that 'God enfleshed' existed in the beginning, or that his (divine) body created all other (bodily) things. The way in which Gregory introduces Fr.50 indicates he has his own polemical preconceptions about what Apollinarius means to say: 'since he desires that the same flesh be divine...' (L.p.216,ll.4-5). Fr.53 seems to be even more the work of Gregory – drawing out the implications of Apollinarius' thesis that the incarnate one pre-existed (in Gregory's interpretation flesh and all) *ad absurdum*. If Dorner's assessment of Apollinarian Christology is correct, then Apollinarius may have actually said, as Gregory reports, 'that God incarnate/who suffers' pre-existed not only *qua* divine spirit, but in the sense that being incarnate was an eternal potentiality in the nature of the Logos.

[67] L.p.216,ll.30-31.

[68] L.p.217,ll.6-7.

[69] L.p.217,ll.9-11.

These technical criticisms refer back to earlier Christological conclusions drawn by Apollinarius based on scripture (cf. Fr.45 (*Phil.*2.7), Fr.40-41 (*Zach.*13.7)). Failure to recognise Christ's true divinity is being equated with failure to accept Apollinarius' T. theory as expounded (Fr.19-47).

***Fr.56,57,58*:** Gregory quotes three rhetorical questions in which Apollinarius asks who (τίς;) is the subject in the earthly Christ? These seem designed to remind Apollinarius' opponents that the subject in Christ exhibited divine holiness, wisdom and authority from the moment of his birth and so must be divine:

> **'For who is the Holy One from birth?' (*Fr.56*); 'Who is wise without being taught?' (*Fr.57*); 'Who does divine works by his own authority/means/power (ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ)?' (*Fr.58*).**[70]

The last question may indicate that Apollinarius is linking the divine subjectivity (= spirit, νοῦς, τὸ κυριώτατον) with *volitional autonomy*.

Fr.59-62

In these fragments Apollinarius attempts both to equate and draw distinctions between the way in which God and Christ (God enfleshed) act with divine authority, with the help of four Johanine texts: *Jn.*5.17 (Fr.59); *Jn.*5.21 (Fr.60); *Jn.*10.18 (Fr.61); *Jn.*12.24 (Fr.62). The final three gospel texts refer to Christ's saving work/death-resurrection and so these fragments reveal links between Apollinarius' Christological thesis and conceptions(s) of salvation.

Fr.59,60*:** In these two verbatim statements, Apollinarius refers to *Jn.*5.17 and *Jn.*5.21 to show that the gospel draws a distinction (διαίρεσις) between the (divine) operation (ἐνέργεια) of God and the (divine) operation of the earthly Christ; **'distinguishing his operation according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), but making it equal according to the spirit (κατὰ πνεῦμα)',** is the interpretative comment which Apollinarius appends to Christ's words in John: 'My Father is working and I also am working' ***(Fr.59).[71] The next proof text suggests distinction and equality of (divine) operation/power *and* will.

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[70] L.p.217,ll.17-23. In Gregory's view the questions are designed **'to furnish (the view) that the flesh is the Godhead'.**

[71] L.p.217,ll.30-33.

'For as the Father raises the dead and makes alive, so also the Son makes alive those he wills (θέλει)' [*Jn.*5.21].

> **'He himself further possesses equality in power (δυνάμει) and distinction of operation (τῆς ἐνεργείας διαίρεσιν) according to the flesh, according to which ... he did not make all alive, but some whom he desired (ἠθέλησεν)' (*Fr.60*).**[72]

The sense of equality 'κατὰ πνεῦμα' in Fr.59 seems relatively straightforward: Apollinarius is pointing to the co-equally divine element (spirit) shared by God and Christ. The sense of the ubiquitous phrase 'κατὰ σάρκα', here used to explain distinction rather than unity, seems more ambiguous. It seems unlikely that Apollinarius is making a simple division and referring to the carnal energy principle in Christ (ψυχή). He may (in the case of κατὰ σὰρκα if *not* κατὰ πνεῦμα) be speaking modally of the 'carnal' subject in Christ, meaning the divine subject (πνεῦμα) operating in its fleshly form. No wonder Gregory is puzzled: **'What does he mean by this?'; 'If anyone has power for the advocacy of intelligent things let him explain what he means.'**[73]

Fr.61-62*:** Apollinarius' usage of *Jn.*10.18 and *Jn.*12.24 is hinted at only by Gregorian report. ***Fr.61 indicates that Apollinarius used the gospel statement, **'No one takes away my soul/life (ψυχή) from me, I have the authority (ἐξουσίαν) to set it down, and I have the authority to raise it up'**[74], to confirm the divine *equality* of God and Christ 'to do divine works ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ' (cf. Fr.58). The theme of (saving) death and self-resurrection probably leads into Apollinarius' next text-based point, but Gregory chooses not to give his exegesis of *Jn.*12.24: **'What he says about the seed that dies and thus grows up again with many more seeds ... I will willingly omit' (*Fr.62*).**[75] It seems likely that Apollinarius introduced *Jn.*12.24 to confirm and elaborate upon the soteriological implications of *Jn.*10.18.

[*Hypothesis*: Apollinarius may have drawn a connection like this: Christ as a divine subject has the authority/volitional power to lay down his own life (ψυχή and body) and raise it up again (Fr.61 re *Jn.*10.18); this is why we are saved, because the divine subject raised up his body and ψυχή (something no human subject could do) as the grain of wheat

[72] L.p.218,ll.3-5.
[73] L.p.217,l.29,l.33-p.218, l.2.
[74] L.p.218,ll.10-12.
[75] L.p.218,ll.13-15.

which dies and raises up the ear of corn and, thus, he raised up many other souls and bodies. Apollinarius may have offered an explanation of *how* Christ's death/resurrection was accomplished and saves us on the basis of a *trichotomic* explanation of Christ's death *vis-à-vis* ordinary human death, for this would explain why Gregory enters upon a discussion as to whether or not the (human) soul dies after reporting Fr.62.[76]]

Fr.63-65

In this group of fragments Apollinarius considers texts (the proof texts of his opponents?) which appear to give *human* attributes to Christ: a human will [*Mt.*26.39]; a human temporality [2 *Cor.*5.16]; and human appetites [*Mt.*11.19]. Apollinarius' nuanced explanations of the first and third texts are not as strictly monothelite as we might have expected given his earlier emphasis on the one divine subject, spirit, νοῦς, τὸ κυριώτατον in Christ.

Lietzmann reconstructs the verbatim ***Fr.63*** from a main statement (63^a) which is quoted more than once in *Antirrheticus* 31, 32 and a short closing phrase (63^b) which is appended to part of this in *Antirrheticus* 33.[77]

Fr.63^a is in line with the thesis which Apollinarius has maintained and developed polemically against his opponents' divinized man position since Fr.49. The subject = τὸ κυριώτατον = (volitional) ἐξουσία = *will* in Christ is divine. Thus Apollinarius attacks those who do not recognise this when they interpret *Mt.*26.39 (and understand 'not mine but thine' as a reference to the will of a *man*).

> **'But they are thrown into the confusion of the unbelievers and they do not remember that this will was said to belong not to the man of earth as they suppose, but to God who descended from heaven.'**[78]

Fr.63^b is not given by Gregory until *Antirrheticus* 33 because it suits his reply to attack 63^a first. The additional phrase comes as quite a surprise given the monenergetic nature of Apollinarius' thesis in the D. documents and the apparently monothelite way in which the T. thesis has been expounded. 63^b seems to indicate that Apollinarius, in the face of *Mt.*26.39, admits that God has not only taken on flesh 'not without a soul' (Fr.22), but

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[76] See *Antirrheticus* 30(J.p.178,l.7-p.179,l.7).
[77] See *Antirrheticus* 31(J.p.179,ll.8-9,14-17); *Antirrheticus* 32(J.p.180,ll.8-11); *Antirrheticus* 33(J.p.182,ll.6-9).
[78] L.p.218,ll.20-23.

that it has some sort of human will (the will of the flesh?) which conforms itself or is conformed to the descending divine will: '**...this will was said to belong ... to God who descended from heaven** ***as that which has been taken into a union with him*** (τὸ [sc. θέλημα] εἰς ἕνωσιν αὐτοῦ προσειλημμένον)'.[79]

***Fr.64*:** At this point Apollinarius may have offered an equally 'novel' exegesis of 2 *Cor.*5.16, which is quoted by Gregory shortly after the Apollinarian statement, **'some people are falsifying the Apostolic doctrine'**.[80] We can only guess why Apollinarius might have turned to this text: 'We, who once knew Christ according to the flesh, know him thus no longer.' It may have been to support and explain the κατὰ σάρκα formula which he has used to interpret the Johanine texts (cf. Fr.59, 60), and it may have been used in connection with the exegesis of *Mt.*26.39. It seems, perhaps, more likely that it is Gregory's proof text introduced to rubbish Apollinarius' thesis (as Gregory understands it) that there is a God who is fleshly at all times, before and after the economy. This is the way Gregory uses 2 *Cor.*5.16 in *Antirrheticus* 53.[81]

***Fr.65*:** If Gregory's report is to be believed, Apollinarius seems to have admitted in response to *Mt.*11.19 ('the Son of Man came eating and drinking') that, in some sense, Christ was subject to the appetites/(animal) necessities of a man: **'these things [sc. eating and drinking] are necessary (ἀναγκαῖα) on account of the man'**.[82] Again we can only speculate as to what Apollinarius really said. But in response to this problematic text he may again have offered a divisive exegesis even to the extent of using the term ἄνθρωπος: the eating and drinking do not apply directly to the divine subject (this is why the Jews 'blaspheme' when they call him 'glutton', etc.) – these are carnal necessities which belong to the human form (flesh not without a ψυχή), which he has taken-on-in-addition.

Fr.66-69

These fragments come from a passage of the *Apodeixis* wherein Apollinarius appears to be giving his incarnational theory more precise definition by pointing out its typological difference from the false view of his opponents, by recapitulating its two main ideas, and by introducing a new technical formula.

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[79] L.p.218,ll.22-24, (L.p.219, ll.6-7).
[80] L.p.219,ll.32-33; [2 Cor.5.16] see *Antirrheticus* 34 (J.p.183,ll.9-13).
[81] See, J.p.222,l.25-p.223, l.1.
[82] L.p.219,l.36.

***Fr.66*:** Midway through *Antirrheticus* 34, Gregory's comments indicate that Apollinarius leaves behind his controversial exegesis of the 'difficult' texts and sets about advocating the idea which has come to be regarded as the keynote of his 'heretical' theory.

> 'Next, he says that he who appeared corporeally was superior (κρείττονα) to a human nature, but again shows him to be inferior (καταδεέστερον) to men, mutilated (ἠκρωτηριασμένον) by that which is superior. [Lietzmann, Fr.66 →] **For in us the thing which is held above other things (τὸ ὑπερέχον) is the intelligence (ἡ διάνοια), which he says the flesh lacked in which God was made manifest, and he affirms this clearly on the basis of (legalistic) arguments (διὰ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἀγώνων) about which, lest someone should consider the careful scrutiny of these impious things to have been omitted, we will with a few words (δι' ὀλίγων) run over what is said.'**[83]

Mühlenberg seems correct in suggesting that Gregory's report indicates the beginning of a new section of the *Apodeixis*. Mühlenberg is less convincing in his opinion that this is the first time that the 'second theme' of the incomplete humanity has featured since Fr.48.[84] Fr.66 may not correspond to anything which Apollinarius actually said immediately after Fr.65 in the *Apodeixis*: it is more likely that it is a Gregorian preview/interpretation of what comes next in the Apollinarian treatise. Nevertheless, it is possible that Apollinarius began the new section with a proposition not unlike the first sentence of Fr.66, for this would seem to follow on from what has been established Fr.47-65 (viz. that in Christ the subject/chief element/will is divine (Fr.49-62) and yet the flesh has some sort of will and animal appetites (Fr.63-65), and *thus* the chief element = intelligence in Christ is divine, and *therefore* the human flesh (may have a will and appetites, but) lacks intelligence). When Gregory speaks of the legalistic arguments introduced by Apollinarius in support of this proposition it is difficult to tell how far Gregory is looking ahead. He may be looking forward to the syllogistic proofs which feature later (Fr.70-80). But Gregory does speak of a *brief* summary of Apollinarius' justifying arguments. If this is the case then he may only be previewing the part of the *Apodeixis* which he discusses in the rest of *Antirrheticus* 34-35 (i.e. Fr.67-69). If this is the case, then it would seem from those fragments that Apollinarius (initially) justified his proposition that the flesh of Christ lacked

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[83] *Antirrheticus* 34 (J.p.183,ll.22-29 and L.p.220,ll.1-5).

[84] See Mühlenberg, p.81. *Contra*: The 'second theme' seems to be the implied compliment of the 'first theme' (viz. the superiority/divinity of τὸ κυριώτατον in Christ) since Fr.49, as it is implicit in the main thesis of the *Apodeixis* from the onset (cf. Fr.19,22[b],25,31,38,41,42).

intelligence on the grounds that it cohered with a typologically correct conception of the incarnational union as against the typologically false view which lies behind his opponents' thinking: **'...he puts forward against us a statement of our wrongdoing saying that they suppose that a union of flesh and an assumption/taking on (πρόσληψιν) of a man are the same'.**[85]

Fr.67 may be non-verbatim, but its content suggests that it is quite close to what Apollinarius actually said next. Gregory's counter-argument to Apollinarius' 'statement of wrongdoing' in Fr.66 fails to grasp completely the point. Apollinarius is not just contrasting two types of incarnational action (ἕνωσις ν πρόσληψις), but two types of incarnational action-and-object, and Fr.67 draws out the difference of the two incarnational conceptions when it comes to the object:

> **'He declares that we speak of two persons, (namely) God and the man taken-on (προσληφθέντα) by God. But he says that he ... deems that the one enfleshed is none other than the incorporeal one (ἀσώματον), but the same one according to a likeness (καθ'ὁμοίωσιν) of our life in flesh.'**[86]

This reported fragment rings true as something close to an Apollinarian statement. Not only does it emphasise that the divine subject in Christ is *per se incorporeal*, but it recapitulates the two main tenets of Apollinarius' earlier exposition: God is the only subject (= person (?)) involved in the incarnation (therefore not two persons); his union with flesh involves being 'in flesh' and taking-on-in-addition not a man, but a 'likeness' to us/man (cf. the title of the *Apodeixis* which shares the same formula as Fr.67).

Fr.68: This reported fragment, which follows shortly afterwards, affirms that in the type of doctrine advocated by Apollinarius there is only one (divine) person. The continuity of this (incorporeal) person is explained by recapitulating the anthropological model employed earlier. **'But he says there is thus one (person) (τὸ ἓν) as each of us is (one person) out of (ἐκ) spirit and soul and body.'**[87] It seems surprising that Apollinarius should reintroduce this analysis of a human individual/person quite so bluntly (i.e. 'out of' three quasi-parts) when trying to show the enduring singularity of the simple divine person. Gregory's counter-argument finds this aspect of Fr.68 useful and Gregory may be

[85] L.p.220,ll.5-8.
[86] L.p.220,ll.12-16.
[87] L.p.220,ll.19-20.

responsible for recapitulating the Apollinarius T. analysis here.[88] Also no evidence remains in the *Antirrheticus* as to how the trichotomic explanation of the incarnational unity in Fr.68 (?) then moved into the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος explanation in Fr.69. Whilst the anthropological model in Fr.69 is not incompatible with the T. model (of Fr.68?), it is actually a (new) type of dichotomy.

Fr.69 would perhaps follow on from Fr.67 more smoothly without Fr.68. This is a verbatim citation from the *Apodeixis* in the opinion of Lietzmann and Mühlenberg as seems confirmed by Gregory's recapitulation and attention to its precise form of words. **'For (he says) he would not be made in the likeness of man, unless he happened, exactly as a man (καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος) to be a mind enfleshed (νοῦς ἔνσαρκος).'**[89] Here, perhaps, is the *formula* by which Apollinarius is able to clinch his explanation of the incarnation as a union with flesh (Fr.67): a divinely initiated action ('the divine enfleshment') in which a divine subject, person, will, intelligence = mind (i.e. God) takes on (not a man/human person but) a 'human likeness', so that he is 'exactly as a man', structurally and in terms of the carnal form which he possesses/wears. The formula is in Mühlenberg's eyes the defining formula of the *Apodeixis* (and indeed Apollinarius' Christological thinking elsewhere).[90] It is certainly the case that this formula seems to be implied and anticipated by much of Apollinarius' earlier exposition and is trailed by Gregory in Fr.48.

Fr.70-76[a]

This group of fragments belongs to a part of the *Apodeixis* in which Apollinarius offers several formal arguments in support of his doctrine. Gregory refers to these as attempted proofs (ἐπιχείρημα) and syllogisms (συλλογισμός), and he dismantles them into premises (πρότασις), consequences (ἀκολυθία), and conclusions (συμπέρασμα) in order to expose their fallacy. As a result, the fragments which survive are a collection of verbatim propositions and deductions, but we cannot be sure of the original form, number, or logic of the Apollinarian arguments to which they belonged. Lietzmann identifies the longest

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[88] Gregory argues that Apollinarius' doctrine is incoherent because he tries to preserve the singularity (and simple nature) of the divine person when enfleshed (and therefore composite) by introducing a threefold division (see, J.p.185,ll.6-12). Gregory goes on to argue that Apollinarius' trichotomic analysis is novel and non-scriptural. Paul provides authority for the D. analysis preferred by Gregory: man is constituted from a *rational* soul and body. If the T. analysis does not even apply to man, how can it apply to God? (*Antirrheticus* 35, J.p.185,l.13-p.186,l.20).

[89] L.p.220,ll.23-25,cf.ll.26-27.Mühlenberg, p.69.

[90] E.g. Mühlenberg, pp.215-230.

versions of Fr.71 and 76 as the original sayings and reconstructs Fr.71, but the water has been left very cloudy by Gregory.[91] According to the comments of Gregory which preface Fr.70[a] the purpose of these formal arguments is, **'jointly to compel us towards the acceptance that the only begotten God is mind enfleshed'**[92] (i.e. to persuade us that Christ, understood as God himself incarnate, *must* be the divine mind enfleshed). If we look at the five (?) arguments that follow this seems to be the sole purpose of the first three found in Fr.70, 71, 72-73.

Fr.70 [*First Argument* – for Christ as (divine) νοῦς ἔνσορκος]: **'Unless the Lord is (a) mind enfleshed, wisdom would be illuminating the mind of a human being. But this wisdom is in all human beings also. And if so, the coming of Christ was not the visitation (ἐπιδημία) of God, but the birth of a man.'**[93]

Fr.71 [*Second Argument* – for Christ as νοῦς ἔνσορκος]: **'If the Word has not become (a) mind enfleshed, but was wisdom in the mind [i.e. of a man], (then) the Lord did not come down (κατέβη) nor empty himself (ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν).'**[94]

Both proofs argue that Christ must be (divine) mind enfleshed to preserve the *uniqueness of the incarnation as a divine action* (a visitation, a descent, a *kenosis*). Both proofs beg the question in their opening premise.

Fr.72-73 [*Third Argument* – for Christ as (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος]: **'Consequently he was indeed a man, for a man is a mind in flesh according to Paul' *(Fr.72)*; 'Since he was a man...and this man of clay was also a heavenly man' *(Fr.73).***[95] Gregory tells us that this argument (Fr.72) has **'the same premises'** (i.e. the Lord must be νοῦς ἔσαρκος and not a man...) as those which preceded it.[96] Gregory tells us that Apollinarius **'adds another thought'** to Fr.72, namely Fr.73.[97] The *Third Argument* is therefore anthropological: Christ must be νοῦς ἔνσαρκος because it explains his (special)

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[91] Fr.74 is the longest surviving verbatim citation of the *Apodeixis*, but Gregory admits that he has preserved just the *protasis* and the conclusion, leaving out the intervening 'rubbish'! (L.p.222,ll.3-5). According to Gregory the first part of Fr.76 (76[a]) (L.p.222,ll.25-27 = J.p.193,ll.6-11, *Antirrheticus* 39) is a 'conclusion' – to the argument which went before (?). Gregory then reports another argument (Fr.81[b]) (L.p.224,ll.15-19 = J.p.194,ll.2-6, *Antirrheticus* 39), which Lietzmann regards as more germane to a later argument (Fr.81) (J.p.199,ll.17-20 in *Antirrheticus* 42), before going back to the rest of Fr.76 for which 76[a] provides not the conclusion, but the opening proposition (L.p.223,ll.1-2 = J.p.195,ll.16-21, *Antirrheticus* 40).
[92] L.p.220,ll.33-34.
[93] L.p.220,ll.28-31.
[94] L.p.221,ll.14-15.
[95] L.p.221,ll.22-23, ll.31-32.
[96] L.p.221,ll.20-21.
[97] L.p.221,l.30.

manhood – it allows him to be (as) a man in structure, but also God because his mind is from heaven.

The next argument seems to have a slightly broader agenda. It seeks to prove that Christ must be (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος and also *cannot include a human νοῦς* for soteriological reasons.

Fr.74 [The *Fourth Argument* for Christ as (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, without a human mind]: **'If together with God who is (a) mind, also a human mind was in Christ – then the work of the enfleshment is not accomplished in him.'** Gregory identifies this as the *protasis* and admits to missing out the middle of the argument.[98] What follows is the 'conclusion'. But it seems from this that Apollinarius argued (in the middle of his proof) that the human mind needs to be left out of the equation because it is incapable of operating flesh in a way that looses itself from sin, and because its eventual participation in this 'loosing' is dependent upon it not being compelled by the divine mind.

> **'But if the work of the enfleshment is not accomplished in a self-moved (αὐτοκινήτῳ) [i.e. human] mind and not under the compulsion of necessity, the work is accomplished in flesh which is moved by another (ἑτεροκινήτῳ) and operated by the divine mind, which work is the loosing from sin. But the self-moved mind in us participates in the loosing so far as it identifies/reconciles/assimilates (οἰκειοῖ) itself with Christ.'**[99]

***Fr.75*:** Having expressed incomprehension at Apollinarius' conclusion in Fr.74, Gregory introduces Fr.75 as 'the next words in the discourse'. The argument offered in Fr.75 is to do with *training* and may have some connection with the last thought in the soteriological argument of Fr.74, but it seems more probable that it constitutes a *Fifth Argument*[100] (for Christ as a (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος without a human mind). **'If one**

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[98] L.p.222,ll.2-8.
[99] L.p.222,ll.8-12.
[100] Mühlenberg (pp.82-84) believes that this proof is a 'continuation' of the soteriological argument in Fr.74. 'It says that a human understanding could not have brought about the works of salvation since it would only attain sinlessness through moral practice and no one claimed this about Jesus: it came naturally to him.' *Contra Mühlenberg*: Although 'ἄσκησις' is a term which suggests the development of moral as well as intellectual understanding, Mühlenberg's interpretation is too soteriologically suggestive on this basis alone. It seems more likely that the argument in Fr.75 constitutes a self-contained proof that Christ lacks a human mind, which refers to the unlearned wisdom/knowledge of the earthly Christ (cf. the rhetorical question in Fr.57 re *Jn.*17.5).

(mind) attains more than another this comes about through "training" (δι' ἄσκησιν). But there is not training in Christ. There is not therefore a human mind (in Christ).'[101]

***Fr.76[a]*:** According to Gregory the first part of Fr.76 was then offered as a 'conclusion' (– to the five formal proofs which precede it (?)).[102]

> **'But let this attempted proof be silenced most of all because of what is appended – (namely) the conclusion supplied by him which holds thus according to the (exact) form of words: "Therefore the human race is not saved by the assumption (ἀναλήψεως) of a mind or a whole man, but the taking-on-in-addition (προσλήψεως) of flesh." This being the conclusion.'**[103]

This serves as a fitting grand (?) conclusion not only because it reinforces the point made by the *Fourth* and *Fifth Arguments* (Fr.74,75) that there was not a human mind in Christ, but because it goes back to the typological distinction, which, according to Gregory's report, Apollinarius drew at the beginning of the section preceding the formal proofs: **'he puts forward as a wrongdoing such a statement against us saying that they suppose that a union (ἕνωσις) of flesh and a taking-on-in-addition of a man (πρόσληψις) are the same' (*Fr.66*).**[104] Apollinarius seems to have made a terminological shift using 'πρόσληψις' in Fr.76 to define his own doctrine of the incarnation rather than the false type he opposes. This shift does not amount to Fr.66 and Fr.76[a] being completely inconsistent with one another.

In Fr.76[a] Apollinarius is still talking about *soteriology* and the fuller version of Fr.76, which Gregory cites later on, gives us more insight into the type of soteriological thinking which lies behind the (soteriological) *Fourth Argument* (Fr.74) used to justify the doctrine of Christ as (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος. Nevertheless, the other four formal arguments in this section of the *Apodeixis* are *not*, it seems, driven primarily by soteriology, but by the two tenets of Apollinarius' *Christological* theory. The incarnation is a divine action with a divine subject (*First, Second, Fifth Arguments*) in which the heavenly subject becomes like a

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[101] L.p.222,ll.17-19.
[102] In Mühlenberg's view (p.83) Fr.76 is the conclusion of another syllogistic proof which Apollinarius has left out because 'the hypothesis and middle term contained nothing Gregory considered worthy of contradicting'. *Contra Mühlenberg*: The comments in the *Antirrheticus* after Fr.75 suggest that Apollinarius moved on from the *Fifth Argument* to do with training to offer Fr.76, either as a grand conclusion to his syllogistic proofs (Fr.70ff.), or as a conclusion to the section Fr.66ff., or (possibly) as a conclusion to the soteriological *Fourth Argument* (Fr.74) (see, *Antirrheticus* 38-39, J.p.192,l.28-p.193,l.8 and L.p.222,ll.25-27).
[103] L.p.222,ll.25-28.
[104] L.p.220,ll.5-8.

man (*Third Argument*). The soteriological *Fourth Argument* also belongs to the first group because it is concerned to identify the subject of the saving work of the earthly Christ.

[*Fr.81^b and Gregory's Comments in Antirrheticus 39*

Gregory's comments after Fr.76^a indicate that Apollinarius may have gone on (after his 'conclusion' in Fr.76) to give even more precise theoretical definition as to how his conception of the incarnation differed from that of his opponents.[105] He may have discussed the technical difference between the action of πρόσληψις *vis-à-vis* ἀνάληψις, and he may have linked this to a paradoxical notion that, whilst the conjoining of two wholes (e.g. the ἀνάληψις of a complete man by perfect God) results in two wholes (e.g. two persons), the composition of a whole and something imperfect (e.g. the πρόσληψις of incomplete flesh by a perfect νοῦς / God) does not result in two but one (e.g. person). It is difficult to discern whether the unusual grammatical and arithmetical contrasts which Gregory reports in *Antirrheticus* 39 are chiefly the product of his own counter-argument which draws out *ad absurdum* the implications of the type of Christology Apollinarius has recommended, or whether such contrasts correspond to technical distinctions drawn by Apollinarius himself in a passage which follows Fr.76 to which Gregory makes passing allusion. The rare editorial disagreement between Lietzmann and Müller over how to take ***Fr.81^b*** reflects this interpretative dilemma.

> **'For by these words he puts forward the falsehood, (and) he makes plain the impiety by the weakness of his advocacy for (he says) if the perfect God were joined to a complete man there would be two. Therefore that which is imperfect composed together with that which is perfect is *not* regarded by him as two (?)'.**

Lietzmann gives the final sentence in 81^b a question mark to indicate that this is Gregory's rhetorical question rather then Apollinarius' thesis.[106] In the Justinian variant of 81^b, however, the 'by him' and the question mark are omitted so that the final phrase looks like

[105] *Antirrheticus* 39 (J.p.193,l.11-p.194,l.27).
[106] L.p.224,ll.16-19.

Apollinarius' own deduction.[107] Müller chooses to leave out the question mark in the Jaeger edition of the *Antirrheticus*.[108]]

Fr.76*-Fr.80

These fragments feature in a section of the *Antirrheticus* (§§40-41) where Gregory's counter-argument to the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος doctrine determines the sequence of quotations/reports rather than what comes next in the *Apodeixis*. When we are given the first part of Fr.76 in *Antirrheticus* 39 (76[a]), Gregory refers to it as a 'conclusion', but then having moved ahead (?) to another type of Apollinarian argument – the 'arithmetical' (Fr.81[b]) – Gregory returns to Fr.76, giving a longer version (76*).[109] This fragment seems related to Apollinarius' soteriological proof of νοῦς ἔνσαρκος (Fr.74) and Gregory alludes to problematic aspects of its soteriological assertion several times in his counter-argument in *Antirrheticus* 40. In *Antirrheticus* 41 Gregory introduces his most effective soteriological attack on Apollinarius' *divine* νοῦς ἔνσαρκος doctrine – namely, that the attainment of virtue requires a human mind and free choice – by introducing two more snippets of Apollinarius' soteriological doctrine, which speak of Christ's flesh partaking of virtue (Fr.79) and human minds (somehow) conforming to Christ intellectually (Fr.80). Fr.79 is linked terminologically to Fr.76 (by ἀβιάστως and συναρμόζω) and may well have followed on from it. Fr.80 may have followed Fr.79, but seems to expand upon the idea at the end of Fr.74, explaining *how* 'the self-moved mind in us participates in the loosing in so far as it assimilates itself to Christ'. The non-verbatim Fr.77 and 78 seem to refer to what Apollinarius 'says' in the wider context of the *Apodeixis*, which in Gregory's view has a bearing upon the soteriological theory he advocates in Fr.74,76. After Fr.76*-80, Gregory goes back to the 'arithmetical' argument (Fr.81) (which he has already alluded to in *Antirrheticus* 39 (Fr.81[b])) when he talks about what comes after the 'conclusion' of Fr.76[a]. Fr.76*-80 should *not* therefore be regarded as the next soteriological step in Apollinarius' exposition in the *Apodeixis*: they belong to a section of the *Antirrheticus* where Gregory has decided to *go back* and chew over the implications of Apollinarius' soteriological νοῦς ἔνσαρκος proof (the *Fourth Argument* (?)) in the interests of his polemic.

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[107] L.p.224,ll.20-24.
[108] J.p.194,ll.2-6.
[109] Fr.76*(L.p.222,ll.20-24)=Fr.76[c](L.p.223,ll.1-2)=J.p.195,ll.16-21, *Antirrheticus* 40.

***Fr.77,78*:** These non-verbatim allusions to what Apollinarius 'says' about the '*divine*' flesh bear no apparent relation to the actual words of Apollinarius' soteriological proof(s) for νοῦς ἔνσαρκος which survive in Fr.74,76,79,80. It seems very probable that they are entirely the product of Gregory's counter-argument in which he tries to show the inconsistency and failure of Apollinarius' theory of flesh-mediated salvation, given his earlier pronouncements upon the divinity of the flesh (according to Gregory's (mis)understanding).[110] It seems best to pass over these fragments when attempting to reconstruct Apollinarius' original argument in the *Apodeixis*.

***Fr.76*,79,80*:** Fr.76* offers a longer verbatim version of Apollinarius' soteriological 'conclusion' (to the *νοῦς ἔνσαρκος proofs* (Fr.70-75) or to *the (fourth) soteriological proof* (Fr.74) ?). Fr.79, 80 offer two verbatim precisions which were probably attached to Fr.76* (or Fr.74).

According to the way in which Gregory introduces it, Fr.76* falls into two components, which I will call 76^a and 76^b. (Essentially Fr.76* consists of two statements, but the parenthesis which belongs to the first statement (76^a), 'for which being ruled is a natural property', is not introduced by Gregory until later so it will be counted with 76^b for the purpose of this analysis.)

***Fr.76^a*: 'Therefore (ἄρα) the human race is not saved by the assumption (ἀναλήψεως) of a mind or a whole human being, but by the taking-on-in-addition of flesh (προσλήψεως)...**

[*Fr. 76^b*]...[for which being ruled is a natural property]. And there was a need of an unchanging mind not falling under the power of the flesh because of the weakness of knowledge, but a mind joining the flesh (συναρμόζοντος) to itself without constraint (ἀβίαστως).'

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[110] E.g. **'But if the divine body is also something celestial, as he says, it is perceived as surrounding the Word and in no way does he bestow what is changeable to it as a consequence...Therefore, in vain, things spoken about the flesh are now, by him, declaimed. For if this (flesh) is something divine, it is clear that it is also immutable, but if changeable, altogether not divine.'** (from **Fr.77**, L.p.223,ll.9-13); **'Just now he says that the flesh of the Word is divine and co-eternal in contradiction to (its being) acquired and assumed. Then next that it [sc. the flesh] is unfavourably disposed towards our human, pathetic and mortal nature. And lo! again, because the flesh is bound to one governed by passion according to change and alteration, he makes the flesh without intellect so that it might heal by its divinity because he holds *the mind* to be an obstacle of God's providence for human beings and that which is without a human mind is most pleasing to God.'** (from **Fr.78**, L.p.223,ll.19-25). Gregory is clearly offering *his own* summary of Apollinarius' doctrine of the flesh as it has so far (in his view) incoherently emerged in tandem with the soteriologically justified idea of Christ without (human) mind.

In *Antirrheticus* 39 Gregory refers to 76[a] as a 'conclusion'. What sort of conclusion is he talking about? He could mean that it is a conclusion to the five νοῦς ἔνσαρκος proofs which preceded it (Fr.70-75), but if so it is a *soteriological* conclusion: 'Therefore the human race is not *saved* by...'. It could be that the whole fragment (76*) represents a *Sixth Argument* for the doctrine of νοῦς ἔνσαρκος (a separate soteriological proof from the '*Fourth*' in Fr.74). If this is the case then it is an argument which works the wrong way round – giving its conclusion (76[a]: 'οὐκ ἄρα...a mind, etc.') *before* the soteriological premise (76[b]: 'there was a need for an unchanging mind, etc.'). Thus Gregory could mean that 76[a] is the conclusion to a soteriological argument indicated by 76[b]. However, if we consider the content and vocabulary, Fr.76[b], (along with Fr.79-80) supplies further soteriological details, which could equally suggest that it is a conclusion/expansion of the soteriological proof given in Fr.74.

It is not possible to reorganise Fr.74,76*,79,80 into a singular logical structure to demonstrate that these statements were originally *all* components of a single formal proof for Christ as (divine) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος, but, taken together, the fragments do seem to represent a single cohesive complex of soteriological ideas which together justify the Christological conclusion reached in Fr.76[a]. Gregory's deconstructional polemic may obscure the precise form of the original syllogism(s) so that it is impossible to reconstruct what we might call '*The Soteriological Argument for Christ as Divine νοῦς ἔνσαρκος*', but it does seem possible to *re-sequence* the fragments in a way which better facilitates their exposition of a singular soteriological thesis.

[***A Re-sequenced View of Apollinarius' Soteriological Argument*** for Christ as a divine mind who takes-on-in-addition (προσλαμβάνω) flesh and does not assume (ἀναλαμβάνω) a human mind or a whole man.

***Fr.74*:** Syllogistic proof (begged by an unexplained premise!) that Christ is a divine mind and not a human mind because the work of salvation ('loosing from sin') cannot be accomplished in a self-moved, undetermined (human) mind, so it must be accomplished by a divine mind operating passive flesh. *Coda*: Our self-moved minds participate in this salvation by self-assimilation to Christ.

***Fr.76[b]*:** Further explanation of the work of 'loosing' (Fr.74), showing/proving why a divine mind operating flesh and not a human mind was necessary. The unchanging divine

mind does not fall under the power of flesh (like a self-moved human mind would have done if unconstrained by God cf. Fr.74) through weakness of knowledge. The divine mind is able to join the flesh to itself without constraint (ἀβίαστως) because flesh is passive (Fr.74) and because 'for it being ruled is a natural property' (Fr.76^{b} – parenthesis).

***Fr.79*:** Further explanation of how the joining of divine mind and passive human flesh leads to the 'loosing from sin'. **'Flesh is joined to God** (i.e. the divine mind cf. Fr.74,76^{b}) **without constraint (ἀβίαστως)** (because of the passive nature of flesh cf. Fr.74,76^{b} – parenthesis) **and partakes of pure virtue'**.[111]

***Fr.80*:** Explanation of how this virtue is then extended to us – expanding upon the *Coda* of Fr.74. **'He** (God/divine mind) **gives a share in pure virtue to every mind under his control and to all those who become like Christ intellectually** (i.e. 'assimilate themselves' to Christ cf. Fr.74, *Coda*) **and are not unlike Christ in terms of the flesh** (cf. Fr.72 (?)).'[112]

***Fr.76a*:** *Conclusion*: Therefore the human race is not saved by the ἀνάληψις of a (human) mind or a whole human being, but by the πρόσληψις of flesh. Thus the *Soteriological Argument* (together with the other *proofs*) of Christ as divine νοῦς ἔνσαρκος without a human mind – concludes *in the denial of the completeness of the humanity* which leads into the arithmetical (and semantic?) arguments justifying Apollinarius' Christology which follow (cf. Fr.81^{b}, 81).]

Fr.81-87

In this next group of fragments, having offered proofs (Fr.70-76,79,80), Apollinarius seems to return to the task of typologically defining his conception of the incarnational union in contrast to the false view held by his opponents (a task he began Fr.66-69) – showing the latter to be inherently dualist, adoptionist and contrary to human free will.

Fr.81 is a verbatim statement which is the same as the opening proposition of the 'arithmetical' argument against a complete manhood which Gregory has already reported in *Antirrheticus* 39 (cf. Fr.81^{b}, above). The earlier version has been described by Gregory as a (weak) argument offered in support of the 'conclusion' reached in Fr.76^{a}. Thus the purpose

[111] L.p.223,ll.29-30.
[112] L.p.224,ll.3-4.

of Fr.81 would seem to be not so much to justify the divine νοῦς ἔνσαρκος understanding of Christ, but to justify the consequent view that his humanity cannot be complete.

> **'And if God has been joined (he says) to a man, perfect (τέλειος) God to a complete (τελείῳ) man, then they would be two, one Son of God by nature (φύσει) and one adopted (θετός) (son).'**[113]

This argument against there being a 'whole man' (Fr.76[a]) involved in the union seems to have two bases. The first is logical/arithmetical: two complete/whole beings cannot be combined to form a single being ($1 + 1 \neq 1$). The second is Christological: if a whole man is joined to God this is the equivalent of a false 'two Sons' adoptionism.[114] Attached to the logical strand of the argument may be the ἀνάληψις/πρόσληψις distinction discussed by Gregory in *Antirrheticus* 39 and the 'logical' alternative which Justinian's source transmits as an Apollinarian alternative: 'Therefore the *in*complete joined to the complete would not be regarded as two'.[115] The anti-adoptionist strand of the argument leads into the next two fragments.

***Fr.82*:** Although non-verbatim, this report is useful because Gregory indicates by his apology what came next. Apollinarius must have accused those who subscribe to an adopted son (by holding to the completeness of Christ's humanity) of espousing attendant errors, such as promoting a God-bearing (θεοφόρος) man above the angels, expanding the Trinity into Tetrad, and opening up the way for polytheism.

***Fr.83*:** This is the charge in the next verbatim fragment. **'If he who received God is true God there would be many Gods since all men receive God.'**[116]

***Fr.84*:** In this verbatim citation, Apollinarius has returned to establishing the verity of his own alternative understanding of the incarnation. Unlike the assumption of a man, which leads via adoptionism to polytheism, his conception of the mode of union (the

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[113] L.p.224,ll.14-15.

[114] The term θετός is not, however, a technical term associated with adoptionism.

[115] L.p.224,ll.23-24.

[116] L.p.224,ll.32-33. In countering Apollinarius' anti-adoptionist arguments Gregory stresses that he too subscribes to the singularity and continuity of the divine subject; the Christ of 2 *Cor.*5.19 is the divine Lord of *Rom.*11.36 (*Antirrheticus* 42-43, J.p.201,l.25-p.203,l.15). But his argument in defence of two natures (*Antirrheticus* 42, J.p.201,ll.6-24), and his suggestion that Apollinarius has attached flesh to the divine nature/substance (*Antirrheticus* 42, J.p.200,l.9-p.201,l.6), indicate that Apollinarius' anti-adoptionist arguments at this point in the *Apodeixis* may also have been aimed against *dyophysite* Christology, with which Gregory feels identified.

πρόσληψις of flesh) preserves the uniqueness of the incarnational unity as indicated by the unity of worship.

> **'Nothing else was united in such a way (οὕτως) as the flesh which was taken-on-in-addition (προσληφθεῖσα). Things not united in this way (οὕτως) are not thus worshipped. And nothing else is worshipped in such a way as the flesh of Christ.'**[117]

***Fr.85*:** On the evidence of this verbatim fragment Apollinarius went on to offer an explanation of the unity of worship in metaphysical and physical terms which (certainly in Gregory's eyes) give more insight into the type of unity he has in mind when he talks about the πρόσληψις of flesh/an incomplete humanity by the divine mind. **'The flesh of the Lord he says is worshipped because it is one person (ἕν ... πρόσωπον) and one living being (ἓν ζῶον) together with him (μετ'αὐτοῦ).'**[118]

***Fr.86*:** In the verbatim part of this fragment Apollinarius seems to be simply clarifying what he said in Fr.84. **'No created thing (ποίημα) is worshipped *with* (μετὰ) the Lord as his (αὐτοῦ) flesh.'** Apollinarius' point is not that the flesh is divine, but that it is *created.* This shows the uniqueness of the mode of the incarnational union (the πρόσληψις with flesh) because no other united thing (Fr.84), i.e. created thing (Fr.86), is worshipped. Gregory's reaction to this argument is to combine the idea of creature worship implicit, in his eyes, in Fr.86 and the idea of a divine-human composite implicit in Fr.85 to show that Apollinarius surpasses Eunomius in impiety.[119] *The non-verbatim description of Apollinarius' theory which Lietzmann gives us as part of Fr.86, therefore, probably bears little relation to what Apollinarius actually wrote at this point in the Apodeixis.*[120]

***Fr.87*:** In this verbatim fragment Apollinarius adds another reason why the alternative to his own conception of a unique God-flesh unity – viz. a union of God and a man – fails: the *Free Will Argument.*

> **'If someone thinks that a man on a par with all men and angels is united with God, he will make the angels and men into beings who do not possess free will (μὴ αὐτεξουσίους) – in the way that the flesh does not have free will. But**

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[117] L.p.225,ll.1-3.
[118] L.p.225,ll.19-20. Gregory responds to this statement by recalling the title 'in the likeness of men' and suggesting that Apollinarius conceives the unity along the lines of the psychosomatic συμφυία (*Antirrheticus* 44, J.p.204,l.30-p.205,l.19).
[119] See *Antirrheticus* 44 (J.p.205,p.19-p.206,l.25).
[120] L.p.225,ll.26-35.

lacking free will (is) the destruction of the living being with free will. But the nature is not destroyed by he who has made it. Therefore a man is not united to God.'[121]

This is the first time that this proof of why Christ's humanity cannot be complete and *must* lack a volitional element has been used (in so far as the *Antirrheticus* allows us to know). However, the *Free Will Argument* in Fr.87 ties in with aspects of the earlier *soteriological* argument (Fr.74,76*,79,80). It offers (e.g.) a reason why the compulsion of the human mind/will in Christ by God is impossible (cf. Fr.74: 'the work of the enfleshment is not accomplished in a self-moved (human) mind *and not* under the compulsion of necessity'); it is impossible *because of God's immutability as a providential creator.* In Fr.87, the reminder that **'the flesh does not have free will'** picks up on another theme found in Fr.74 ('the work is accomplished in flesh which is moved by another, operated by the divine mind') and also Fr.76 ('a divine mind joining the flesh to itself without constraint') (cf. also Fr.79). Thus the *Free Will Argument* for Christ's incomplete humanity appears to be systematic with the *soteriological proof for νοῦς ἔνσαρκος*, and it may be a constitutive element within a soteriological theory which supplies an important justification (and motive?) for the Christological doctrine advanced in the *Apodeixis.*

Fr.88-92

In the next group of fragments Apollinarius returns to his anthropological theory (cf. Fr.24), this time demonstrating its scriptural bases (Fr.88). Again he uses it as a framework for understanding Christ's uniqueness as a 'man' who is also 'heavenly man' and 'life-giving spirit' (Fr.89-90, cf. Fr.25-31). He thus confirms the type of Christology delineated and 'proved' (Fr.67-87), recapitulating its anthropological basis, and using the same framework to demonstrate the defectiveness of the alternative God-man conception against which he has defined his theory antithetically (Fr.91-92).

***Fr.88*:** Whilst this fragment is, according to Gregory's own admission, both a report and a paraphrase[122], it is nevertheless useful because it is descriptive rather than judgemental, revealing (some of?) the actual proof texts which Apollinarius used to justify the T. anthropology. (Earlier Gregory reports a verbose demonstration of the T. theory when Apollinarius first introduces it (Fr.23-24), but, as Gregory chooses to ignore this, it

[121] L.p.226,ll.1-6.
[122] L.p.226,ll.23-24.

may have been philosophical rather than scriptural.[123]) Gregory's long, text-by-text counter-interpretation of the scriptural passages used by Apollinarius is also helpful for reconstructing Apollinarius' argument, because Gregory, intent on his own exegesis, indicates in plain and credible terms the probable use Apollinarius made of the texts.

*Thess.*5.23 was used by Apollinarius to justify his basic spirit, soul, body T. division of man. **'For Paul did not divide the human being into three segments (τμήμασι) according to *our* reading of that which he wrote to the Thessalonians.'**[124]

*Dan.*3.86 was used to confirm the spirit, soul distinction. **'The Song of the Three Young Men ... does *not* show that the souls by themselves give praise, nor that the Spirits (give praise) independent of the souls *as Apollinarius thinks*.'**[125]

*Rom.*1.9 and *Jn.*4.24 were used to further prove the separation of man's spiritual element and its equation with νοῦς. **'The Saviour, saying God must be worshipped "in spirit", does *not* indicate the "mind" by the term "spirit"'**, says Gregory in reply to Apollinarius' interpretation.[126]

*Rom.*7.23, which shows the carnal element warring against the spirit, allows Apollinarius to sub-divide the flesh into ψυχή and a body to confirm that the spirit is a third element:

> **'He proposes that the flesh is something else besides this [sc. "the spirit" of *Rom.*1.9 and *Jn.*4.24] which is "at war with the spirit" [*Rom.*7.23]. And this flesh he says is not without a soul (οὐκ ἄψυχον), as the spirit is indicated by this (text) to be a third thing beside the soul and body.'**[127]

(This recapitulates Apollinarius' 'not without a soul' understanding of flesh in Fr.22[b] which also refers to *Rom.*7.23.)

***Fr.89*:** This verbatim fragment indicates the immediate Christological use which Apollinarius made of the recapitulated and scripturally proven T. anthropology. It is applied to the 'manhood' of Christ together with a reminder that the Lord was a special type of man/spirit.

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[123] L.p.210,ll.7-14.
[124] L.p.227,ll.3-5.
[125] L.p.227,ll.11-14.
[126] L.p.227,ll.14-15.
[127] L.p.226,l.31-p.227,l.3.

'Therefore, if man is from three elements, and the Lord is also a man, (then) the Lord is also altogether from (ἐκ) three elements – spirit and soul and body. But (he is) also a heavenly man and a life-giving spirit.'[128]

Although it is not spelt out in this fragment (or Fr.91) the logical deduction is that the heavenly, life-giving spirit/mind therefore *replaces* the human spiritual element in Christ, allowing him to be both (as) a man in structure and 'heavenly man' according to this replacement.[129]

Fr.90 (verbatim) belongs to the same line of deductive reasoning as Fr.89, but it is not formally the conclusion which Fr.89 lacks: **'If...the heavenly man is from *all* the elements equal to us men of clay, so that he has a *spirit* equal to us men of clay, he is not a heavenly man ...'.**[130] Like Fr.89, Fr.90 only *implies* the technical conclusion that in Christ the divine spirit/νοῦς replaces the human equivalent in his trichotomy. Fr.89,90 may, therefore, originally be components of a more complex argument leading to a concluding statement after Fr.91 which Gregory has omitted. Alternatively, Fr.90 may be, like Fr.91, an argument which follows a conclusion reached by Apollinarius after Fr.89. If this is the case, then the purpose of Fr.90 is similar to Fr.91. It confirms the conclusion that in the T. Christ the spiritual element cannot be human by deducing the false consequences which would otherwise follow: **'...he is not a heavenly man, but a receptacle (τὸ δοχεῖον) of the heavenly God.'**

***Fr.91*:** This verbatim fragment indicates another false consequence of insisting that all three parts of Christ's manhood are human: the incarnational union would create a hybrid **'God-man (ἀνθρωπόθεος)'** out of four elements.[131]

***Fr.92*:** This verbatim argument, designed to show the undesirability of making Christ completely human (in all three elements), leaves behind the T. analysis of Christ's whole humanity, offering a reworking of the logical argument against the impossibility of combining two completes into a singular unity (cf. Fr.81). **'If he is from two complete**

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[128] L.p.227, ll.22-25.

[129] Thus the T. analysis allows us to understand how Christ can be at once both 'man' and God (and therefore 'heavenly man') – cf. Apollinarius' 'chief point' at the very onset of his exposition, Fr.18.

[130] L.p.227, l.34-p.228, l.2.

[131] L.p.228,ll.8-9. Apollinarius' argument that the combination of a three part whole and a fourth (part?) creates a symmetrical two-part hybrid is rather unconvincing and illogical, as Gregory points out in his counter-argument (*Antirrheticus* 49, J.p.214,l.19-p.216,l.89). Apollinarius may have been turning criticism previously levelled against his own doctrine (cf. Fr.113) against his detractors.

(beings), he is not God in the one in which he is a man, nor is he a man in the one in which he is God.'[132]

Fr.93-97

At first sight this appears to be an oddly assorted group of fragments as transmitted by Gregory: two parts of (the same?) soteriological-Christological argument (Fr.93,95); an argument to do with divine immutability (Fr.97); and two reported accusations against Apollinarius' opponents (Fr.94,96). However, closer consideration suggests that the five fragments share a common purpose: Apollinarius seems to be showing that his incarnational theory is *the only expositional solution* to what is Christologically/soteriologically requisite. The three verbatim fragments (Fr.93,95,97) seem designed to (re)outline what *has to be* the case *vis-à-vis* Christ, if true belief in God's incarnation and saving death-resurrection is to be upheld and shown to be truly efficacious. The saviour, who is the subject of the incarnation, passion and death-resurrection, *must* be God (Fr.93,95), who pre-exists (Fr.96), and *not a* sinful man subject to corruption (Fr.93,94,95) (i.e. it must be 'a divine incarnation'). Nevertheless, there must be a real incarnation – an 'intermingling', a 'becoming flesh' in the gospel sense of 'tabernacling among us' (Fr.93), for salvation requires that there be one who dies and rises (Fr.95), '*as* man to dissolve the dominion of death' (Fr.93) (i.e. there must be a divine incarnation truly 'in the likeness of man'). Both sets of requirements must hold without undermining the immutability of the divinity/continuity of divine subject (Fr.97). The *solution* which Apollinarius proposes in Fr.97, as the only answer to the specific question raised in that fragment, is the *same* (sole) solution which he intends to imply when he outlines what is Christologically and soteriologically necessary (Fr.93,95). All this is only possible 'if (divine) mind has set itself down in man' (Fr.97)[133] (i.e. it is only possible if one accepts Apollinarius' Christological theory based on the T. anthropology, as expounded and proved in the *Apodeixis*). The accusations (Fr.94,96), which also feature in this section, indicate that Apollinarius also confirmed his theory as the (only) solution by showing the false doctrines which necessarily follow for those who do not accept it (e.g. denial of the Lord's pre-existence and belief in the 'saving passion' *of a man*).

Fr.93 has been reconstructed by Lietzmann from four Apollinarian propositions cited by Gregory in *Antirrheticus* 51. The style of the four sub-fragments confirms that they

[132] L.p.228,ll.14-15.
[133] L.p.229,l.31.

are verbatim, as, perhaps, does Gregory's surprise at Apollinarius' 'orthodoxy'.[134] The four propositions are united by internal logic and common purpose: they conspire to show what is Christologically necessary for incarnational/soteriological reasons. They represent part of an argument because they *point* to a solution without actually explicating it.

> **'One who remains a man and is subordinated to the common corruption of man is not able to save the world. But we are also not saved by God who has not been mingled (ἐπιμιχθέντος) with us. But he is mingled (μίγνυται) since he becomes flesh, that is man – just as the gospel says that when he became flesh he "tabernacled among us" (ἐν ἡμῖν ἐσκηνωκέναι). But he neither looses the sin of human beings without becoming a man free from sin, nor dissolves the dominion of death over all human beings, unless he died and rose *as* (ὡς) a man.'**[135]

***Fr.94*:** Gregory reports that Apollinarius **'claims the statement of the Church says that we regard the suffering in respect of the man'.**[136] This accusation seems to correspond to something Apollinarius actually said because it invites the opening proposition of the next verbatim fragment, **'But the death of a man does not annul death'** (Fr.95). It is unlikely, however, that Apollinarius, at this point in the *Apodeixis*, proposed a theopaschite alternative in the crude terms reported by Gregory (in the latter half of Fr.94), particularly as he seems to have accompanied his doctrine of the divine passion with a reiteration of his commitment to the Son's consubstantial divinity.[137]

***Fr.95*:** Lietzmann regards the whole of this fragment as verbatim. Mühlenberg argues that it is probably a *Referat* which stays fairly close to Apollinarius' actual words.[138] Another possibility is that the first sentence is verbatim, the second Gregory's paraphrase or (mis)interpretation of what Apollinarius implied.

> **'[1] The death of a man does not annul death nor does one rise who has not died. [2] From all of which (he says) it is clear that God himself died (and) accordingly (he says) that it was not possible for Christ to be conquered by death.'**[139]

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[134] Gregory seems to be reacting to Apollinarius' unexpected use of ἄνθρωπος terminology. He continues to presume that a divine flesh theory lurks somewhere in the background (*Antirrheticus* 51, J.p.217,l.9-p.218,l.9).
[135] L.p.228,ll.20-27.
[136] L.p.229,ll.1-3.
[137] L.p.229,ll.5-8.**'For he says that the other [sc. a man's death] is inferior to the one divinity dying and he explains this in many places, contending with Arius whilst also setting forth the doctrine of the Trinity.'**
[138] Mühlenberg, p.70.
[139] L.p.229,12-15.

Whether or not the second sentence is verbatim is important because, if genuine, it indicates how close certain Apollinarian statements might have come to (unqualified) theopaschitism. Fr.95 belongs to the same line of argument which begins in Fr.93 and therefore would appear to point to a more nuanced position (– perhaps, 'God himself died (and rose) *as man*'). As it stands the second sentence presents something of a logical contradiction: it was necessary for God to die, so that Christ did not die (because God cannot die!) – and perhaps it was the intention of Gregory's paraphrase (?) to make it appear thus.

***Fr.96*:** Apollinarius' Christological scheme does allow God to be the ultimate subject of the death-resurrection, even if not suffering in his immutable nature, and this perhaps explains why Gregory next reports an Apollinarian accusation that his opponents deny that Christ pre-exists. It seems unlikely that Apollinarius is choosing this moment in his exposition, which is focused upon who is the subject of the death-resurrection, to reopen the discussion on the nature of Christ's pre-existence *per se*. Apollinarius' *probable* point is that his opponents, who say that a man suffers and dies, deny the continuity of the divine subject in Christ, namely he who is eternal creator, and who becomes incarnate and saves by his death/resurrection (as man) – God the Word. **'He says that Christ is said by us not to exist from the beginning as God the Word exists.'**[140]

***Fr.97*:** Given what has gone before, the verbatim Fr.97 does not seem to be an isolated justification of the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος doctrine on the grounds that it preserves the divine immutability in respect of the incarnation. Apollinarius here reveals the implied solution to all the otherwise antithetical requirements of a faithful Christology/soteriology, namely his own Christological thesis as expounded in *Apodeixis*! **'How does God become man without having been changed away from being God, unless mind has set itself down (κατέστη) in man?'**[141]

Fr.98–105

In this final series of fragments we lose touch with the structure of (the denouement of) Apollinarius' argument in the *Apodeixis* because Gregory, as he admits on several occasions,[142] chooses to pass over passages which he claims he cannot understand and quotes or reports only a few Apollinarian statements on assorted aspects of Christology.

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[140] L.p.229,ll.19-20.
[141] L.p.229,ll.30-31.
[142] L.p.230,l.1; p.230,ll.20-22; p.231,ll.1-3; p.231,ll.19-20; p.231,ll.27-29.

Gregory has no doubt chosen these extracts primarily to assist his polemic in the closing chapters of *Antirrheticus* so it is unlikely that Fr.98-105 offer a very representative insight into the conclusion of the *Apodeixis*. Nevertheless, the content and terminology found in these fragments seem to offer us enough evidence to draw the conclusion that Apollinarius (having arrived at the *Q.E.D.* of his doctrine in the environs of Fr.97) spent the final paragraphs of his treatise recapitulating or summarising its main tenets. Gregory's final comments (Fr.105) give us some idea of the nature of the very end of the *Apodeixis*.

***Fr.98*:** In this verbatim rhetorical question, Apollinarius uses *Mt.*24.30 and *Jn.*10.30 to challenge the false view that Christ was a man, **'who has become God after the resurrection and is no longer a man'.**[143] Given that this variant form of 'adoptionism' comes quite close to Gregory's own teaching,[144] it is not surprising that Gregory chooses to select and take issue with this statement on the grounds that Apollinarius is obviously, and absurdly, trying to extend Christ's pre-existing corporeality into the post-existence as well – (fingernails and all!).[145] Fr.98 may belong to the section of Apollinarian exposition represented by Fr.89-97, i.e. it may be another argument used by Apollinarius to show the expositional advantages of his T. doctrine over the false alternatives. (By allowing for the continuity of subject, it explains how the earthly Christ is the same Son (of God), and how the divine Christ is the same Son (of Man).)[146] Fr.98 may equally belong to a concluding section represented by Fr.99-104, wherein Apollinarius recapitulated the key tenets of his incarnational doctrine such as the continuity of the eternal subject. Fr.98 has scriptural links with the argument in Fr.99-100 [*Jn.*10.27-28,30], and Fr.104 may have *Mt.*24.30 in mind because it is concerned with accounting for Christ's corporeality (= manhood) at the 'consummation'.[147]

***Fr.99-100*:** In Fr.99 Gregory reports an Apollinarian proof text [*Jn.*10.27-28] and its interpretation: **'by the divinity of the Father he draws the sheep to himself'.**[148]

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[143] If this is the case: **'how will the "Son of Man" "send out his angels" and how will we "see the Son of Man coming upon the clouds"? And how, even prior to having been united and deified, does he say, "I and the Father are one"?'** L.p.230, ll.3-6.

[144] 'a man neither before, nor after, but only at the time of the economy' (J.p.222,ll.25-27). For Gregory's full position, see *Antirrheticus*, 53(J.p.221,l.6-p.223,l.10).

[145] *Antirrheticus* 56 (J.p.288,l.18-p.229,l.9).

[146] Apollinarius' doctrine of the inseparable unity of the divine subject with the flesh may also lie behind his idea of the post-resurrection Son of Man, but this, like Gregory's doctrine, is no doubt linked to the divinization of the human flesh *per se*. The expositional advantage of the Spirit-flesh model of man is it allows some real account of Christ's post-resurrection 'manhood'.

[147] L.p.231,ll.22-23.

[148] L.p.230,ll.25-26.

Immediately afterwards, he cites a verbatim rhetorical question (Fr.100), which probably belongs to Apollinarius' exegesis and reveals why he has quoted the text. **'If Christ was united with the Father before the resurrection, how was he not united with God in himself (ἐν αὐτῷ)?'**[149] Like *Jn.*10.30, *Jn.*10.28 confirms Apollinarius' view (not that there is a third Christological subject as Gregory tries to demonstrate *ad absurdum*, but) that the subject in the earthly Christ is divine. He is thus one with God '*in himself*', i.e. as a subject and by the divine nature he shares with the Father. Hence 'by the divinity of the Father he draws the sheep to himself' appears to be an accurate report of Apollinarius' exegesis of *Jn.*10.27-28. The idea of the earthly Christ as consubstantially divine Shepherd is developed by Apollinarius in connection with *Zach.*13.7 (Fr.33-41) in an earlier section of the *Apodeixis*, when he is giving the scriptural basis for the first tenet of his thesis: viz. a 'divine enfleshment', since a divine subject. Whilst there is no evidence from Gregory that Apollinarius reintroduced the *Zach.*13.7 proof text in the final paragraphs of the *Apodeixis*, Fr.99-100 appear to indicate that he recapitulated this main theme.

***Fr.101-103*:** The next glimpse Gregory allows of Apollinarius' conclusion deals once more with the Christological problem of who suffers and how. Given that Gregory began the *Antirrheticus* by suggesting that the very purpose of the *Apodeixis* is theopaschite,[150] it is not surprising that he alights on suggestive statements concerning the passion made by Apollinarius at the end of his treatise.

***Fr.101*:** Whilst Lietzmann considers the statement, **'The saviour has suffered'**, to be verbatim, Gregory's subsequent interpretation, **'Who is the Saviour? "God", he says in what was before this'**,[151] is probably a crude (mis)representation of Apollinarius' overall position, which bears little relation to what he actually said here at the end of the *Apodeixis*. This appears to be confirmed by the fact that Gregory needs to go back to Fr.67 for his evidence, and by the fact that Apollinarius seems to offer a much more nuanced explanation of the passion in what follows immediately.

Fr.103 is revealing, not so much because of the term 'ἔδει' which Gregory seizes upon as evidence of Apollinarius' theopaschitism, but because of its final formula which recapitulates the second main tenet of the Christology (and indeed *title*) of the *Apodeixis*. **'It was necessary (ἔδει) that passions were set in motion according to the likeness (καθ'**

[149] L.p.230,ll.27-28.
[150] *Antirrheticus* 5 (J.p.136,l.13-p.138,l.9).
[151] L.p.231,ll.4-9.

ὁμοιότητα) **of men.'**[152] Although we do not know exactly why Apollinarius chose to talk again of the passion in his conclusion, the terminology indicates that he is recalling and rehearsing the account of Christ's humanity which he has given earlier in the *Apodeixis* (cf. Fr.42-47,63-65). In accordance with this, he may be saying in Fr.103 that, whilst the subject in Christ is divine, the human attributes do not pertain directly to the subject or his (divine) nature, but belong to the genuine carnal form which he has taken-on-in-addition.

***Fr.102*:** Via Gregory's unsympathetic report, we are given a further clue as to how Apollinarius here explained the way God suffered: according to the likeness of men, but 'not exactly as a man (καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος)'. **'What does not admit suffering suffers not due to the necessity of an unwilling nature exactly as a man, but in conformity with nature (ἀκολουθία φύσεως)'**[153] [Apollinarius may be saying that the Logos suffers not by necessity, because unlike a (fallen) rational human nature he is not subject to the will of the flesh, but by conforming with nature, in the sense that the divine νοῦς takes on the form of flesh willingly and governs it according to its carnal nature which is strictly passive. If he is making this point then he is recapitulating aspects of his earlier Christological exposition (Fr.63-65) and soteriological proof (Fr.74,76,79,80).]

***Fr.104*:** Gregory also notes that Apollinarius makes a point about Christ's post-resurrection body near the end of the discourse: **'And since the body is in heaven, he is with us even to the consummation of the age.'**[154] It is much easier to understand why Gregory has preserved this statement than why Apollinarius originally made it. Gregory wishes to show that Apollinarius has the absurd idea of incarnation/salvation through a heavenly body still in mind even when it comes to the post-existence. It seems more probable that Apollinarius was giving a final demonstration of the expositional advantages of his thesis, either for interpreting *Mt.*24.30, or for explaining our future salvation in Christ as (risen) νοῦς ἔνσαρκος (cf. *De Fide et Incarnatione* 7).

***Fr.105*:** Gregory describes the 'last gasps' of the *Apodeixis* thus:

> **' ...such things as those which lie at the last gasp, at the end of the discourse, contained within irresistible thoughts – just like some sort of panting – I deem necessary to pass over without enquiry. Straitened by these, he calls upon the**

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[152] L.p.231,ll.16-17.
[153] L.p.231,ll.10-11.
[154] L.p.231,ll.22-23.

Greeks to support his own mythological fancies. And yet such things come close to them.'[155]

Mühlenberg, in his reconstruction, makes much of the invocation to the Greeks, suggesting that Apollinarius concluded his treatise by claiming that 'Christian teaching is the truth of Greek philosophy'.[156] Given that Apollinarius has derided his opponents as Jews and Greeks on more than one occasion, and given that Gregory regards Apollinarius' exposition as 'close' to the Greeks in a derogatory sense, Mühlenberg's suggestion is perhaps unlikely and certainly based on slender evidence. The 'invocation to the Greeks' may be a Gregorian description of the final flurry of philosophical (?) or syllogistic arguments, which he cannot be bothered to report.

[155] L.p.231,ll.27-31.
[156] Mühlenberg, p.90.

Appendix 3

ANACEPHALAEOSIS: DETAILED ANALYSIS

Source, Authenticity, Context

The *Anacephalaeosis* is a compressed statement of Christological doctrine consisting of thirty short paragraphs most of which are syllogistic theses.[1] It can be found in the fifth dialogue of the *De Trinitate Dialogi*, the Pseudo-Athanasian treatise which some historians of dogma have accredited to Maximus the Confessor.[2] The syllogistic statement occurs during a dialectical discussion between 'Orthodoxus' and an Apollinarian. Lietzmann attributes the theses to Apollinarius himself because five of them are quoted by Theodoret in a group of citations from 'the writings of Apollinarius' at the end of *Eranistes III*. Theodoret does not specify the name of the 'other' Apollinarian work from which he quotes after the *Contra Diodorum KKB* (Fr.127-139), and he presents the paragraphs in a different order (§§17,20,19,18, and, 'a little further on', §29).[3]

Lietzmann gives the name *'Anacephalaeosis'* to the Apollinarian syllogisms because of an interjected comment from 'Orthodoxus' in the Ps.-Athanasian text made in reply to the twelfth thesis: 'Listen and you will be vexed by the proposition held by the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις as he calls his writing.'[4] In his edition, Lietzmann places the *Anacephalaeosis* immediately after the last two fragments of the *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔΒ΄) (Fr.145,146 (=126)) which are preserved by Leontius in the *Adv. Fraudes* at the end of Timothy of Berytus' letter to Homonius. Lietzmann seems to have drawn a connection between the *Anacephalaeosis* and the *Contra Diodorum* because of Timothy's comments prior to Fr. 145.[5] Having quoted a number of paragraphs of the *Contra Diodorum* (Fr.140-144), Timothy introduces Fr.145 thus: 'And in the summary (ἀνακεφαλαιώσει) of this same discourse he says...';[6] he then introduces Fr.146 (=126) as 'next' (in the same 'summary').

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[1] L.p.242,l.23-p.246,l.18 (E.T.pp.333-338,above).
[2] *De Trinitate Dialogi*, see *MPG*28.1265ff.;L.p.90-91;Raven,p.165.
[3] Theodoret,*Eranistes III*,*MPG*83.309A-D.
[4] *De Trinitate*,*MPG*28.1272C;L.p.242,l.23 (note).
[5] L.p.144.
[6] L.p.242,l.13,see Leontius,*Adv.Fraudes*,*MPG*86.1968.

Raven accepts Lietzmann's editorial decision and offers his own more expansive justification:

> 'We have here in all probability an appendix of syllogisms to the great book against Diodore as a summary and similar in intention and style to the appendices which Theodoret himself adds to his own *Dialogus*. The custom of adding a brief epigrammatic recapitulation seems to have been not unusual'; 'Theodoret...quotes it as "another book following upon the 'Book of Chapters'" as Theodoret calls the *C.Diod.* One quotation from Apollinarius in Leontius *Adv. Fraudes*... is labelled as from the *Anacephalaeosis* of the *C. Diod.*: it is not found in Lietzmann's *Anac.*: but is cast in exactly similar syllogistic form'.[7]

Whilst Theodoret's comments in *Eranistes III* provide strong evidence that Apollinarius was the author of the group of syllogistic theses preserved in *De Trinitate Theologi,* and whilst their style and Orthodoxus' comment in the Ps.-Athanasian work indicate that this work may well have been a summary, neither Lietzmann nor Raven have provided enough justification for identifying this 'summary' with the summary at the end of *Contra Diodorum*, as mentioned by Timothy (Fr.145) in Leontius. Theodoret's comments between *Contra Diodorum* Fr.139 and the citations from the *Anacephalaeosis* indicate more that the latter was '*another similar* work' (ἐν ἑτέρῳ παραπλησίῳ) to the *Contra Diodorum KKB*, not that one work literally 'followed' the other as Raven's translation of παραπλήσιος suggests.[8] The comments in Leontius indicate that Fr.145 and 146 (=126) belong to a summary appended to the *second* book *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔΒ΄).[9] Since one of these fragments (Fr.146) belongs to what Theodoret calls the *KKB* (Fr.126), there are perhaps stronger grounds for believing that *all* the fragments of the *Contra Diodorum KKB* (Fr.121-39) belong to the summary of the *Contra Diodorum*, which Timothy refers to as the '*Anacephalaeosis*' (in the *Adv. Fraudes*) but not Theodoret. However, the fragments of the *KKB* preserved by Theodoret and the two fragments of the 'summary' of the *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔΒ΄) preserved by Timothy/Leontius do *not* exhibit an 'exactly similar' style and purpose to the thirty theses found in the *De Trinitate*. The theses preserved by Ps.-Athanasius are a series of categorical syllogisms which belong together forming a developing deductive argument. They are concerned with the basic question: 'Who is

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[7] Raven,p.165,n.[6],n.[5].
[8] *MPG83*.309C.
[9] See L.p,241,ll.27-28;L.p.242,l.1,l.13,l.18:'And in discourse "B" which was against Diodore... and in the *summary* of this same discourse'.

Christ?' Fr.145 and 146 of the *Contra Diodorum* make logical inferences about the *communicatio idiomatum* and the consubstantiality of the Word's flesh, but they are *not* formal syllogisms focusing on the central Christological question of the *Anacephalaeosis.*

It seems more probable, therefore, that the *Anacephalaeosis* is *not* the 'summary' at the end of *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔΒ΄) but is another work by Apollinarius, or the summary of another work, for which we have no idea of the context. Mühlenberg does not connect the *Anacephalaeosis* with the *Contra Diodorum*, but is perhaps too firm in his opinion that these theses do not 'constitute some sort of book in their own right'. In Mühlenberg's view: 'It is far more likely that these theses were the basis for a larger work in which every chapter was preceded by a syllogistically formulated summary by Apollinarius or an editor.'[10] Contrary to Mühlenberg's opinion, it should be noted that, whilst certain conclusions precipitated by individual theses do not always cohere with one another, the overall arrangement of the series gives the impression that the *Anacephalaeosis* was designed to be read as a single developing logical argument in its own right, and that it has not been simply assembled from various chapter headings.

Conclusion The *Anacephalaeosis* is a summary statement of Christological doctrine, composed in a syllogistic style probably by Apollinarius himself (or possibly an editor), which may have stood at the end of a longer expository work, recapitulating its conclusions in a succinct way. There is no firm reason for believing that this is the 'summary' which stood at the end of the *Contra Diodorum* (ΠΔΒ΄). Thus, we have very little idea of the literary context of the *Anacephalaeosis*, and no idea of its historical context.

The Structure of the Anacephalaeosis

The *Anacephalaeosis* as a whole attempts to answer the questions 'Who is Christ?' and 'How is he thus?' by means of a developing deductive argument based upon a series of contributory deductions made in the individual paragraphs. Eighteen of the paragraphs are categorical syllogisms (§§1-11,13,14,15,17,19,20,23) constructed according to the *schema* noted by Lietzmann: 'First an indisputable philosophical truth is set down as the major premise: a biblical testimony follows as the minor premise and the combination of the two

[10] Mühlenberg,pp.102-103.

establishes the conclusion.'[11] Three other paragraphs (§§12,18,21) are close to being formal syllogisms. §18 offers a major premise, but the biblical minor premise (viz. 1 *Tim.*2.5; *Gal.*3.20) is implicit in the major, and the conclusion left unstated because it is the same as that in §§17,19,20. §12 is interesting because it begins as a syllogism but arrives at a more complex conclusion than the premises formally allow. Equally interesting is §21 because its major premise contains two propositions, the second of which is *not* an indisputable philosophical truth: it, thus, rather begs the question. §16 stands alone among the first twenty-one paragraphs in offering a deductive argument which breaks the mould of the other syllogisms because it has *three* premises the second being *anthropological* rather than biblical. It is also the first thesis to arrive at a *positive* deduction about what *is* the case rather than what is not. The formal difference of §§12,16,21 indicates that these paragraphs are significant moments in the development of Apollinarius' overarching argument (i.e. where the logical mechanism needs some adaptation to accommodate the presuppositions of his own hypothesis) – and this proves to be the case. Similarly significant are minor additions brought into the formally deduced conclusions of other syllogisms (§§4,5,6). Towards the end of the *Anacephalaeosis,* as Apollinarius moves towards his overall conclusions in §§29-30, he leaves behind the restrictive form of the categorical syllogism. The theses which we find in §§22, 24-27 do not possess formally stated conclusions. In these theses Apollinarius asks questions and suggests alternative answers, pointing out the weakness of one of them and, thus, implying his unstated conclusion. §28 is not so much an individual thesis as a recapitulation of the argument so far. It recapitulates the main Christological questions and rules out two of the answers (as 'proved' by the earlier syllogisms). §29 offers a more expansive piece of exposition and is something of a grand conclusion to the main question of who Christ is, is not, and how. §30 offers a further qualifying argument drawing on scripture to show how this view of Christ is not theopaschite.

[11] L.p.145.

Does the Anacephalaeosis Offer a 'Summary' of the Type of Christology which Apollinarius Advocates in the Apodeixis and the other T. Documents?

At first sight there are a number of obvious parallels between the doctrine of Christ and justifying arguments which we find in the *Anacephalaeosis* and the type of Christology which we find advocated in a less stylised and compressed way in the *Apodeixis* and *KMP*.

The first fifteen syllogisms of the *Anacephalaeosis* are all designed to show that it is 'a divine enfleshment' by proving the continuity and divinity of the subject in Christ: 'αὐτὸς θεός ἐστιν'(§8). This is also the inference of the less formal theses which precede the conclusion (§§22-27): 'ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ θεός' (§26). In repeatedly demonstrating the 'first tenet' of belief which informs the T. thesis in the *Apodeixis*, Apollinarius recapitulates a number of the justifying arguments which we find in that work: Christ is a 'heavenly man' and not a man from dust/earth (§3 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.16-17); the subject in Christ pre-exists (§§6-7 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.32-33) in glory (§7 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.46) and thus, strictly speaking, his flesh does not pre-exist (§12 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.42); Christ is a life-giving spirit and not a living soul (§§13,23 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.26-31); his incarnation is a *kenosis* and not an indwelling (§15 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.71); Christ is the creator of all (1 *Cor.*8.6) (§8 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.33); on earth he speaks and acts with divine authority (*Jn.*5.21) (§§20,26 cf. *Apodeixis* 58-60); Christ is a divine saviour who necessarily transcends the sin and corruption of what he saves (§2 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.93).

In the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius is equally concerned to explain how the same divine subject is *also* really Son of Man, but necessarily in a particular way: 'according to a human likeness'. The theses in the *Anacephalaeosis* which prove that Christ is God and Man (§§17-20) reflect the same concern, even though two earlier theses suggest that Christ is only 'man' by synonomy (§§4,16 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.45). In the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius explains the divine subject's real human likeness in terms of the divine Spirit's acquisition of real human flesh (Fr.19). In the *Anacephalaeosis*, his first explanation as to how Christ is God and 'man' offers the same answer: 'Divine Spirit was united with flesh' (§16). This explanation is based upon an anthropological analysis and, like the *Apodeixis*, accounts for Christ's humanity in terms of the *structural* similarity. We also find the other notions of human 'likeness' from the *Apodeixis* present in the *Anacephalaeosis.* Christ is like us because of the similarity/sameness of his human flesh to our 'bodies which are not

dissimilar' (§29). Omnipresent by implication is the idea that Christ is a 'man' according to the flesh because he is 'like a man' in the sense of 'not exactly the same as a man'. In *Anacephalaeosis* 16 Apollinarius' verb for the union is ἑνόω, but in §12 he describes the same divine action as the πρόσληψις of flesh. Apart from one verb in §21, Apollinarius prefers to describe the act of union as a uniting (§§12,16,28), taking (§§29,30) and conjoining (συνάπτω) (§§21,29), rather than describing it in more 'compositional' terms. This is typical of the more 'assumptional' analysis which is preferred in the other T. works. The main emphasis of §§29-30 is that the flesh is included in the enduring divine unity by means of a *possessive* conjunction: God is its 'owner' (οὗ). This way of understanding the Christological unity is, again, more typical of the T. works.

Anthropology

In the *Apodeixis* Apollinarius' Christological thesis is linked to a trichotomic analysis of man which can also be presented as a νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy. Whilst Apollinarius never makes explicit the same T. analysis in the *Anacephalaeosis* and, in particular, never speaks of the ψυχή as distinct from the mind or spirit, there are a number of reasons for assuming he has the same anthropological framework in mind (which is, no doubt, why scholars have placed these syllogisms among Apollinarius' T. works). In the final paragraph Apollinarius admits that Christ's flesh 'possesses the impulses which make war upon the mind' with allusion to the words of the Apostle in *Rom.*7.23. This is the very text which justifies his allocation of the carnal ψυχή to Christ (Fr.22) and man (Fr.88) in the *Apodeixis*, and it is probable that in the *Anacephalaeosis* he sees such a soul as the source of the rebellious impulses combated, therefore, not by the ψυχή of the monenergetic D. works (where the term denotes the entire motive principle), but by the νοῦς of the T. works, where Apollinarius gives a less animal and more volitional/ethical account of the 'guiding principle' in man and Christ. Two of the earlier syllogisms (§§10,11) confirm that Apollinarius has Paul's ethical νοῦς–σάρξ dichotomy in mind, when explaining how Christ differs from normal human beings, rather than the psychosomatic model of physical unity which we find in the D. writings. Thus when Apollinarius offers his only anthropological definition in *Anacephalaeosis* 16 – 'Man is a spirit, united with flesh' – it seems appropriate to identify this with the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy of the *Apodeixis*, 'man is a mind

enfleshed according to Paul' (Fr.72), and to understand πνεῦμα as equivalent to νοῦς (Fr.88) rather than ψυχή to which, according to this analysis, it is opposed. Such a dichotomy has a 'spiritualist' tendency (see *Tomus Synodalis*) and thus sits well with the keynote of the syllogistic deductions in the *Anacephalaeosis*: viz. Christ (*qua* spirit/νοῦς?) *is* the Son of God himself and not another. Whilst Apollinarius draws close to a νοῦς–σάρξ analysis of man in the *Anacephalaeosis* (§§10-11,16,30), it is interesting that he draws short of identifying the divine subject with the mind in Christ even in §30: 'they (the carnal impulses) are no more obedient to him (God) than mind'. When Apollinarius speaks earlier (§§10-11) about the division between mind and flesh in a man it is to show how Christ is *unlike* men.

Predication

The *communicatio idiomatum* does not feature prominently in the *Anacephalaeosis* and where it does Apollinarius offers the 'conventional' explanation which we find in the other T. works rather than the 'inclusive' one which is more typical of his D. treatises. In the syllogisms which prove Christ is both God and Man (§§17-20), divine and human attributes are both predicated of the same *subject* rather than the same divine-human physical 'whole'. Apollinarius spends §§1-15 demonstrating that this subject is God himself and not a man. There seems to be, therefore, something of a logical contradiction when the next group of syllogisms demonstrate that the subject in Christ is 'not only a man, nor only God'. Taken in isolation §§17-20 appear to indicate that Christ is an intermediary subject (person), the μέσος between God and man. Linguistically *Anacephalaeosis* 18 is the nearest that Apollinarius ever comes to recapitulating the highly compositional idea of Christ as μεσότης which we find in Fr.113. But the two ideas are not the same. In the latter syllogism, by using the Aristotelian notion of the medium between extremes and the *exemplum* of a hybrid animal as a model for the unity in Christ, Apollinarius arrives at the idea of one intermediate state (= generic nature?) in Christ, neither fully human nor fully divine. In *Anacephalaeosis* 18, Apollinarius uses a scriptural title (1 *Tim.*2.5; *Gal.*3.20) as proof that the (divine) subject in Christ is (in some sense) both God (already proved) and man. The theses which follow (§§22-27) return to an emphatic demonstration of the fact that the subject in Christ is divine and not human by nature. Thus, whilst on its own the idea

of the μέσος is symmetrical and potentially subordinationist, taken in context, we must draw the conclusion that Christ is 'not only God' in a different way from the way in which he is 'not only a man'. He is 'not only God' in the sense that, although he is identical with God in himself and according to his divine nature, he is also 'man' in respect of the human flesh which he has taken on/is united to. On the few occasions where Apollinarius does explain the mixed attributes of Christ, it is divisively according to this scheme (§§6,12,30).

Soteriology

In the *Anacephalaeosis*, more than any other work, soteriology *does* seem to provide the primary motive for Apollinarius' (subsequent) Christological conclusions, particularly if we take his deductive method of argument at face value, for many of his scriptural premises have soteriological implications (§§1,2,3,5,9,10,11,17,18,19,20,23,24,25,29,30). Nevertheless, it would be unwise to draw from these general conclusions. The *Anacephalaeosis* offers a highly stylised argument perhaps providing subsequent justification for a more expansive Christological thesis which has preceded it. We should also note how those theses which depart from the syllogistic format and play the key role in precipitating Apollinarius' overall Christological conclusion (§29) rest upon premises which are other than soteriological (§§ 4,6,12,16,21).

In the soteriological premises of the *Anacephalaeosis*, we find a number of the ideas which go to make up the *Soteriological Thesis* in the *Apodeixis* and which are alluded to in the other T. works. Rational human beings have fallen into a state of sin because of the division/conflict between flesh and mind (§§9-10 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.74,76). By their own free choice human beings/minds cannot escape this situation because they cannot 'successfully achieve true righteousness' (§24 cf. *KMP* 30 [*LV*]), and (consequently) man is subject to (physical corruption and) death (§3 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.93, *KMP* 30 [*LV*]). Neither can true righteousness be imposed upon human beings by divine compulsion (§25 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.74,87). As a result there is need of a divine Saviour not a man indwelt by God (§§1-2, cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.38). Salvation from sin and death comes because God is united to flesh/the body 'not dissimilar to ours' (§29 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.80) and divine Spirit (§16 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.19) (= mind §30 (?) cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.25, 76). Christ is thereby sinless since God/divine mind overcomes the carnal impulses (§30 (?) cf. *KMP* 30), or lacks the normal

'division'/conflict between mind and flesh which exists in man (§§10-11 cf. *Apodeixis* 74,76 (?) 88). This union between God/divine Spirit and flesh facilitates the demonstration of the highest righteousness/virtue (§25 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.80) and a vicarious (?) suffering and death according to the flesh (§§19,29 (?) cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.25), which is both a dying and raising up (§17 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.93), instating impassibility and immutability in the flesh (of Christ) (§§3,29 cf. *KMP* 2). The benefits of the salvation wrought in Christ's flesh (the 'first' incarnational phase) are subsequently bestowed upon others (the 'second phase'). How? Because we are physically included in Christ's representative flesh: 'the owner of the body gives us conjunction' (§29 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.93). But future salvation is also selective (§20), for it depends on Christ's moral judgment of human beings (§28. cf. *KMP* 12) and is therefore conditional upon receipt of the sacrament of baptism (§28 cf. *De Fide et Incarnatione* 5,7) and belief in the Incarnation: 'Therefore those who *believe* that God took flesh are also in possession of the benefits and do not change to that other (opinion) of those who hold what is contrary saying that a man was conjoined to God.'[12] Here, in what may well be the formal conclusion of the *Anacephalaeosis,* we find again evidence of the notion of 'appropriation by faith' (by acknowledgement of the true Faith) which comes to the fore in the *KMP* (see above).[13]

Thus within the theses of the *Anacephalaeosis* we find most of the elements of the two-stage theory of salvation which is typical of Apollinarius' T. works. They are not here fully synthesised into a single scheme due to the disrupted syllogistic style of Apollinarius' argument. Instead we find a number of scripturally derived notions which, when held together, point towards the type of thesis which we find in the *Apodeixis* and this may be indicative of the way such a scheme came together (or was deduced!) in Apollinarius' mind.

Evidence of the Compositional Conception of Unity in the Anacephalaeosis

The *Anacephalaeosis* displays many of the ideas which we find in the type of Christology Apollinarius expounds in the *Apodeixis* and the other T. works, but alongside these we find evidence of the 'compositional' conception of unity more typical of the D. writings. The compositional conception is juxtaposed rather than fully integrated with Apollinarius' more 'assumptional' understanding of the union and exerts a determining influence upon his

[12] L.p.246,ll.10-13.
[13] See pp.229-231,above.

grand conclusion (§29). The co-presence of this conception may explain why we sense a certain inconsistency between the deductions in §§1-15 and §§17-20, and between the grand conclusion (§29) and the subsequent proviso (§30), and why a level of ambiguity pertains to the spirit-flesh model for man and Christ in §16.

There is no evidence of the compositional conception of unity in the first fifteen syllogisms when Apollinarius sets out to demonstrate that Christ is God *per se* and not a man. The only hint of the monenergetic view typical of D. thesis comes in §§10-11 where Apollinarius asserts that there is no 'division' between the mind and the (spirit of the) flesh in Christ who, consequently, does not need to mortify the flesh. Apollinarius *may* make this assertion because he believes that in Christ the divine spirit supplies the entire motive, vital element and is united to passive flesh (i.e. a body) which lacks any rational, vital and emotional impulses of its own. This, therefore, is one way to interpret the spirit-flesh analysis of Christ as 'man' which follows in §16. On the other hand, the repeated emphasis upon the divinity of the subject in Christ and the persistence of his divine nature (§§1-15), the 'spiritualist character of Apollinarius' dichotomic formula – 'man *is* spirit – united to flesh' (§16), the presence of the term πρόσληψις (§12) to describe this unitive act, and the reference to a νοῦς–σάρξ dichotomy in human beings (§10) more strongly invites us to interpret §16 as the reference to the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος conception of Christ and man which we find in the *Apodeixis.*

The slight ambiguity which surrounds the interpretation of §16 on the basis of §§1-15 is further increased by the next group of syllogisms (§§17-20), which come to the conclusion that 'Christ is not only God, nor only man, but both God and man'. These syllogisms invite a more symmetrical understanding of the unity in Christ by their joint predication of divine and human attributes, as does most of all, the term μέσος, which linguistically (at least) points towards the compositional μεσότης conception of Christological unity which we find elsewhere. Interpreted in the light of §§17-20, the spirit-flesh dichotomy of §16 may be a reference to the unity of man/Christ as a psychosomatic whole which is characteristic of the D. works. Here we have the idea of one individual subject/being (person?) rather than one vital nature, but this subject is not, strictly speaking, divine or human. In the second premise of the next syllogism (§21), Apollinarius recapitulates his earlier deduction, 'Christ is God', perhaps to offset any misinterpretation of (§§17-20). However, in explaining how he is God (and *both* God and man) he turns to

compositional language: 'He is not a man operated by God but a body compounded (συντεθέν) to God'.[14] That Apollinarius may have his compositional idea of Christ/man as a psychosomatic unity in mind is indicated here not only by the verb but by the fact that he now refers to the carnal element (cf. §16) as a 'body'. The next two syllogisms also recapitulate arguments and ideas which are typical of Apollinarius' D. thesis of the unity. In §22 he refers to the uniqueness of Christ's virginal generation when demonstrating (by implication) that he is not a man. This proof is the same as the one which he brings against Diodore's dyophysite position when defending his D. doctrine of the 'highest unity' (Fr. 142); in *De Unione* the virginal conception is central to his explanation as to how Christ is constituted as one vital nature both divine and human. In §23 Christ's super-humanity is described in vitalistic terms. Christ is not a living soul, he makes alive, he is a life-giving spirit. Whilst the same Pauline text (1 *Cor.*15.45) is used in the *Apodeixis* to prove that Christ's spirit/mind is divine, in *De Unione* 2,12-13 it is used in connection with the virginal conception to underpin the idea that divine spirit supplies the vital part in Christ's unique nature in place of an animating human soul. In the *Anacephalaeosis* 23, the reference to 1 *Cor.*15.45 follows on from a reference to Christ's unique mode of virginal generation (§22) and precipitates the conclusion: 'he is not of our nature'.[15] Here Apollinarius may have in mind the alternative of a divine-human (composite) φύσις, such as we find in the D. works. The next theses (§§24-25) rather work against such an interpretation because they imply that Christ's nature is (not human since) divine (cf. §5). Thus, in the *Anacephalaeosis* Apollinarius' syllogisms lead him to reject the idea that Christ's nature is the same as ours, but, in so doing, they imply more than one alternative: this is because his nature is divine; this is because he is of a divine-human (composite) nature.

Apollinarius seems to be moving away from his more symmetrical understanding of Christ's unity towards the end of the *Anacephalaeosis* as he nears his final conclusion in §29: Christ is divine by nature (§24,25); Christ himself is God (§26); Christ is *not* a man (§27,28) or a man indwelt by God (§28). But when the question '*how* is he united?' is re-asked with reference to Matthew's statement about the Son of Man in heaven (§28), Apollinarius offers a final explanation which is expository rather than syllogistic and clearly framed in the same monenergetic terms as his compositional D. thesis. A man with 'movements' (κινήσεις), be they 'rational' (λογιστικαί) *or* '*vital*' (ζωτικαί) *or*

[14] L.p.244,ll.17-19.
[15] L.p.245,ll.5-6.

'emotional' (παθητικαί) is not conjoined to God. Rather, God takes flesh which is an 'organ of life' to which 'neither words nor actions belong'.[16] Here Apollinarius' conception and terminology are reminiscent of the highly compositional fragment from the *Contra Diodorum Ad Heraclium* (Fr.117). In other words, rather than a man with his own independent impulses, entirely passive flesh/a body[17] is conjoined (= compounded § 16) to God who supplies the motive component entire – not only rational, but vital and emotional. This is why God's body (and consequently our own) is strong against the sufferings: because it shares in the divine life (principle). (And this is why there is no separation between Christ's mind and flesh (§§10-11): because the latter *lacks* the carnal impulses and need not be mortified, because it lives and moves *entirely* by the *divine* life-principle (?).)

That Apollinarius is thinking along lines which are not only monenergetic and vitalistic, but also compositional in *Anacephalaeosis* 29, is evidenced most by the explanation which he offers as to why the body is worshipped: 'It is worshipped as the flesh of God, God being thus what is worshipped, and he, whose body it is, gives us conjunction, and it is not worshipped as a creature because no creature is *a part (μέρος) of God.*'[18] This is one of the most radically compositional statements which Apollinarius makes in any of the surviving material. We have noted how in one of the D. works he offers the paradoxical idea that the perfect Word plays the role of a part *towards the body* (*De Unione* 5) and how this idea seems to lie behind his asymmetrical notion of union by πρόσληψις in the *Apodeixis* (Fr.81[b], *Antirrheticus* 39), where *from the side of the flesh* the unitive action involves completion, but *not* from the side of the complete divine subject who initiates the action. Here, in *Anacephalaeosis* 29 the compounding works the other way round. The body is conjoined to God in the sense that it supplies *a part of Him.*

Given the compositional climax of the *Anacephalaeosis*, it is perhaps surprising that, in his anti-theopaschite *addendum* (§30), Apollinarius draws very close to advocating the specific role of νοῦς to God in the spirit-flesh union and seems to admit that Christ's flesh has non-intellectual 'impulses' (κινήσεις – 'emotional' and 'vital', i.e. a ψυχή?), which are not merely theoretical because 'they are no more obedient to him than to mind'.[19] He admits such impulses in order to predicate the (psychological?) passions to the divine subject's

[16] L.p.245,l.30-p.246,l.4.
[17] Apollinarius uses the terms σάρξ and σῶμα as if equivalent in *Anacephalaeosis* §29.
[18] L.p.246,ll.7-10.
[19] L.p.246,ll.13-17.

fleshly acquisition, rather than to God himself. Such an admission is strangely unsystematic with §10 and §29, and there is the possibility that the final paragraph has been subsequently tacked on by Apollinarius, or a later editor, to field a pertinent criticism of the conclusion reached in §29. The last statement in §29 has the appearance of a formal conclusion, recapitulating the main thesis, 'God took flesh', rejecting the false alternative, 'a man was conjoined to God', and making future salvation dependent on Faith (in the Apollinarian doctrine).

It may equally be the case that Apollinarius anticipated the theopaschite criticism and so appended §30 at the time of writing. If so, then this *addendum* to the *Anacephalaeosis* is reminiscent of certain fragments in the *Contra Diodorum KKB* wherein Apollinarius, while advocating his monenergetic D. thesis, is forced to admit some sort of independent agency within the human element to save the divinity from being compromised as the subject of a sub-divine action (Fr.130-131). In the context of the D. work, such adjustments are not entirely systematic and point towards the T. thesis, even though such a thesis does not appear to be entirely in place. In the light of *Anacephalaeosis* 30, the spirit-flesh dichotomy of §16 becomes, by implication, the νοῦς ἔνσαρκος dichotomy of the *Apodeixis*. But in the *Anacephalaeosis* the T. analysis of man is not spelt out, neither is the νοῦς-σάρξ analysis of man in §30 applied directly to Christ. It is interesting to note that Apollinarius makes the adjustment in §30 in anticipation of, or in response to, the criticism that his monenergetic thesis is theopaschite – and in so doing he turns to the idea of the νοῦς at war with the carnal impulses. This is precisely the reason specified by Rufinus when recording the fact that Apollinarius revised his anthropological model.[20]

How Should the Anacephalaeosis Be Regarded? – Conclusions

Given the presence of many ideas which are typical of the T. works, and yet, given the co-presence of a concluding explanation of the unity in §29 which is much more reminiscent of the doctrine in the D. works, and given that this is again adjusted in §30, it is unsurprising that scholars have disagreed when it comes to the 'classification' of the *Anacephalaeosis*. Riedmatten and Norris place the document among Apollinarius' T. works[21] and must

[20] Rufinus,*H.E.*2.20(*MPL*21.526C-527A).
[21] Riedmatten[2],p.209 n.[1];Norris,p.83.

therefore interpret the dichotomy advocated in §16 in the light of the final paragraph (§30), which introduces the idea of the νοῦς and its conflict with fleshly impulses. Lietzmann prefers to place the *Anacephalaeosis* among Apollinarius' D. works: 'In spite of the numerous echoes of the *Apodeixis*, we probably do not have an excerpt in front of us: the clearly marked dichotomy in thesis 16 indicates the first period as the time of composition.'[22] Thus it may be fairest to say that in the *Anacephalaeosis* we have an interesting piece of deductive reasoning, probably written by Apollinarius himself, which lacks a context and lacks a 'category'. Here we find a series of syllogistic arguments offered to prove (variously) Apollinarius' basic Christological beliefs, especially about what is *not* the case. Because the syllogisms are self-contained and categorical, they precipitate a number of (over) bold deductive conclusions which are not entirely compatible. When it comes to showing who Christ is and how, the theses do not throw up one explanation but both the symmetrical/compositional idea and the assumptional idea, juxtaposed rather than fully integrated. Despite the presence of the term νοῦς (§§10,30), there is not sufficient evidence that the T. anthropology is actually in place as a Christological model. Neither are there sufficient grounds for believing that προσλαμβάνω (§12) is present as a key technical term: Apollinarius is equally happy to refer to the incarnational action as a non-specific λῆψις (§§29,30). In §12 he speaks of the πρόσληψις of flesh by 'the divinity' rather than the divine subject, which is his more characteristic usage in the T. works. At the conclusion of the work, when Apollinarius answers the question 'How is Christ united?', we find the monenergetic compositional D. solution (§29) moderated by an anti-theopaschite statement which implies the not entirely systematic νοῦς-ἔνσαρκος (T.) solution. The dialectic between the two types of solution and between the individual logical deductions may be a genuine representation – albeit stylised – of the type of reasoning going on in Apollinarius' mind as he struggled with the Christological paradox. Whilst the compositional idea of unity still sits in Apollinarius' overall conclusion (§29), it is possible to see from the work as a whole how it is giving ground to the other view of unity. The primary emphasis is upon the divine subject and nature and his taking of flesh, and this leads away from, or revises, the symmetrical idea of a composite nature from divine and human parts. Thus we find in the *Anacephalaeosis* more asymmetrical versions of this idea: God united to his flesh, not a μεσότης, but the μέσος (§18); the body as a part, not of a divine-human whole – but of a

[22] L.p.145.

subject (God) since it is 'his' (§29); God's *taking* of flesh/a body (§12,29,30) which is thereby *compounded* to God (§21).

Appendix 4

CHRONOLOGY

Analysis of a series of Apollinarian texts and what little we know about their individual circumstances has led to a 'developmental' hypothesis. It is important to show more precisely that such an interpretation is, at least, not impossible given what else is known with some certainty about the chronology of the life, works and politics of Apollinarius of Laodicea and those who opposed him.

To this end I here place in a possible chronological sequence significant facts which can be established about the theological, political and literary activities of Apollinarius of Laodicea, those influenced by him and those opposed to him. I will indicate the relative 'certainty' of such facts in one of four ways:

**When the fact is established securely by reliable ancient witnesses and/or modern scholarly consensus it is marked thus – **.

*When the fact is established by deduction from information supplied by reliable ancient witnesses and/or is generally supported by modern scholarship it is marked thus – *.

(?) When the 'fact' is established by an ancient witness who may be unreliable, and/or by a modern deductive argument which is not conclusive because it is based on a possibly unreliable witness and/or internal evidence it is marked thus – **(?)**.

(??) When the 'fact' has been established by modern scholarship by internal doctrinal analysis alone, and/or by more speculative interpretation of information supplied by ancient witnesses it is marked thus – **(??)**.

[After each such 'fact' the significant ancient witnesses and/or modern authorities are noted and/or some indication is given of the bases for conclusions established by more deductive means.]

A Suggested Chronological Sequence for the Theological, Literary and Political Activities of Apollinarius, his Followers and Those Who Opposed Him c.346-90.

*(1)***October 346: Athanasius visited Laodicea when returning from his second exile. He formed a friendship with Apollinarius** a reader in the Church who was consequently excommunicated by George – the Arian bishop of Laodicea. Thereafter Apollinarius enjoyed a good reputation for orthodoxy among those who opposed Arianism.

[Sozomen, *H.E.*6.25; Epiphanius, *Panarion 77*, 2.1.]

(2)*c.348-351: Diodore (later of Tarsus) and Flavianus, two influential lay ascetics, zealously upheld the 'true religion' at Antioch after Constantius II appointed Leontius as Arian bishop. They opposed the ordination of the ultra-Arian Actius to the diaconate.

[Theodoret, *H.E.*2.19; Philostorgius, *H.E.*3.27.]

(3)(?)c.352: Apollinarius began to advocate a novel doctrine of Christ at Laodicea.

[Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep.102 (c.382): '[his] faith began thirty years ago'. Compare Socrates, *H.E.*2.46 which suggests that the Apollinarii developed their doctrine when Bishop George vacillated over Seleucia c.359.]

(4)(??)c.352-362: An Apollinarian doctrine which denied Christ's possession of a rational and sentient human ψυχή and explained the incarnational union in a compositional way spread northwards from Laodicea to Antioch; it gained influence among the 'orthodox' ('semi-Arian') congregation for whom Diodore and Flavianus were spokesmen; it proved useful to the Arians; it met early resistance from the 'Eustathian' faction under Paulinus (and possibly from Diodore and Flavianus).

[The presence of the Apollinarian delegates at the Council of Alexandria (*Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 11) indicates Apollinarian links by 362 with the Antiochene faction from which the Vitalians later emerge; *Tomus* 7's 'second stipulation' seems aimed at the Apollinarian D. Christology. Eudoxius' Arian Creed (see pp.252-253, above) betrays Apollinarian influence (c.360, Mühlenberg, p.61). *Tomus* 7's 'first' and 'second' stipulation seem aimed at the psilanthropist dualism of Paulinus' faction. Paulinus is most keen to endorse the anti-Apollinarian/Arian stipulation (*Tomus* 11). The Council of Alexandria is not concerned to resolve a monophysite-dyophysite argument, nor does the *Tomus* mention Diodore or Flavianus. If such an argument exists c.352-362 it may be internal to the 'Semi-Arian' faction at Antioch.]

(5)(??)c.352-362: Among other treatises upon Christology which are no longer extant Apollinarius wrote the D. works *Ep. Ad Dionysium A.* and *De Unione.* The *Epistle* was written to a clerical associate who had reported a new type of *dyophysite* dualism advocated by those who Apollinarius previously believed to be 'orthodox' in their incarnational views. In the *Epistle* Apollinarius attacked the new type of 'Samosatanism' and advocated a compositional monophysite thesis referring to the example of a singular human nature. *De Unione* offered a fuller explanation of the same D. doctrine explaining in more detail the psychosomatic model and explaining its miraculous inception with reference to the virginal conception understood on quasi-traducian lines.

[The early dating of *Ep. Ad Dionysium A* is suggested by Apollinarius' surprise: 'I am amazed having heard tell of some men...' (§1) '...for they say, as I hear, "Two Natures"' (§2). When writing *Ad Jovianum*, Apollinarius denounces the two natures fallacy together with the two sons error in the opening paragraph, indicating that he *was* familiar with dyophysitism *by Autumn 363.* The 'biological thesis' of *De Unione* 12-13 must also have been devised prior to 363 because it is plainly alluded to in *Ad Jovianum* 1-2 (L.p.251,ll.9-13) together with the key proof text *Lk.*1.35 (cf. *De Unione* 1).]

(6)*c.360: Apollinarius became a bishop (of the pro-Nicene faction) at Laodicea (having been commended by Athanasius) in the period after the dethronement of George who had moderated his Arianism and consequently vacillated over whether to accept the *homoion* formula of Seleucia. Acacius of Caesarea ordained another – Pelagius of Laodicea – as George's successor. Thus c.360 Apollinarius was one of two Bishops of Laodicea. In spite of his 'Arian' ordination, Pelagius enjoyed a long association with Meletius of Antioch and soon moved closer to the ('New') Nicene position.

[Apollinarius' status as 'bishop' (362) is attested by *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 11. See also Leontius, *Adv.Fraudes* 138; Jerome: 'Bishop of Laodicea' (*De Viris Illustribus* 104). Leontius (*Adv.Fraudes* 138) and Facundus (*Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum* 7.3) refer to a journey made by Timothy (of Berytus) to Rome and Athanasius' endorsement. The overthrow of George and ordination of Pelagius: Socrates, *H.E.*2.39,40,46; Philostorgius, *H.E.*5.1. The association of Meletius and Pelagius c.363: see Socrates, *H.E.*3.25.]

(7)360-362: The Antiochene Schism.** Factional divisions at Antioch hardened and became plain to see when Constantius II made Meletius of Sebaste Bishop of Antioch because he had signed up to Seleucia and then exiled him because of his 'New-Nicene' leanings. The 'Meletian' congregation remained loyal and established their church in the 'Old Town'. The Emperor appointed Euzoius as Arian Bishop. The 'Old Nicene' Eustathian congregation was led by presbyter Paulinus who was in communion with Alexandria and who was ordained as third Antiochene Bishop in 362.

[Socrates,*H.E.*2.44; 3.6; Sozomen,*H.E.*4.28; Theodoret,*H.E.*2.31; Philostorgius,*H.E.*5.1; Epiphanius, *Panarion 73*, 28-34.]

(8)c.361-363: Apollinarius, as Bishop of Laodicea, and Diodore, as spokesman for the Meletian congregation at Antioch, both acquired further renown by resisting Julian the Apostate's pagan revival.**

[The Apollinarii, with great ingenuity, represented Christian literature in classical forms: Socrates, *H.E* 3.16; Julian, *Ep.*42. Julian encountered robust and philosophical opposition from Diodore, a 'charlatan priest', at Antioch (Julian, *Ep.*55); see also Facundus, *ProDef.Tr.Cap.* 4.2, *MPL*67.621AB.]

(9)362: The Council of Alexandria.** Representatives of Paulinus' 'Old Nicene' Antiochene faction and the 'Meletians' (those who gathered in the 'Old Town'), including monks sent by Bishop Apollinarius, discussed their Trinitarian and Christological differences. They were united in their rejection of Arianism and acceptance of the Nicene Creed and agreed to overlook their terminological differences; they signed up to a Christological formula *(Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7*)* with three 'stipulations'. **(?)** These were designed to limit the 'dualistic' tendency of the 'Eustathian' Christology espoused by the 'Old Nicenes' and the 'Arian' tendency of the

Christology, espoused by (some) Meletians in association with Apollinarius, which implicated the Word in change by denying Christ's human ψυχή.

[Athanasius, *Tomus Ad Antiochenos.* This interpretation of *Tomus* 7 follows the traditional view and is based on analysis of the whole Athanasian text (see p.84,n.[101], pp.251-253,above). It is *not* the only interpretation of the *Tome* or the Synod's purpose: see (e.g.) Mühlenberg, pp.223-230; Young, F., *Nicaea to Chalcedon*, p.79.]

(10)362: The ultra-Nicene Lucifer of Cagliari went to Antioch before the arrival of the *Tome* and ordained Paulinus bishop thereby deepening the schism.**

[Socrates,*H.E.*3.5-6; Theodoret,*H.E.*3.2.]

(11)*c.360-363: St. Basil corresponded with Apollinarius seeking and receiving theological advice as to how the '*homoousion*' of the Father and Son should be understood (**(?)** in the aftermath of the anti-Nicene Arian Councils 359-360).

[See Basil, *Epp.*361-364. The case for the authenticity of this correspondence has been convincingly made *contra* Lietzmann (pp.20-21): see Prestige, *Basil and Apollinaris*, pp.1-37; Riedmatten, 'La Correspondance' *JTS, NS7*, pp.199-210. Mühlenberg also argues for this approximate dating and context (pp.39-40) with good reason given the content of *Ep.*361.]

(12) June 363-February 364: The Reign of Jovian**. Elected Emperor on the Persian front, Jovian published an 'Edict of Toleration' (September), allowing for the reinstitution of Christianity. He stayed at Antioch from October to December and was petitioned by representatives of the various church factions (e.g. the 'Nicenes', the Arians, the 'Macedonians' and the 'Acacians') who were keen to persuade him of the 'orthodoxy' of their own particular version of the Faith.

[Socrates, *H.E.*3.22,24-26; Sozomen, *H.E.*6.3-6; Theodoret, *H.E.*4.1-4; Ammianus Marcellus, 25.4-10; Athanasius, *Ep.*56; Themistius, *Oration* 5.]

(13) Autumn 363: Apollinarius wrote the D. work *Ad Jovianum***, sending the Emperor a confessional formulation of the same virginal-conception-based monophysite doctrine which he had developed more fully in *De Unione*. He rejected the false alternative of two sons and two natures and, by anathema, disassociated his own doctrine from that of those who change or confuse the divinity or say that the flesh is superhuman.

[The dating and context is fixed by (12), above.]

(14) Autumn 363: Meletius (back from his first exile) gave his assent to the Nicene Creed at the Synod of Antioch** in the presence of Jovian together with leading members of the '*homoean*' party (e.g. Acacius of Caesarea), who (unlike the Macedonians) also decided to moderate their position to win favour with the new Emperor. Another

signatory was Pelagius of Laodicea. Thus the head of the Antiochene faction associated with Apollinarius established a political connection with his episcopal rival at Laodicea.
[Socrates,*H.E.*3.25; Sozomen,*H.E.*6.3.]

(15)*Autumn 363: Athanasius failed to re-establish communion with Meletius and renewed his support for Paulinus who was uninterested in reunion. The church at Antioch remained divided in spite of the initiative of Jovian and Athanasius and Meletius' shift toward the Nicene position at the Synod of Antioch.
[Basil,*Ep.*258.3*; Ep.*89.2; Rufinus,*H.E.*2.21.]

(16)364: Valens, Arian Emperor of the East (364-378), went to Antioch** and persecuted those who acknowledged the '*homoousion*' and who refused the Arian Bishop Euzoius. He sent Meletius into a fourteen year exile and left Paulinus 'unmolested because of his eminent piety'.
[Socrates, *H.E.*4.2 (E.T. Schaff, p.97); Sozomen, *H.E.*6.7; Theodoret, *H.E.*4.21.]

(17)*c.364-378: Diodore and Flavianus, as presbyters in the Meletian congregation at Antioch, played a key role in sustaining Meletius' flock against Arianism ((?) and other false doctrines e.g. Apollinarianism) and the brutality of Valens.
[See Socrates,*H.E* 4.17; Theodoret,*H.E.*4.22*:* 'Diodore in his wisdom and courage like a clear and mighty river watered his own and drowned out the blasphemies of his opponents' (E.T. Jackson, p.127); John Chrysostom also records that great numbers were 'fed by Diodore's sound doctrine' (*Laus Diodori* 4.3); Theodoret's account of Flavianus exposing the heresy of Apollinarius may be more literary than factual: see *H.E.*5.3.]

(18)(??)c.364-377: Apollinarius and Diodore, both enjoying reputation and influence within the leaderless Meletian party at Antioch, argued with one another over Christological doctrine and Apollinarius wrote his works *Contra Diodorum.* Apollinarius upheld his monophysite D. thesis in letters to his supporters (e.g. *Ad Heraclium)* and in polemical works directly addressed to Diodore. (ΠΔ α΄ and β΄). Diodore criticised Apollinarius' doctrine of the 'highest unity' on the grounds that it undermined the divinity of the Word by compounding him with flesh on the basis of a psychosomatic analogy. Diodore advocated an alternative dyophysite view of an 'assumptional' union 'by grace', which he tried to differentiate from the perceived 'two sons' dualism of the Paulinists. In reaction to Diodore's criticism Apollinarius qualified his compositional D. thesis (see *KKB*), introducing apologetic arguments which pointed away from it and which contained ideas and terminology suggestive of a revised (T.) thesis.

[This early dating sequence for the controversy with Diodore is based upon analysis of the *Ctr.Diodorum* fragments (see pp.71-83,above) and certain fragments of Diodore's own work. The proximity of Apollinarius and Diodore as defenders of the true faith *contra mundum*, both connected with the same leaderless Antiochene faction, rather suggests the inevitability of their collision. Jerome attests that Apollinarius himself was lecturing at Antioch c.373-374 (*Ep.*84.3: dating, L.p.15, Raven, p.139), and Apollinarius cultivated the support of the Meletian presbyter Vitalis (Socrates, *H.E.*6.25). Diodore, like Meletius, may have established links with Pelagius and his congregation at Laodicea. Pelagius and Diodore were certainly rewarded together when Meletius returned (see Theodoret, *H.E.*5.4; Socrates, *H.E.*5.8). This early dating and sequence is not beyond question because the sources have completely decontextualised the Apollinarian and Diodorean fragments which relate to this controversy. Diodore's *Contra Synousiastas* fragments may belong to a later period (see pp.421-422, below).]

(19)*c.367-371: The D. Christology of Apollinarius was spread beyond Laodicea and Antioch by certain disciples who travelled to Cyprus and further afield ((??) e.g. Corinth and Egypt).

[The arrival of 'young' Apollinarians in Cyprus is recorded by Epiphanius Bishop of Salamis (367-403) in *Panarion 77,* 2. Lietzmann believes that Epiphanius' report indicates that these disciples were spreading Apollinarian doctrine in both its D. and T. forms (L.p.11), but the controversial articles of belief described by Epiphanius *all* clearly derive from the D. thesis: (i) Christ had a heavenly body; (ii) Christ did not assume a human ψυχή; (iii) the body is consubstantial with divinity (*Panarion 77,* 2.4-5). The disagreement/uncertainty (αμφεβάλλετω) between the Apollinarians reported by Epiphanius is not between (three) different types of doctrine but over how far the D. thesis should be followed to its consubstantialist conclusion. Epiphanius' report indicates that Cyprus was not the only place troubled by 'consubstantialist' Apollinarianism: 'it threw the east into great turmoil' (*Panarion 77,* 2.5, E.T. Williams, p.569). Epictetus, Bishop of Corinth, took memoranda at the Synod precipitated by the spread of this doctrine. Thus, Apollinarian missionaries may have reached Corinth and Thmuis in Egypt, for Serapion was sent a copy of Athanasius' *Ad Epictetum* which offers official comment upon the memoranda and the novel (Apollinarian) doctrine. When Apollinarius writes to Serapion, the latter appears to have been influenced by one with 'consubstanialist' views (see Fr.161).]

(20)(?)c.369-370: A Christological controversy was precipitated in the East because disciples disseminating the D. Christology of Apollinarius asserted that Christ's body was *'homoousios'* with the divinity. A Synod was convened and there was a discussion between these 'consubstantialists' and certain dualist critics. The synod failed to condemn effectively the views of either group since they (e.g. Epictetus) lacked experience and expertise in the field of Christology. Consequently Epictetus sent his 'memoranda' (i.e. the 'Minutes' of the Synod) to Athanasius informing him of the Christological debate, hoping for some authoritative guidance upon the 'orthodox' position.

['Some even dared to say that Christ's body was co-essential (ὁμοούσιον) with his Godhead and threw the east into great turmoil; it became necessary to call a council (σύνοδον) and condemn persons of this kind' (Epiphanius, *Panarion* 77, 2.5, E.T. Williams, p.569). Reacting to Epictetus' 'memoranda' ('υπομνήματα' in *Ad Epictetum* 2-3 (*MPG*26.1052C-1053C) = 'the minutes taken' (ὑπομήματα πέπρακται) in *Panarion* 77, 2.6, see Holl, p.417, l.16), Athanasius condemns the dualists as well as the 'consubstantialists'. He criticises Epictetus for the Synod's failure to properly condemn such views (*Panarion 77,* 2.6; *Ad Epictetum* 3). The Apollinarians and the dualists seem to have reached some sort of truce at the Synod (*Ad Epictetum* 12). For dating, see (22), below.]

(21)(??) c.369-370: *De Fide et Incarnatione* was written by Apollinarius on behalf of his 'Synod' affirming the D. Christology with the help of soteriological arguments

and ambiguous formulae for the unity. He clarified his nominal-but-real attribution of 'divine consubstantiality' to the flesh in reply to those who might wish to 'disparage the Lordly and saving flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ on the pretext of the "*homoousion*"'.

[This estimate of the context of *De Fide et Incarnatione* rests primarily on analysis of the text (see pp.88-97,above). Apollinarius seems to be responding to Nicene criticism of his D. thesis, but he does not disown allegiance to consubstantially divine flesh as unequivocally as he does in *Ad Serapionem* (Fr.159-160) which may indicate that *De Fide et Incarnatione* was written before Athanasius' *Ep. Ad Epictetum* had been circulated. The Apollinarian 'Synod' mentioned in *De Fide et Incarnatione* 3 may be the post-schism (379) Synod alluded to by Gregory Nazianzus in *Carmen De Vita Sua* 609-619, but it could equally be a pre-schism gathering of churchmen sympathetic to Apollinarius' views. Athanasius refers to a recent proliferation of diverse (Arian?) Synods of dubious authority and orthodox councils, condemning them (*Ad Epictetum* 1), and his epistle is a response to a 'Synod' attended by Apollinarians and dualists which he only knows about via Epictetus' report.]

(22)*c.370-371: Athanasius wrote the *Ep. Ad Epictetum* in response to the Bishop of Corinth's report about a Christological controversy between two groups. He 'wrote plainly about the faith and denounced those who were saying those things and making trouble' (*Panarion 77*, 2.7, E.T. Williams, p.569). The focus of his attack was the 'consubstantialist' fallacy and he developed several lines of criticism against this (and other aspects of the Apollinarian D. Christology) recommending the divine Word's assumption/ possession of flesh as the true understanding of the incarnational 'becoming'. He made it absolutely clear that those confessing the 'consubstantial divinity' of Christ's body stand outside the Nicene Faith. He sent the letter to Epictetus with the instruction that he should read it publicly at Corinth; it was then circulated, e.g. to Serapion at Thmuis and Apollinarius at Laodicea.

['The fathers who also assembled at Nicaea say that, not the body, but the Son Himself is coessential with the Father...Either then deny the Synod of Nicaea...or, if you wish to be children of the fathers, do not hold the contrary of what they wrote' (*Ad Epictetum* 4, E.T.Robertson, p.571). The instruction for public reading: see *Ad Epictetum* 12. The circulation: see Apollinarius' *Ep. Ad Serapionem* (Fr.159). *Dating of the Ep. Ad Epictetum*: Raven (pp.102-110) argues for c.360-361, but the majority of scholars prefer a later date, e.g. Voisin (p.62)369-370; Lietzmann (p.11)371; Kelly (*Creeds*, p.334)370-371. It seems more likely that the recent Roman Synod mentioned in *Ad Epictetum* 1 is that of Damasus which condemned Auxentius of Milan (Williams,p.569,n.[5]). The view that Athanasius is attacking a doctrine very similar to the Apollinarian D. thesis is based upon analysis of the *Ad Epictetum* (see p.97,p.247,pp.250-251,pp.255-256,above), Epiphanius' report (*Panarion* 77,1-2) written shortly after, and Apollinarius' reaction. There is a marked revision of his use of 'substantialist' language (if not also his doctrine) after *Ad Epictetum:* compare *Ad Serapionem* Fr.160-161, *Ad Terentium* Fr.163, *Ad Dionysium B* with *De Unione* 8, *Contra Diodorum* Fr.117,119,126/46.]

(23)*c.371-373: Apollinarius wrote the *Ep. Ad Serapionem* making it plain that he agreed with Athanasius' denunciation of 'consubstantialist' Christology. He advised Serapion, who had been influenced by another (Apollinarian), to speak of the unity of the divinity with flesh in a more precise and apposite way using the terminology of πρόσληψις rather than φύσις.

['The flesh is divine by the union with the Word not by nature (φύσει)' (Fr.160);'it is better to say that He has taken on (προσείληφεν) flesh which is consubstantial with us...possessing distinctiveness through the union' (Fr.161). Mühlenberg (p.62) notes Serapion's own 'consubstantialist' tendency.]

(24)(??)c.371-376: Apollinarius abandoned his D. doctrine of the union having come to recognise its expositional inadequacies due to Diodore's criticisms, Arian appropriation, the theological controversy caused by his 'consubstantialist' supporters and the unequivocal critique published by his longstanding friend and anti-Arian ally Athanasius. In sympathy with Athanasius' suggestion that the divine assumption/possession of real human flesh is a true understanding of the mode of the union he began to give more emphasis to this theme, stressing his belief in the divine (πρόσληψις) of flesh to differentiate his own, more nuanced, position from that of the 'consubstantialists'. He developed certain ideas which had proved useful in his apologetic response to Diodore's criticism and the T. Christology emerged.

[This 'conclusion' is based upon my textual analysis of *Contra Diodorum* (*KKB*) (pp.75-83, above) and the Athanasian argument and its target in *Ad Epictetum*, and the evident contrast between the ambivalent position towards the 'consubstantially divine' flesh in some of the D. documents (*De Unione* 8,Fr.117,119,126/146,116(?)) and Apollinarius' unequivocal rejection of such an idea in documents after 371 (e.g. *Ad Serapionem; Ad Terentium; Tomus Synodalis).* It may not be possible to date the 'moment' of the D. to T. 'conversion' with the precision of Voisin (p.77) – 'vers 374, il y avait renoncé [sc. la dichotomie] et professait la trichotomie' – but Apollinarius' receipt of the *Ad Epictetum* appears to have been a significant moment. In what remains of *Ad Serapionem* (c.371-373) the concept of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh is present, but we cannot determine the anthropological framework. In the *Ancoratus,* written c.374 (see Voisin, p.70; Richard, p.9; Williams, vol.1, intro.xiii), Epiphanius is the first to speak of the error of 'some people' who say that the νοῦς is what scripture calls the 'spirit,' contrasting this with the ψυχή on the basis of 1 *Thess.*5.23 and substituting the Word for the νοῦς/spirit in Christ (see Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* 77, (*MPG*43.161B). His identification of this group as 'Diomoeritae'/Apollinarians (*Ancoratus* 13) may have been copied in after he had written the *Panarion* (c.375-378) (see, Voisin, p.70,n^2). Apollinarius' explicit identification of the Word with Christ's νοῦς in *Ad Diocaesareenses* 2 indicates that his T. analysis was certainly in place c.376 and Epiphanius finds Vitalis upholding such a doctrine when he visits Antioch to find out what the Apollinarians believe c.376: see *Panarion* 77, 23.1-2.]

(25) May 373: Athanasius died at Alexandria and was succeeded by Peter.**

[Rufinus, *H.E.*2.3. Sozomen, *H.E.*6.19. Jerome (*Chronicle II*) places Peter's consecration in the ninth year of Valens' reign.]

(26)c.373-374: Lucius was consecrated Arian bishop of Alexandria by Euzoius of Antioch with the support of Valens. Renewed persecution of the Nicene party in Egypt followed.** Peter fled to Rome. Those, including desert monks, who confessed the '*homoousion*' were harried and killed. Eleven Egyptian bishops (the 'Confessors') were forced into exile in Palestinian Diocaesarea.

[Socrates,*H.E.*4.21-22,24; Sozomen,*H.E.*6.19-20; Theodoret,*H.E.*44.18-19; Jerome,*Ep.*15.]

(27)*c.373-374: Apollinarius lectured at Antioch. Jerome was impressed by his teaching detecting no 'unorthodoxy' in his doctrine.

[Jerome, *Ep.*84.3. Lietzmann, (p.15) dates Jerome's travels in Palestine/Syria c.373-374, also Voisin (p.80). Mühlenberg (p.56,n.[3]) prefers 377.]

(28)*c.373-376: 'The Eustathius Affair'. The radical '*Homoiousian*' Eustathius of Sebaste fell out politically with Basil of Caesarea ostensibly over the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. To undermine Basil's attempt at the reunification of 'moderate' elements within the Eastern Church, and to discredit those who were moving closer to the Nicene party, Eustathius accused Basil of Sabellianism, producing an anonymous passage of 'Sabellian' exposition as evidence. Basil named Apollinarius as the author and denied that he had had any recent or theological correspondence with Apollinarius, although he did not unequivocally condemn Apollinarius himself. The 'Sabellian' passage was probably a Eustathian paraphrase of what Apollinarius had actually written and Basil was less than transparent about his relationship with Apollinarius since he had written to him for theological advice c.360-363 (see (11), above) about the 'consubstantial' unity of Father and Son and may have again sought it more recently ((**?**) in the 370s) *vis-à-vis* the 'consubstantial' status of the Holy Spirit.

[This scenario has been convincingly reconstructed by Mühlenberg (pp.26-44) via analysis of a series of letters written by Basil (c.373-376): *Epp.*129,131,223,224,226,244,250; see also Sozomen,*H.E.*6.21.]

(29)*c.375-377: Those within the Meletian community at Antioch who had been influenced by Apollinarius' Christological teaching split away to form their own congregation (a fourth Antiochene faction) under the much respected presbyter Vitalis; this occurred when fellow Meletian Flavianus took steps to prevent the regular communication between Vitalis and the Bishop of Laodicea. The Vitalians worked to establish their theological and political legitimacy by various means (see (30), (31), (33), below) and Vitalis was consecrated as the third 'orthodox' Bishop of Antioch (by Apollinarius).

[Sozomen, *H.E.*6.25 reports this cause of the Vitalian secession, and Raven (p.146) thinks the anecdote may hold some truth. The approximate dating is indicated by Jerome (*Epp.*15,16) who informs Damasus (c.376, see Mühlenberg, p.47) that three men are claiming to be rightful bishop of Antioch. When Epiphanius visits Antioch (c.376-377) he meets with 'the Bishop Vitalis' – *Panarion 77,*20.3. Theodoret, (*H.E.*5.4) describing a later event, mentions that Apollinarius 'had already ordained Vitalis at Antioch'.]

(30)*375-376: Terentius, a general in Valens' army with 'orthodox' Christian sympathies, was appointed *Comes Orientis* and visited Antioch. Apollinarius sent him the *Ep. Ad Terentium* to assure him of the orthodoxy of his own doctrine (as held by the Vitalian faction at Antioch). He contrasted his own doctrine of the heavenly son's προσληψις of flesh with two false alternatives – a 'consubstantialist' doctrine of the union and a two-persons dualism – thus disassociating himself from the views of those

'consubstantialist' Apollinarians already condemned by Athanasius and also the type of Christological error implicit in the doctrine of the other two 'orthodox' Antiochene factions.

[Basil's *Ep.*214, also addressed to Terentius, confirms that the *Comes* was staying in Antioch – c.376: (see Mühlenberg, p.50). Basil commends Meletius to Terentius. See also Theodoret, *H.E.*4.29.]

(31)c.376: Vitalis ((?) prior to being ordained Apollinarian Bishop of Antioch) visited Rome to win support for the Apollinarian congregation at Antioch** and the orthodoxy of its beliefs. Pope Damasus requested a Vitalian creedal statement and, initially, this met his approval. Damasus gave Vitalis a letter of recommendation to take to Paulinus. After Vitalis had gone Damasus sent a presbyter, Petronius, to Paulinus with another letter admitting that his approval of Vitalis had been too hasty. Damasus sent a third letter, *Per Filium*, containing a formulary which he instructed Paulinus to make Vitalis sign as a necessary preliminary for establishing communion with him.

[This sequence of events can be established from the content of Damasus' *Per Filium Meum Vitalem (*see Coustant, P., *Epistulae Romanorum Pontificum*, Paris,1721,p.507). Gregory of Nazianzus (*Ep.*102) mentions the Vitalian creed handed to Damasus. Basil (*Ep.*129), writing to Meletius (early 376 – see Mühlenberg, p.47), seems to allude to Vitalis' mission to Rome when he instructs Meletius to urge the Western church 'not to receive indiscriminately the communion of those coming from the East...who write down the Creed as supposed proof of orthodoxy' (E.T. Deferrari, *LCL* 215, p.289). Basil's *Epp.*214, 216 mention that Paulinus (376) is boasting of a letter from the West. Whether Vitalis visited Rome before or after his consecration remains open to question: see L.p.56; L., *History of the Early Church*, vol. III, pp.27-28; Mühlenberg, p.48.]

(32)*c.376-377: Epiphanius of Salamis visited Antioch to find out the true nature of Apollinarian Christology as advocated by its leaders, as opposed to the 'young' disciples who had brought the 'consubstantialist' D. doctrine to Cyprus c.370 ((?) and more recently (c.374) a doctrine which denied Christ's human νοῦς). On arrival at Antioch Epiphanius also attempted to re-unify two apparently 'orthodox' parties by (unsuccessfully) arbitrating between Paulinus and Vitalis. Paulinus demonstrated his orthodoxy against Vitalis' charge of Sabellianism. Paulinus accused Vitalis of denying the completeness of Christ's humanity, and when Epiphanius interviewed the Apollinarian bishop he found that he indeed espoused a novel (T.) doctrine, which admitted that the divine Word took real flesh from Mary and a human ψυχή, but which denied that he took a human νοῦς since this was replaced by the divinity. Epiphanius argued against this doctrine using scriptural proofs of the full humanity and he also called into question the anthropological premises of the Apollinarians: e.g. that the νοῦς is what scripture calls 'the spirit' and that the mind *per se* is an 'hypostasis', rather than 'some kind of energy' which moves the whole human hypostasis. The Vitalians were unconvinced. Epiphanius returned to Cyprus and completed the *Panarion*, his major

work against the heresies. In the chapter against the Apollinarians, he described his encounter with Apollinarianism in Cyprus and at Antioch, and confirmed that the 'godly' Apollinarius was indeed the source of the new and divisive heresy. In the latter half of the chapter Epiphanius developed his own critique of the Apollinarian T. Christology as found at Antioch acknowledging that Apollinarius himself (c.377) would no doubt reject the cruder error of his 'consubstantialist' disciples.

[Epiphanius' visit to Antioch, recorded in *Panarion* 77,20.2-24.5, is confirmed by Basil's *Ep.*258 to Epiphanius (written late summer 376, see Mühlenberg,p.51) in which Basil thanks Epiphanius for bringing to his attention 'doctrines which have been fabricated by certain people and have caused disturbances' (E.T. Deferrari, *LCL* 270, p.39). Basil confesses his own reluctance to comment on incarnational belief, and mentions the fact that Epiphanius has established communion and dialogue with Paulinus. Basil commends Meletius to Epiphanius. *Panarion* 77 (see Holl.K., *Epiphanius III,*pp.415-451, E.T. Williams[2],pp.567-601) provides a contemporary witness to the type of Apollinarian Christology being advocated by a close ally of Apollinarius c.376 since Epiphanius completed the *Panarion* c.377-378 (Williams[1],intro.p.xvi). Not only the interview with Vitalis (§§22-25), but the nature of Epiphanius' own refutation of Apollinarianism and refutation of Apollinarius himself, which prefaces (§§14-19) and follows (§§25-38) the account of the visit to Antioch, indicates that he is encountering c.376-377 the same type of Apollinarian T. Christology which Apollinarius sets out in the *Apodeixis.* In the first part of the polemical preface (14.1-18.16), Epiphanius attacks an extreme group of Apollinarians who have 'told him in private'(14.4) that Christ 'took another flesh different from ours', linking this idea to a fallacious theory of the virginal conception: 'because he did not get it from a man's seed he received a different body'(18.13, E.T. Williams,p.583). These are perhaps 'consubstantialist' exponents of Apollinarius' D. thesis who Epiphanius dismisses. Epiphanius then returns to 'the thread of the subject' (19.1-8) i.e. what 'he', Apollinarius, is actually teaching. Thereafter the evidence is very strong that Epiphanius is describing and reacting to Apollinarius' T. doctrine of the divine προσληψις of flesh. E.g. (1) The rejection of the completeness of the assumed humanity is linked with *a semantic distinction* between ἀνάληψις and λῆψις reminiscent of *Apodeixis* Fr.76*/Antirrheticus* 39 (see *Panarion* 77,19.1-4). Epiphanius' does not identify πρόσληψις as the preferred Apollinarian compound, but attests that this distinction and a special sense of λῆψις was crucial to their belief: 'I have often considered and been perturbed that they justify contention and a battle to death for the sake of this expression, and this tells me they probably use the expression in some rather strange sense'(19.9-10, E.T.Williams,p.584). E.g. (2) Epiphanius not only records that Vitalis admits a human ψυχή (22.5-23.1 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.22,25), but his counter-argument indicates that he understands the Apollinarian (T.) doctrine to recognise a human will at the level of flesh/irrational soul: 'ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀνοήτου' (see *Panarion* 77,27.1-2 cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.63). E.g. (3) Although Epiphanius prefers to focus upon Apollinarius' 'moral'/soteriological justification for his rejection of the human mind (25.2;26.5;29.4, cf. *KMP* 30[*LV*]) because it suits his own polemical purposes, he also seems aware of the 'arithmetical' basis for the Apollinarian denial of the completeness of Christ's humanity: 'The Word became man completely. And if we say completely (τελείως) we do not have two Christs (29.4-5). E.g. (4) The Vitalians may also hold the mind to be a hypostasis (23.5) as may Apollinarius (34.4-5) (see Richard, 'L'Introduction du mot', pp.9-12, *contra* Riedmatten, 'Sur Les Notions',p.556), if so, Epiphanius' witness confirms the proximity of the Apollinarian idea of the Word's πρόσληψις of flesh *qua* νοῦς to the 'orthodox' idea of divine hypostatisation.]

(33)c.376-377: Apollinarius corresponded with the eleven exiled Egyptian Confessors in Diocaesarea** (see (26), above), attempting to win their influential support and endorsement of the Nicene orthodoxy of his doctrine (as held by the Vitalians at Antioch). When they did not reply to a lengthy dogmatic letter he sent them another, *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses*, clarifying his doctrine of the incarnation 'on account of recent uproar not set in motion by us, but others' (**(?)** e.g. Paulinus and Epiphanius). He quoted from Athanasius' *Tomus Ad Antiochenos* 7 with additions and omissions whereby he interpreted Athanasius' words in the context of his own T. doctrine. The Confessors sent

letters to Apollinarius, saying that they would enter into communion with him if he recognised Paulinus. Apollinarius wrote back insinuating that Paulinus was a heretic. This made the Confessors suspect Apollinarius. These suspicions were confirmed when some of his writings came into their possession and they learned that he had accused their regional bishop, the Nicene Diodore of Tyre, together with Epiphanius and the Neo-Nicene Silvanus of Tarsus (tutor and associate of Diodore, Apollinarius' Christological critic at Antioch), of heresy. The Confessors wrote again to Apollinarius firmly rejecting his overtures and his doctrine.

[This sequence for the correspondence and explanation of its motives can be established by analysis of : (i) Apollinarius' *Ep. Ad Diocaesareenses*; (ii) an epistle written by the Confessors to some Nitrian monks preserved by Facundus (see *MPL*67.618C-619B, also Mühlenberg, p.55n.[2]); (iii) Basil's *Ep.*265, written to three of the exiled bishops in 377 (see Prestige, *Basil and Apollinaris*,p.33; Mühlenberg,p.47), commending them for their final dismissive letter to Apollinarius.]

(34)*c.376-377: Basil became concerned by the disruptive effect which Apollinarius' incarnational teaching was having upon the Eastern Church for it had brought not only doctrinal controversy, but now further *political* division to the Church which Basil had worked hard to unify. Because the teaching of Apollinarius had caused schism at Laodicea, Antioch ((**?**) and Berytus), and because the Apollinarians were now openly seeking to proselytise Basil's friends, or openly criticising his allies or those with whom he sought communion, Basil expressly condemned *Apollinarius himself* in a letter (*Ep.*263) to the West warning Rome of the Church's new post-Arian 'enemies within' and identifying Apollinarius as one of the 'wolves in sheep's clothing'.

[Basil's deteriorating opinion of Apollinarius c.376-377 can be traced by a comparison of several datable letters: In *Ep.*129 (early 376, see Mühlenberg,p.47) to Meletius there is no sign that he regards Apollinarius as a political enemy, but some evidence that he finds his doctrinal novelties wearisome: 'Apollinarius, that man who is prepared to make all sorts of claims'(see Deferrari, *LCL* 215, p.282). In *Ep.*244 (376, see Mühlenberg,p.48) to Patrophilius, Basil distances himself from Apollinarian doctrine: 'I have read few of his works, for I have no leisure to examine into such things closely.' By contrast he is fulsome in his support of Diodore: 'Diodorus, however, as a disciple of the blessed Silvanus, we accepted from the beginning and now both love and respect him'(E.T. Deferrari, *LCL* 243, pp.457-459). In *Ep.*265, written to three of the Confessors (in 377, see Prestige, *Basil and Apollinaris*,p.33; Mühlenberg,p.47) Basil launches a fierce attack upon Apollinarius, former 'champion of the truth' and 'one of us', but now regarded as divisive author of 'manifold innovations'. Basil accuses Apollinarius of schismatic political activities (sending emissaries and appointing 'bishops'), Sabellianism, and holding a confusing, heterodox Christology: 'Has not the doctrine of the incarnation been destroyed by him...made ambiguous to the many because of the turbid and cloudy questions he raises'(E.T. Deferrari, *LCL* 270, p.111). In *Ep.*263, taken by envoys to Rome (in 377, see L.p.26; Mühlenberg,p.46), Basil calls upon the West for help in ending the divisions in the Eastern Church/Antioch, denouncing Eustathius of Sebaste, Apollinarius and Paulinus on theological and political grounds as the new enemies of church unity. He attacks Apollinarius for his prolific writings 'constructed, not only out of scriptural proofs, but out of human arguments', and for 'his statements about the incarnation [which] have caused confusion among the brethren, many...being intent on innovations, have been turned aside to inquiries and contentious investigations of these unprofitable words'(E.T. Deferrari, *LCL* 270, p.99). Basil asks the Western Church to write to the schismatics to ask them to withdraw from their innovations on pain of excommunication.]

Note

Thus, c.377, Apollinarius himself was condemned by name, for the first time, by a leading spokesman for Eastern 'Orthodoxy.' This was because his doctrinal argument (with Diodore *inter al* at Antioch) had become *politicised.* This had not been the case at the time of the earlier *doctrinal* controversy precipitated by the 'consubstantialists' c.369-371 (see (20)-(22), above) from which Apollinarius had been able to disassociate himself by means of *doctrinal* adjustment. The ordination of Vitalis created a new and unwanted obstacle placed in the way of Antiochene reunification and therefore a more general reunification between Nicenes and 'Semi-Arians' in the East. Diodore, Flavian and the 'dyophysites,' Eustathius of Sebaste and the 'Macedonians,' Meletius, Silvanus of Tarsus and other 'Neo-Nicenes,' Epiphanius and the Nicene Confessors, Paulinus and the 'Old Nicene' dualists at Antioch, all were now united in their opposition to the Apollinarians. It is hard to know who struck the first blow (L.p.27) but the Apollinarians, believing themselves to be the true custodians of 'orthodoxy' at Antioch, Laodicea (and Berytus?), fought back intellectually and politically.

(35)*c.377: The Apollinarian Timothy of Berytus ((?) Apollinarius' envoy sent West to answer Basil's accusations) and his teacher Apollinarius were officially condemned, by Pope Damasus and a Roman Synod in the presence of the exiled Peter of Alexandria, together with their impious doctrine (the T. Christology), which went against the Nicene Faith because it denied the whole man salvation by diminishing Christ's manhood (through denying the human mind).

[See Damasus' *Synodical Letter* preserved in translation by Theodoret (*H.E.*5.10). Damasus offers a more explicit refutation of the T. Christology in *Ep.*2, Fr.2 (*MPL*13.352-353), but does not name the Apollinarians as its source: 'some among our people'. Leontius (*Adv.Fraudes* 151) confirms that Apollinarius and Timothy were condemned at the time of Timothy's *second* visit to Rome. (First visit, see (6) above.) The presence of Peter of Alexandria at Rome (Theodoret, *H.E.*5.10) confirms that the condemnation took place before the death of Valens (378) when Peter returned to Egypt. A letter of Peter to the Nitrian monks preserved by Facundus (*MPL*67.613AB) indicates that Timothy brought condemnation upon himself by accusing Basil, Paulinus, Epiphanius, Diodore of Tyre and Peter of heresy and by refusing to recognise any bishop of Antioch other than Vitalis. The condemnation at Rome is also recorded by Rufinus (*H.E.*2.20).]

(36)(??)c.377-378: Apollinarius wrote the *Ep. Ad Julianum* explaining to one of his disciples how to respond to criticism (e.g. from Epiphanius, Damasus, Flavian, Paulinus) which was now being brought to bear by 'Orthodoxy' against the Apollinarian T. Christology because it denied the human mind and thereby the completeness of the humanity.

[The Apollinarian letter (Fr.150-152) seems to have been written before Basil's death (1 January 379) because Julian quotes it (see L.,Fr.180) in reply to Polemon, who accuses Basil of stirring up trouble (see (34), above). This is the first document in which Apollinarius is clearly responding to an attack on his T.

Christology. We have no evidence of any criticism of the T. Christology prior to Epiphanius' *Ancoratus* c.374. It became the specific target of a more weighty 'orthodox' attack c.377(see (32)-(35), above).]

(37)(?)c.377-378: Polemon wrote a dogmatic letter to fellow Apollinarian Julian complaining of dyophysites who 'admire Athanasius' and have been 'stirred up by Basil and Gregory's glibness of tongue', since, like Basil and Gregory, they insist on two intellectual natures 'and two faculties of will and as many energies'. Thus they deny the monenergetic doctrine of one composite nature steadfastly held by Polemon.

[Polemon's letter (see.L.,Fr.176-177) must have been written *after* Basil became actively engaged in countering Apollinarian Christology (c.376-377) (see (34) above) and, in all probability, *before* his death (1 January 379) unless the reference to Basil's political agitation is posthumously made as is the reference to Athanasius' intellectual reputation.]

(38)(?)c.378: Councils at Alexandria and Constantinople ratified the anti-Apollinarian formula of Damasus' Roman Synod (see (35), above). [see Rufinus, *H.E.*2.20.]

(39)c.378-379: The Arian Emperor Valens died (August 378), and the Western Emperor Gratian published an edict of toleration of the non-Arian, non-Macedonian elements of the Church. He nominated Theodosius as Eastern Emperor (January 379) and sent General Sapor to the East** to drive out the Arians and to entrust the Church to all those prepared to accept communion with Pope Damasus. Due to the amnesty, Meletius returned to Antioch from exile. **(?)** When Sapor arrived at Antioch he met three leaders of 'orthodox' factions: Paulinus, Apollinarius and Meletius. Paulinus was already in communion with Damasus but Paulinus refused communion with the more conciliatory Meletius. Apollinarius claimed to be in communion with Damasus, but Flavian exposed his doctrinal differences to Sapor: 'Damasus maintains our nature to have been taken in its perfection by God the Word...you deprive our intelligence of its salvation', (Theodoret, *H.E.*5.3, E.T. Jackson, p.133). Meletius was endorsed by both Sapor and Theodosius as the head of the 'orthodox' church at Antioch. Meletius consolidated his position at Antioch and made a provisional agreement to facilitate the future reunion of the 'Old Nicenes' with the Meletians. Meletius appointed his loyal presbyter Diodore as Bishop of Tarsus. Apollinarius 'thus failing to get the government of the churches, continued for the future, openly to preach his new-fangled doctrine, and constituted himself leader of the heresy' (Theodoret, *H.E.*5.4, E.T. Jackson, p.133).

[The dates of the emperor's are secure, and the Church histories give testimony to Gratian's edict (see Socrates,*H.E.*5.2;Sozomen,*H.E.*7.1;Theodoret,*H.E.*5.2). Sapor's encounter with the Church leaders at Antioch is reported in Theodoret's subsequent dramatised narrative (*H.E.*5.3), which seems too stylised to

be entirely factual. Theodoret may have conflated Gratian's original edict with a later edict issued in the reign of Theodosius. (Lietzmann (pp.28-29) believes that Sapor brought *Cod.Theod.*16.5.6 to Antioch and, therefore, went there *after January 381.*) The agreement between Meletius and Paulinus is reported in Socrates, *H.E.*5.5 and Sozomen, *H.E.*7.3; the secession of Apollinarius and appointment of Diodore of Tarsus in Theodoret, *H.E.*5.4.]

(40)(?)c.378-379: Apollinarius and some of his supporters held a Synod at Antioch or Laodicea. (??) In reaction to the denunciation of their doctrine in the West and growing theological and political opposition to their congregations in Syria the Apollinarians issued the *Tomus Synodalis* – a succinct and circumspect formulation of the Apollinarian T. Christology designed to show its 'orthodoxy'.

[The Apollinarian Synod is mentioned by Gregory of Nazianzus in *Carmen De Vita Sua* 609-619 (*MPG*37.1071). The approximate dating is worked out from the autobiographical sequence described by Gregory (see Dräseke,p.49;Voisin,p.94;Mühlenberg,p.56). Raven (p.218,n.[4]) suggests that either the *Tomus Synodalis* or *De Fide et Incarnatione* is the confession produced by this Synod. My own analysis of the tone and content of the *Tomus* (pp.188-192,above) indicates that the former possibility is more likely, given the situation c.378-379. The Apollinarians, on the brink of more official condemnation in Syria, are trying to demonstrate the orthodoxy of the T. doctrine and, therefore, to differentiate it from the 'consubstantialist' and 'theopaschite' errors associated with the D. doctrine, also emphasising that the divine προσληψις of flesh is a doctrine of true 'en-manment' instituting salvation for all men. They are also careful not to make explicit their denial of the human νοῦς in the face of early criticism of this aspect of the T. Christology.]

(41)*October 379: A Synod at Antioch was attended by 153 Eastern bishops, including Meletius and Pelagius of Laodicea. The bishops signed a confessional formula put together from Western formulae as testimony to their unity of faith, with each other and with the West. The formula clearly denounced (the 'Macedonian') subordination of the Spirit and censored (the Apollinarian T.) Christology which held the Lord's flesh to be soulless, or *mindless,* or *incomplete* – but those who held such views were *not condemned by name.* This may have been the first official, but anonymous, condemnation of the Apollinarian T. Christology in the East.

[The Synod is attested by Rufinus, *H.E.*2.20(*MPL*21.527B-C) and mentioned by Theodoret,*H.E.*5.9. Our knowledge of its formula is sketchy. Theodoret rather suggests it offers a more expansive version of the confession in the 'Synodical Letter' from the Council of Constantinople c.382 which prefaces his reference to the Antiochene Synod. Lietzmann (p.28) believes it to be consistent with the law brought into force on the 28 February 380: *Cod.Theod.*16.1.2.]

(42)10 January 381: An imperial edict was issued banning heretical services,** naming the Arians, Eunomians and Photinians, and calling for reinstatement of all orthodox bishops loyal to the Nicene Creed.

[See *Cod.Theod.*16.5.6. In Lietzmann's opinion (p.28) this is the edict which General Sapor brought to Antioch finding three factions there – the Meletians, the Paulinists and the Apollinarians all professing their 'orthodoxy'(see Theodoret, *H.E.*5.3 and (39) above).]

(43) May 381: Theodosius convened the Council of Constantinople attended by 150 orthodox bishops under the presidency of Meletius to reunite the Eastern**

Church around the Nicene Creed. Gregory of Nazianzus, who had been preaching in the city since 379, was enthroned as Bishop of Constantinople. The Council confirmed Diodore as Bishop of Tarsus and Pelagius as Bishop of Laodicea: 'On Pelagius of Laodicea and Diodorus of Tarsus devolved the administration of the Churches in the East' (Socrates, *H.E.*5.8, E.T. Schaff, p.122). When Meletius died during the session, Gregory assumed the presidency of the council but failed to secure the episcopal throne of Antioch for Paulinus as Meletius had agreed (see (39) above). When Gregory's authority was challenged by Maximus and others who suggested that his translation to the see of Constantinople was illegal according to a Nicene canon, Gregory resigned with the Emperor's permission and retired to Nazianzus (June 381) and Nectarius, the prefect of the city, became his successor at Constantinople. The Council ratified the Nicene Creed and issued a number of canons. Canon 1 condemned the Apollinarians, but not very emphatically appending 'and the Apollinarians' to a list of heretical groups who should be anathematised.

[See Socrates,*H.E.*5.6-9; Sozomen,*H.E.*7.5, 7-9, 11; Theodoret,*H.E.*5.8; Rufinus,*H.E.*2.19. For canons, see Stevenson, J., *Creeds, Councils*, pp.115-118. Mühlenberg, (p.57) suggests that 'and the Apollinarians' may be a subsequent addition since Timothy of Berytus is among the signatories of the minutes of the Council.]

(44)*Summer 382: Another Synod was held at Constantinople by the same Eastern bishops who were reluctant to travel to Rome. They sent a 'Synodical Letter' to Rome complaining of those 'wolves in the flock' who were holding rival assemblies. They published a short confession of belief based on Antioch 379, and Constantinople 381 (see (41) and (43) above). They rejected the Apollinarian D. and T. Christology by implication of their stipulation that 'the economy of the flesh is not soulless, nor mindless (ἄνους), nor incomplete'.

[Theodoret,*H.E.*5.8-9.]

(45)382: A Synod was held at Rome** ((?) because the Western Church was less than happy with the outcome of Constantinople since the Eastern Synod had sidelined Paulinus and denounced Apollinarianism ineffectively). Jerome drew up a creed which Apollinarians should sign if they wanted re-admittance to the Church.

[See Theodoret,*H.E.*5.8; Ambrose, *Fidei* (*Ep.*14), complaining to Theodosius about the Eastern settlement and unchecked Apollinarian activity; Jerome, *Apologia Adversus Rufinus* 2.20.]

(46)(??)c.377-383: Apollinarius wrote the *Apodeixis* – in order to provide full and 'scientific' definition and explanation of his T. Christology as orthodox, in reply to those in the East and West who had denounced it, and for the benefit of Apollinarians who

were coming under political and theological pressure, and for evangelical purposes: i.e. to promote and preserve the true and salvific faith of the church as he genuinely understood it.

[It is difficult to date the *Apodeixis* precisely. Apollinarius turns his attack on all those who do not accept his doctrine and Gregory of Nyssa feels included in this group identifying it with the Church (Fr.94). *Apodeixis* was written before Gregory wrote *Antirrheticus* in reply. Scholarship dates *Antirrheticus* in the mid-380s (e.g. Hübner ('Gotteserkenntnis',p.138)382-383; Mühlenberg, (p.90)385-387) due to Gregory's apparent unfamiliarity with Apollinarian doctrine in the early 380s (see *Ep.*3(c.380); *Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii,* 172-181(c.383)). Voisin (p.85) dates the *Apodeixis'* composition at the very onset of Apollinarius' break with orthodoxy (c.376-377), but this 'schism' and Apollinarius' subsequent condemnation by the Church seems to have been less decisive and more protracted than Voisin imagines. The tone and content of the *Apodeixis* suggests that the work belongs to the period in which the Apollinarians have been denounced, but not effectively severed, and in which Apollinarius feels he can still make a case for his beliefs in 'orthodox' circles.]

(47)c.377-388: The Apollinarians worked hard to spread their doctrine in the East** establishing schismatic congregations and taking advantage of the slow and ineffective censorship brought to bear by Eastern 'Orthodoxy'.

[See Sozomen,*H.E* 6.27: 'The eastern regions...from Cilicia to Phoenicia were endangered by the heresy of Apollinarius'(c.387) (E.T. Schaff, p.364); Basil on Apollinarian evangelism (c.377) see *Ep.*265; Gregory of Nazianzus' *Epp.*101-102 on Apollinarian activity in Cappadocia (c.379-382); *Cod.Theod.*16.5.13 (Jan.384) and Gregory's *Ep.*202 indicate that Apollinarianism was strongly established at Constantinople. Ps.-Athanasius, *Contra Apollinarem* combats Apollinarianism as taught in Alexandria c.383-391(see (51), below).]

(48)c.382-383: Gregory (semi-retired bishop) of Nazianzus wrote *Epp.*101-102 to Cledonius, the presbyter whom he had left in charge of his flock, instructing him on how to deal with Apollinarians,** who claimed to have the support of Gregory and a Western Synod and were dividing the 'orthodox' community by their Christological teaching and liturgical activities, even holding an Apollinarian Synod at Nazianzus. In *Ep.*101 Gregory denied that he had endorsed Apollinarian doctrine and assured Cledonius that the West had condemned it. He subjected the Apollinarian T. doctrine of the divine προσληψις of flesh to several lines of acute criticism – most famously 'what is not taken-on-in-addition (ἀπρόσληπτον) is not healed' (negating the Apollinarian concept and its key term for soteriological reasons), but he also attacked the 'arithmetical' presupposition lying at the very basis of Apollinarian thought: 'He asserts he could not contain two completes (τέλεια). But this "not" only applies if you conceive things concretely (σωματικῶς).' Gregory also attacked the Trinitarian doctrine of the Apollinarians for being hierarchical and subordinating the Spirit. He summarised his own Christological position: like Athanasius *(Ep. Ad Epictetum),* he offered an 'assumptional understanding of *Jn.*1.14 which extended to the whole man, nevertheless careful to differentiate this from adoptionism and 'two Sons' dualism which he condemned. In *Ep.*102 he responded to Cledonius' request for a 'summary definition' of

his own doctrinal position, affirming his faith in the divine Trinity (including the Holy Spirit) and a non-dualist Christological belief in one Son. He then summarised his reasons for rejecting the 'mindless' T. doctrine of the Apollinarians, exposing their 'deceitful' understanding of 'not without soul, nor reason, nor mind, nor imperfect' (see (e.g.) *Ad Diocaesareenses* 2, *Panarion 77*,22.2) which had earlier tricked him into thinking their creed to Damasus was orthodox. In spite of Gregory's letters, and an imperial edict (see (49) below), the Apollinarians installed their own bishop at Nazianzus c.383.

[Mühlenberg (p.58) dates *Ep.*101 as in the summer of 382, and *Ep.*102 in the same year (so too Lietzmann p.74) *contra* Dräseke who dates *Ep.*102 c.386). The Apollinarian Synod, see *Ep.101 (MPG*37.192C):'their present synagogue of vanity'(E.T. Browne,p.442). The installation of an Apollinarian bishop, see Gregory of Nazianus' *Ep.*125 to Olympius written shortly after *Cod.Theod.*16.5.12 (September 383). Analysis of *Epp.*101-102 strongly indicates that Gregory is confronting the same type of T. Christology which Apollinarius sets out in the *Apodeixis,* although he may not have read the *Apodeixis* itself (*yet* – see (54) below). (*Ep.*101, see *MPG*37.176A-193B,E.T.Browne,*NPNF* vol.7,pp.439-443;*Ep.*102, see *MPG*37.193B-201C, E.T. Browne, pp.443-445). E.g.(1): In *Ep.*101 Gregory attacks the doctrine of the πρόσληψις of a mindless (ἄνουν) humanity, picking up on the Apollinarians' T. Christology and formulating his own soteriological argument in reply to theirs (181C cf. *Apodeixis* Fr.76). Gregory uses the term πρόσληψις on several other occasions when explaining his own Christological doctrine on assumptional lines, but is equally happy to use the term which Apollinarius rejects – ἀναλαβόντος (189C). E.g.(2): Gregory indicates that he is familiar with the Apollinarian T. formula 'a divine enfleshment'(188A;196A) according to a human 'likeness' based on a novel usage of *Phil.*2.7-8. This is why Gregory accuses them of docetism (197B). E.g.(3): Gregory is aware that the Apollinarians justify their exclusion of a human mind on the basis of its moral weakness (185C-188A). E.g.(4): Gregory attacks the *'arithmetical argument'* which is employed by Apollinarius in the T. works as a key justification for the denial of Christ's νοῦς/complete humanity (e.g.Fr.81,92) in *Ep.*101(184B-185B):'He asserts he could not contain two completes. But this 'not' only applies if you conceive things concretely...For intellectual 'things' can mingle non-concretely and without being parts (ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀμερίστως)'. The (lesser) completeness of a human mind need not be 'squeezed out (ἐκθλίβω)' of the unity by the co-presence of the greater perfection of God. The completeness of a mind is relative:'it is not an absolute thing (οὐχ ἁπλῶς τέλειον)'.

N.B. Historians of dogma have been impressed by Gregory's eloquent and apposite soteriological argument against Apollinarius' soteriological justification of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh (Damasus may already have formulated a similar argument, see Theodoret,*H.E.*5.11). But, in so doing, they have commented less upon the significance and effectiveness of Gregory's attack on the 'arithmetical' argument which underpins Apollinarius' T. Christology and his rejection of a human mind and two natures. Gregory, offering psychological and natural *exempla*, questions Apollinarius' main non-theological 'heretical' presupposition. Why can there *not* be a real unity from two completes? There only cannot be because Apollinarius insists on thinking in a concrete, materialistic way about being complete – treating the divinity of the Word or the human mind like a measure of corn or a bodily entity filling a single space. Gregory suggests that there *can* be a true union of incorporeal completenesses within a singular subject: 'Consider how the same individual (ὁ αὐτὸς) can contain a soul, reason, a mind and the Holy Spirit'(184C). Here Gregory appears to approach a psychological understanding of personal unity!

E.g.(5): In *Ep.*102(201AB), Gregory accuses the Apollinarians of inconsistency and incoherence referring to *their own* divisive predication which they practise in spite of their opposition to dyophysitism. He is rightly observing how closely Apollinarius' 'conventional' use of the *communicatio idiomatum* in his T. works approaches the 'orthodox' practice. E.g.(6): Gregory rests his case at the end of *Ep.*101 using terminology which suggests he is familiar with the *Apodeixis* or at least the 'scientific' method by which Apollinarius recommends his T. thesis: 'Therefore mind *was* taken on (προσείληπται), this now has been scientifically demonstrated (ἀποδέδεικται) by means of, to use their expression, geometric and necessary proofs (ἀποδείξεσι)'(188BC). E.g.(7):In *Epp.*101 and 102, there are statements which suggest that Gregory may be aware of the D. version of Apollinarianism: 'if his manhood is without ψυχή, even the Arians admit this'(184A);'these men, when they are theologising among their genuine disciples, and those

initiated into their secrets, ...scarcely allow flesh at all...they bring in the Godhead to supply soul and reason and mind as though it had mingled itself only with his flesh' (196BC, E.T. Browne,p.226). However the main focus of Gregory's attack is upon the T. doctrine which suggests that it was this which he is encountering at Nazianzus c.382. *He seems aware of the D. Christology more as a hypothetical possibility which he uses to his polemical advantage*, i.e. showing, by exaggeration, the Arian tendency of Apollinarian thought. He may also, like Gregory of Nyssa, be unclear about the Apollinarian νοῦς/ψυχή distinction. His unfamiliarity with the Apollinarian D. thesis is strongly indicated by the way he formulates his own counter-Christology in *Ep.*101, unselfconsciously using the very *exemplum* and terms used by Apollinarius in his D. account of the union (180A-B;184B). It is unlikely that Gregory would have denounced 'dualism' in terms of 'mixture', 'substantial union' and the psychosomatic unity if he was concerned to refute Apollinarian 'consubstantialists'.]

(49)3 September 383: An imperial law was published, for the first time naming the Apollinarians (together with the Arians, etc.) and banning all such groups** from holding services or ordaining their own clergy. The edict ordered that the clerics and teachers of such groups should be repatriated and warned against negligence.

[*Cod.Theod.*16.5.12.]

(50)(??)c.383-390: Apollinarius wrote the *KMP*, a systematic formulation of the 'orthodox' faith as defended by the Apollinarians *contra mundum.* The Christological sections summarised the T. doctrine of the divine πρόσληψις of flesh, explained more expansively in the *Apodeixis*. The Trinitarian sections were designed to demonstrate the 'orthodoxy' of the Apollinarian position in the face of growing criticism (see (e.g.) Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep.*101) of this aspect of Apollinarius' teaching now he was outside the Church and had lost his reputation as Athanasius' loyal ally against Arianism.

[This suggestion for the 'late' dating of *KMP* cannot be proved (or disproved) and rests upon 'internal' evidence. The nature and preponderance of the Trinitarian doctrine suggests that Voisin (p.411) may be correct: 'Apollinarius wrote the *KMP* towards the end of his life to show that his Trinitarian teaching conformed to that of the church', i.e. after his secession, when charges of Sabellianism (Basil,*Ep.*265) and hierarchical subordinationism – particularly of the Spirit (Gregory of Nazianzus,*Ep.*101 *MPG*37.192B) were brought against him. Apollinarius takes the greater pains to differentiate his doctrine from the *latter* form of heresy and we have no evidence of this charge being laid at his door until 382-383. Epiphanius, c.376-377, knows nothing unorthodox about Apollinarius' doctrine of God (*Panarion 77*,2.1,4.1) and Basil charges him with the reverse of subordinationism c.377. The production of a carefully formulated '*Sectional Confession of Faith*', upon the acceptance of which salvation depends, accords with the evangelical activities of the Apollinarians in the 380s, as defenders of 'orthodox' belief.]

(51)(??)c.383-391: An Alexandrine author (or authors), belonging to the school of Athanasius, wrote two books against the Apollinarian T. doctrine as advocated in Alexandria by one referred to as 'Rhetorius'.

[Traditionally these books (*De Incarnatione Contra Apollinarem I & II,* see *MPG*26.1093ff.) were ascribed to Athanasius himself as written c.372-373, shortly before his death (e.g. Bright,W., in Wace,H.(ed)*DCBL*,p.64). Scholarship now believes they were written some time later by a disciple who was familiar with Apollinarian doctrine. De Riedmatten ('Les Notions Doctrinales Opposees', pp.553-554) dates the work c.383-391 because the only other reference to 'Rhetorius' (see *MPG*26.1101) is to be found in Philester of Bresicia's *Diversarum Hereson Liber* (101.63), which was written c.383-391 and places Rhetorus in Alexandria. The Ps.-Athanasian work clearly attacks the T. Christology of Apollinarius. See (e.g.):'You speak about a heavenly mind (νοῦν) in an ensouled body (σώματι ἐμψύχῳ). But an ensouled

body does not amount to a complete man, nor does a heavenly mind amount to God.' (*Contra Apollinarem I*,20, *MPG*26.1128B); see also *Contra Apollinarem II*,1(*MPG*26.1133A).]

(52)21 January 384: Due to the persistent activity of heretical groups (including the Apollinarians) at Constantinople another imperial edict was issued telling them to get out of the city.**

[*Cod.Theod.*16.5.13.]

(53)(?)c.385-387: Gregory of Nyssa wrote the *Antirrheticus*, a refutation of the Apollinarian T. Christology as interpreted by Gregory from the text of the *Apodeixis*.

[Scholarship prefers to date the *Antirrheticus* after Gregory's *Adv. Apol(l)inaristas (Ad Theophilum)* and, therefore, after 385 (see L.p.84;Mühlenberg, p.90;Meredith, *Gregory of Nyssa*,p.48). Gregory's attack is directed against the T. Christology which he sometimes misunderstands or misrepresents – hence the presence in the *Antirrheticus* of some paraphrased 'Apollinarian' fragments and Gregorian counter-arguments which are more suggestive of the Apollinarian D. thesis (e.g. Fr.86/*Antirrheticus* 44, where Gregory compares the 'error of Apollinarius' to that of Eunomius with which he was more familiar).]

(54)*c.387: Gregory of Nazianzus wrote *Ep*.202 to his successor at Constantinople, Bishop Nectarius: Gregory was concerned about the way heretical groups were 'still' actively proselytising and dividing the Church and in particular about 'the boldness of the Apollinarians' whom Nectarius had failed to reprimand and who were still holding meetings and claiming to be orthodox. To persuade Nectarius to take action (i.e. to urge the Emperor to enforce his ban), Gregory described a book/pamphlet (πτυκτίον) written by Apollinarius which had come into his hands, 'the contents of which surpass all heretical depravity' (E.T. Browne, p.438). According to Gregory, the Apollinarian work taught: (1) a *synousiastic* doctrine of co-eternal, heavenly flesh 'συνουσιωμένος' with the only-begotten Son; (2) that the 'man from above' lacked a mind, since this part of his compound structure (σύγκραμα) was filled by God the Word; (3) a theopaschite doctrine. **(??)** The book Gregory described thus was the *Apodeixis*, or *the Apodeixis as represented by Gregory of Nyssa in the Antirrheticus.*

[Voisin (p.115) and Mühlenberg (p.58), date *Ep*.202 c.387. Prestige (*Basil and Apollinaris*, pp.62-65) argues convincingly that parallels between *De Unione* and the book described by Gregory (*Ep*.202,*MPG*37.332B-333A) are superficial. Gregory's résumé is more suggestive of the *Apodeixis* which is trichotomic, and apparently 'theopaschite' in its final stages (see Fr.94-95,101-103) and in Gregory of Nyssa's opinion (*Antirrheticus* 4-5). The 'synousiastic' doctrine of the heavenly flesh may be Nazianzus' (mis)interpretation of the *Apodeixis* in the environs of Fr.32-42, possibly as (mis)interpreted in Gregory of Nyssa's *Antirrheticus,* 13-19. The *Apodeixis* came into the possession of Gregory of Nyssa in the same period (c.384-387) and the two Gregorys were corresponding at this time (see (e.g.) Gregory of Nazianzus' *Ep*.182,c.384).]

(55)10 March 388: Theodosius ((?) at the request of Nectarius) issued another edict unequivocally banning the Apollinarians** from holding assemblies and ordaining clergy and excommunicating them, without appeal, from the Emperor and his Church.

[*Cod.Theod.*16.5.14 (see Voisin,p.115,n.[4],E.T. Stevenson, *Creeds,Councils*, p.119). Lietzmann (p.36) and Mühlenberg (p.58) suggest that the edict may partly have been the result of Gregory's efforts – i.e. *Ep.*202.]

(56)(??)c.388-390: Apollinarius withdrew from public life. His disciples became divided on how to respond to the imperial ban and the 'orthodox' critique of Apollinarius' teaching. The more 'extreme' disciples, like Polemon, fought back accusing the Gregorys, Diodore of Tarsus and the Italians of heresy and continuing to uphold an uncompromising version of their master's doctrine of the union against the Church and any 'backsliding' Apollinarians. The 'extremists' maintained their own schismatic congregations with their own clergy in spite of the ban. Other more 'moderate' disciples were prepared to sign up to the Roman and Constantinopolitan formulae and tried to remain within the 'orthodox' church – believing that they were loyal to their master's teaching. Once Apollinarius had retired, and certainly after his death, the two groups became engaged in Christological controversy over the true nature of their master's teaching. The moderates accused the extremists of adhering to the type of 'consubstantialist' fallacy which Apollinarius had rejected. The extremists accused the moderates of dyophysitism. Timothy of Berytus managed to offend both groups of Apollinarians.

[Raven (p.148) suggests that Apollinarius withdrew to Laodicea in the early 380s, leaving the organisation of the Apollinarian Church to his disciples. We know that Apollinarius was elderly c.376-377 (see Epiphanius, *Panarion 77*,2.1). Timothy of Berytus was among the signatories at Constantinople 381 and Polemon's *Contra Timotheum* (see L.,Fr.174) indicates that Timothy and other Apollinarians were later prepared to acknowledge that Christ was 'ἄνθρωπος τέλειος' – 'longing it seems for nothing or only for perishable glory in this life, since they have been ensnared by the hope of priestly office'. Polemon's work must have been written after the *Antirrheticus* because it attacks *both* the Gregorys. Vitalis was still an Apollinarian bishop in Antioch after the imperial edict of 388 and the death of Paulinus (see Flavian's homily *De Anathema, MPG*48.943-952). It seems unlikely that open Christological controversy was waged between Polemon and the moderates until *after the death* of Apollinarius (see Voisin (pp.112-135) who suggests that Polemon and the 'Synousiasts' defended a schismatic form of Apollinarianism against the moderates 'at the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth'). At this time the 'Synousiasts' appear to have formed the greater part of the Apollinarian 'party' for the 'moderate' Valentinian writes:'even if you are many, you will be set at naught by your impiety' (*Capita Apologiae* 6, see L.p.290,ll.5-6). It appears that Valentinus' prediction came true because we know of only two more specifically anti-Apollinarian edicts: *Cod.Theod.*16.5.33(397) and 16.5.65(435). This suggests that the extremists were marginalised and the moderate Apollinarians soon reabsorbed within orthodoxy. 'Such sparing mention and obviously mild treatment compared to the Eunomians indicates that in most places the initially so self-confident and aggressive party had externally made peace with the Grand Church in the manner suggested by the Council of Constantinople and so provided the Monophysite leven'(L.p.40).]

(57)(?)c390: Apollinarius died.

[Jerome tells us in *De Viris Illustribus* 104 that Apollinarius died during the reign of Theodosius (379-395). Raven (p.148) dates Jerome's work c.392. It would appear from Gregory of Nyssa's *Antirrheticus* 22

(J.p.162,ll.12-15) and Nazianzus' *Ep.*202(*MPG*37.332B) that Apollinarius is still alive c.387, because he is the target of the Gregorian polemics. It does not seem that he lived long into the 390s, because there is no evidence of the Polemianists or the moderate Apollinarians seeking his advice as a living master in their controversy over what he had written. Lietzmann (p.xv) suggests Apollinarius died 'between 385 and 395'; Caspari, Dräseke, Voisin and Kelly give c.390.]

Notes

(1) **The *Anacephalaeosis*** is a work by Apollinarius for which we have no external clues as to its literary or historical context. I have therefore not attempted to place this work in the chronological sequence. Based only upon an analysis of its Christological content (pp.385-399, above), my suggestion would be that these syllogisms most probably belong to the same period as the *Contra Diodorum KKB*, and may have been composed c.364-374.

(2) **Placing the 'development' of Apollinarian Christology within this chronological sequence depends on two key 'suggestions' which have not been justified very strongly:** (i) Apollinarius' controversy with Diodore and the works *Contra Diodorum* should be placed relatively early on (c.364-377, see (18), above). (ii) The composition of the T. document *KMP* should be placed much later in the sequence (c.383-390, see (50), above). In both cases I have been influenced by suggestions made by Voisin, these being (i) that the impetus for the development of Apollinarius' doctrine was his argument with 'Antiochene' dualism (Voisin, p.53) and (ii) that the *KMP* focuses on Trinitarian theology because it is post-schismatic and *apologetic* (Voisin, p.411). It should be acknowledged, however, that there is one detail which appears to go against the idea that Apollinarius' controversy with Diodore, and his D. works against him, belong to a period *before* the *KMP*. In the Diodorean fragments translated by Brière (see Brière, M., 'Fragments Syriaques de Diodore de Tarse', *ROC*, 10, 1946, pp.231-283), Diodore appears to be combatting Apollinarius' D. type Christology and this seems to support the idea that the two influential theologians clashed over the D. Christology and therefore *prior* to the development of the T. Christology; *and yet*, in Fr.26, Diodore reveals that Apollinarius has *already* written the T. work *KMP* for he writes, 'I found also from the very one who launched these novelties...', and then quotes a passage from *KMP* 28[*LV*] (see Brière, pp.269-270).

This detail is *not*, however, in itself enough to rule out the possibility of my 'Suggested Chronological Sequence' (above): all it shows is that *one* of Diodore's works (the one from which Fr.26 has been excerpted) was written after the *KMP*. The fragments in the Brière collection have come from a sixth century Syriac translation of a

Greek *florilegium* of Diodore's sayings put together from his own works by those hostile to him. (The Syriac translation is preserved in the manuscript: *Cod.Brit.Mus.Add.* 12156, see Sullivan, F.A., *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*, 1956, pp.172-181.) Whilst the *lemmae* between the fragments in this Syriac document suggest that they all come from one work, for which Leontius of Byzantium has provided scholarship with the title '*Contra Synousiastas*' (because he quotes five fragments from a Diodorean work of this title in his own *Ctr.Nest.et Eutych.111 (MPG*86.1385D-1388D), three of which are equivalent to Brière's Fr.31-32,22,27), *the superscription to the Syriac manuscript indicates that this is a florilegium of excerpts from more than one work*: 'Blasphemies taken from the *Books* of Diodore' (see Brière, p.259). Timothy Aelerus has preserved four texts from Diodore in his Syriac work against Chalcedon, two being equivalent to Brière's Fr.30 and Fr.37 (see Sullivan, p.176,n.[3]), and Timothy records that these are from a (different) work: '*De Incarnatione*'. According to Sullivan (p.180), M. Richard is unjustified in making the assumption that this is Diodore's 'Second Book Against the Synousiasts'. Barhadbesabba, a sixth century Nestorian, writes in his *H.E.*17, dedicated to Diodore, that Diodore wrote *three* books against the Apollinarians (see Brière, p.231). The *lemmae* between the fragments in the Syriac document translated by Brière may, therefore, be references to the position of the fragments in the earlier Greek *florilegium* from which the editor of *Cod.Brit.Mus.Add.* 12156 has made a selective Syriac translation – and *not* their place in *one* original Diodorean work.

Conclusion: Our knowledge of the origin of the Brière collection is too slender for us to conclude that all its fragments have been excerpted from one Diodorean work written (like Fr.26) after the *KMP* (possibly in the 380s, see Young, F., *From Nicaea to Chalcedon*, 1983, p.185) and against Apollinarius' 'Synousiastic' disciples rather than Apollinarius himself (see Lietzmann, Fr.174 wherein Polemon attacks Diodore). We know from the Lietzmann fragments that Apollinarius wrote more than one work against Diodore and the difference between his *Contra Diodorum Ad Heraclium* and the *Contra Diodorum KKB* indicates the passage of time. Similarly Diodore's (several) books against Apollinarius and his supporters may have been written over a lengthy period, both before and after the *KMP*. It could be that Diodore's attack remained focused upon the 'Synousiastic' dimension of Apollinarianism even after he became Bishop of Tarsus (c.378-379) because he was familiar with Apollinarius' earlier (D.) teaching at Antioch, and because Apollinarius' most evangelical supporters (the Polemianists) appeared to continue to uphold this aspect of their master's teaching.